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PREFACE
This project was formally initiated in September 1997, two and a half months after the Treaty o f 
Amsterdam had been agreed by the EU Heads o f State and Government. The Treaty marked a 
turning point o f the institutional basis o f  European foreign policy. Title V o f the Treaty on 
European Union was amended, introducing Common Strategies, a new post as High Representative 
for the CFSP, a  Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, incorporating the Petersberg tasks into the 
Treaty, opening up for a common defence, the integration o f  the Western European Union into the 
EU, constructive abstention and on some issues also qualified majority voting. Crucial political 
progress has also taken place in the course o f the last decade or two regarding the creation o f  the 
Common European Security and Defence Policy, the EU’s unity o f  voice in most international 
organisations, the increasing use o f  economic sanctions, and the rapprochement o f Member State 
positions in the question o f the Middle East Peace Process. The gradual progress o f  European 
foreign policy however stands in sharp contrast with the general perception o f  the actual capabilities 
o f  European foreign policy since the beginning o f the European Political Cooperation in 1970. The 
disaster evolving for the European Union’s foreign policy ambitions in the Western Balkans 
throughout the 1990s and the institutional unanimity voting system are only two o f  many more 
illustrations o f  this contrasting paralysis. The image o f  European foreign policy viewed by this 
project was thus initially one reflecting the paradox o f  simultaneous presence o f progress and 
paralysis o f European foreign policy, cutting across variables and time. Following this image was 
always the audio o f voices discussing the degree to which EU, Europeans, the West, and the leaders 
o f  our time have been able to learn any lessons from their past failures (or in theory also successes). 
Not many events were allowed to pass, without hearing the choir o f  voices claiming what we have 
or should have learned from Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, or any other crisis or conflict intervention. 
Characteristically, these learning claims were formulated in an implicit way and against a seemingly 
dubious background, assuming everyone to be perfectly aware o f  the theoretical or practical 
justifications for the ability o f actors to learn in international relations. As the concept o f learning 
continued to re-emerge in this relatively vaguely defined manner, the idea thus came to dedicate this 
project to examine whether learning may explain the image o f  the dichotomy o f  progress and 
paralysis o f European foreign policy, what the conditions are for learning to take place, and which 
lessons may be learned from the past regarding European foreign policy in international relations in 
theory and in practice.
v
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
One often hears about the lessons that actors in the European Union have learned or should have 
learned from outcomes in international relations. The former European Union High Representative for 
Civilian Peace Implementation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Carl Bildt, for instance, asked “Hat Europa 
Aus Bosnien gelernt? ” (1997).’ Jean-Marie Guehenno finds that “the inability o f  the European Union 
to deal effectively with the Yugoslav crisis has had a lasting impact on the image o f Europe and on the 
confidence o f Europeans in European institutions” (Zielonka 1998a:25, 1-3). The German minister o f 
defence, Rudolf Scharping, has elaborated on the lessons from Kosovo, which he sees as a catalysing 
factor for the development of the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP).1 2 *Lord 
Roper echoes this, when he suggests that the development of the European defence capabilities is the 
“realisation o f  the inadequacy o f  producing forces in Bosnia and Kosovo”? Finally, Elfriede 
Regelsberger and Wolfgang Wessels go as far as to include “the lessons from  the EPC (European 
Political Cooperation) fo r  the creation o f  the CFSP” (1996:32-34).
Such references to learning, as frequently made by scholars, think tank directors, or government 
representatives, suggest that learning makes a difference in international relations. However, if learning 
is important, where is then the theory that explicitly accounts for the impact o f learning on international 
relations? Ernst B. Haas examines learning in a typological approach, seeking to explain the change in 
the definition o f the problem to be solved by a given (international) organisation (1990). Johan P. Olsen 
and Guy Peters further explore the role that lessons from experience play in administrative reforms in 
eight democratic polities (1996). However, compared to theories and application of various learning 
approaches found elsewhere, for instance, in sociology, in economics, in (business) organisational 
theory, and in history, learning only rarely occurs in the international relations literature (IR).4 Learning 
is even less frequently introduced to the emerging sub-discipline of either IR or European politics 
examining the development of European foreign policy, the topic o f this thesis. Overall, the learning
1 Mr. Bildt was also EU special representative to the former Yugoslavia in 1995.
1 Speech at the London School o f Economics (LSE). March 2000.
J Comment in guest lecture. LSE, February 13.2001. Lord Roper was formerly the Head of Western European Union Institute for Security Studies.
4 The abbreviation "IR” refers to the academic discipline analysing international relations.
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concept is not very precisely defined; so far no “agreed-upon concept ” of (“organizationar) learning 
has been produced (Olsen & Peters 1996:4), and its empirical justification in IR has not yet been 
convincingly demonstrated.
Learning, as a concept and a variable, thus needs further clarification. The objective here is, first, to 
find out how learning could be better defined and elaborated, and second, to see how learning matches 
the problems o f international relations and, in particular, those o f European foreign policy. To achieve 
these two aims, learning is attempted conceptualised, operationalised and empirically applied to 
instances o f crises and conflicts in international affairs where the European Union either has been 
engaged, potentially could have been engaged or in some people’s opinion should have been engaged.
]
Basically, the question is, how important has learning been in determining European foreign policy 
over time. In practice, this question is analysed with respect to a time frame of approximately 25 years, * 
i.e. from the late 1970s to the early 2000s (see Section 1.6).
1.1 The puzzle
The development o f European foreign policy (EFP, used interchangeably) is thus what learning 
alongside other relevant variables o f this project should be able to explain. Explaining EFP is not an 
easy task given that it has been characterised by a number o f  puzzling dynamics. One o f  these puzzles 
concerns the particular performance o f the EPC/CFSP being, on the one hand, the “paralysed’ entity 
that has been “unable to act in international politics” (Zielonka 1998b), and, on the other hand, a unit 
in constant progress, gradually enhancing its capabilities, its presence and its goals over time.
As regards the progress, at the Hague Summit in December 1969, European foreign policy was an 
“instruction to Ministers o f  Foreign Affairs to study the best way o f  achieving progress in the nature o f  
political unification”.5 Thirty years later in the “Helsinki Millennium Declaration” o f December 1999, 
this instruction had become an institutionalised and unique framework in the world for multilateral 
foreign policy co-operation. Recently, the Union has been able to formulate what it is now in the midst 
of preparing to implement, namely “the objective., to have an autonomous capacity to take decisions *2
5 Communiqué of the Conference of the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the European Community, The Hague, 2 December 
1969. In Hill and Smith (2000. Document 2/1.72).
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and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and then to conduct EU~led military operations 
in response to international crises”.6
The extent o f the Union’s progress and its relevance for the outcomes in international relations is 
indeed a matter of dispute. However, the scope of the European foreign policies, the instruments 
attached to them, the decision-making mode o f  the institutions and the overall presence o f  the Union in 
international affairs have been characterised by significant progress during the last ten, twenty or thirty 
years.
The first assumption above, i.e. that the Union has been paralysed in international affairs, is less 
contentious, despite the fact that paralysis is hardly the most appropriate word to use when describing 
an entity which has produced more than 6,000 statements in 15 years. Instead, paralysis captures some 
o f the instantaneous reaction patterns of the CFSP to international crises and conflicts. For example, the 
Union largely failed to deliver timely, adequate and sufficient responses to major international conflicts 
such as in the Middle East, in the African Great Lakes Region (Rwanda/Burundi 1994) and on the 
Western Balkans. In addition, those reactions that were produced suffered from a strongly rhetorical 
bias. Also, the Member States have tended to avoid using the CFSP on issues where there was a danger 
that the policy would involve restrictions towards third countries that could harm the Member States’ 
economic and political bilateral interests. Further, they have often disagreed on those rare occasions 
when policies towards solving a crisis and conflict were actually put forward. In addition, they have 
later defected in the implementation of some o f the measures agreed to by their Joint Actions. The 
Member States of the Union have simultaneously failed to create an operational decision-making 
capacity with the potential to respond automatically and comprehensively towards crises and conflicts 
in international affairs. In this respect, the eye-catching factor is not the sluggish development of the 
security dimension. After all, it would have been thorny, and in fact proved impossible, to base the 
initial development o f EFP on strong military capabilities only (and not economics as it turned out), in 
particular due to Europe’s traumatic experiences of wars (Ahmann, Birke & Howard 1993). Instead, the 
paralysis o f the Union is mainly a foreign policy trait. Despite gradual progress and some improved 
opportunities for action, the foreign policy sphere has proved to be a highly protected bastion of the 
Member States.
6 European Foreign Policy Bulletin (EFPB) 99/253 o f 11.12.99: Conclusions of the European Council meeting in Helsinki, 10 and 11 December 1999 
(extracts only).
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It may be worth noting that this thesis is not introducing any novel puzzle to the study o f European 
foreign policy in international relations. For example, three years ago, Jan Zielonka’s edited volume, 
“Paradoxes o f  European Foreign Policy” scanned this puzzle, asking whether the Union is a  
superpower in the making or a foreign policy failure. Only a subset o f Zielonka’s puzzle is debated 
below. First, the thesis only looks at the small, albeit growing part o f  European foreign policies which 
is represented by policies of the CFSP. Second, the project does not scrutinise why the Union, on th e  
one hand, is a gargantuan economic superpower, yet, a foreign policy midget, on the other. M ost 
importantly, the real puzzle is not why the Union has either been paralysed, or has made progress, since 
academics already have accounted (more or less convincingly) for the two factors separated from each 
other. The real puzzle is, instead, why the Union has been paralysed, while continuing to m ake 
significant progress in its foreign policy, and vice versa?
1.2 The question (s)
It is this dichotomy that forms the background for introducing learning to EFP. The main question 
asked is how the progress and the paralysis link to those lessons that one so often hears the Union 
should or should not have learned from the outcomes in international relations. Learning is here defined 
as the updating o f actors ' beliefs about the workings o f  a particular strategy or policy based on actors * 
previous effort attached to this strategy and the observed success or failure o f  this strategy. The project 
aims at addressing questions like: To what extent does the progress and the paralysis o f  the Union 
reflect that actors have been able to Ieam lessons from past European foreign policies? To what extent 
may the paralysis and the progress imply that actors have been impeded from learning the lessons 
about, for instance, the need to act as a unity in international politics? To what extent does it reflect that 
actors have learned the lesson -  which may be true or not -  that CFSP and joint EU decision-making 
are efficient modes o f  foreign policy behaviour? Similarly, to what extent are EU decision-makers - 
given the complexity o f international affairs, not to mention the limited experience decision-makers 
must have in implementing European foreign policy - able to construe proper causalities from outcomes 
in international relations? Finally, assuming that EU decision-makers -  at least in some instances - are 
able to learn, what is then the impact of their lessons on European foreign policy, and thus on  
international relations?
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1.3 Two decades of progress & paralysis
One o f the major working tools o f this project will be to provide a specification o f this progress and 
paralysis of EFP. The purpose is in particular to pinpoint changes in the policies of the CFSP (EPC) 
from the end o f the ’70s until the turn of the Millennium.7 The unit o f  observation is European foreign 
policy, which is “the formulation and execution o f diplomatic, foreign and security policy actions o f the 
EC (European Community) and the EPC, now CFSP” (Ginsberg 1999:430, 3).8 The aim o f pinpointing 
policy changes is to investigate how the presence of the Union in its external affairs has changed over 
time. Following Allen & Smith, this presence may be tangible or intangible, and include capabilities to 
act and mobilise resources, credentials and legitimacy, and expectations (1990). For reasons delineated 
in Chapter 2, the project will concentrate on assessing the Union’s capability-presence in international 
relations, defined as the Union’s capability to act and mobilise resources in its international relations 
with third countries.
It may be worthwhile to draw up the expected contours o f progress and paralysis before proceeding 
with smart suggestions as to how to explain them. Here, it should be relatively uncontested that the 
Union’s foreign policy capability-presence has encountered a weak, but gradual progress during the last 
two decades. The Union has reacted to an immense amount of crises and conflicts all over the world in 
a process initiated by the creation o f the EPC in 1970, and has been able to attach an increasing 
(although still limited) amount of resources to these actions (see for instance, Schneider & Seybold 
1997, Allen & Smith 1998, Nuttall 1992, 2000, Hill, 1993, 1998b, Zielonka 1998a, b). Viewed in terms 
of the decisions taken by the General Affairs Council of the European Union (the Council meetings of 
foreign ministers), the gradual progress may be illustrated as in Table 1.1 below.
In Table 1.1, the institutional output is the amount of documents registered in the European Foreign 
Policy Bulletin that represents an EPC/CFSP decision or action. The total amount of documents is an 
aggregate measure for all documents regarding the EPC/CFSP for a given year, including, for instance, 
press statements, questions in the European Parliament, and conclusions of the European Council. As 
can be seen, the total number o f  documents has been relatively constant in the range of 2-500 *
7 The CFSP replaced the former EPC in 1993. The two names are used interchangeably throughout the text.
* More generally, EFP is both Member States’ traditional foreign policies pursued at the EU level and EU institutions’ external affairs. This follows Brian 
White’s terminology whereby EFP holds three dimensions. First, there is "Union (EU) foreign policy as the more overtly political dimensions o f  
European foreign policy". Second, Community (EC) foreign policy is included as part o f  EFP. Community foreign policy is foreign policy as trade and
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documents per year for the period as a whole. This also applies to the Union’s statements in 
international forum, for instance, speeches by the Presidency o f the Union to the UN General 
Assembly, etc. The number o f statements issued by the Union has however increased remarkably since 
the end of the Cold War. Before 1989, the annual number o f press statements from the EPC/CFSP was 
between 30-80 statements. After 1989, the Union issued between 104 and 195 statements each year.
Table 1.1 Institutional output of EPC/CFSP 1985-2000
Year Documents
Total
Press
statem ents
Statem ents
International
forum
Common Positions Jo in t Actions Common Strategies
1985 345 33 78 - - -
1986 417 46 80 - - -
1987 543 34 99 - - -
1988 529 61 113 - - -
1989 345 74 67 - - -
1990 477 80 31 - - -
1991 491 137 95 - - -
1992 483 122 12 - - -
1993 534 129 22 1 5 -
1994 345 127 53 8 9 -
1995 429 128 77 13 9 -
1996 398 148 28 11 19 -
1997 360 135 25 12 15 -
1998 483 195 97 24 18 -
1999 288 140 72 35 26 1
2000 164 104 5 16 10 ■ 2
2001 - - - . - - -
T o tal 6633 1694 949 ■ 120 io i :
Source: The European Foreign Policy Bulletin (L'RL. http./Avww. me.it/EFPB/). Common Positions under the Single European Act (1987) are not 
included. The Joint Actions and Common Positions thus refer to those instruments available from the TEU came into force November 1, 1993 Common 
Strategies was introduced as an instrument by the Amsterdam Treaty that came into force May 1, 1999. means that the number is not available. The 
EFPB arc not available electronically before 1985.1999 and 2000 were not fully updated by the EFPB-service.
development co-operation with third parties (1999: 46-47). Importantly, one should also add environment policy to the Community dimension (Bretherton 
and Vogler 1999) Third, there is national foreign policy, i.e , "separate foreign policy o f  Member Slates".
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Apart from this, the Union’s policies from 1993 to 1999 have included more than 1160 CFSP 
decisions, of which 120 have been Common Positions and 101 were Joint Actions. The number of 
Common Positions and Joint Actions has gradually increased from its lowest level in 1994 (in the first 
full year of the existence of instruments) where 17 Joint Actions or Common Positions were issued. 
This figure rose to 61 in 1999.
The Joint Actions and Common Positions have covered issues such as:
- defending Member States against US extraterritorial sanctions,
- export restrictions on dual-use technology;
- support for the continued démocratisation (e.g. South Africa)
- support for a viable police force (e.g. in Albania)
- financial support for the Middle East Peace Process
- programmes for non-proliferation and disarmament (e.g. in the Russian Federation)
- joint restrictions on the use of landmines, and support for mine clearance.
- contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread o f  small arms and light 
weapons (e.g. in Mozambique and Cambodia)
- pressure towards countries from Central and Eastern Europe to resolve border and minority issues 
(the Stability Pact),
- participation of the Union in the implementing structures of the peace plan for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina,
- unilateral visa bans against certain government and military personnel, such as in Belarus 1998, and
- restrictive measures against countries such as the Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia, Libya, Nigeria, 
Burma/Myanmar, Indonesia, etc.
It may be added that the Union since the Treaty of Amsterdam came into force in May 1999 has taken a 
number of decisions with qualified majority voting as their legal basis.9 Furthermore, the Union has 
established its capability-presence in a range of international organisations, e.g., in the UN where the 
EU Member States (plus the associated countries) vote unanimously in a vast majority o f the cases put
9 To have qualified majority voting as their legal basis means to have earlier Common Positions or Joint Actions as legal basis. From 1 Mav to 31 October 
99 those were: 99/612/PESC; L242 (14.09.1999), 99/424/PESC; LI63 (29.06.1999), 99/357/PESC, L140 (03.06.1999), 99/319/PESC; LI23 
(13.05.1999), 99/694/PESC; L275 (26.10.1999), 99/730/PESC; L294 (16.11.1999), 99/729/PESC; L294 (16.11.1999). Another two decisions were taken 
due to the threat o f  qualified majority voting according to Council officials. First, the decision on visa restrictions on Serbia was initially opposed by 
Greece (EFPB 99/079, 10 May 1999 in OJ LI23, 13.5.1999, 1 -2). When Greece saw she was to be outvoted, she abstained. Similarly. Sweden and Austria 
were against an implication of the Common Strategy towards Russia concerning the dismantlement ofW M D in Russia (EFPB 99/266. 17 December 1999
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forward at the UN General Assembly.10 That being said, the recent developments o f the C E SD P 
highlight the significant progress of European foreign policy. In June 2000, the European Council in  
Feira (Portugal) reaffirmed its commitment from Helsinki to building a CESDP capable o f reinforcing 
the Union’s external action through the development of a military crisis management capability as w e ll 
as a civilian one.11 The setting-up and first meeting o f the committee for civilian aspects of c ris is  
management is now a reality. It should lead to the undertaking by Member States, co-operating 
voluntarily, to provide by 2003 up to 5,000 police officers for international missions across the range o f  
conflict prevention and crisis management operations, including the identification and deployment o f  
up to 1,000 police officers within 30 days. As regards the military crisis management capabilities w h ich  
are formulated through the Headline and the collective capabilities goals (Headline Goals), the Helsinki 
Summit concluded that Member States should be able to deploy up to 60,000 troops by 2003  
undertaking crisis management operations.12 On March 1, 2000 interim structures o f a M ilitary 
Committee (IMC), a Military Body (IMB), and a Political and Security Committee (IPSC) w e re  
established.13 The Nice European Council from December 7 to 11, 2000 made these committees 
permanent (“standing committees”). The Union further established a situation and crisis centre w ith in  
the General Secretariat o f the Council of Ministers aimed at early warning and monitoring of crises an d  
conflicts. The centre, among other things, provides the Union with a 24-hour telephone service, 
answering Mr. Kissinger’s famous question about whom to call to “speak to Europe”.14 Another sign o f  
the progress o f European foreign policy is the success that EU negotiators achieved in Macedonia 
during Summer 2001. Notably, EU Special Representative to the former Yugoslav Republic o f  
Macedonia, Mr. Leotard, his team o f negotiators from the EU Policy Unit, the High Representative 
Javier Solana and the US envoy Mr. Pardew obtained after difficult negotiations an agreement (T he 
Framework Agreement) between the Macedonian (fYROM) government and the representatives o f  the 
ethnic Albanian minority in August 2001, which was later ratified by the Macedonian Parliament.15 
Finally, the EU reactions to the terrorist attacks on the United States 11 September 2001 were also 
relatively swift. Extraordinary General Affairs Council of the foreign ministers, extraordinary Summits
in OJ L331, 23.12.1999, 11-16). Sweden and Austria followed the other Member States when they saw they would otherwise be isolated. Interview 
Council Secretariat, May 2000.
,n According to the Italian representative at the UN, Ambassador H E. Francesco Fulci (President of ECOSOC), the Member States vote unanimously in 
97% of all cases (Lecture given at the EUI, April 7, 1999).
11 Presidency conclusion from the Santa Maria da Feira European Council, 19 and 20 June 2000 (Council Press Release ( 19-06-2000) - No: 200/1/00).
13 A headline catalogue has now been developed specifying the attempted contributions of each Member State to the Rapid Reaction force. See for 
instance the Council's information on this issue: httnV/uc eu int/pcsc/dcfault asp0Ians=cn
13 EU defence ministers started to meet regularly in 1998-1999. The agenda of these meetings included the implementation of Article J.V o f  the 
Amsterdam Treaty allowing for military action performed under the CFSP for the first time (Article J.V), and the development of the CESDP.
14 The famous Kissinger question was never asked according to a recent account. Instead, Kissinger should have said to the Danish Presidency of the EPC. 
foreign minister K.B. Andersen that he did not have the powers to speak for the other Member States (Rodman 1999)
15 Reuters. AFP and other news agencies 15 May-15 October.
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were held in the weeks following the attacks, the EU Troika went on a trip to Asia and the Middle East 
to gain support for the coalition with the US against the terror (going to Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, 
Syria and Egypt) and the EU quickly linked its political aims in the CFSP with concrete measures in the 
first pillar on humanitarian aid to refugees from Afghanistan and aspect of home- and justice affairs 
cooperation within the third pillar.16
Those who follow these recent European security policy developments may find it obvious that some 
progress has taken place in European foreign (and security) policy.17 *Yet, one should not forget that for 
many years it was even a contested issue whether the Union produced a policy, or not. Ginsberg 
argues that while there is not one European foreign policy, there are a number o f “European foreign 
policies” which the term “European foreign policy” stands as a synonym for.19 An official in the 
Council Secretariat similarly suggests that the problem with the CFSP is not whether there is a policy, 
or not, but what the nature of the policy is.20 Judging from these views, one may conclude that whether 
or not the Union produces policy or policies is no longer at the core o f the contested issues anymore. A 
common denominator for the failures, or the paralysis, is, instead, the Union’s inability in many 
international crises and conflicts to attach the necessary economic, military or diplomatic resources to 
carrying out its objectives.
In the literature focusing on the limitations o f  EFP, attention has centred on the failures o f the Union to 
support its declaratory and economic influence in areas such as the Balkans, the Middle East and the 
African Great Lakes region by more rigorous CFSP actions reflecting financially or militarily 1) the 
many words, 2) the unilateral foreign policies o f the larger Member States, 3) the Union’s economic 
power or 4) even US foreign policies. Chris Hill and Karen E. Smith note that “by 1996 expectations o f  
the CFSP had clearly been lowered\ by the general factors .. but also by the CFSP’s apparent failures 
in its first three years o f  life. The track record with the difficult problems o f Iraq, Bosnia, Algeria and 
the Middle East, seemed to many disastrous, although reactions then differed as to whether success 
was inherently impossible or dependent on extending integration to the sphere o f  foreign policy (2000, 
169, 6-13, see also 287, 295-6, 297-316). Part o f the problem could not be seen from Table 1.1 above. 
Since 1993, for instance, 141 CFSP decisions - equivalent to less than 8% of the total number o f
16 See for instance the web site o f the Belgian Presidency http://www, eu2001.be
17 The terms European foreign policy and European foreign and security policy are used interchangeably.
'* See Karen Smith’s clarification o f this issue (1996:11).
19 At the ECPR Rotating Summer School: EU’s capability and influence in international affairs at the University of Geneva, September 2000
Interview Council Secretariat, May 2000,
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decisions - involved more than solely administrative resources of the Union in their implementation. 
Moreover, roughly 75% of these 141 decisions were extensions, modifications, or suspensions o f  
earlier CFSP decisions.21 In less than 2!4 % of the CFSP decisions, the Union thus managed to find  
more than administrative resources for its purposes. This is also echoed by Hill & Smith. They point a t 
the inability o f the Union to raise resources to all its political goals. In a comment on the extensive lis t 
from the Lisbon Report 1992 including areas such as the Middle East into EU’s regional priorities they  
note, “the list was a paradigm o f the diplomatic and political overload to which the CFSP was soon to  
be subjected’ (2000:162). Needless to say, part o f the perception o f the failure o f the Union was a lso  
related to how the US performed. In this specific case, a rough comparison with the statements o f  the  
US in its foreign policy showed that the US actions included more than administrative resources in  
approximately 12% o f its actions towards other (non-EU) countries. Against some countries, such as 
Nigeria, the US figure was as high as 17%.22
Further, while the plans for the CESDP indeed have unprecedented potential, there has never yet been 
any credible threat o f the use of military force by the EU. Moreover, France and Britain have refused to  
give up their UN Security Council seats to a joint EU seat and there are still large variations between 
regions and countries in the depth and scope o f the Union’s action, e.g., as in Myanmar and in 
Indonesia. Finally, the Union has supported the Middle East Peace Process as the largest financial 
contributor, and had a seat in the important Sharm El Sheikh fact-finding commission (the Mitchell 
Commission), but has in general had little say in the actual negotiations, surpassed by the US.
1.4 Progress and paralysis as a learning process?
Based on the assessment of the Union’s capability-presence, the project tests a model for international 
co-operation focusing on learning.23 Learning is seen as a variable, representing a way o f introducing 
ideas to the study o f international relations and foreign policy of the Union in particular. Going back to 
the more general question of IR theories regarding why countries may wish to co-operate (or even 
integrate) their foreign policies in international affairs, the relevant question here is which role ideas 
may play in facilitating co-operation in international relations.
21 Include those decisions that concerned the budget o f  the European Communities (first pillar).
22 This contradicts the comment made by a senior official in the Council Secretariat, who noted that the US foreign policies were as rhetorically biased as 
the Union's policies The comparison is performed from the US government's official URL: http://www.state.gov/mdex cfm
2_’ In so far as a model is an attempt to provide a miniature or theoretical representation of something this thesis presents a model.
10
Max Weber discussed the impact o f ideas extensively, which illustrates that the study o f ideas is far 
from novel to IR. What is new, however, is that several authors more recently have voiced the inclusion 
o f ideas into studies on the development of European foreign policy (Larsen 1999; White 1999, 2000; 
Ginsberg 1999; Zielonka 1998b). These authors find, firstly, that ideas should shed more light on how a 
particular structure emerges, such as the CFSP. Secondly, ideas may provide information about the 
constraints and opportunities of the agency. Finally, ideas enter the discussion where Bretherton & 
Vogler ask for “an approach that emphasises neither structure, nor agency, but the relationship 
between them” (1999:28, 16-19).
There are several types o f ideas that are relevant to the discussion, and these will be examined in 
Chapter 2. In particular, Alexander Wendt (1999) suggests a  division o f labour between the 
“rationalist” (cognitivist) concept o f common knowledge (i.e. shared beliefs), which according to 
Wendt provides a useful model of how culture is structured at the microlevel, and social 
constructivism, which at the macro level emphasises cultures’ constitutive aspects (158-159, 12). The 
focus in this thesis remains on describing the impact o f learning and the conditions for learning 
understood as actors’ updating o f ideas/or beliefs about the workings of EFP and the CFSP. Put 
differently, the thesis discusses neither the impact of norms, nor the impact o f normative beliefs about 
how EFP should work. It aims at discussing the impact o f learning as the change in actors’ perceptions 
about the workings o f a particular strategy or policy based on the experience that this actor obtains from 
observing the outcome of previous effort attached to a given policy.
Two groups o f explanations are considered. Under a first scenario, the development o f the CFSP/EPC 
is a process of learning, i.e. a process where actors (here governments, see Chapters 2 and 3) are 
constantly engaged in finding out how the CFSP actually works or how effective it is in solving 
problems in international relations. Within this design, governments may, despite not knowing the 
actual effectiveness o f the CFSP, under certain conditions be able to learn about it by comparing their 
previous actions and beliefs about their workings with the results of the actions, i.e. the outcomes in 
international relations.
Under a second scenario, in contrast, EFP cannot be understood in terms of learning. This may either 
stem from the fact that learning simply does not take place in international relations or within the
11
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decision-making framework of the CFSP, or because learning is impeded from taking place due to  
various factors influencing the process.
If  learning does not take place or is impeded from taking place, a range of alternative explanations for 
EFP must be explored instead. For instance, the literature has explained EFP as a product o f national 
interests, it has seen EFP as driven or constrained by institutional rules and procedures, bureaucratic 
conflicts, as catalysed and partly a product of socialisation/political discourse, or as a component 
moving in accordance with the structures o f the international system. An implicit but common 
denominator o f earlier literature is, however, that EFP develops with a process-like nature, for instance, 
influenced by various ideas similar to those suggested in the learning scenario and constrained by or in 
interaction with various interests and institutional factors.24 25
This project favours such a triangular approach to explaining outcomes in international relations based 
on ideas, interests, and institutions. The role o f economic links, preferences, interests, or stakes, as 
Christopher Hill calls them, is neither trivial, nor irrelevant. Yet, for some time it has been one o f the 
explanations for European foreign policy, and international relations, which needed better specification. 
Traditionally, it has been assumed that the economic and political spheres of foreign policy were safely 
divided, if not by definition, then at least in the European Union because of the dual structure, i.e. the 
division between external economic relations (first pillar, the European Community, EC) and the CFSP 
(second pillar) that effectively hindered any spill-over or spill-around from one field to the other, or any 
day-to-day issue-linkage. With globalisation and increasingly blurred relations between the economic 
and political sphere, and between low politics and high politics,26 the autonomy of the two areas 
appears now to be increasingly illusory. If this is true, it would echo among others Rummel, who noted 
that the EPC “has been complementing the EC 's economic foreign policy” (1994:115, 2nd column, 20- 
25). The task would seem to be to establish that the Union’s external economic policy one way or the 
other feeds into the EPC/CFSP and the capability-presence o f the Union.
7* This holds, for instance, for Hill’s capability-expectations gap, where expectations under certain conditions are updated according to the experience 
actors’ gain regarding their capabilities. Here, the institutional capacity forms part of the capabilities and the interests form part of the expectations, i.e. 
the perceptions or ideas (1993, 1998b).
25 Spill-over and spill-around are neo-functionalist concepts (see Schminer 1969, 1970). Spill-over increases the scope and level o f commitment to 
integration and spill-around increases the scope while holding the level o f authority constant or within a zone of indifference (Ginsberg 1989:38,1-4). It is 
Schmittcr (1996b) who admit the limited relevance of the neo-functionalist approach in explaining the CFSP/EPC. See Chapter 2.
2<I Jan Zielonka talks about high politics today being more like low politics used to be and vice versa as illustrated by the importance and the interests the 
Member States takes in the EMU. the structural funds, tax harmonisation proposals etc Various seminars, 1999-2001.
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On the institutional side, EFP-literature has tacitly accepted traditional neo-institutional arguments 
regarding institutions as facilitators or constraints on international co-operation. The predominant view, 
however, turns the classical institutional argument 180° around, by arguing that the institutional 
structures created in the foreign policy sphere through the Treaty on European Union (TEU, 1993) are 
obstacles to co-operation, despite the range o f new instruments to act in international affairs resulting 
from this treaty. As Holland notes, “radical innovations were proposed... but ultimately an 
intergovernmental approach remained ascendant (Holland 1997:5).. In most aspects CFSP „face 4the 
traditional ills * that typified EPC (3). This part of the literature is relatively well documented, for 
instance, by accounts on the impact o f the various bureaucratic struggles and institutional frictions that 
exist in EFP. The focus here will instead be on the more macro-oriented judgements regarding the 
impact of the treaties and specific agreements between the Union and third countries, which may 
represent a change in the competence of the Union in dealing with issues related to these countries. 
Because of the pillar division between external economic relations and the CFSP, issues such as the 
impact of the Union’s external economic relations and its competence on the CFSP have barely been 
discussed anywhere. This project will seek to fill this gap by developing a framework, compatible with 
the idea that learning may play a role that suggests a linkage between the competences o f the Union in 
its external economic relations and the CFSP.
Many would agree with Simon Nuttall that EFP has been particularly structured by at least three 
systemic factors, the Cold War, the Gulf War (UN-Iraq-Kuwait), and the War in the former Yugoslavia 
(2000). The problem facing researchers seeking to test this assumption is, how to differentiate among 
the effects of the Gulf War, the impact of the end of the Cold War, the wars in Bosnia, or more 
recently, in Kosovo, since all occurred within the same period. Put differently, it is likely that the 
perception of failure in the former Yugoslavia, or the structural changes caused by the acceleration of 
economic globalisation after the end o f the Cold War influenced EFP. Equally likely is the role played 
by the fall of the Berlin Wall, the German unification and the immense pressure from Central and 
Eastern European countries for the unprecedented speeding up of history triggering the CFSP and the 
pressure to build a CESDP (after Bosnia and Kosovo). More important than being able to establish one 
systemic effect’s superiority over the other will be to establish their intervening influence on the main 
variable, learning, and on the external economic preferences and institutional competence. - - \  ■ :i
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1.5 The main hypothesis
The main hypothesis is that EFP has developed as a process o f learning. The null-hypothesis is that E F P  
dynamics cannot be expressed as a process o f  learning. The hypothesis on learning implies that those  
actors that take decisions about EFP within the CFSP, for instance, governments, under certain 
conditions may learn about the CFSP. Learning means that they gain knowledge about its workings 
from observing the results of their actions and the outcomes in international relations. This presupposes 
that the actors are able to act in accordance with this gained knowledge, since actors leam from  
experiencing the success or failure o f their effort (for instance, the resources involved in an action) 
attached to the CFSP in solving a given crisis or conflict. Furthermore, this only makes sense if actors 
do not have perfect information about the workings of international relations.
The theoretical logic of the framework is that actors hold ideas or beliefs about the workings o f th e  
CFSP. They also hold beliefs about the workings o f their unilateral foreign policies and could similarly 
hold beliefs about the workings of different other multilateral policies, such as those pursued through 
the UN, the OSCE, etc. These beliefs then act as a constraint on decision-makers or provide them w ith  
opportunities that direct them in their choice; a choice between acting and not acting, as well as a  
choice whether or not to use the CFSP when acting. Referring to the discussion of the beginning of th is 
chapter, learning here implies, for instance, that the way the Union dealt with the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia and the observed results o f  these actions taught decision-makers some lessons about how  
the CFSP works. The European foreign policy implication of the learning hypothesis is that changes in 
actors’ beliefs about the workings of the CFSP under certain conditions may lead to changes in the 
degree o f effort attached to the CFSP, and thus increase or decrease the capability-presence of the 
CFSP.
Under the null-hypothesis, in contrast, the mechanism of learning is for some reason either irrelevant, 
non-existent or prevented from playing any significant role. As indicated in the discussion above, the 
project in particular examines the impact o f changes in actors’ interests and in the institutional 
competence constraining actors in their actions. The proposition is that the constellation o f economic 
preferences from the EU Member States towards third countries (through the external economic 
relations of the Union) and the competence o f the Union in dealing with these issues, may influence the 
capability-presence of the Union (as expressed through the CFSP). Hereby, the framework takes into
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consideration that economic interests may have different probabilities of determining the EFP under 
various institutional settings. Specifically, an alternative hypothesis is formulated, paying due 
consideration both to the intensity and diversity o f economic preferences among Member States, and 
the degree to which competence has been transferred to the Union’s external economic relation over 
time.27
Learning may also be impeded by constraints in the ability to gather information about the outcomes in 
international relations. Those include, for instance, the inability o f actors to learn properly due to an 
overwhelming number o f facts or the presence of too many actors seeking to affect the outcomes in 
various directions. The project looks specifically at the impact o f external strategies that may have 
competed with (i.e. been different from) the Union’s strategy. This relates to questions such as whether 
the Union could have learned anything from Kosovo about the workings of the future CESDP. This is 
important, since frequently the assumption is made that Kosovo played a role in the forming of the 
CESDP. The proposition deriving from this part of the framework may for instance imply that the 
Union could not have learned much from Kosovo about the CESDP. First, the Union had no experience 
in security policies at the time the decision was taken to proceed with the CESDP. Second, the Union 
may have been too focused in their evaluation of the actions in Kosovo on the power o f the US in 
determining the strategies in NATO to be able to judge objectively whether the strategies o f NATO and 
the influence o f Europe on events were reasonable or not. Clearly, this part of the framework represents 
an effect that under some conditions may contrast with the dynamics of learning. In this case, one 
simultaneously may have capability-presence enhancing and reducing forces at place. These are 
however exactly the types o f contravening effects that may explain the dichotomy between progress and 
paralysis in European foreign policy.
Another variant o f the inability to learn is the role of sticky or fixed  beliefs. The project refers to these 
beliefs as “hubris-beliefs” and they comprise both overconfident beliefs about own policies and beliefs 
similarly characterised by lack o f confidence. One example, touched upon in the empirical analysis, is 
the case of Britain who from time to time has been described as “punching beyond its own weight”. 
Another example may be Greece, which for “normative reasons” for a long time believed that it would
27 The Union’s external economic relations {or the Union's Common external economic policy) is the “Common Commercial Policy" (Title IX. Treaty of 
Amsterdam) dealing with I) trade issues such as export policy, tariff and trade agreements, trade protection, anti-dumping measures, export credits and 
credit insurance and 2) economic and commercial measures such as services, capital, intellectual property rights, investments, establishment and 
competition. The external economic relations does not explicitly include Title XX development co-operation, but this will nevertheless be included here.
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not be in their “national interest” to concede in any way towards Turkey in the EFP sphere, notably, 
regarding the suggestions of unfreezing aid to Turkey in 1999.
As regards the impact of systemic factors, the project aims at discussing the extent to which, fo r 
instance, the end of the Cold War may have altered the opportunities for learning to take place. P u t 
differently, the focus is on the intervening influence o f systemic changes such as the one in 1989 in  
Europe on actors’ ability to see the workings o f their policies more clearly, or decision-makers’ beliefs 
in the workings of EFP per se.
1.6 Empirical analysis
The purpose o f the empirical analysis is to provide a small sample o f test cases o f  the learning 
framework. The idea is to establish the utility o f  discussing EFP as influenced by actors’ ability to learn 
about the workings o f the CFSP, as well as assessing the impact o f the suggested complementary 
variables.
The sample comprises three case studies. First, an initial quantitative case study is performed on EFP 
towards the Gulf States (i.e. Qatar, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
Oman, and Yemen). It aims at capturing systematic signs of learning and/or relevant complements to  
learning on a large-scale data set. Second, in order to confirm, reject and discuss the results o f the 
quantitative exercise, a case study of EFP towards the Islamic Republic of Iran is carried out. The case 
study contains both a qualitative and a quantitative assessment. The latter should complement the 
preceding analysis, and clarify eventual differences between a regional and a country specific 
perspective. Finally, to correct for eventual regional or country specific bias, as Iran is a central player 
in the Gulf region, a qualitative case study concludes the empirical analysis, looking at the capability- 
presence of EFP towards one of the African regional powers, Nigeria.
Why were exactly these countries and regions chosen? Clearly, almost any case choice o f EFP appears 
at this moment justifiable due to the need for more “gardening” (Zielonka 1998b). The three studies 
chosen also represent areas deemed to be of geo-strategic importance to the EU, politically as well as 
economically. The Lisbon Summit in 1992 identified Central and Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean 
and the Middle East as areas open to joint actions in accordance with the recognition that 4iglobal
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power was beyond its reach”.29 As regards the Gulf or the Middle East, a lot o f studies have been done 
on US foreign policy, but only a small number of studies include the European dimension 
(Greilsammer & Weiler 1988; Robertson 1989).
EFP towards Iran seemed particularly unexplored. Here, only three studies come to mind. These are 
Matthias Struwe’s analysis o f “the Policy o f  Critical Dialogue” from 1998, Mohammad Reza 
Saidabadi’s account on “Progress and Regress in EU-Iran relations since 1989” and Fred Halliday’s 
description of (Western) EFP towards Iran 1979-1995 (1998). The stimulus for another study on EFP 
towards Iran also lies in Ali Massoud Ansari’s comment from 1996 contending that any civilian 
government in Iran is a “dream” or an “obscure obsession o f  a few ”. The European Union has namely 
been among those few believing that some sort o f civilian government could be installed in Iran.
Africa was together with Latin America, the Caribbean and Asia included in the conclusions of the 
Lisbon summit, but not as areas directly open to joint action. They were areas that were supposed to be 
monitored specifically. Still, Africa was subject to one of the most successful Joint Actions, namely the 
Joint Action in December 1993. A range o f crisis and conflicts such as those in West Africa (Sierra 
Leone), in the Horn o f Africa (Eritrea/Ethiopia), in the African Great Lakes Region (Rwanda & 
Burundi), including the Congolese conflict (Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, 
Tanzania, Angola, Zambia, Namibia and Uganda) also point to Africa as a key region for the Union’s 
capability-presence. Moreover, studies regarding EFP towards Africa have been rare with the exception 
of Martin Holland’s South Africa studies (1994, 1995a,b). No case studies have until now focused on 
EFP in Nigeria. For practical reasons, it was not possible to perform a quantitative study of EFP 
towards Nigeria as well. This would otherwise have provided consistency between the empirical 
analysis of EFP towards Iran and Nigeria. The data set available only covered the period 1989-1999 
which was considered too short a time period to generate robust results from quantitative (time series) 
analysis (see also Chapter 4-5).
Some effort was made to obtain at least some similarity between the units of observation used in the 
two cases. It was judged important that Iran and Nigeria both 1) are large oil producing countries, 2) are 
major exporters to the EU, 3) have a skewed income distribution creating widespread poverty, 4) were
18 "Report to the European Council on the Likely Development o f  the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) with a View to Identifying Areas 
Open to Joint Action vis-à-vis Particular Countries or Croups o f  Countries" 1992: 26-27 June; Document 2/21 in Hill and Smith 2000: 166.
EFPB 93/532 6 December 1993 implementing a co-ordinated programme of assistance in preparing for the elections in South Africa on 27 April 1994.
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international pariahs during large parts of the last two decades, and finally 5) are regional powers that 
have a proven track record of influencing their neighbours.
As regards the time frame of the analysis, it was previously noted that the time frame “in practice” was 
approximately 25 years. Despite the fact that a long period o f a quarter o f a century is difficult to cover 
consistently, the aim of this thesis, to analysis learning, necessitated as long intervals of observations as 
possible. This also follows from the important methodological aim o f introducing more systematic 
research methods to European foreign policy analysis. The full period o f 25 years was difficult to cover 
empirically however. For example, the data available (see Chapter 4) did not provide sufficient 
observations for the period before 1979. Yet, using the last two decades as point o f reference for the 
tests were relatively convenient in terms o f  ability to collect information from interviews and 
electronically, such as through the European Foreign Policy Bulletin, covering the period from 1980.
A variety of sources were used to collect the empirical data. Besides downloading data sets from 
quantitative data set sources on the Internet, five qualitative interview rounds were carried out at the EU 
institutions in Brussels: in May 1999, November 1999, May 2000, September 2000 and in April 2001. 
The interviewees were key officials or representatives EU Council Secretariat and the Member States’ 
national representations. Approximately 45 interviews were carried out, some were with representatives 
o f Member States and Iranian and Nigerian diplomats, a majority were with Council officials, and a few 
interviews were with officials of the Commission. The interviews were use to provide factual 
information on the dependent and explanatory variables regarding a specific development, and appear 
in a number of cases (but not all) with actual citations. Most interviewees expressed the wish to remain 
anonymous. Finally, one may add that data from an experiment (a simulation of General Affairs 
Councils) that had been carried out at the European University Institute in February 1999, March 2000, 
and March 2001 were used as background information during the creation of the theoretical and 
empirical framework (See Dahl & Giacomello 2000).
1.7 Limitations
Ambitions and results seldom reach the same heights. This project is no exception to this rule. One may 
highlight three major limitations of the study. First, the framework does not diverge as much as 
intended from the start from the tradition of eclecticism (White 1999; Holland 1995a), the “borrowing”
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of ideas and approaches from other subject areas and applying them to the foreign policy arena; one of 
the Achilles Heals of the European foreign policy literature (see Chapter 2). For instance, the learning 
model derives from a sociological model on education and gender segregation on the labour market. 
Moreover, the conceptualisation of ideas seeks to echo the cognitivist approach to ideas thus taking a 
stance in the constructivist -  cognitivist IR-debate. The mix of sociological models and IR-literature put 
into the literature on EFP was deemed necessary to explain the dichotomy between progress and 
paralysis of EFP, but the author is aware that some may prefer cleaner approaches.
Second, the project has a narrow focus. For instance, it disregards the group of explanations focusing 
on the impact o f norms, identity, Europeanisation (i.e. socialisation, see Chapter 2 and 7) or discourses. 
These explanations need to be investigated further, as implicitly pointed out by Roy Ginsberg in his 
vision of seeing the research community on EFP moving along the so-called input-output continuum, a 
multidimensional line o f explanations o f various aspects and stages o f EFP development (see Chapter 
2). The fact of having ignored the impact of norms, identity and socialisation is a simple illustration of 
the resource constraints of the project. Also left out is the impact o f power politics in its traditional 
sense. However, one o f the propositions is that power politics today needs to be understood in a novel 
fashion, for instance, as highly integrated with economic interests and institutional competence.
Third, the study fails to include a study on European foreign policy towards one of the conflicts or 
crises in South Eastern Europe in the 1990s. EFP towards South Eastern Europe is important as:
i) a test case for EFP,
ii) an area with intensive (however, not necessarily successful) EFP capability-presence,
iii) an area belonging to the Union’s natural sphere o f external operation (e.g., according to the 
Lisbon Summit), and
iv) an important test case for a framework on learning in EFP.
Why was such a study then not included? The reason paradoxically has to do with how crucial the 
former Yugoslavia has been for the CFSP. Put differently, it is proposed that the way the Union acted in 
South Eastern Europe in the ’90s has influenced not only future policies towards the South Eastern 
European region, but the development of the CFSP as a whole. The influence, in other words, went 
beyond South Eastern Europe to the Union’s policies towards the rest of the world; and it also 
penetrated into its internal affairs. Under this assumption, the suggestion was that either the former
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Yugoslavia had to be analysed separately as an in-depth study moving meticulously through all th  
events and reactions o f  the Union, or it had to be included as a structural component, i.e. as possibl; 
influencing EFP towards other third countries as well. Given the resources available, it was decided t( 
include the former Yugoslavia only as a possible structural component for the policies o f the Unioi 
towards other third countries.
1.8 Project conclusions
The Union’s capability-presence expresses duality between paralysis and progress. In perspective, the 
empirical analysis confirms that EFP has indeed been a dw arf the last two decades compared to the 
foreign policies of the larger Member States, such as France, Germany and Britain and compared to the 
US. This traditional mode of comparison however was complemented with a more separate evaluation 
o f the development of EFP over time.
This analysis revealed that EFP towards the Gulf States, Iran and Nigeria experienced growth, but no 
impressive growth of EFP in the ’90s. Even viewed at isolated, the policies suffer from many severe 
weaknesses, such as inconsistency over time, lack of action in severe crises and conflicts, and 
detachment of EFP from the behaviour o f the target.
However, the Union demonstrates that it manages to raise its capability-presence more towards 
cooperative” events, than “hostile” ones. Importantly, the negative elements of EFP were not paralytic 
in the traditional sense, but form part o f the progress o f the CFSP. For instance, one characteristic has 
been the increase in defection dramas among the Member States, which despite being harmful for the 
CFSP illustrates that actions are now taken that actually matter for the domestic affairs o f the Member 
States.
The progress, despite not being impressive, is expressed in a number of ways. First, compared to 
practically all the smaller Member States’ foreign policies, the Union as a whole has been acting more 
towards problems in the Middle East/Iran/Nigeria than any of these Member States did unilaterally.
Second, a period of silence characterised EFP until 1992-1993, but as part of a development starting 
with the SEA in 1987, an increased depth o f EFP came to the surface in the beginning of the ’90s. For
2 0
instance, the Union managed to use existing instruments extensively initiating dialogues and sanctions 
which previously were either only unilateral, UN-based, or simply non-existing. In this period, the 
governments began to regard the Union as mode of collective response towards sensitive political 
problems, including violations of human rights and breaches o f democratic principles.
Third, for the Member States the use of the Union’s foreign policy apparatus, including the CFSP, in 
several cases became a better alternative to unilateral or other multilateral policies. This stemmed from 
the institutional deepening o f the EU through the TEU, but it was also related to the end o f the Cold 
War combined with various windows o f opportunity created by developments in third countries and the 
specific configuration o f the EU Member States’ external economic interests in some o f these third 
countries at the time. After 1996, EFP widened its scope, by embedding first and third pillar issues into 
the actions of the CFSP. Especially with respect to development aid from the first pillar and visa 
restrictions from the third pillar, there is a tendency to include these as operational instruments for the 
CFSP despite the fact they belong to other pillars.
The question remains, whether the increased effort of the governments to the CFSP really proves that 
EFP is a more effective forum for the solving o f collective problems of international relations, or not. 
The study seems to confirm that the increased use of the CFSP also results from an enhanced ability of 
the Member States to abide with the negative externalities o f any collective action of the Union that 
might involve political and economic redistribution problems in the Member States.
The learning framework appears to be a valid tool of understanding some parts o f the EFP dynamics. It 
appears that the Union not only has increased its capability-presence in international affairs but has 
begun to act more and more as an actor capable of learning. In 1987, the first indications of this are 
present, in 1991 all the quantitative results suggest the presence of learning, and from 1993 all the data, 
qualitative and quantitative, points to the existence of this ability to learn from failures and successes in 
EFP. Notably, the enhanced ability to learn does not imply that the Union did more things in a 
consistent way. It only suggests that the Union did things more consistent with its own past actions and 
the perceptions of the workings of the CFSP than before. In addition, the learning framework only fitted 
the larger Member State governments of the Union.
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The ability to learn about EFP was - also after it became more elaborated in the 1990s - highly 
dependent on the US stance in international affairs. The findings suggest the existence o f large 
ambiguities in the Union’s attitude towards the US. The more ambiguous and weak the US strategy 
was, the easier it was for the Union to increase its capability-presence. The reason that the Union 
sometimes goes against the US does not have much to do with whether this is the most effective 
strategy or not towards the problems facing the Union in third countries. The results regarding the 
impact of the US also runs counter to the impression given by the literature on European foreign policy, 
for instance, Nuttall (1997), about how autonomous from the US the EPC/CFSP has been. What is 
different from a traditional “hegemonic power” interpretation o f  the US influence, is the 
complementary role the US is suggested to play in international relations as a focal point of EU 
governments’ perception o f whether outcomes have been successful or not.
The empirical data only vaguely supports an isolated impact of the external economic relations on the 
CFSP, but this may also relate to some limitations in the quantitative measurement. Support is stronger 
in the qualitative analysis o f the impact o f external economic relations. First it seems that economic 
preferences may account for the bias o f the Union’s capability-presence towards more cooperative 
events. Hereby, this effect runs in the opposite direction of the effect o f the increased institutional 
competence of the external economic relations. Second, the institutional competence hypothesis seems 
in particular promising. The higher the competence o f  the Union in its external economic relations, the 
more able the Union apparently becomes to introduce measures towards given third countries, which 
implementation are sustainable towards particularistic economic interests in the Member States. Put 
differently, the acquis communautaire, the existing body of EU legal acts, and the acquis politique, the 
political positions adopted by the Union, determines a degree o f competence of the Union in dealing 
with a given third country, and this degree of competence is then positively proportional to the Union’s 
ability to act through the CFSP towards this country.
This result raises an important question regarding finding the right mix between economics and politics 
in foreign policy. According to the analysis, the Union cannot keep economics and politics apart. Each 
time this is tried, the Union increases the risk of initiating measures that are not sustainable in the end. 
The more the Union becomes capable o f acting, the higher is the risk o f decreasing the belief in the 
CFSP as the policies of the Union run into problems. Politics such as human rights policies may seem 
problematic from a particularistic economic interest point of view, and economic interests are among
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the most important ones in the European Union. Yet, with government’s increased ability to learn from 
its failures and successes in international relations, the importance o f  making the complicated link 
between political aims and economic policies in third countries seems to be the way the Union can 
enter not only a virtuous circle of learning, but also a virtuous circle of capability-presence.
Finally, if Haas’ approach to learning according to himself differs sharply from the more direct ideas o f 
causation embedded in behavioural and in rational-choice approaches, then learning as developed here 
differs, sharply from learning a-la Haas. However, just because the focus here was on individually held 
beliefs about the workings of policies, in contrast to group-based ideas, as suggested by the 
constructivist school, or normative beliefs about how strategies should be, the framework seems to be 
more complementary to than actually competing with other approaches.
1.9 Contents
The thesis is divided into a theoretical and an empirical part. The following two chapters, Chapters 2-3 
deduce and outline the theoretical framework. This is tested empirically on the aforementioned three 
cases in Chapters 4-6. Finally, the results o f the theoretical and empirical parts are summed up in 
Chapter 7.
In chapter 2, the aim is to provide a sustainable theoretical location for the project through a critical 
assessment of the analysis o f European foreign policy. Different explanations on progress and paralysis 
are discussed and suggestions are presented as to how the literature could address these developments. 
The triangular proposition of the existence o f a relationship between interests, ideas and institutions is 
used as a tool to open the discussion with the aim of seeking to dispose the advantages and 
disadvantages of previous work on these dimensions. This leads to a range of suggestions regarding 
how progress and paralysis may be addressed in terms of learning and which alternative explanations 
should be considered. In Chapter 3, these are implemented specifying a theoretical framework focusing 
on actors’ ability to learn from successes and failures in international relations. The framework is a 
broad model on learning and actors’ ability to update their beliefs about the workings o f the CFSP 
based on previous beliefs, effort attached to a strategy and the outcomes in international relations. 
Further, the model is deliberately constructed to allow for the investigation of a number of alternative
explanations on EFP, such as those mentioned above regarding changes in interests, institutional 
competence, and the impact of competing strategies.
In Chapter 4, the learning model is tested on the policies of the Union towards the (Persian) Gulf States 
from 1983 to 1999. This first empirical chapter mobilises quantitative methods to analyse time series on 
international events o f conflict and co-operation. The data set is based on the work o f Professor Philip 
A. Schrodt and his collaborators using the Kansas Events Data System (KEDS, 1998). The aim o f the 
chapter is to provide a statistical indication from an already existing data set on the relevance o f the 
learning framework and to highlight areas in need o f further investigation in the qualitative empirical 
model.
In Chapter 5, this is followed up by a case study on one o f the major policies of the Union towards the 
Persian Gulf, the policies towards Iran. The study examines the applicability of the learning framework 
using qualitative case study tools. Learning is in general indicated as the joint significance of, 1) past 
European foreign policies, 2) past outcomes in international relations, and 3) the expectations that 
centrally placed decision-makers o f the Union held about the workings o f the EPC/CFSP towards a 
given third country. A quantitative study of EFP towards Iran extracted from the general study in 
Chapter 4 is furthermore discussed. The competing hypotheses, in particular the one regarding the 
impact of the external economic relations and the impact of various factors that could have prevented 
actors from observing outcomes sufficiently clearly in international relations are further assessed.
In chapter 6, the policies o f the Union towards the Federal Republic o f Nigeria are examined. The 
analysis resembles Chapter 5. It aims at following the fluctuations in the developments in Nigeria over 
the last two decades, the Union’s reactions to these events, and the beliefs held by centrally placed EU 
decision-makers regarding the workings o f EFP towards these events. Apart from complementing the 
previous assessment o f the learning framework, the Chapter evaluates some o f the alternative 
explanations to EFP than learning; in the Nigerian case emphasising the importance of changes in the 
institutional competence o f the external economic relations due to Nigeria’s membership o f the ACP 
group, and thus the EU-ACP cooperation agreements, notably Lomé I-IV.
Chapter 7 contains the conclusion, including some policy implications and ideas that future research on 
this topic may incorporate.
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CHAPTER 2
THE ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY
This chapter provides a critical assessment o f the literature on EFP, European Foreign Policy Analysis 
(EFPA). The first section is a tour d ’horizon o f different ways EFP has been conceptualised and 
measured in the past. The fundamental problem is how to conceptualise and measure EFP outcomes, 
the dependent variable o f the thesis. As noted in Chapter 1, attention remains on three potential 
channels of influence on EFP, the three /s, interests, institutions and ideas. The aim is not to provide a 
quantitatively complete literature search on the analysis of European foreign policy. Instead, the 
literature assessment aims at forming a notion o f how the three is might be combined (theoretically and 
in operational terms) to explain the paradoxical dual face of European foreign policy, the paralysis and 
the progress
According to this, the second section addresses how EFP has been explained as essentially deriving 
from actors’ interests, what the units of analysis have been for these approaches and where their main 
strengths and weaknesses lie in explaining the simultaneous presence o f  progress and paralysis o f EFP. 
The third section contains a similar discussion on institutions, though mainly dealing with classical 
(and more or less rationally) inspired institutional perspectives to EFP. One may note that other 
institutional approaches - that attach more independent explanatory power to institutions - are discussed 
under the third and final /, the ideas, in the fourth section. The fourth section hereby compares the 
constructivist (reflectivist) approach to ideas with the cognitivist (rationalist) approach. Towards the 
end o f  the chapter, the different inputs from the various assessments are gathered, delineating a starting 
point for developing the theoretical framework in Chapter 3.
No such thing as complete literature review of European foreign policy literature exists However, one may find comprehensive summaries in. for 
instance. Smith (1999). Peterson and Sjursen (eds. 1998). Bretherton & Voglcr (1999). Pienine (1997) or Knud Erik Joersenscn (1997)
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12.1 Conceptualisation and measurement of EFP outcomes
(a) The state o f  the art
The major part o f EFP A over the last 30 years represents an impressive undertaking in describing the 
phenomenon of European foreign policy considering its novelty, complexity and frequently shifting 
institutional basis. This descriptive strength has been characterised by close links to contemporary 
policy-making questions and for some part common sense theoretical frameworks avoiding abstract 
epistemological discussions or modelling for the sake o f modelling adventures. These descriptive 
studies include, for example, Allen & Smith (1990) Bourlanges (1997), Broek (1995), Cameron (1999), 
Carlsnaes (1994), Edwards (1997), Ginsberg (1992), Hill & Wallace (1996), Holland (1995 a; b) 
Joergensen (1993b), Nuttall (1992, 2000), Regelsberger & Wessels (1996), Sjoestedt (1977), Smith, 
K.E. (1996), Smith, Michael (1998), Stavridis(l993), Wallace (1978).
The weaknesses o f EFPA have not remained few, however. Martin Holland finds the literature 
“eclecticaF and “atheoreticaF (1995),2 while Roy Ginsberg points to the lack of any middle range or 
larger theory of EFPA (1999). Brian White observes, “/» reviewing the strengths o f  the field, foreign 
policy analysis has a long tradition o f eclecticism, the ‘borrowing ' o f ideas and approaches from  other 
subject areas and applying them to the foreign policy arena ” (1999: 39, 7-22). Knud Erik Joergensen 
summarises the criticism o f  the literature noting that EFPA:
•  mainly deals with policy-studies,
•  has remarkably low interest in theoretical issues,
• suffers from an almost complete absence of cumulative research,
• lacks any considerable interest in synthesis of case-studies, and
•  largely fails to engage other than Europeans ( 1993a),
After Joergensen wrote these remarks, the literature has slowly begun to comply with most o f these 
points. This was further catalysed by the boost to field in the mid-1990s following the enhanced *
* Holland's contributions (1994; 1995a; b) are eclectical as well. For example, by using Hill’s Capability Expectations Gap theory (CEG) on the Joint 
Action o f the EU against South Africa in December 1993, he shows that any CEG can be minimised and even closed. External expectations were in the 
South Africa case matched by rising capabilities. This occurred despite the fact that the capabilities per definition were not exclusively controlled by the 
Union. Moreover. Hill focused on changes in the expectations as one of the main sources of narrowing the CEG. and less on changes in capabilities Hill 
assumed these to gradually increase over time (Hill 199Sb and comments at the EUI Council of Ministers’ Simulation 1999)
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involvement of the EU regarding the implementation o f the peace in Bosnia, the Union’s relations with 
the Mediterranean countries, not to mention the creation o f the CESDP after Kosovo. The field 
however remains fragile to criticism as the quality of its frameworks largely depends on the goodness 
of fit that can be obtained between originally imported frameworks and the specific nature o f the 
problems in the European foreign policy sphere.
(b) IR & EFPA
Matching imported literature from, for instance, foreign policy analysis (FPA) of IR-theory has been a 
Sisyphus task for EFPA.3 Christopher Hill and William Wallace note that “if is, in principle, relatively 
easy to describe the assumptions and mechanisms through which established sovereign nation-states 
conduct foreign policy. The evolution o f  European Political Cooperation (EPC), however, presents a 
challenge o f  a different order ” (1996: 1). This statement probably contains the raison de tre  o f the 
discipline’s reluctance to follow any particular strand of IR-theory dogmatically.4
The mismatch between imported theories and the European foreign policy sphere often starts already at 
the level of the research question. For the IR-theory on liberal peace, the question is how liberal 
(member) states may avoid violent conflicts with each other.5 This is however not what European 
foreign policy is about since here the question is rather how and why Member States may co-operate 
among each other in order to address conflicts and crises outside the Union. Similarly, (commercial) 
liberalism assumes that states bound together in a perfect liberal economy, with free trade, will have a 
moderating influence on international politics promoting peace between peoples (Risse-Kappen 1995; 
Moravcsik 1991). The question in EFPA is different, as it regards why Member States bound closely 
together in a liberal economy (although not perfectly so) may facilitate resources to be undertaken in 
actions towards a third country. EFPA has also suffered from the inability to attach the word 
“integration” to its dependent variable due to the unanimous decision-making mode of the CFSP. The 
result has been that the field de facto was marginalized from the overall European integration debate 
and some authors in European integration theory hardly dared to include the CFSP in their analysis
31 am grateful for inputs on this subject from participants in Jan Zielonka’s seminar “Foreign Policy Analysis" (Session 3 March 2000).
 ^Exceptions include Pijpers (1990), Struwe's constructivist account (1998). and Brethenon & Vogier (1999) using constructivism. See below.
J For an overview of the literature on liberal peace one may consult Oneal (2000).
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until just recently.6 Also vis-à-vis FPA, the literature has had conceptual problems. In particular, a 
proper definition o f foreign policy has been problematic to establish considering that the policies o f  the 
CFSP are pursued by 15 and not by one government. This has not been facilitated by the fact that FPA 
itself has been ambiguous on crucial questions such as what foreign policy is (Wallace 1990:1; Holsti 
1995; Gustavsson 1999:84,1-6).
(c) The unsuccessful measurement o f  outcomes in EFPA
These problems have led to confusion about how European foreign policy should be conceptualised and 
measured in a reproducible and operational fashion (Joergensen 1998; Larsen 1999:588). Five to ten 
years ago this was less important than now. At that time, almost any definition of success and failure of 
European foreign policy could impossibly disguise the serious problems EFP had had in breaking 
through as a viable crisis solution forum. For example, one could hardly arrive at different conclusions 
than Regelsberger & Wessels noting that, “the balance sheet o f  the CFSP... remains on the whole 
unsatisfactory”, whatever success-criteria used to arrive at such conclusion (1996:42). Now, EFP has 
expanded its operations and part of the literature is trying to move beyond the mere descriptive and 
narrative approach used so far. Providing a consistent and operational measurement of the outcomes of 
EFP therefore now seems more due than ever before.
In general, the outcome or the degree of success o f  EFP has been measured using highly different 
criteria. Those have ranged from looking at 1) the treaty aims, 2) the rhetorical aims formulated by 
decision-makers, to 3) the normative opinions held by various analysts or politicians about what EFP 
should be able to achieve. The strength of using treaty-based aims are that one hereby can reproduce 
ones results more easily given the aims are clearly understood and operational. Using treaty-based aims 
criteria, for example, Zielonka notes, uthe Union is paralysed, because it has been unable to live up to 
its Treaty binding obligations” (1998b). Rummel & Wiedemann suggest that the Common foreign and 
security policy should be “common”, “foreign”, be about “security” and produce a “policy” as those are 
the characteristics promised by its treaty-based name.7 Yet, despite the fact that the language o f the 
TEU in fact is both Mplain and clear” (Zielonka 1998b:2) and that the major aims o f the CFSP as
6 Moravcsik (1993:494,3-12, see also Section 2.2 (c)) and Philippe Schmitter ( 1996b: Chapter 6) coining from two different poles of European 
integration theory, liberal intergovernmental ism and neo-functional ism. have both denied the relevance of their theories in the area of the CFSP.
Moravcsik has more recently started to contribute to the debate on European foreign policy and the CFSP. notably, in Moravcsik (2001 ) 
Chapter IV in Zielonka 1998a. Bourlanees uses the draft of the TEU as his benchmark and concludes that the CFSP is sick (19971
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formulated in Article J.l o f the Treaty o f Amsterdam have remained stable since the TEU, using treaty- 
based aims may for some purposes seem too institutional to have any practical relevance (Bretherton & 
Vogler 1999). As Ole Waever points out “loyalties, images, and identities are often vague, fluid, and 
irrational; as such they can hardly be dealt with by legal treaties, institutional measures and military 
commands M (1996).
The use o f rhetorical aims formulated by politicians, EU decision-makers, or academics in order to 
assess EFP may be valuable to determine EFP performance on specific issues. For instance, it seems 
valid to judge politicians and EFP on their promises and threats regarding solving the crisis in the 
former Yugoslavia in 1991. Diplomacy is also traditionally a linguistic undertaking and thus 
rhetorically biased so rhetorical aims do have an important function.8 Assessing EFP solely on 
statements is however a problematic undertaking since many foreign policies are symbolic.
Max Weber has warned against normative research that confuses scientists’ own values and ideas with 
those o f the actors they are studying.9 Weber’s warning is worth remembering in the context of trying to 
assess EFP. Employing normative opinions about how EFP should perform is, as Hill notes, to set the 
“sauf qualitatif hoped for many” (1991), but it is hardly the way EFPA may generate scientific results 
(Grunert in Cafruny 1998:96). A federalist approach is therefore per definition problematic, because it 
contains references to European integration as the ultimate goal and salvation o f the nation states given 
their inability to deal alone with the problems and competition confronting them in the international 
system (Moens 1997; Norgaard et al 1993). Also, the use of personal normative criteria may be difficult 
for other researchers to adhere to and the carefully derived results run a higher risk o f being wasted. 
When Grunert, for instance, states that EFP is the reason for “the tragedy” in the former Yugoslavia (in 
Cafruny 1998:96), one must ask whether his conclusion more was based on his and many other 
Europeans’ high expectations about EFP capabilities at that time, than it reflected a deeper analysis of 
the Union’s impact on the Balkans. That being said, a normative discussion in the public debate is 
justified and needed in order to evaluate whether the Union is progressing in a way that we can adhere 
to, or not. It may also serve as an input in the scientific debate regarding, for example, the legitimacy of 
EFP, which will be touched upon in the following section (Stavridis 2000; Hill and K.E. Smith 2000). *
* Interviews, Council Secretariat, June 1999 and May 2000.
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(d) Towards a more realistic benchmark?
Obviously, no true or false way of measuring the performance o f EFP exists. This author however 
disagrees with arguments such as the one presented by Larsen suggesting that “if is better to be 
interested in the different perceptions o f  success and their political strength than trying to make an 
aggregate measure" (1999a:588).
Trying to form a measure that captures the essence of the variable that a research question regards 
seems essential in answering a given question also in the complex environment o f EFP.9 10 1More 
important than the actual contents of the measure is however the benchmarking of the outcomes in a 
way that facilitates the study o f variations in these outcomes. Different options emerge from the 
literature. Notably, several authors use the US, the EC, or Member States’ foreign policies as 
benchmarks o f comparison with the policies o f the CFSP. In fact, the Council secretariat notes in one of 
the information brochures that the CFSP is needed because “the EU is a  major economic player and  
should play a commensurate political role on the international system*\" Such an approach is less 
suitable for attempts as this trying to explain the dynamics o f EFP through various explanatory 
variables. This reason is that the CFSP lacks unity o f analysis with the US, the EC and even larger 
Member State policies, the latter representing giants compared to the midget o f the CFSP. The strategy 
in this project is therefore instead to analyse variations in European foreign policy per se. The 
conclusions derived from choosing such a benchmark subsequently regards the dynamics of European 
foreign policy rather than the impact and overall presence of EU in international affairs.
How should a benchmark for EFP then look like? Well, Hill’s Capability Expectations Gap (CEG) - 
which Larsen refers to as a dangerous aggregate measure - is conceptually a safe starting point exactly 
because it is a very accurate and an operational aggregate measure. Departing from the capabilities, Hill 
operationalises capabilities as the resources, instruments and cohesiveness of action o f the Union 
whereas expectations are divided into internal and external expectations. In order to direct the 
capability measure towards policies such as those analysed in this project, it may be useful to 
incorporate into capabilities the notion o f  “presence” developed by Allen & Smith (1990), or
9 From Reinhard Bendix’ description of Max Weber on the Methodology of Social Sciences. Translated and edited by Edward Shils and H A. Finch. 1949. 
Glencoe III. Free Press. In the International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. Oxford UP.
10 In this respect, it is important to note that Joergensen whom Larsen legitimised his statement from mainly criticised the inconsistency by which success- 
criteria were implemented, not the use of success-criteria per se.
11 The Council of the European Union & the CFSP. General Secretariat of the Council. 1999
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“act or ness” in Gunnar Sjoestedt (1977) and revised in Bretherton & Vogler (1999).12 The difference 
between Hill and Allen & Smith/Sjoestedt/Bretherton & Vogler represents taste rather than substance. 
Presence measures the role the Union plays in international politics. It is a multidimensional concept 
intended to capture three assets o f EFP: capabilities, expectations and legitimacy. As mentioned in 
Chapter 1, presence includes capabilities from “the capacity to act and mobilise resources”, and 
expectations from “the place it occupies in the perceptions and expectations o f  policy makers ” 
Expectations and capabilities may however be assumed to have different dynamics and presumably 
they also correlate extensively. At least, the suggestion is that one o f the reasons for the Union’s duality 
of progress and paralysis may come from the extent to which capabilities and expectations interact. 
Capabilities, following the previous discussion, represent a major and natural dependent variable in 
EFPA. Section 2.4 and Chapter 3 will then return to the issue of how the interaction between 
capabilities and expectations may take place.
The capability-presence or the Union’s capacity to act and mobilise resources here relates to the 
Union’s policies and may be specified further by looking at individual policies’ depth, scope and 
decision-making mode. Depth is the degree of commitment and the character of the policy output. 
Scope reflects the limitations and opportunities of the common policy provided by the linkages among 
various policy areas. Decision-making mode is the formal and informal decision-making rules of 
decision-making (Schmitter 1969; Lindberg et al 1970; Petersen in Noergaard 1993).
The third dimension of Allen & Smith’s presence is the legitimacy of decision-processes, a concept that 
also appears in Bretherton & Vogler’s “requirements fo r  the Union’s actorness in international 
a f f a i r s Legitimacy is closely related to Stavridis’ notion of “the democratic deficit o f the EPC/CFSP”, 
which suggests a gap between norms or principles and actions of European foreign policy (2000:450). 
In the EPC/CFSP, the democratic deficit is about the lack of democratic accountability in the 
EPC/CFSP stemming at least partially from national democratic deficits in the way o f performing 
foreign policy (Stavridis 1993:173). Including the democratic deficit seems important in EFPA, but the 
credentials of the Union or the capability of the Union to act and mobilise resources does not 
necessarily have the same dynamics as the legitimacy. Importantly, a policy may be highly efficient, yet 
completely illegitimate -  while another policy may have the reverse properties (Regelsberger & 
Wessels 1996:42, 11-12). The legitimacy of decision-processes does therefore not form part o f the
12 Stavridis (2000) provides different wavs of measurement of EFP success and applies them to the EFP towards the Mediterranean region.
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capability-presence measured in the remainder of this project, but should be included in future research 
taking into account the potentially different dynamics of capabilities and legitimacy.
Clearly, one should not theorise to much on the measurement ex ante as the data set and the type of 
analysis to a certain extent will determine the final operationalisation of EFP outcomes. Here, one could 
expect that the operationalisation may have to vary depending on whether the data is single 
observations, cumulative cases or large-scale data sets. In this project, the operationalisation of 
capability-presence in the quantitative study follows more or less directly from the choice o f data set 
providing less degrees o f freedom for specific EFP-related research needs, but on the other hand 
ensuring consistency with IR-literature (See Chapters 4 and 6). The qualitative analysis, on the 
contrary, uses a measurement of capability-presence as the one suggested above, dividing the EFP 
outcome into different degrees of scope, depth and decision-making mode.
One should also note that the concept o f capabilities and presence, as measured in the proceeding 
empirical analysis, include European foreign policy outputs, for instance, a Joint Action on South 
Africa. This use o f “capabilities” follows, for instance, Hill (1993) where one of the dimensions of 
capabilities is the actual policy action o f the CFSP in a particular situation, for instance, economic 
sanctions against a pariah state. Analytically, capabilities and presence do not include the 
outcomes/effects o f European foreign policy as analysed by, for instance, Ginsberg (2001).13 In this 
project, outcomes and effects are still dealt with however. Outcomes and effects of EFP are seen as 
important inputs, and thus explanatory factors in determining the capability-presence o f EFP. This will 
be elaborated in Chapter 3 and illustrated in the proceeding empirical chapters.
2.2 Interests
(a) Who s interests?
Interests play a key role in most explanations for EFP. The realist assumption that states follow the 
course o f action that preserve their national interests in the best way14 is repeatedly introduced as an
13 Due to the submission of this thesis before the publishing of Ginsberg’s book, the author has only seen a draft to one of Ginsberg’s chapters at a 
seminar of Ginsberg at the ECPR Rotating Summer School: EU’s capability and influence in international affairs at the European Institute of the 
University of Geneva. September 2000.
u See Waltz 1979. 1997; Risse-Kappen 1995a; Keohane 19S6; and Stein 1990.
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/explanatory factor for outcomes in the CFSP, in particular those emphasising the limitations o f  EFP. 
Pijpers concludes that the nation states and their governments have been the major actors in the EPC 
(1990; 1992). In fact, nation states are becoming increasingly important according to him. In 
intergovemmentalism the focus remains on the nation state, but more on aggregated domestic interests 
and less on security and power. Intergovemmentalism assumes that when cooperation points to mutual 
benefits and the utility of joint approaches, members will support joint foreign policy actions.
The problem with intergovernmental approaches to EFP relates to the aim of solving the puzzle 
regarding the simultaneous existence of progress and paralysis. Intergovernmental approaches seem 
generally less able to account for both these phenomena. They have been criticised for, 1) failing to take 
the international community sufficiently into account, and 2) being reductionist if not tautological by 
assuming integration when common interests exist, and lack o f integration when interests are not 
common (Schneider 1998b). This is of course partly different in international bargaining approaches, 
for instance, those inspired by Putnam (1993; Ewans et al 1993). Hereby, Peter Schmidt’s 
intergovernmental bargaining approach explains the development of West European Security and 
Defence Cooperation holding that the intent to strengthen Member States’ bargaining power in 
international relations by enlisting multinational support for national perspectives and programs is one 
of the driving forces of a common security and defence policy.15
EFPA here has sought to regard any explanation within a broader multilevel decision-making
n
framework. For example, in Hill’s multilevel governance (MLG) framework, the EPC/CFSP decision- , 
making is regarded as a sub-system of the international system that receives inputs from multiple levels 
of mixed actors. Those involve, primarily, 1) other actors in the international system, 2) national 
governmental actors, 3) sub- and transnational governmental and non-governmental actors and 4) other 
European Union institutions such as the European Parliament and the European Commission (1998a: 
44-46, in particular Figure l) .16 In this tradition, seeing institutions through some sort o f MLG approach 
to “a mixed actor system’\  Alasdair Young conceptualises the Union’s actions as being part o f  a multi­
level process engaging national, European and international levels o f  governance " (2000:94, 12-17; 
Larsen 1999:593).
I! Schmidt stresses political volition, spillover from other policies and perceived necessity for cooperation in a rapidly changing or even chaotic 
environment and the demand to avoid re-nationalisation of security and defence policies in Europe (1992:236, 1-8).
Ginsberg suggests a methodological “theory” conceptually building on H ill’s three-layered MLG model 
(international, European, domestic). Hereby, Ginsberg includes both “structures” and “agency” 
depicting the relationship between the “international context”, “the external relations system o f  the 
E C \  and “National Foreign Policies” (1999:433-447). The methodological conclusion of Ginsberg is 
that as long as one follows point by point the “input-output making continuum”, one may “go a long 
way framing the policy problems facing EFP” (435). As described in Chapter 1, the input-output 
continuum is a multidimensional line linking different explanations in EFPA (such as 
intergovemmentalism, neo-functionalism, domestic politics, etc.) to specific phenomena or sub-groups 
of interaction (such as the CFSP). To follow all the points and explanations on the line in order to 
determine the EU’s presence is not a task for the individual scholar. This should rather be understood as 
a cumulative task for the whole EFP research community. As Ginsberg has specified, instead o f seeking 
to include all points on the continuum, one should focus on particular points, however, being aware of 
the broader system by which EFP fits in.16 7 For instance, one may build frameworks around a specific 
explanation for the Union’s capability-presence, such as Nuttall’s “socialization and informal rules 
hypotheses” (1992, 1997 in Regelsberger et al 2000), which sees socialization within the CFSP as one 
of the determining factors o f the emerging European foreign policy from 1970 to the TEU, Hill’s 
Capability-Expectations Gap, or by testing one of the neo-functional hypotheses.
One should always be aware o f the problem o f incompatibility between different theoretical 
approaches. An individualistic model, for instance, has a different interpretation than a model that is 
collectivistic. For instance, liberalists claim that agents in international politics are members of the 
domestic society as individuals, consumers, voters, or privately constituted groups such as firms, 
households, and interest groups (Stein 1990:7). States are still relevant, and may even be the major 
actors, but they possess a declining ability to control their own destinies (Holsti 1995:43). Hocking & 
Smith argue, “key goals o f  national economic policies now lie outside those factors determined by a 
given nation state”, for instance, caused by tendencies o f globalisation (1994).18 In this project, as 
suggested by Manners & Whitman, the EU is not regarded as 15 unitary states, but rather as 15 
governments (2000). As a benchmark, the government is “all political institutions o f the executive, the 
legislative, and the judiciary and the associated decisions, activities and outputs (Kaase & Newton
16 See also Ha2el Smith (1995).
17 This was specified to the author during a seminar of Ginsberg at the ECPR Rotating Summer School: EU’s capability and influence in international 
affairs at the European Institute of the University of Geneva. September 2000,
'* Globalisation may, for instance, be defined as the increase in cross national border transactions o f physical, financial, or human capital.
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1995:8). Even with such a broadened definition, one must recognise that the 15 governments o f the 
Union contain many different élites whose importance vary considerably from Member State to 
Member State and indeed may also interact on a transnational basis (Risse-Kappen 1995b).
(b) Which interests matter?
Academics used to distinguish sharply between foreign policy and foreign economic policy. This 
distinction reflected, on the one hand, foreign policy that dealt with military, defence and security 
issues. On these high-politics issues, a clear agenda existed leading to distinctive policy processes 
where trade was a collective material interest that would preserve security as the hierarchically most 
important area. On the other hand, foreign economic policy was concerned with low politics issues, 
such as trade tariffs, subsidies, economic reforms, and development aid. These were neatly separated 
from foreign policy by the bounded hierarchical subordination to high politics. This distinction made 
some sense in the IR-literature through the ’70s and ’80s. Yet, it was maintained in EFPA after the end 
of the Cold War because of the dual pillar structure dividing external affairs of the Union into the 
community-based external economic relations of the first pillar and the foreign and security policy of 
the CFSP o f the second pillar.
Power politics did not just die out after the Cold War, however convenient that would have been. 
Zielonka, for example, describes the “the return o f  geo-political strategies in European capitals” 
(1992). Examples include the dispute among EU Member States about the payments for EU’s special 
envoy in Mostar, which Winn calls a “blatant attempt o f  France to gain leadership in the unfolding 
crisis in Bosnia’\\997:2S). Moreover, the French President Jacques Chirac has urged Europe to cope 
with the dangers of the increasingly unipolar (US driven) international system.19 Hill elaborates over 
what he calls “historical realism”, whereby the European foreign policy system is dominated by this 
logic o f  diversity of interests (1998a; 1993:324). According to Hill, the logic o f diversity o f interests is 
the way common pressures are exerted on differing national situations (1998a:36, 16-19). This inhibits 
integration and makes cooperation intermittent (Debié 1997).
!5 See also Joffc (1993), Moreover. Greece unilaterally vetoed any decisions against its own national interest regarding Cyprus. Macedonia and Turkey 
Germany recognised Slovenia and Croatia in winter 1991 despite a common EU path towards recognition planned for February 1992 (Crawford 1996).
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The distinction between high politics and low politics is however becoming increasingly obsolete 
(Rosenau 1990; Hocking & Smith 1997; Bretherton and Vogler 1999:169-170; Joergensen 1993b). 
Hocking & Smith reason that power politics after the end of the Cold War took place as competition 
more “/» terms o f  economics rather than in terms o f  territorial acquisition or military assertiveness” 
(See also Holsti 1995:37; Zielonka 1998b: 18). In fact, the whole creation and development of foreign 
policy co-operation between fifteen sovereign states “sui generis” over a period o f both Cold War and 
post Cold War suggests the opposite. This outcome seems to be neither given, nor in principle 
predictable or derived from the distribution o f power in the international system as the realists assume 
(Waltz 1979). In an empirical study, Zielonka notes that power politics today is performed within the 
auspices o f “the pressure o f  practical consideration” and not a la “Bismarck and Metternich”. He 
reports that instead o f finding hegemonic politics, he has found only traces o f  Mhegemonic atavism 
There may be a range o f reasons for this that are unrelated to interests in the traditional sense. The 
German sociologist Niklas Luhman, for instance, spoke about the “Gesetz des Wiedersehns” in order to 
indicate that within an organisation you never meet only once. If you play power politics, others might 
harm you on a different occasion.20 Whatever, reasons for the vanishing demarcation lines, EFPA 
urgently needs to build an analytical bridge between economics and politics.
(c) Taking the first step towards a theory on European Security Economy?
In order to explain the Union’s paralysis and progress as a global foreign policy actor, one would for 
instance need to be aware o f  the role played by economic credentials, force o f attraction, economic
i
power, and legitimacy in the foreign policy field, and consideration should be given to the impact o f  the i
institutional structures on the CFSP (Allen & Smith 1990; Piening 1997; Grunert in Cafruny & Peters 
1998; Carlsnaes & Smith 1994; Wallace & Wallace 2000). As regards the impact of economics, in the 
day-to-day European foreign policy making, the external economic relations o f  the EC are becoming 
cumulatively present, for instance, through the use o f political conditionality (Karen Smith 1998).21 
This development overlaps with the more frequent use o f economic sanctions as a tool of the Union. 
Notably, economic sanctions involve both external economic relations and the CFSP as economic ™ 
sanctions are decided in the CFSP (e.g. as Common Positions or Joint Actions) and implemented " 
within the external economic relations (TEU, Article 228a).
i0 Peter Schmidt (see bibliography) pointed this out to me.
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Knowledge from liberal inspired approaches with institutional or power-politics related ideas may well 
be what it takes to investigate the relation between economics and politics in European foreign policy. 
One o f the ideas inspired by liberalism is neo-functionalism (Haas 1964), which predicts that 
iiexiernalizatiotf> will take place within the logic o f spillover.21 2 Alternatively, the relationship between 
economics and politics is analysed by interdependence theories. Interdependence is defined as a state, 
mutually shared by two or more parties, of being determined or significantly affected by external forces 
(Keohane & Nye 1977). Within this logic, the CFSP is a regime, that is, a governmental arrangement of 
procedures, rules, or institutions whereby governments regulate and control transnational and interstate 
relations (Ginsberg 1989:8, 34-S6).23 Like neo-functionalism, however, interdependence theory, also 
fails to consider some important issues. First, the impact o f interdependence on the political 
management functions regarding foreign policy at the EU level is unclear. Are the foreign policy 
institutions such as the CFSP immune to developments towards more interdependence or globalisation?
Second, what about the problems of distribution? As Moravcsik notes, “there are important 
distributional conflicts not ju st within (EC) states but among them” (1998:3, 33-38). In particular, a 
distinctive feature of foreign policy is that it often involves high costs from the very beginning o f  the 
implementation of an action. Paradoxically, Moravscik’s approach argues that his liberal 
intergovemmentalism has nothing to say in the area o f the CFSP; since the CFSP produces “a  non- 
socio economic collective good” (1993:494, 3-12). However, the Union’s handling o f the 
administration of the town Mostar may suggest that a large part o f the paralysis of the Union lies within 
traditional problems o f distribution of economic costs for non-material foreign policy goals among 
fifteen different Member State economies (Regelsberger 1997). The aims o f the CFSP may be non­
economic in nature, but the means to reach them most certainly are not. Third, even though functional 
or interdependence arguments may have some validity for European integration, those economic 
interests that are referred to need to be specified better in the CFSP than they have been until now.
More recently, studies such as Michael Smith, Bretherton & Vogler and Nuttall approach this issue in a 
more ambitious way than earlier (1998; 1999; 2000). Michael Smith’s neo-institutional essay captures
21 Political conditionality emails “the Unking by a state or international organisation ofperceived benefits to another state (such as aid) to the fulfilment 
o f  conditions relating to the protection o f  human rights and the advancement o f  democratic principles" (9-12). See also Allen & Smith (1990).
22 Two factors are determinant for the process of spill-over: i) “the underlying interdependence o f  functional tasks and issue arenas capable o f  being
mobilised by pressure groups, parties, or government agencies Mho s interests are affected',, and ii) "creative talents o f  political elites”
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the fundamental linkage between the world political economy and EFP (Larsen 1999a:592,6; M. Smith ! 
1998). What Smith understands as economic interests is a four dimensional entity. According to Smith, j
“a  sector logic” causes different sectors of activity in the World Political Economy to participate. •
i
Hereby, institutions play the role o f  activator engaging in “institutional entrepreneurship” or j 
“institutional c o -o p e ra tio n Member States demand certain actions, preferably with the use of EC ! 
instruments to avoid drawing on national resources. Finally, the World Political Economy pressures the 
EU by external demand. Smith’s first and third logic thus mostly refers to the agency of the dynamics 
between the external economic relations and the CFSP, either with specific sectors or Member States as 
the agents. The second and the fourth logic primarily relate to the structure o f either the EU system or 
the world system. In many ways, this approach addresses some of the gaps mentioned above. Yet, one 
of the dimensions that would need to be added to Smith’s approach in order to address the external * 
economic relations -  CFSP question is the impact o f the world political economy on the CFSP itself. \ 
This relates to the fact that if the relationship between economic and political variables is becoming as • 
blun-ed as Hocking & Smith and Peter Schmidt argue, it is unlikely that the CFSP has remained j
■k
untouched. 1
\
By studying the relationship between economic “presence” and different degrees o f external 
“actorness”, Bretherton and Vogler divide the impact o f economic interests according to the } 
supranational competence underlying this interest (1999:99, 46). Similar to Michael Smith, Bretherton 
and Vogler however fail to include the impact on the CFSP of having different competence in various 
parts o f external economic relations, such as trade and FDI (46). The question regarding different 
competence of the Union in, for instance, trade, foreign direct investment, services, and intellectual 
property rights indeed brings to mind that economic interests diverge considerably from issue to issue.
If the interests do not diverge because of the intensity and diversity of transactions, they diverge 
because of the different institutional competence involved regarding these transactions, etc. The link 
between institutional competence and interests may be very close and some institutional competence 
may even derive from the economic interests. One of the results of Fritz Scharpf s research on 
federalism is, for instance, that the Länder (and the Bund) preferred the passing over o f competencies to ,
a negotiating system in order to bypass democratic control (1988).24 In sum, it seems commendable to : 
include institutions (or institutional competence) as one of the constraints and opportunities imposed on
Ginsberg uses a revised neo-functionalist interdependence approach to explain the emergence of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
24 Peter Schmidt pointed this out to me.
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economic preferences that in the end determine (economic) interests. This should form part o f any 
attempt to analytically link economics and politics of EFP.
2.3 Institutions
The importance o f institutions is recognised by the majority of approaches in EFPA. Much o f the 
literature would probably subscribe to Keohane’s definition of institutions as a “persistent and 
connected set o f rules, form al and informal, that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity and 
shape expectations'X 1987). Some strands o f institutional EFPA would consider institutions as more 
than the aggregate of rules (and norms), as major independent variables for human actions and a 
cultural constraint (Aspinwall & Schneider 2000). Norms refer to an idea in the minds of members of a 
group specifying what the members or other people should do, ought to do, and are expected to do 
under given circumstances.25 Institutions are dealt with as a place within which ideas or norms are 
embedded. These sociological institutionalist approaches will be examined separately in Section 2.4 
analysing ideational approaches to EFP.
In the remainder of this section, the focus will be on those approaches that interpret institutions more 
narrowly in line with North, where institutions are the humanly devised formal and informal framework 
within which human interaction takes place and that shapes this interaction (1990). The formal 
framework consists of constraints and opportunities of an explicit character, such as rules devised by 
human beings. The informal framework comprises those constraints and opportunities of more implicit 
nature, such as conventions, codes of behaviour or procedures (3). Similarly, Scharpf considers 
institutions as organisational capabilities (i.e. assemblies of personal, material, and informational 
resources that can be used for collective action) and the formal and informal rules governing their 
employment (1989). In other words, this literature would agree that rules of the CFSP are set by the 
institutional framework, however, the organisational capabilities o f the CFSP may influence the overall 
institutional framework just as well as the institutional framework structures the organisational 
capabilities.
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The neo-institutional EFPA
A substantial amount of EFP-literature implicitly uses typical assumptions o f neo-liberal 
institutionalism in their respective frameworks. Institutions thus help states work together in the 
international system (Keohane 1986; Lisa Martin 1992). Cooperation occurs when actors adjust their 
behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of others. The environment in which cooperation 
occurs is not necessarily one of harmony of interests as in a purely liberalist framework. Instead, actors 
have mixed interests (Axelrod 1984; Axelrod & Keohane 1993; Baldwin 1993:91).26 By increasing the 
ability to communicate and cooperate, institutions may change the pay-off structure o f  the actors 
(redefine interests). Institutions are thus facilitators of cooperation. For example, by introducing 
principles and rules, international institutions make governments more concerned about precedents (the 
shadow o f the future), thus, affect leaders’ expectations about the future (Axelrod 1984). Institutions 
may further provide a  standard against which actions can be measured, providing information about 
actors’ compliance, and assigning responsibility for applying sanctions (Axelrod & Keohane 1993:97). 
Finally, issue-linkages “may be attempted to gam additional bargaining leverage by making ones own 
behaviour on a given issue contingent on others actions toward other issues”. To the extent these issue- 
linkages are beneficial to both sides in a negotiation they may facilitate agreements that might not 
otherwise have been possible.
These characteristics should be able to account for the progress of EFP if  one can demonstrate growing 
institutional capacity and converging interests in EFP. Characteristically for EFPA, institutions seldom 
play the role o f the facilitator and interests seldom converge among the Member States, thus the 
paralysis. A vast majority of EFPA holds that unfortunately there is a considerable gap between how 
institutions should become facilitating and the way the CFSP institutions are actually structured. 
Notably, institutional EFPA is preoccupied with identifying institutional flaws and deficiencies that 
have caused EFP to fail and subsequently need to be removed (Grunert in Cafruny 1998). For instance, 
Regelsberger marks out that “the unanimity ruling leads to paralysis and to a less constructive 
positioning o f  the member states^ 1997:67-83). Regelsberger adds that 1) the political committee o f the 
CFSP that was “unable to fulfil its function since the political directors fee l more responsibility fo r  
Member States' own foreign policies”, and 2) the Joint Actions and Common Positions that created
(a)
After G.C. Homan's definition from 1950
2fi Often this is described by the Prisoners Dilemma came, but Stag Hunt. Chicken or Deadlock games may also account for it.
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“natural occasional overlap o f the agenda o f the different pillars, sometimes leading to hogging down 
o f proposals in institutional quarrels.”
This leads Regelsberger to suggest reforms o f the EU’s foreign policy institutions, including, 1) 
introducing (qualified) majority voting with the possibility of opting out under special criteria or 
positive abstention, 2) clarifying the pillar structure on the IGC, 3) reserving Joint Actions for very 
special and detailed issues, and 4) letting Common Positions cover the broad range of everyday issues 
expressing in a more formal way the Union’s acquis politique on international issues.
The strength o f these institutionalist methods is that they are policy relevant and often useful in 
discussion o f institutional reforms at the IGC.27 The primary drawback is the underestimation o f factors 
other than institutional flaws, such as the impact o f ideas and the failure to incorporate interests with 
more nuance than just as either converging or diverging preferences.28 The institutional literature seems 
to suggest that diverging national interests ultimately would have been suppressed and more 
cooperation would have resulted had the Union had more efficient institutions in the first place. This 
leads to wrong conclusions such as Monar’s argument that an important general effect o f the Union’s 
dual system is that it “is an in-built tilt towards the economic domain” (1998). The reason is that one 
could just as well argue that had it not been for the CFSP and the dual structure that secured the 
integrity of European foreign policy at a time the foreign policy dimension of EFP was very limited 
compared to economic and external economic relations policies, the economic bias might have been 
much higher today than it actually is.
Similarly, institutional EFP A does not reflect on how the external economic relations and the CFSP 
will develop over time if  the dual structure really is an artificial barrier. Regelsberger & Wessels note, 
“the link with instruments outside o f  CFSP is not developed to the degree that it would be available 
whenever needed” (1996:53,24-31). The question is what will happen over time and how did it reach 
this point. It must at least imply that either the dual structure becomes increasingly unsustainable over
27 The work of authors such as Cameron. Regelsberger. Wessels. or Krenzler has indeed formed the basis o f on-going reform discussion of the CFSP One 
example is the Reflection Croup on Enlargement chaired by Horst Jurgen Krenzler and financed by the European Commission DG.
28 Among others Diez(199S). Wendt (1999); Risse-Kappen (1996); Keohanc & Goldstein (1993); Waever (1996).
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time, or alternatively, the external economic relations and the CFSP might be pulled apart reinforced by 
the artificial division between them.29
Related to the problem of treating interests and ideas superficially, is literature’s treatment of the 
feasibility and the conditions for institutional reforms. Proposals for institutional reforms such as the 
introduction o f qualified majority voting may be unlikely to gain support despite the fact that a carefully 
performed institutional analysis concludes that it would lead to more EFP cooperation. It has, for 
example, been argued that EFP would have been better o ff continuing with a revised form o f the 
foreign ministerial EPC (Nuttall 2000:109). When a continuation o f  the informal EPC is suggested to 
provide more momentum to EFP, one must ask, “how the Union's lack o f  ability to project power 
leading now to fa r  reaching plans fo r  a Common European Security and Defence Policy could have 
been dealt with in a better way ..through ..informal EPC meetings or a community basedforeign policy 
(Dahl 2000)?
(b) The outcome measurement problem o f  institutionalism
What creates problems for institutional EFPA is, ironically enough, not so much its explanatory 
emphasis on institutions; it is the assumption and measurement o f the development of the dependent 
variable, European foreign policy. In particular, this holds for the 1990s where European foreign policy 
has not just been paralysed, but has also shown progress compared to the 1980s. From being a 
facilitating factor behind EFP development inducing “socialisation” and the ‘feeling o f belonging to a 
club” in the ’70s and ’80s (Nuttall 2000:272), the changes in informal rules at the beginning o f the 
1990s is interpreted as leading to “presidential overload”, “institutional turbulence at the expert leveF, 
and “confusion over the instruments”. Authors now blame the failures o f the CFSP on the formality of 
the TEU (Nuttall 1997; Wessels 1999). Wessels finds that the formal rules of the CFSP are too rigid to 
be operational. However, if the assumption is that EFP has not shown progress in the ’90s compared to 
the ’80s, it is no wonder that institutional literature gets it wrong. What needs to be settled is thus the 
measurement o f the dependent variable, European foreign policy outcomes (see Section 2.1).
If the measurement o f  the dependent variable problem can be solved, the analytical framework behind 
the institutional literature seems perfectly valid to analyse EFP, in particular, when ideas and interests
w Some may see the division as a mode by which it becomes easier to secure that the "trade ministers do their yoi>’’-philosophy of the EER can remain 
unaffected of political demands for action in the name of human riehts norms and democratic principles (Interview Council Secretariat. November 1999).
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are specified more explicitly. In fact, the formalised framework of the General Affairs Council 
meetings (see Chapter 3) may even allow for formal theorising on specific issues as seen in Schneider 
& Seybold’s analysis o f the decision-making of the EPC (1997).
2.4 Ideas
Ideas are by no means a novel construct. Max Weber, for example, emphasised them (or introduced 
them) in his work on meaning (Sinn) that individuals attribute to their action. As EFPA is a relatively 
new area o f inquiry, there are however some opportunities for re-emphasising ideas due to either 1) the 
relative absence o f ideas in specific EFP approaches, and 2) the analytical problems that exist in the IR- 
literature, particularly regarding which ideas matter.
(a) Constructivism
Despite this, ideas have begun in recent years to enter EFPA more explicitly through various 
constructivist approaches.30 In constructivism, identities and interests are endogenous to social 
interaction (Wendt 1994; 1999; Joergensen 1997). The major question posed is how state interests may 
be transformed through this interaction. Norms shape the foreign policy of states (see definition of 
norms in Section 2.3). Norms are developed from the interaction among different groups in the 
domestic as well as in the international society. The set of rules and norms underlying a society 
determines the identity o f a state or a certain political group, and this shapes its international behaviour.
What does constructivism then have to offer the literature? Constructivism explains the paralysis of 
EFP by the diversity o f national identities (Larsen 1993; 1997; Risse-Kappen 1995a; Struwe 1998; 
Joergensen 1993a; 1997; Smith, K.E. 1993). The progress o f EFP is explained in terms of élite 
socialization (Tonra 1996; 1997), the emergence of human rights norms into EFP (Struwe 1998) or the 
evolution of meanings and practices that constitute inter-subjective international structures (Bretherton 
& Vogler 1999:30, 1-2)31 Constructivism’s main contribution to EFPA is its attention to ideas, which
30 Constructivists disagree internally as to what a constructivist approach is, for instance, on the issue whether constructivists may make truth claims and 
generalisations in social sciences (Risse 2000.3,5*7). To avoid this internal discussion, constructivists are here declared constructivists. The thesis mainly 
looks at what has been defined a social or ideational constructivism. This strand of thought highlights that ideational factors have causative force in world 
affairs. See an overview on different constructivist approaches in Penman (2000:Chapter 1).
31 Bretherton and Vogler see the Union developing as a foreign policy actor through "dynamic interaction between innovative political actors and the 
opportunities and constraints afforded by changing international and domestic structures" (1999:29. 32-35).
43
Uhas filled an important theoretical and empirical gap. Karen Smith notes “constructivism ...appears to 
be useful, particularly in understanding how the \supranational * style o f  decision-making could 
develop, even in the foreign policy sphere” (1996:79, 16-19).32 3Moreover, constructivism is in fact one 
o f the most systematic IR research frameworks applied to EFPA since Pijpers’ attempt to apply realism 
in 1990.”  Constructivism has taken the measurement and conceptualisation problems of the outcomes 
in EFP seriously, although the number o f rigorous empirical applications still remain few. Another 
strength o f constructivist studies is the huge amount of information that is loaded into empirical 
applications, as constructivist approaches often rely on qualitative case studies and deals with ideational 
variables that cannot be measured directly but needs several indicators to be assessed.
A disadvantage though is that constructivist studies are seldom individually comparable and are thus 
unsuitable for cumulative research. Moreover, constructivism 1) has problems in approaching the 
intergovernmental nature o f  the CFSP, 2) has limited new information to provide about the paralysis of 
EFP, and 3) has systematically underestimated the importance o f beliefs and ideas about the workings 
o f a policy. First, constructivism, has had difficulties in gaining legitimacy in the field with its 
arguments about the importance of non-state actors while the CFSP has held and still holds highly 
intergovernmental features. Second, in explaining the paralysis o f the CFSP in the 1990s, 
constructivism comes relatively close to the traditional state-centric approach saying that the lack o f co­
operative progress in the CFSP might result from lack o f opportunities for discursive policy 
deliberation in EFP (Risse-Kappen 1996:71; Larsen 1997).
Third, constructivism fails to take into account that ideas may as well as being general policy- 
paradigms or norms also be specifically related to the workings o f a policy. Crawford maintains that the 
“lack o f  European norms ...made Europe unprepared to act decisively...in the first part o f  the Bosnia 
War, 1991-1993” (1997:4, 3-5). Moreover, Crawford argues that in the second phase of the Bosnia 
War, 1993-1995, the “procedural norm o f preserving multilateralism ...this time avoided domestic 
forces being more important than procedural norms in accounting for the final outcome”. The question 
is how could the norm o f  multilateralism gain in force in the course o f only two years?34 Crawford
32 Moreover, analysing the influence of Western Europe on American foreign policy during the Cold War, Thomas Risse-Kappen ( 1993) argues that “the 
interaction processes in the transatlantic relationship can be better understood on the basis o f  liberal theories o f  International relations ”...
"complemented by institutionalist arguments emphasising the role o f  norms and communicative action".
33 See the rather critical remarks on this attempt in Riemersma (1991).
34 Ruggie (1993) defines multilateralism as “an institutional form that coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis ofgeneralised 
principles o f  conduct: that is principles which specify appropriate conduct fo r  a class o f  actions, without regard to the particularistic interests o f  the 
parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence
44
IJI  If MHWH ^  j j JLKW
maintains that the impact o f  the failures o f unilateralism and EU foreign policy to provide a solution to 
the war made Member States swing towards multilateralism. Such an explanation relates to changes in 
the idea about how unilateralism works compared to how multilateralism works as a solution to the 
conflict in the Balkans. Strictly speaking, it does not regard a norm but more an idea about the workings 
of a particular policy.
A similar problem appears in Struwe’s account of why the Critical Dialogue (CD) towards Iran 
emerged at the beginning o f the 1990s (1998). Struwe’s main argument is that CD was facilitated by the 
emergence of human rights norms. That human rights norms have changed the agenda of IR over the 
last decade is uncontroversial (Hoffman 1994). However, the emergence o f human rights norms cannot 
explain why the CFSP became the instrument by which Member States such as Germany, France, and 
Britain sought to make Iran comply with these norms. In theory, the appropriate question to ask is 
instead why CD was not formulated within OSCE, the UN, the Contact Group, or G8, instead o f the 
EU, thus emphasising the importance of other ideas than norms.3S
(b) Cognitivism
The question is whether, there are any alternatives to constructivism, or not. Rational approaches have 
in line with a general neglect of ideas in IR largely ignored the impact of ideas in EFPA (Schneider 
2000a:3, 9-28). In theory, however, approaches exist that address ideas in a way that may fill the gap of 
the constructivist literature. Wendt suggests a division of labour between the “rationalist” (cognitivist) 
concept of common knowledge (i.e. shared beliefs), which, according to Wendt, provides a useful 
model o f how culture is structured at the microlevel, and constructivism that at the macro level 
emphasises cultures’ constitutive aspects (158-159, 12).
Hereby, Wendt indirectly refers to the common distinction in IR between the cognitivist (rationalist) 
and the reflectivist (interpretivist or constructivist) notion o f ideas (Maier 1998). To these two 
dimensions, one may add discourse analysis.36 In the cognitivist school, ideas are held by the 
individuals, “beliefs in heads” (Wendt 1999), analysed by a literature often known as the “ideas as 
beliefs” literature. wCognition are those mental activities associated with acquiring, organising and
jS The Group of 8 (G8) consists of Canada, France. Germany. Italy. Japan, United Kingdom. USA and Russia.
56 See Diez 1998.
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using knowledge” (Diez 1998). The important difference between the cognitivist and constructivist 
tradition is that the cognitivist tradition allows for beliefs about how the world is to play a role in 
addition to the role played by normative beliefs about how the world should be. Cognitivism would 
accept that should-beliefs play an important role as ideological (philosophical or normative) beliefs 
referring to “an image o f  the world, or a set o f  such images which reduces the disquieting and often 
painful cognitive dissonance in the minds o f  the people who hold i f  (Deutsch 1988; Jervis 1970). One 
example is Jonathan Story’s “The Idea o f  the Core: The dialectics o f  history”, referring to how EFP 
developments in the 1990s may be explained by the change in dialectic after the Cold War (1997).37
Yet, beliefs about how the world is, or how the world works, may also be important. Such beliefs occur 
in the literature as instrumental, practical, cause-effect (Goldstein & Keohane 1993)38 or positive beliefs 
(Breen 1999:464, 6-8), and one may also call them functional beliefs. These beliefs regard the actors’ 
(subjective) assessment o f the necessity (or effectiveness) of a given action in terms o f securing a given 
outcome.39 Actors thus hold a “private” meaning o f the world. As Wendt suggests, actors hold “beliefs 
about each other’s rationality, strategies, preferences, and beliefs” or other features o f the workings of 
the world. Crucially, however, these beliefs are attached to a strategy or an idea, they are “contingent 
upon an agent's information on the state o f  the world” (4, 11-13). This implies that the expression 
“ideas as beliefs” is only halfway true concerning functional beliefs.40
The crucial dividing line between the cognitivist notion o f ideas and the reflectivist notion is 
ownership. In cognitivism, beliefs are held by individual agents and explained in intentional fashion. 
Yet, in the cognitivist tradition beliefs may be shared (Weingast 1995), common, group-based (Verbeek 
1994), élite based (Converse 1964:450; Welch Larson 1994:23), socio-economic élite based (Deutsch 
1988), or aggregated (M. Condorcet 1989).41 In contrast, in reflectivism ideas are “something more” 
such as collective representations, knowledge structures held by groups which generate macro level
37 Before the end of the Cold War the dialectic was one of two Germanys, two Europes, two alliances, and two superpowers. After the end o f the Cold War ) 
the dialectic changed with a new structure becoming visible where there was no military threat and the US was the only remaining superpower. I
31 In their view ideas have “causal weight in explanations o f  human action" Goldstein and Keohane distance themselves from cognitivist approaches, but |
Diez (1998) finds many similarities. !
39 Regarding the cognitivist school, see Boudon 1996. j
How exactly beliefs influence the outcome differs, however. As a constraint, “actors may believe that ineffective means o f  achieving goals (actually) j
are effective" (Morrow 1994:21 ). As an opportunity, beliefs are road maps (or “switchmen”) showing actors how to maximise interests, whether those |
interests are material or ideational (Max Weber cited from Goldstein & Keohane 1993). Beliefs may also be focal points that catalyze convergence in 
expectations to emerge (Garrett & Weingast 1993, Goldstein &  Keohane 1993) by helping to reduce ambiguity (Weingast 1995: 450). “ Values and ideas 
ofgeneral public" may also exist as "hooks" o f politicians by distracting the attention of the public from material interests to pursue own material (or 
other) self-interest” (Deutsch 1988. Bonoli 1999).
41 Converse (1964) hypothesised that élites have a more “articulatedelaborate, richer and better connected set o f  beliefs" than the public. "Elite" is here
defined as a very small minority of people who have very much more o f at least one of the basic values underlying the society, for instance, power, than [
have the rest o f  the population (Deutsch 1988). j
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patterns in individual behaviour over time (Wendt 1999:8, 12-13). In Wendt’s view, the cognitivist 
notion o f  common knowledge (i.e. shared beliefs) is something that changes each time beliefs change 
because beliefs are exclusively held by the individuals. Hereby, common knowledge or culture becomes 
nothing more than a metaphor in Wendt’s opinion.
Another advantage o f the cognitivist notion of ideas is that it recognises that not only do ideas play a 
role, but also that they play a role in combination with other factors such as economic interests, power, 
institutional rules, etc. A crucial determinant o f an action in the cognitivist tradition is also the degree 
of information about the opportunities that exist among actors. Put differently, the more uncertainty, 
perception of risks and the more “bounded' the rationality becomes the more relevant becomes the 
cognitivist approach to beliefs. Since international politics is full of imperfect information, EFP seems 
to be an area of relevance for a study offunctional beliefs.
Starting with the cognitivists approach, addressing the impact o f beliefs comprehensively should also 
include an analysis of the impact of normative beliefs, ideologies, or “grand strategies” on EFP. In 
the élite political belief systems approach,42 3 “beliefs systems” hold both “instrumental” beliefs and 
“ideological beliefs.44 Belief systems are thus as Larsson notes, “the total universe o f a person ’s 
beliefs about the physical world, the social world, and the se lf  ’ (Welch Larsson 1994:18). Ole Holsti 
also refers to the belief system and national images where the latter may be interpreted as specific 
beliefs about the world (1962)45
It should be added that in discourse analysis, the meaning and value o f the world is structured not by 
one’s immediate consciousness but by the way the various reality-making scripts one inherits or 
acquires from one’s surroundings by cultural /  linguistic tradition (Diez 1998). “Analysis o f  discourse 
thus takes into account the dynamics o f  the language rather than studying views as mental states in 
individuals'’ (Larsen 1999b:454). The question one must ask is whether the discourse is not already 
embedded into an analysis including outcomes, interests, institutions and ideas. At best discourse
42 An analys is of US grand strategies may be found in Amr. Sabet (1999). Wallace 1991.
43 George 1969; Weingast 1995; Jervis 1976. Welch Larson (1994) suggests the inclusion o f schemas which "mold a person 's general knowledge o f  
concepts and situations". The schema concept is more elaborate than the belief system approach by not only focusing on belief-behaviour linkages but 
also on the interv ening processes. The two approaches, the belief system approach and the schema approach do not seem to be contradictory.
44 Welch Larson 1994(17/18); Foyle 1997) Finally, in discourse analysis the term beliefs, generally avoided. Instead, ideas are used and are defined as 
"discourse”. Following Littin (1994), discourse is "sets o f  linguistic practices and rhetorical strategies embedded in a network o f social relations
45 Using this terminology, Kenneth Boulding, for instance, distinguishes between images of fact and images of value (1969 in National priorities: 
military, economic and social. Cited from Diez 1998:4). Jervis bases his notion of perception and misperception in international politics on the 
importance of history and the past.
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analysis is therefore another -  but superfluous way - of expressing various inferences governing EFP 
development. At worst, discourse analysis will - by sharing Habermas’ “attempt to eliminate all traces 
o f instrumental or strategic rationality from  the concept o f  communicative action” -  completely miss 
the point made earlier that (ideational) instrumentality may actually play an important role in the 
development of EFP leading to highly distorted conclusions (Schiemann 2000:3, 23-27). Until now the 
few discourse analytical attempts made in analysing EFP have, however, been rather harmless and 
offered interesting descriptive narratives o f a policy or action (Larsen 1999b).
(c) Learning & Ideas
In order to simplify, the project would prefer to separate is beliefs from should beliefs, but recognises 
that in reality this is virtually impossible (Schneider 2000a; Stocchetti 2000). In support of an analytical 
separation is however that the dynamics o f normative and functional beliefs must be different. Whereas 
normative and functional beliefs may both change over time, normative beliefs are less likely to be 
linked to the outcome o f a certain action. In this sense, normative beliefs may even sometimes seem 
almost constitutive. This is because normative beliefs are more context-dependent and less issue 
dependent than functional beliefs. Apart from adhering to Wendt’s suggestion of a division o f labour 
between cognitivism and constructivism when studying the impact of learning on EFP, this project sees 
an advantage in trying to isolate the effect offunctional beliefs.
How could this be done? Slightly surprising, this project found that H ill’s CEG in fact illustrated how 
functional beliefs may be accounted for in EFPA in general and in this project specifically. Whereas 
Hill’s work on EFP is “¿7 reference point fo r  all subsequent discussion”,46 it has seldom acted as 
reference in the debate o f  the inclusion o f  ideas into EFPA, Larsen being one of the exceptions (1999b). 
Recalling Hill’s model, expectations, i.e. ambitions or demands of the EU’s international behaviour 
deriving from both inside and outside the Union have overestimated the true capacity of the Union to 
supply the demanded foreign policy. Ideas and learning enter the model in two ways. First, discouraged 
beliefs (expectations) may under certain conditions be reduced, leading to a narrowing of the CEG. As 
Hill once noted, “the belief system o f  the practitioner is a deep rooted legacy o f  experience and 
political culture, but it is also an organic set o f  attitudes which is capable, within limits, o f se lf
46 Numerous authors stress Hill's importance. See for instance the bibliography o f this thesis of White, Holland. Larsen. Knud-Erik Joergensen, Stavridis 
orCafruny (1998: 148,29-37)
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transformation” (1988:30, 38-41). Second, the conditions for these dynamics to work are that structural 
forces do not run counter to the CEG. In Hill’s logic o f  diversity o f  interests, it becomes clear that ideas 
form part o f these structural forces as expressed in the identities o f the actors involved.
The link between beliefs or ideas and history has further been made in work on lessons from the past. 
Regelsberger et al indirectly address learning in their account on the vicious and virtuous circle of the 
ECP/CFSP (1997). In the vicious circle, ineffective and inefficient institutions made EFP decision­
makers run into failures. This, in turn, lowered the belief in the effectiveness of the CFSP (“credibility” 
is the word used). As a result, the willingness to use the CFSP was lowered and even less effective 
institutions evolved. Unavoidably, more failures arose. In contrast, the virtuous circle is the future ideal 
described by the converse mechanics. Member States realise the ineffective institutional structures, 
improve them and experience success followed by success. Ernest May and Richard Neustadt more 
directly link ideas to learning (Steve Smith 1988:24-25). In their account, foreign policy-makers are 
influenced by the beliefs about the lessons of history, either in terms o f analogies between the current 
situation and events in the past, or by seeing a clear pattern in the development of an issue. The point 
made is that there was a tendency for decision-makers to remember history badly, thus being unable to 
learn the appropriate lessons. This relates to the question on the Union’s paralysis and progress arguing 
that “learning” is not necessarily an automatic feature of foreign policy. There is an optimal way in 
which learning may take place, influenced by the beliefs decision-makers hold and under the right 
conditions. If these conditions are not fulfilled, learning may be impeded, or alternatively, if they 
improve, learning may be enhanced. The latter also seems to be the point made by Goldstein & 
Keohane, or any perception o f ideas that favours the notion o f ideas as either constraints or 
opportunities, whether these are embedded into the decision-making, or not.
Finally, both Ernst B, Haas and the Olsen & Peters conceptualisation o f learning are among the few 
focal points in the IR discipline. Ernst B. Haas defines learning as “the process by which consensual 
knowledge is used to specify causal relationships in new ways so that the result affects the content o f 
public policy”. Olsen & Peters in contrast see learning as either 1) “a positive outcome and an 
accomplishment in terms o f  improved knowledge, skills, performance, and preparedness fo r  the 
future”, or 2) “the processes through which experience is consulted and acted upon” (1996: 6). The
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conclusion of the discussion above comes closest to Olsen & Peters’ suggestion, yet, the aim will be to 
build a learning framework around the beliefs actors hold about the workings of strategies in particular.
There are, in fact, several “learning” models available in various parts o f the social sciences that may 
capture such dynamics. There is the Bush-Mosteller model of stochastic learning from 1955 and 
Michael Macy’s “ Walking out o f social traps” from 1989. There is also the individualistic, decision- 
theoretic model used by Breen (1999), which explicitly deals with beliefs actors hold about the 
workings of various strategies. The latter’will be applied to EFP in the following Chapter, as it appeared 
most up to date and had a structure that seemed applicable to the choices facing governments in EFP.
2.5 Conclusion
How should interests, ideas and institutions be incorporated and/or combined in an operational way to 
explain the paradoxical progress/paralysis dichotomy of EFP-dynamics over the last two to three 
decades? The primary conclusion of the literature review concerning this question is that more work 
needs to be done on how to conceptualise the dependent variable, European foreign policy, in an 
operational way. This holds either the term used for EFP is presence, capabilities, actomess, 
cooperation or maybe even - some day in the future - integration. The conceptualisation and 
measurement ultimately depends on the research question that a particular scholar seeks to address. Yet, 
this project argues that definitional reasons should never exclude neither single case studies nor 
cumulative research in being performed.
It was suggested to conceptualise European foreign policy as capability-presence, i.e. the Union’s 
capabilities to act and mobilise resources in international affairs. One sometimes forgets that 
capabilities to act and mobilise resources are after all the most important part of how EFP is assessed 
by decision-makers and by the public. Capability-presence could be operationalised by following | 
European integration literature’s notion o f depth, scope and decision-making mode. A narrowing o f the I 
dependent variable like this (excluding, for instance expectations and legitimacy) is seen as another way 
o f following Ginsberg’s input-output continuum more efficiently. Moreover, it seems operational for 
the wish to explore some of the growing quantitative material on EFP using statistical tools. Finally, it I
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emphasises the dynamic nature of this study, trying to explore reasons for fluctuations in EFP over time 
and not compared to the US, to the first pillar, or to the Member States.
The impact of learning is the core question of this project departing from the learning rhetoric among 
politicians and others about the Union’s actions in Bosnia, Kosovo, etc., to the sporadic literature on 
learning in IR by authors such as Haas and Olsen & Peters. This chapter specified learning as a social 
scientific concept relating it to the dynamics o f ideas. Ideas are basically a Weberian construct and 
needs to be demystified whenever possible. However, the use o f  ideas in EFPA has been sparse and not 
very explicit apart from the constructivist input. Constructivism naturally deserves credit for taking 
ideas seriously, but can hardly account for the impact of ideas about the workings of policies, i.e. 
functional beliefs. It also dismisses its own relevance as regards the impact o f individually held beliefs. 
Wendt is thus completely right in suggesting the division of labour between micro level research on 
these Junctional beliefs by the cognitivist/rationalist tradition and the macro level research on ideas held 
by a group of individuals.
Choosing Wendt’s “micro-lever as the focus o f  this project was not difficult. Constructivism has been 
weak in explaining both the paralysis and progress of the EFP, as have other approaches such as 
intergovemmentalism. The question, which justifies this approach, is why decision-makers prefer 
certain solutions, unilateral or multilateral, the UN or the EU, or a combination o f these to other 
solutions in a given situation. Why do EU governments distribute their effort the way they do, and why 
has this distribution of effort, or what we may term as the governments’ focus, changed over time, 
producing paralysis as well as progress?
Finally, the thesis adheres to finding areas where a changing composition of interests, or changing 
institutional competence backing certain interests up, have influenced the development of the EFP. Due 
to the erosion of borders between foreign policy and foreign economic policy, integrated frameworks 
are needed that include a hybrid notion of power involving both military and economic interests. 
Hocking & Smith suggest an integrative approach to foreign policy decision-making that gives “due 
weight to the influence o f conflicts in domestic constituencies and that recognises the role o f  the policy­
maker as being able to operate at the interface between the domestic and international arena and 
influencing both". As the study of external economic relations and its impact on the CFSP has been
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largely ignored, the suspicion was that the key to at least some o f the EFP paralysis and progress could 
be found between the external economic relations and the CFSP. The task became to express the impact 
of the external economic relations on the CFSP, and thus the impact o f institutional change and 
economic interests on the CFSP, taking duly into account the importance o f ideas and learning on EFP.
CHAPTER 3
A LEARNING MODEL OF EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY
The purpose o f this chapter is to develop a learning model o f  European foreign policy. As noted in 
Chapter 2, the aim of this model is to express how learning may affect a government’s decision to 
“subscribe” to the particular “idea” (Boudon 1996) or strategy of using the CFSP when acting in 
international affairs. Conventional wisdom says that learning cannot account for everything in the 
development of European foreign policy. The framework should therefore also look at the conditions 
under which learning will take place in order possibly to highlight the impact of some other factors 
than learning. Some of the conditions for learning may relate to the dynamics o f beliefs about the 
workings of the CFSP, and thus to the learning mechanism as such. Others, relate to factors such as the 
impact o f economic interests and institutional change, as described in the preceding chapters. The 
intuition is that some of these factors either have hindered learning or determined the Union’s actions 
in international affairs regardless of actors’ ability to learn.
The first section of the chapter lists some assumptions underlying the learning model. Those include, a) 
the main actors, b) the main objectives o f EFP, c) the allocation of effort, d) the cost function, and 
finally, e) the domestic constraints facing EFP decision-makers. The second section uses these 
properties to deduce how a purely interest driven allocation of effort in international affairs may look 
like. The third section develops the actual learning model by assuming that information is far from 
perfect in international affairs and that a government subsequently needs to decide which action to take 
based on beliefs about the workings o f the various possible actions. The choice of allocation o f effort 
between unilateral and multilateral (European) foreign policy will be given particular attention 
throughout the chapter. The fourth section discusses the learning model with respect to the specific 
European foreign policy context and deduces some hypotheses regarding learning and the impediments 
that may exist to learning. This section thus develops the core hypothesis on learning, and some o f the 
reasons for the null-hypothesis (on no learning) being true instead. The section further looks at how 
shifts may occur to the learning dynamics such that the distance changes between the beliefs held about 
European foreign policy capabilities and their actual workings. The fifth section looks at the impact of 
external economic relations on the CFSP. This is an attempt to describe in more detail one of the 
alternative explanations of European foreign policy developments. As mentioned in previous chapters,
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the focus will be on arriving at a better notion of the combinatory influence of economic interests and 
institutional competence o f the external economic relations and the impact of their change on EFP.
3.1 Assumptions
(a) The actors
The framework deals with the institutional negotiating environment o f the General Affairs Council 
(GAC), i.e., the meetings of the ministers of foreign affairs. In the GAC, governments are represented 
by foreign ministries through their foreign ministers, political directors, ambassadors to the Political 
and Security Committee, (PSC), permanent representatives (in COREPER), military representatives (in 
the Military Committee and Military Body) and by other officials working for these people in the 
committees in the Council Secretariat. It is in this group o f largely government-related decision-makers 
that the main actors of the CFSP are found, as “the CFSP seems to remain a policy area where 
intergovernmental bargaining dominates the decision-making process” (Welle 1995, cited in Risse- 
Kappen 1995:67, 2-4).
Other actors play a considerable role in the policy-making process. As long as the objectives delineated 
below are fulfilled, other actors such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), or individuals is 
assumed to care less about the choice between, for instance, a unilateral or European solution to a 
problem as long as the goals are fulfilled. Due to this, a government needs to be concerned about where 
its objectives are carried out most effectively, mainly because it is held responsible for the 
implementation o f the objectives. A government may ex ante hold preferences about where to carry out 
foreign policy that do not regard whether a given institution is the most effective or not. For instance, a 
government almost per definition must be more inclined to use unilateral foreign policy-making to 
solve a particular crisis since this will make the government remain at least as independent, or 
powerful, as before.
(b) The objectives
Any negotiation whether to act or not in this sphere o f GAC is based on policy objectives that are
primarily political in nature. Often these proposals are initially raised at the EU level through one of the
Council working groups. That the proposals are political stems from the political aims o f the CFSP.
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Those involve, 1) “to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity 
of the Union..”, 2) “to strengthen the security o f  the Union”, 3) “to preserve peace and strengthen 
international security.”, 4) “to promote international cooperation..”, and 5) “to develop and 
consolidate democracy and the rule o f  law, and respect fo r  human rights and fundamental freedoms 
(Treaty of Amsterdam, Title V, J.l (1)). In practical foreign policy-making, issues raised within the 
CFSP thus must have a non-economic (political) component since if they were purely economic they 
had not become an issue o f the CFSP in the first place. For instance, those who maintained that human 
rights violations should be brought to an end in the African Great Lakes Region during the atrocities 
committed in Rwanda 1994-1995 - advocating among others that the Union should react through the 
CFSP - were hardly sincerely preoccupied with European economic market shares in the region or in 
the world, neither were their primary concern the distribution of costs and benefits.1
(c) Allocation o f  effort
One may now assume that the government continuously has two choices during a foreign policy crisis 
or conflict.2 First, the government may decide either to act or not to act. Second, the government will in 
case it decides to act decide on the allocation o f effort between unilateral and multilateral action.3 
When the government acts unilaterally, it simply means that the government concentrates its effort on 
national foreign policy institutions while pursuing its objectives. Alternatively, the government may 
attach its effort to multilateral action by involving international institutions. For the EU Member States 
those, for instance, could be NATO, OSCE, UN, WEU (now being phased out), CFSP, G8, or the 
Contact Group. In the following “multilateral (European) refers to the EU’s CFSP unless otherwise 
noticed. If  the government decides to act, it thus furthermore has to decide how much effort it wishes to 
attach to European foreign policy. The government thus allocate its total effort when they act between 
unilateral and European foreign policy.
There is necessarily a continuity of outcomes (of a crisis or conflict) possible either the government 
acts or not.4 In the following, the focus is on two possible outcomes o f acting namely success (S) and 
failure (F). The government thus faces three different expected returns confronted with a foreign policy
1 That objectives on some issues, such as the Stability Pact for southeastern Europe, must be viewed recognising the impact of peace and stability on 
economic development for the region as whole does not violate the assumption. Analytically, stability and security can only be considered economic 
objectives insofar as it is the structure of the system that indirectly influences economic transactions EFPB 99/087, 17/5-1999. OJ L 133,28.5.1999,1-2,
\ One may think of the crisis or conflict as consisting of events that are single action items. Chapter 4 will elaborate on this.
5 For instance, Chittick etai (1995) use a unilateral -  multilateral perspective to governments1 belief systems.
4 Cases where governments cannot act due other governments' unwillingness to act are treated as thoush the eovemment had decided not to act.
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event: 1) the government acts, experiences a success, and receives the utility U(S), 2) the government 
acts, experiences a failure, and receives the utility U(F), and 3) the government does not act, and 
receives the utility U(N). The costs involved are assumed the same, either the government experiences 
a failure or success. There are no costs involved when the government does not act. This implies that 
U(S) > U(N) > U(F).
i ,
(d ) The costs
According to assumption (b) above, the CFSP aims at producing a non-economic collective good. 
However, the costs of producing this good are mainly economic. The costs derive from the efforts 
involved in mobilising resources towards a given third party, whether this party represents a region, a 
country or a sub-national unit.5 This effort may be tangible or intangible, present or future, involve 
human, physical, financial or environmental resources and may be followed by benefits6 *or additional 
costs. The costs may comprise financing of an action, e.g., for sending and maintaining staff of a 
special envoy,8 sending election observers or a special fact finding mission.9 The costs may also 
include measures to introduce dialogue or facilitate co-operation such as holding a peace conference10. 
or convoying humanitarian aid,11 etc.12 *There may also be political costs, as an action, for instance, 
may lead to loss o f power o f the government. Similarly, costs include economic losses stemming from 
restrictions on economic transactions such as the freezing o f assets, trade embargoes, boycotts, 
withdrawals of the GATT principle of the MFN preferential trade treatments, or the halt o f privileged 
treatment given by EC to imports (from e.g. Mediterranean countries), interruption o f GSP,n  etc. When 
the costs are tangible, resources have to be found through budgetary financing. Mobilising o f these 
resources are therefore usually discussed at the EU working group level itself.14 At the GAC, the
i Some actions of the CSFP have been aimed at sub-national units, e.g., the sanctions regime against UNITA (EFPB 97/019, “Council decision on Angola 
and aimed at inducing the Uniao National para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) to fulfil its obligations in the peace process" (30 Oct 1997, OJ 
L 309, 12. II. 1997: 8).
‘ E g. a "peace d i v id e n d a possibility described in the Arab-lsraeli Conflict by Leifer ( 1994) or a “democracy dividend’ as discussed in Nigeria (Africa 
Research Bulletin; Oct, 16* — Nov. 15th 2000,37(10), 14335; "Nigeria: Dividends ofPeaceT'
1 1ssues such as environmental standards, quality of life or other qualitative costs should in theory be included despite their apt measurement problems.
* The four special envoys sent by the Union after the TEU have been; Mostar (e.g. EFPB 96/215, 15/7-1996; OJL 185 24 07.1996. 2-4), African Great 
Lakes Region (EFPB 96/0S0, 25/3-1996, OJL87, 4 4 1996, 1-2), Kosovo (EFPB 99/047, 30/3-1999; OJL 89, 1,4,1999, 1-2) and the Middle East (EFPB 
96/348, OJL 315,4.12.1996, 1-2). The Kosovo envov was withdrawn in July 1999 after the United Nations Mission had been established (EFPB 99/134 29 
July 1999).
* The Union has issued joint actions to send electoral observer units to the Russian Federation (EFPB 9.11.93; OJL90, 20.11.1993,3). South Africa (EFPB 
93/532 6/12-1993, OJL 316,17 12.1993.45^47), Middle East (EFPB 95/265,25.9.1995; OJL 23 8 6.10.1995,4-7), Zaire (EFPB 96/326 11/11 -96, OJL 300, 
25.11.1996,1), Congo (EFPB 97/026 19.12.1997; OJL357,31.12-1997,1-3), and Nigeria (EFPB 98/383 22.12 98, OJL 354,30.12.98, 1-2).
10 Considering of support o f a regional conference on security and cooperation in the Great Lakes Region, 99/224,15/11-1999, OJ L294 16.11-1999,2-3
11 Support for the convoying of humanitarian aid in Bosnia and Herzegovina (O JL  286,20.11.1993. 1 -2).
lî EP notes in a communiqué that "it endorses the stress that is now being placed by The EU on "positive measures” and dialogue - and on supplementary 
programs, good governance, and democratic principles which may eventually replace conditionality (Report A 409/98; 6 November 1998 o f EP Committee 
on Foreign and Security Affairs).
15 GSP means general system of preferences and is granted unilaterally by the EEC to 129 LDCs from 1/1-1971-1994 (Sauvé & Stem ] 995).
14 Interview Council Secretariat. May 2000.
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financial issues are often settled before the 
reflect indirect costs that have not been 
disagreements.
meetings.15 However, disagreement at the GAC level may 
dealt with at the working group level or other political
(e) The domestics
Despite being main actors, governments still represent some segment o f  their domestic society and 
indeed domestic individuals. This representation will subsequently be reflected in the choice o f the 
degree o f effort attached to a given European foreign policy action. The government has a certain 
degree o f freedom -  in theory - in choosing which sort o f solution, unilateral or European, it wishes to 
endorse, in particular with which institution they will carry out their foreign policy objectives. They 
may prefer bilateral solutions between their government and a third country or may endorse various 
multilateral institutions to pursue their aims. What governments initially are inclined to do clearly play 
a decisive role as well, which will be developed further in Section 3.6. However, more important in 
terms o f learning is whether governments over time may change any previous inclination to a certain 
strategy or policy, or not.
The above is in line with the conventional wisdom that foreign policy-making is largely an élite-issue. 
Importantly, however, the financing o f the actions and the moral issues that may be attached to a 
particular case will eventually reflect a participation of interested parties similar to other issues.16 The 
costs thus ultimately link back to specific agents whether they are individuals, private or public firms, 
sectors of firms, or other organisations. Costs are distributed to these agents through the budget o f the 
EC,17 national foreign policy budgets, or the European Investment Bank. Shareholders may experience 
reduced shareholder values, falling yields, lack o f dividends and firms may as a result have to cut their 
working force or the wages.
The fact that costs of any CFSP action per definition needs to be distributed (sooner or later) to 15 
Member States makes the reallocation of resources of CFSP actions more complicated that if a 
government had acted unilaterally. Costs for European foreign policy actions may moreover necessitate 
politically complex reallocation o f resources within sub-national, national, or European Union budgets. 
To the extent that individuals are able to calculate (personal) gains and losses as accurate as the
15 Such issues thus mostly enter as "A” issues: issues that are not discussed since they in principle have been agreed to already at lower levels
16 Interview Council Secretariat, May 2000.
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available information permits them to perform such calculations, individuals will form preferences over 
different modes o f actions according to the resource consumption involved in a given action. We may 
assume that the more transparently costs are allocated to specific individuals or to groups of 
individuals, the more individuals would recognise this allocation and act accordingly. Moreover, the 
more costs are being imposed extraordinarily or involves complex reallocation across sectors, 
individuals, or interests groups, the more complex the exchange o f utility losses and benefits of an 
action will become, and thus reducing the likelihood of agreeing on a financing scheme for a particular 
action.
3.2 Interest-driven allocation of effort
The way the total effort is allocated between unilateral and European action depends on the returns in 
utility the governments receive from engaging in unilateral action, the returns from acting through a 
European foreign policy framework and the costs. As shown in Appendix 3.1, the government will act 
by attaching the degree o f effort that maximises its utility. Under perfect information, the government 
would allocate its effort in accordance with 1) the returns to unilateral effort, 2) the (completely 
foreseen) amount of unilateral effort, 3) the returns to multilateral effort, and 4) the (completely 
foreseen) multilateral effort.18
The effort attached to European foreign policy increases proportionally with the returns to effort of 
European foreign policy. Moreover, the lower the stakes are in case o f failure o f European foreign 
policy for the governments, the higher will the effort attached to European foreign policy inevitably be. 
Finally, conventional wisdom says that the more governments may gain from acting together, the 
higher the effort to EFP will be. Note, that until now, this illustrated a situation where European foreign 
policy making was represented by a purely interest-based or structural approach. It could easily be 
interpreted as being a realist/ intergovemmentalist approach, but the mechanism also mirrors arguments 
of the politics o f scale as described by Ginsberg (1992). As Ginsberg points out, and as concluded in 
Chapter 2, such an argument cannot stand alone when trying to explain EFP (1992:34-36), but needs to 
be combined with ideational and institutional factors. However, the impact of interests will be *
”  The budgets for CFSP actions have increased considerably after SEA, From 1987-1995 the increase was 350%.
** The model o f Section 3.2-3.3 derives from Breen (1999) and discussions between Professor Breen and this author. Any errors, misinterpretations or 
problems in it can naturally only be the responsibility of the author of this thesis. During the work the author also used papers by Breen and Penalosa 
(1997) and Piketty (1995). Pikeny develops a "rational-learning theory o f  redistributive politics seeking to explain important stylised facts concerning the 
effect o f  social mobility on both individual political attitudes and aggregate political outcomes" (551)
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elaborated on in Section 3.5 where the learning model is extended to include those factors that play a 
role under the null-hypothesis.
3.3 Learning
This section will discuss how the government allocates its effort given the fact that it no longer as in 
the previous section knows its opportunities by certainty. Put differently, the government now only has 
a belief or an idea about the returns to effort despite that it still is deemed to decide how to deal with 
emerging foreign policy crises and conflicts. The belief the government holds may be more or less 
“correct” implying that it is more or less in accordance with what the returns to effort actually are. As 
information in international politics generally is incomplete, this situation should come closer to reality 
than the scenario depicted in the previous Section 3.2 (Peffley & Hurwitz 1992:433; Jervis 1976).
The government is now uncertain about the relationship between the returns to unilateral and 
multilateral (European) foreign policy. In deciding what to do, the government must now stick to the 
beliefs it holds about the certainty of the values o f  the returns to effort being correct, or wrong. These 
beliefs reflect the relative likelihood of success (or failure) to occur - conditioned on the actions taken. 
Two sorts of beliefs enter this model. First, the government holds beliefs about the effectiveness o f its 
own efforts, i.e. beliefs about its unilateral capabilities to act and mobilise resources. Second, the 
government holds beliefs about the effectiveness o f the multilateral (European) strategy of the CFSP. 
Under this uncertainty, the government allocates its total effort between unilateral and multilateral 
foreign policy in such a way as to maximise its utility. The utility is a function of the beliefs about the 
returns to unilateral and multilateral effort and the amount o f effort attached to these two modes of 
action.
Similarly to the world of perfect information where interests and outcomes in the international system 
were the main determinants o f effort, one may compute the optimal level o f effort attached to European 
foreign policy given a government’s constrained ability to recognise causalities. Following the same 
procedure as if the government had perfect information, under uncertainty the government will 
maximise its expected utility, instead of merely its utility. As its decision now depends crucially on the 
formation of expectations about the causal impact o f a certain distribution o f effort on the outcome, this 
world can no longer be compared to the interest-based world, as the realist/intergovemmentalist setting.
Clearly, preferences still matter, but the government also acts in accordance with 1) its beliefs about the
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effectiveness of European foreign policy vis-à-vis unilateral foreign policy, 2) its amount o f effort and 
3) the costs. To maintain the focus on beliefs and learning in this part o f the framework, preferences are 
now assumed constant until Section 3.6.
It is namely by regarding this imperfect information structure o f action over time that the framework 
becomes a learning framework. The basic idea o f the learning model is general and follows from 
Figure 3.1 below.
Figure 3.1 The updating of beliefs
B e lie fs  about the returns 
to  m u ltila tera l (E u ro p ea n ) e ffo r t
B e lie fs  about the returns 
to unilateral e ffo r t
'he logic is that as learning is a dynamic concept, the government may change their beliefs over time.
'he government changes its belief when it receives new information. As shown in Figure 3.1, the 
ovemment holds a prior belief of a certain value (£ (0 ,0 (0 ) at time t. £(r)is the government’s prior 
elief about the workings o f its unilateral strategy, basically corresponding to the belief the government | 
olds about its unilateral capacity in solving a given foreign policy dilemma. 6{t) is the prior belief a j 
lember State government holds about the workings o f its multilateral (European) strategy, reflecting | 
le belief the government holds about the returns to effort attached to the CFSP. Based on these beliefs, I
6 0
the government will decide its multilateral (European) effort to be attached to solving a given foreign 
policy conflict. As indicated in Figure 3.1, the beliefs may be such that the government supports an EU 
action. Supposing that the other governments also support this EU action, the action will take place. 
However, regardless of whether any EU action actually takes place, or not, international affairs will 
continue to produce international outcomes. Moreover, information about these outcomes will continue 
to stream to the governments. However, the government will only receive new information about the 
workings o f the CFSP if it allocates effort to the CFSP and the Union can agree to act. Put differently, 
doing is a necessary (but not sufficient, see below) condition for learning.
Based on the new information about the workings o f the CFSP from the international outcomes and in 
the light of the prior beliefs that the government held about the workings of the CFSP, the government 
will at time t+1 determine a posterior belief (j?,+1,0,+t). As at time t, the government’s allocation of 
effort will at time t+1 take place according to the posterior beliefs about the workings of the CFSP 
given the interests and the costs involved in a given action. The process of updating o f beliefs from 
international outcomes, EU-actions and previously held beliefs should optimally continue this way 
generating more and more information about the workings of the CFSP.
When a government, for instance, experiences a successful outcome, which corresponds to the prior 
beliefs, the posterior beliefs are positively proportional to the prior beliefs. A similar dynamic equation 
represents the updating of the government’s belief in case it experiences a failure. In this case, the 
government will generate a posterior belief proportional to the prior beliefs again. The government’s 
new posterior beliefs, thus, were determined by two factors. First, they follow how much the successful 
or unsuccessful outcomes are in line with the prior beliefs. Second, they depend explicitly on the prior 
beliefs, whatever the prior beliefs are. It may be noted that if the government does not act at all, these 
beliefs remain unchanged ceteris paribus.
In Section 3.5, some of the conditions for changing the beliefs outside this learning framework will be 
discussed, for instance, the impact of changed normative beliefs about multilateralism after the end of 
the Cold War.
As mentioned, the government holds beliefs about the effectiveness o f unilateral and multilateral 
(European) foreign policy. The correct state of the wforld or the actual effectiveness o f unilateral and
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1European foreign policy is consequently not known. In order to understand the dynamics of learning |
better, one may define two states of the world. Following Breen (1999) these two set of beliefs are I
(7r’,0’) and (it, 0). The one set o f beliefs { tt ) resembles the situation where the “correct” returns j
to unilateral or multilateral effort favour multilateralism. In order words, this state o f the world |
represents the situation where European foreign policy is the most successful foreign policy option. J
The other set of beliefs ( n  , 6 ) represents the situation where unilateral foreign policy is the most |
effective and successful option. One o f these states is the “correcr” state of the world, but the I
government does not know which one it is. The government thus is constantly trying to leam which one 
is the more correct state in order to ensure the highest return on its allocation of efforts.
In the one dimensional space between these two states o f the world one may imagine a continuum of 
values of the government’s beliefs about the effectiveness of unilateral and European foreign policy 
reflecting the government’s current conviction and cumulated learning on this issue. The beliefs that 
the government holds at time t are subsequently a  mixture of the two states of the world.
■ I
In the following, these beliefs will be captured in the parameter z. Let us assume that z expresses the j 
weight the government attaches to multilateral (European) foreign policy being successful; to the truth j 
o f the state (ji’,0’). Then (1-z) expresses the weight the government attaches to unilateral foreign policy 
being successful, to the truth o f the state (ir, 0).
The dynamics o f learning may now be expressed in terms of the development of the beliefs z to various 
international outcomes either confirming or discontinuing the previously held value of z. In general, 
the dynamics o f the learning process may be illustrated as in Figure 3.2 below following Breen (1999: 
468, Figure 1).
Figure 3.2 illustrates the dynamics of learning in a (zt, zt+1) diagram. There are two trajectories shown. 
Both regard the situation where the correct beliefs about the world is (the hypothetical situation) where j
European foreign policy is successful and unilateral foreign policy is unsuccessful. The first is dotted j
and marked by the sign rf+, . This trajectory shows the dynamics of the learning beliefs given that the I
correct belief is that European foreign policy is successful, and that the government experiences a j
success. The second is fully drawn and marked by the sign z£ i. Similarly, this trajectory shows the |
dynamics o f the learning beliefs given that European foreign policy is successful, but that the 1
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Figure 3.2 The learning dynamics
government experiences a failure.
The above trajectories will arise from a range o f  non-Bayesian learning schemes, among others the 
Bush-Mosteller model mentioned in Chapter 2. In Appendix 3.1, an example of the application o f a 
Bayesian learning model is, however, reproduced where the two beliefs zt and zt+i follows a specific 
rule, Bayes rule. The learning related to this rule is expressed in (3.1) and (3.2) in Appendix 3.1. 
Appendix 3.2 further lists some of the comparative static effect of such a narrowly defined learning 
process.
Going back to Figure 3.2, let us now assume that the amount of effort allocated to European and 
unilateral foreign policy represents that a prior belief zt is higher than z \  In that case, the government 
who exerts a high degree o f effort to European foreign policy in accordance with these beliefs and 
experiences a success will as shown in Figure 3.2 be confirmed in this belief and increase its belief and 
allocation of effort to European foreign policy even further. This process will repeat it self in the area 
from “ 1” towards “2” in Figure 3.2 until the beliefs converge towards the correct beliefs that European
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1foreign policy indeed is successful. In contrast, the government who under these conditions experiences [
a failure will reduce its belief in the importance o f European foreign policy compared to unilateral I
foreign policy in the area from “2” towards “1” in Figure 3.2 until the belief converges to the belief z*.
Thus if  European foreign policy really is a successful strategy, but the government in this way reduces | 
its effort allocated to European foreign policy every time it experiences a failure, the government will I 
also reduce its chances o f succeeding in the future. |
Assume now instead that the effort attached to European foreign policy starts at the lower range I
corresponding to prior beliefs between “0” and z* in Figure 3.2. A government who experiences a j
success in this unilaterally dominated strategy will tend to believe that this allocation o f effort was the 
more correct one, and will exert even less degree o f effort to European foreign policy in the future. 
Alternatively, a government who experiences a failure given lower prior beliefs in European foreign 
policy than those held in unilateral foreign policy will raise its belief in European foreign policy. The 
government’s belief will here converge towards z*.
In more practical terms, this means that the learning model allows for the possibility o f  either a vicious 
or virtuous circle o f European foreign policy development. The vicious circle is the situation where the j 
government exerting a high effort to European foreign policy experiences failure after failure and thus | 
is not able to arrive at a correct belief about European foreign policy. As the government however did |
initially hold high beliefs about European foreign policy, its beliefs will converge towards the point z*. |
Moreover, the vicious circle occurs when a government exerting a low effort to European foreign | 
policy experiences a success and thus fails to move towards the correct belief about European foreign | 
policy as a success. In this situation, the government will continue to diminish its belief about European 
foreign policy towards “0” if the successes continue to arrive.
The virtuous circle takes place for a government initially exerting either a high effort or low effort to 
European foreign policy, and facing success and failure respectively. The virtuous circle is 
straightforward if the starting point is a higher level o f effort to European foreign policy than unilateral 
foreign policy. However, when departing from a lower level o f effort to European foreign policy, the 
virtuous circle will in case the government continues to experience failures converge towards the point | 
z*. I
I
From Figure 3.2 and following the results o f Breen, the government cannot learn (more) if  its beliefs J
are entirely correct or wrong. This is the case in either point “0” and “2” in Figure 3.2. Figure 3.2 also [
shows that the government may even be incapable o f learning at an interior fixed point *T \ This 
interior fixed point matches a situation where the government holds beliefs, z* that result in a level of 
effort that makes the expected probability o f success the same whatever the parameters of beliefs are. 
This interior point is the confounded learning belief (Breen 1999 after Smith & Sorensen 2000). The 
higher the unilateral capacity is, the higher will the European foreign policy effort have to be at the 
same tim e to reach the situation where learning is impossible. Moreover, the more effective the CFSP 
actually is, the higher the effort attached to the CFSP will have to be for not being able to learn. 
Finally, the more effective unilateral foreign policy actually is, the lower will the degree of effort 
attached to the CFSP be that results in a no learning situation. Put differently, the higher the stakes are, 
and the lower the added value o f a success is, the higher the degree of belief in the CFSP would need to 
be in order to bump into a situation where governments are incapable o f learning. On the other hand, 
the higher the utility of success may be, and the lower the stakes, the confounded learning belief may 
be similar to holding a very low belief about the effectiveness o f the CFSP. The logic behind this is that 
it may be difficult to learn when the cost of failure is low.
3.4 Implications of the learning model
(a) The learning dynamics o f European foreign policy
The learning model suggests the existence o f a virtuous and vicious circle o f  European foreign policy. 
The dynamics of these are different from those traditionally proposed in the literature and discussed in 
Chapter 2. Notably, the new model does not speak about the vicious and virtuous circle of European 
foreign policy’s capability presence per se. The vicious and virtuous circles regard the learning about 
European foreign policy. Entering a virtuous circle in this Chapter means that the development and the 
actual workings of European foreign policy become more and more important as outcomes arrive in 
international relations that are in accordance with previously held beliefs and previous allocation o f 
effort to European foreign policy. Ceteris paribus, this should result in more allocation of effort to 
EFP.
The relevance of the model for the Union’s engagements in the Western Balkans in the ’90s is crucial 
for the relevance of the model at all. As mentioned in Chapter 1, EFP towards the Western Balkans 
needs to  be analysed in a separate study in order fully to grasp the complexity of the conflict. However, 
looking roughly at how events were perceived, it seems likely that the model in this chapter could
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Mcapture some elements o f the Union’s responses to the wars in Kosovo and Bosnia. At the time the j 
conflict in Bosnia arose in 1991-1992, the expectations to European foreign policy being able to solve | 
the conflict were relatively high (Hill 1993). This resulted in a rather high allocation o f effort to ! 
European foreign policy diplomacy in the initial phases of the conflict (at least compared to what j 
individual Member States contributed and to the allocation to other international institutions). “The | 
Community, EPC and later the Union have produced an enormous number o f  declarations, common I 
positions and joint actions dealing with the conflict in Yugoslavia. Particularly in 1991, the Twelve 
discussed the war almost continuouslyn(YY\\\ & Smith 2000:358, 18-24). Experiencing a failure as the 
individual governments most likely felt EU did in Bosnia until 1995, a government would in 
accordance with the model have lowered its belief in European foreign policy and similarly reduced its 
allocation of effort to European foreign policy. The engagement o f NATO later in the Bosnia conflict 
as well as many other international institutions (G8, Contact Group, OSCE etc.) seems to illustrate that 
a given government generally must have lowered its belief about the European foreign policy workings 
in those particular types o f conflicts (Crawford 1996). Thereby, it should also have lowered its 
allocation of effort to European foreign policy. As Hill & Smith also note, “increasingly; the 
Community/EPC was playing less o f  a role in the international search fo r  a solution” (2000:360, 31- 
34).
Kosovo occurs after Bosnia. The lessons learned from Bosnia accordingly provided the introductory 
beliefs and allocation o f efforts for the Kosovo conflict. Soon Kosovo also turned into a failure for 
EU’s international diplomatic capacity, as did other international efforts, when the Rambouillet 
conference to resolve the crisis in January 1989 broke down. The resulting Kosovo War showed the 
lack of leverage the Union had in deciding on the strategies o f NATO towards Kosovo. As Hill & 
Smith note, “in practice, o f  course, the EU  had to sit back and watch NATO take the military lead... 
Collectively, ..., they were reduced to relatively minor matters like the appointment o f  a Special Envoy 
to Kosovo" (2000:385, 31-40). Kosovo became a failure  for EU’s military capability presence in a 
situation where the effort attached to EU diplomacy from individual governments was lower than the 
effort attached to other solutions.19 The Kosovo failure  would therefore normally have increased a 
given EU government’s belief in the importance o f European foreign policy, similar to the movements 
on the trajectory for zt between 0 and z*. This was also what happened, as for instance, the British | 
Prime Minister “Tony Blair in Bucharest dropped broad hints about an accelerated path to EU entry | 
fo r states which cooperated in the war" (Hill & Smith 2000:385). As Hill & Smith note, “almost I 
without noticing it, the EU has been drawn in to a new role as the protector and stabilizer o f  South j 
East Europe, a burden which it may struggle to live up to, economically and politically ”. From the .
learning model, the hypothesis regarding the Balkans would be that Kosovo and Bosnia in total may 
have learned EFP decision-makers o f a government that it needed to allocate effort to the development 
of European foreign and security policy hereby catalysing the development of the CESDP.20 The 
impact o f the two conflicts on a given government’s beliefs about the workings of European policies is 
however different as the allocation o f effort ex ante (to the conflicts) was different.
Another important result of the learning model is that learning has a cumulative effect. Learning is 
more likely to play a decisive role in the allocation o f effort the more experienced a government is or 
the closer the government is to knowing the correct values of the returns to unilateral and European 
foreign policy. If the government is far from knowing the correct beliefs, the government, according to 
the model, will never reach the upper right hand comer o f Figure 3.2 unless some exogenous shock 
pushes the beliefs in that direction. In the latter case one cannot speak about learning in the traditional 
sense.
This initiates a discussion o f when a government o f  the EU will start learning -  and thus when an EU 
government -  if  the correct belief is that European foreign policy is successful -  will increase its stakes 
in the European foreign policy institutions. Regelsberger & Wessels have claimed that the difficulties 
of the CFSP are more serious than just the usual child diseases (“kinderkrankheif) that will disappear 
after a while (1996). Many have argued that particular Member State interests belong to the main 
reasons why these child diseases may be so persistent. If a government holds prior beliefs in the range 
of z* and the level o f zt corresponding to “2” in Figure 3.2, and it is correct that the CFSP is successful, 
there may indeed be a case for talking about child-diseases instead o f permanent diseases. What 
characterises such child-disease symptoms in the world of learning would be that a government’s 
ability to see how brilliant EFP actually is will be improved the more success it encounters. Even 
though failure should arrive, the belief in EFP will not fall below z*. However, it also follows that the 
childhood (or infancy) of a belief such as the belief about the malfunctioning of the CFSP may be very 
long. Indeed, this is the case if failures are the only experience decision-makers encounter in the 
beginning o f a more European-oriented foreign policy strategy. Then the beliefs are stabilised at z* 
instead o f entering a virtuous circle moving towards point “2”. In sum, when early failures arrive, 
governments may be guided by this bad experience for a long time. The memories become the tyranny 
of the past as Jervis notes (1975).
’’ Clearly. Kosovo could be seen as a sign of progress ofthe Union's civilian foreign policy dimension, in particular, as the prospects of peace approached 
:tJ Manv have argued this. One of them was Lord Roper at the LSE 13 February 2001 cited in Chapter 1.
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(b) The inability to learn
Learning assumes the truth o f Pascal’s words that “progress only can be achieved i f  one recognises 
ones nature ones misery together with ones sublime possibility. Not being able to recognise ones 
correct capabilities or the consequences o f a particular strategy may therefore have disastrous impact 
on the intentions to develop the CFSP.
Many factors may impede learning from taking place, internal as well as external factors. Internal 
factors are internal to the dynamics of beliefs in the learning model. External reasons are exogenous 
factors outside the updating o f  beliefs in the learning model, for instance, changes in interests, norms or 
institutional changes. The most important internal reason for lack o f learning that will be discussed here 
are those related to not being able to see the relationship between the outcomes and the effort clearly. 
This may result from 1) the lack of clear strategies, 2) the presence o f  too confident beliefs (hubris 
beliefs) and 3) the presence o f highly competing strategies. The external reasons this framework 
explicitly looks at are the impact o f economic interests and institutional competence. In accordance 
with Chapter 2, those will be merged to a discussion in Section 3.5 o f  the impact of the external 
economic relations on learning and EFP.
As mentioned, in Figure 3.2 the belief z* illustrates a situation o f European foreign policy where the 
government holds almost equally high (or low) beliefs about the effectiveness o f its unilateral capacity 
and European foreign policy. In other words, the government is largely confused as to whether any of 
the two - unilateralism or Europeanism - is more effective than the other in achieving a successful 
outcome. The government is unable to judge whether the resulting success or failures of a particular 
effort is caused by unilateral or by European foreign policy. The updating o f beliefs in such a situation 
will only by chance take place according to the outcome. Most likely, the beliefs will remain constant 
while interests, norms or other factors determine the distribution of effort.
(c) Multilateralism versus unilateralism
One illustration o f this is when a government seeks solutions on different levels, national and European 
at the same time without being focused. In the end, it becomes impossible to find out what impact 
which action had for the outcome. Only when the outcome can clearly be attributed to failure or
Pfaff, 1993, 15
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rsuccess for either unilateral foreign policy or European foreign policy, the government will change its 
distribution o f effort among the two. It thus illustrates one of the predominant themes of the critique o f 
the CFSP after TEU. Zielonka explicitly talks about the “policies without strategies” (1997). As Nuttall 
notes, “it suffered unlike the EMU parts o f  the Treaty, from never having had a clear objective 
generally agreed, and a single draftsman to interpret that objectiven (2000).
Extending the learning model to include other multilateral entities such as NATO, UN, OSCE, G8, 
WEU, and the Contact Group would primarily make the choice more complicated for the government 
than before. This extension would recognise that a government in reality is confronted with the 
presence o f a multitude o f institutions to choose among at the multilateral level, not just the EU. As a 
comment to the formation o f the Contact Group for Yugoslavia, Nuttall notes, “In the circumstances it 
was scarcely surprising that Member States, confronted with an apparent lack o f  effectiveness o f  the 
CFSP, should seek to advance their national policy aims in other fo rd 9 (2000:267-268).22 After the 
Cold War, most of the institutions just mentioned overlap in authority and in expertise (Jopp et al 
1991 ).23 Imagine, for instance, the choice facing EU decision-making trying to mediate a developing 
large-scale conflict in the Azerbaijani enclave Nachicevan, hypothetically involving among others 
Turkey, Iran, Israel and Russia. Faced with such a conflict, the government should eagerly be searching 
for information regarding the most effective international organisation to mediate this particular 
conflict. The Union would probably be considered rather inexperienced in this region besides generally 
not being perceived as much more than an economic actor until now. The OSCE would have the 
advantage o f including all the main actors o f the conflict, but would also suffer from limited 
capabilities, for instance, focusing more on sending election observers and lighter conflict intervention 
measures. The UN Security Council would depend on the consent of Russia in its decisions, and with 
Russia’s close interests in the conflict, any intervention that would diverge from the Russian view 
would be difficult to obtain. The G8 would probably only be adequate to give eventual negotiations or 
peace talks a final boost at a critical stage or coordinating views among the main actors, but would 
need the other institutions to implement their decisions. NATO would have the means at its disposal, 
but would be unlikely to become engaged in a former Soviet Republic. In conclusion, despite the 
advantages of having a broader spectrum of conflict resolution institutions available, the government 
faces a more complicated choice than if there were only the EU and the Member States’ foreign policy 1*3
11 The same argument may probably be used on why NATO became a major player in the former Yugoslavia in April 1993 when it established the No-fly-
zone in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Rummel 1994:110. footnote 10).
13 Illustrative, during the development ofthe crises in Kosovo, September 1998-March 1999 and the actual war from March-June 1999. i.e. within less than 
a year, all o f the following institutions were involved as major parties in the negotiations between Serbs. Kosovars, and the International community at one
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to choose between.* 24 *Intuitively, the learning model does seem relevant to the choice of governments 
among various international institutions. However, it is relevant to discuss how the learning model 
more precisely may be extended to reflect other institutions than the CFSP.
Another matter deriving from the framework is the possibility o f  multilateralism being an idea itself. 
Put differently, beliefs about the returns to effort among various international institutions would now be 
intrinsically linked together within one single idea o f  multilateralism. This implies that if the belief in a 
particular institution decreases, the degree o f effort attached to another institution hereby also 
diminishes and vice versa. This comparative statics would be in line with one o f Javier Solana’s 
statements, “ƒ am convinced that every EU  action broadly speaking could be strengthened and that this 
could contribute to a strengthening o f the workings ofNATO ,'>} s Such a dynamic would also emphasise 
the importance for governments o f dividing tasks thoroughly and transparently when pursuing different 
aims as to diminish the confusing element about which institution caused which effect.26
(d) Hubris
The other extreme of not having clear objectives is to be so certain about a particular strategy that one 
does not really take notice o f the outcome in determining ones future strategies. Evidently, the 
government may still change its beliefs, but in this situation, the change o f beliefs does not take place 
in accordance with the workings of the CFSP. For instance, the government may either attach full 
weight to its beliefs about the effectiveness of unilateral action, or alternatively fully believe in the 
superiority of European foreign policy to other policies. Put differently, the government is totally 
convinced that the degree o f effort it attaches to European foreign policy vis-à-vis its unilateral 
capacity is as optimal as it could be despite that the premises for assuming so are lacking. This is a 
situation similar to hubris.27
The hubris situation may, for instance, be that the government is fully convinced that unilateral reigned 
policy action serves its purposes better than EFP. It would rather go alone than engaging in any EFP
time or the other: NATO, G8, WEU, US, EU, OSCE, and the Contact Group.
24 Governments may also be faced by stress, and overload of information, see Holsti (1962); Diez (1998),
2i “Ich bin aber überzeugt, dass jeder EU geführte Einsatz durch eine breitere Beteiligung nur gestärkt werden kann und dass dies wiederum auch dazu 
beitrage wird, die Wirksamkeit der NA TO zu erhöhen" (1999:2,2“1 d . 56-59). See also Ruggie (1997).
26 The logic is as formulated by Washington Post, “plentiful o f  statements fro m  England’s Tony Blair. Germany’s Gerhard Schroeder and France s Lionel 
Jospin and others indicate ...their belief that a  stronger, more effective Europe in foreign policy and security will strengthen NATO (August 15,1999).
27 In ancient Greek religion, hubris expressed the arrogant Sinn of going beyond the bounds of the Gods that had been set to oneself. Deutsch mentions “in 
politics, national and international, many people have preferred losing power, wealth, or life to losing their illusions" (1988. 55).
7 0
actions. The go alone attitude may also be caused by political sovereignty concerns.28 Strictly speaking, 
this will often be a different matter since caring about sovereignty need not have to do with being too 
certain about ones own belief and mode of distributing effort. In European foreign policy, the notion of 
UK “punching” beyond its own weight captures the same phenomenon. Darby remarks, “it is part o f  
the habit and furniture o f  our minds that Britain should be a great power”?0 Indeed, believing in own 
capabilities is not always a bad. However, under these circumstances (practically without any learning 
going on) there is a high risk that the government is wrong.
(e) Shifts in the government ’s ability to learn
In the logic o f Jervis, the tyranny o f the past could only be overcome if  an oppositely directed (and at 
least as important) event occurs to the one that once caused the tyranny o f the past. Jervis intuition is 
useful but a too simplified version of how the learning model o f this Chapter works. First, learning is 
not impossible when the beliefs correspond to low  values between “0” and z*. Clearly, learning 
becomes more difficult the greater the gap between the actual beliefs and the correct values are. This, 
stems from the fact that the informational requirements for learning the correct values are greater under 
these conditions.
Second, one could imagine that actors’ ability to learn were indirectly affected by various external 
factors and some times might shift from one level to another subject to extreme pressure from these 
factors. The effects o f such external pressures to the learning should be relatively straightforward to 
compute. Appendix 3.2 lists some of the comparative static effects, which in essence are commented 
here.
First, changes in the prior beliefs affect the posterior beliefs positively. The only exception to this is 
when prior beliefs are similar to the confounded learning belief or in either of the two extremes 
corresponding to holding completely wrong or correct beliefs. One could also imagine a shift in the 
prior beliefs caused by an identity change making decision-makers more European in their approach *19
M Alternatively to the model of different ideas of multilateral institutions as depicted above, one may think o f multilateralism as an idea and a concept in 
itself such as Ruggie, Crawford, Mortensen and others do. Ruggie defines multilateralism as "the co-ordinating relations among three or more states in 
accordance with generalised principles o f  conduct fo r a class o f  actions, without regard to the particularistic interests o f  the parties or the strategic 
exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence (Ruggie 1992:571,1-6).
19 Riflcind, Chatham House, 21/9-95, Hill, 2000, President’s address at the 4th Annual Conference of the European Association of Sociology, Amsterdam, 
18-21 August, 1999 (the reference is not completed yet). It is Hill that attaches the expression hubris to British foreign policy in bis 2001: The Blair/Cook 
Effect. Hill already in 1988 noted that sometimes this tendency to hubris (without using the expression) is caused by a kind of "nostalgia", characterised by 
reluctance to abandon anachronistic ways of thinking" (1988).
30 Martin & Gamett 1997.
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regardless of their specific experience o f the workings o f the CFSP. Such a shift in the prior beliefs 
would be reflected in an equivalent shift in the posterior beliefs. Shifting prior beliefs go beyond the 
discussion of this model, but the discussion illustrates that the model also keeps a window open for 
approaches analysing the impact o f normative ideas, identity etc.
The returns to unilateral or European effort may also shift. In the case o f an increase in those returns 
that correspond to higher returns o f multilateral (European) effort than unilateral effort, i.e. an increase 
in 0’, it may be shown that the posterior belief -f+1 will always be positively affected. Section 3.6 (b) 
will discuss an instance o f observed increased returns to effort namely the case of institutional 
competence increase. In addition, one could imagine that some institutional changes made the 
information aggregation process run smoother thus directly limiting the ex ante distance between the 
correct values and the beliefs about the returns to effort. Finally, those returns corresponding to higher 
returns of unilateral than multilateral (European) foreign policy may also increase. Here, the model 
predicts that as long as the returns to multilateral (European) effort are high enough (0’ > 0/2) the 
posterior beliefs under success will also be positively affected by a positive shift in the returns to 
unilateral effort.
One may shortly return to the hubris situation discussed above. Hubris reflects a situation where the 
government is not able to aggregate information about the workings o f EFP for the use in its allocation 
o f  effort. Hubris can thus not be avoided within the dynamics o f the learning model itself. Yet, hubris 
may be avoided or exited from after pressure from external factors, which were discussed above. In this 
specific case, for instance, certain economic or political fundamentals may reveal unexpected 
vulnerability causing governments marginally to distrust their own belief. If such shocks succeed in 
changing the beliefs o f governments — which cannot be assumed however -  they will change the 
government’s distribution o f  effort among unilateral action and European foreign policy action. Here, 
European institutions may provide a forum through which such external shocks may operate, since in 
the EU there should be more possibilities of drawing issue-linkages than elsewhere. After a shock, 
governments might thus start to invest small resources in European foreign policy action. If 
governments were wrong in their conviction, the external shock has now at least given them the 
opportunity to discover their fatal mistake. The use and impact o f EU institutions will be returned to in 
Section 3.5 (b).
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Immediately after such a revelation, one could expect the hubris-belief to recuperate. For instance, if  it 
was revealed that Britain needed multilateral solutions in its foreign policy, and EFP right after this 
revelation experiences a vast failure such as the one in the former Yugoslavia, the danger is that beliefs 
are pushed back towards attaching full weight to unilateral action. In a sense, this is part of what 
Kavanagh captures in his article “attempting to run before learning to walk" as this does not limit itself 
to countries such as Britain with a high belief in the unilateral policies. It may as well describe 
countries such as Belgium that could be seen as having too high beliefs in multilateral or European 
policies. However, as long as the failure cannot be 100 % related to a deficient European foreign 
policy, the governments should generally be able to avoid returning to the hubris condition.
3.5 Economic and institutional factors determining the Union’s capability-presence
It should be clear from the preceding section that learning is not theorised as a major determinant o f the 
Union’s capability-presence, but as an intervening variable, a facilitator and a constraint. Inability to 
learn does not necessarily imply less EU presence in international affairs, as the actual level o f  EU 
presence depends directly on a range of other factors, notably, interests and institutions.
It was mentioned that the decision to allocate effort to the CFSP was determined by actors’ interests 
(among other things). Until now, these interests have been held constant. This section allows interests 
to change, as they are likely to do in reality. The idea is to see how these changes may affect the 
learning mechanism and the capability-presence o f the Union. A starting point for the discussion is to 
clarify how economic interests directly may influence the level o f EFP action.31 What will follow is 
thus an account of how the external economic relations, which roughly speaking comprise economic 
preferences and institutional competence, may affect European foreign policy.
Economic interests determine what an actor, subject to a specific institutional structure, would prefer to 
do given certain beliefs (assumed constant in order to simplify). Below, the impact of the actors’ 
economic preferences regarding external economic trade and investments are discussed. This is 
followed by a discussion of the intervening influence of the institutional structures under which the 
interests are allowed to work, in particular, the impact of the institutional competence of the external 
economic relations and the CFSP are examined. The purpose is to delineate some hypotheses for how
31 As Javier Solana recently noted, 
bestehenden an passen" (1999.2-3).
'In dieser neuen situation brauchen wir nicht notwendigerweise mehr Ressourcen, sondern muessen unsere
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preferences and institutions may influence EFP-making hereby shifting the effort attached to EFP.
(a) Economic preferences
Deriving from assumption (c) in Section 3.1, different strata o f support and opposition towards 
European foreign policy actions exist. These are, for instance, formed through the type of domestic 
sector engaged in external economic relations and thus affected by the mobilising of external economic 
relations’ resources for a given CFSP action. The use o f economic sanctions is a good example. 
Empirical studies on economic sanctions have shown a general tendency o f countries to act through 
export sector restrictions rather than through import sector restrictions (Hufbauer & Schott 1985, 1990 
and 2000). Hufbauer & Schott explain this by two factors (1985: 28-29). First, target countries (those 
being imposed to an economic sanctions by a sender country or a group o f  sender countries) can often 
find alternative markets for their lost export. Second, some sender countries, notably the US, do not 
have the legal authority to impose import controls. Fundamentally, however, there is no legal 
difference between import and export sanctions.
Judged from Hufbauer & Schott, the effects should in theory be the same for an EU sender country 
whether it imposes an import or and export restriction. In Kaempfer & Lowenberg’s public choice 
model of the sanctions’ effects in sender and target countries o f the Western sanctions against South 
Africa (1988; 1990; 1992), it is however the sender’s export sectors that primarily will suffer from 
sanctions through a loss in producer surplus. Import sectors will suffer from the general price increase 
that an import restriction causes. Compared to the export case, this will hurt the consumers mostly. 
Home producers o f substitutable import goods may instead benefit from a restriction in the short run 
due to the price increase and the temporary loss o f a competitor. In line with this, one should expect 
that for the Union, it would be more difficult to find resources for European foreign cooperation on 
measures that hurt export intensive areas than those that hurt import intensive areas.
A third sector to be included is the monetary or financial sector. Whereas imports and exports basically 
are the same type o f transaction, the time-horizon differs between an investment and trade transaction. 
In other words, the transactions have different structures of annuities o f benefits and costs. Trade in 
goods usually have a shorter pay-off structure than investments have. A trade pay-off also continues to 
arrive until the trade virtually is interrupted unless a moratorium on debts occurs. This contrasts with
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the benefits o f  FDI that cannot be cashed in the shorter term.32 Further, it involves a highly complex 
and costly investigation before the FDI even becomes physically represented with a sunk cost value 
above zero.33 Notably, at any time until the investment starts paying off, investors risk loosing 
everything. From the moment the FDI starts paying off, investors similarly loose the difference 
between the invested amount and the benefits that could be gained in the period until the investment 
was cut-off. The impact o f this feature is that EFP co-operation (e.g. sanctions) probably would be less 
likely to hit FDI intensive areas than trade intensive areas. If  FDI eventually is targeted one should 
further expect it to be extremely difficult to target already existing FDI as compared to already existing 
trade. Restrictions regarding future FDI should however not be particularly more difficult to agree on 
than restrictions on future trade. Thus, when FDI are already in place, one should expect a high degree 
o f opposition to be mobilised towards any restrictions against these investments.
This latter feature had not been relevant in the overall economic interest picture had it not been for 
recent years’ explosion in FDI flows in and out of the EU. In 1992, FDI flows in fact superseded trade 
flows.34 External economic interests are thus to an increasing degree other than trade interests. The 
feature had neither been important had FDI still been developed countries’ interactions only. The 
reason is that CFSP mainly holds purposes legitimising actions in developing countries. Recent years 
have, however, witnessed a shift in FDI flows into developing countries (Single Market Review 1998). 
What is emerging may thus be an increasing conflict between FDI interests and the eagerness to 
initiate, for instance, political conditionality or positive measures. Finally, this difference between trade 
and investment becomes relevant looking at the institutional competence o f  the EU in FDI and trade 
respectively.
Another major component is how different intensities and diversities o f trade and FDI over time 
influence EFP.35 Higher diversity of trade and investment flows will eventually result in a more 
complicated reallocation process o f resources provided that the flows are due to be changed as a result 
o f  a European foreign policy action. This necessarily may impede the momentum and scale o f 
European foreign policies. Diversity, as viewed isolated from the institutional structure, will thus not 
facilitate CFSP actions.36
32 FDI outflows basically reflect the willingness and ability of a country’s firms to undertake international production.
33 For a discussion on what determines the level o f FDI, see the Single Market Review ( 1998:31, table 3.3).
>l As noted by Andrew Wyatt-Walter “flows o f  FDI have grown much more rapidly than trade in the 1980s and have thereby acted as an increasingly 
important motor fo r  rising levels o f  economic interdependence” (1999:105). Clearly trade has also increased enormously in the past 15 years. Yet, this 
increase is more in absolute than in relative terms where it has only increased from 12% to 15% of world GDP (Fligstein 1998:15). in 1992, global sales by 
MNE affiliates were worth $5.2 trillion while world-wide export of goods and services amounted to $5.0 trillion.
ji Lisa Martin refers to this as heterogeneity o f interests remarking that heterogeneity increases the probability o f creation o f institutions to provide relevant 
issue linkages to overcome problems of collaboration (1994; 1995). Chris Hill uses the term diversity of interest, however, pointing to a broader 
interpretation of common pressures exerted on different national situations
Heterogeneous interests indeed exist across transactions and within a specific type o f transaction. For example, the UK has large FDI interests amounting 
to 17.5 % of total world FDI. while France and Germanv have shares of 5.3 % and 11.5% respectively (Dunnine 1998). Former colonial powers tend to
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The intensity o f economic preferences has an ambiguous effect on EFP depending on which intensity 
one looks at. Firstly, the higher intensity o f  transactions are internally in the Union towards the rest of 
the world, the less one should expect EFP to be impeded by particularistic interests in the external 
economic relations. Secondly, however, the higher intensity of a given transaction towards a particular 
third country where the Union acts, the less likely EFP-actions become. This effect is intensified by the 
links between groups in both the sender and the target country o f a potential restriction that may induce 
opposition towards an economic restraint.37
(b) Institutional competence
Competence is the degree o f  institutional authority that the Union has over the Member States on a 
given issue. For instance, Woolcock notes, (external) competence is the “assignment o f  policy powers 
between the EU and the Member States [in] any given issue area in international trade negotiations” 
(2000). The relevance of analysing competence stems from the fact that competence first, varies among 
issues and second, varies over time thus providing changes in the constraints and opportunities given to 
economic preferences.
l '
It is “misleading to provide a listing by subject o f  matters fo r  which the EC is competent” according to 
McGoldrick (1997).38 Conventional wisdom however suggests that the areas of trade in goods and 
agriculture are exclusive competence of the Union in international negotiations. Notably, this exclusive 
competence on trade in goods is maintained under Article 113 [133] of the Treaty of Rome. As regards 
services, the competence in general lies by the Member States, except for matters concerning cross 
border supply or when labour associated with the provision of a service crossed the border (2000).39 
Since most services are “establishment”,40 this exception only gives the Union limited competence in 
services. However, as regards foreign policy actions such as economic sanctions that include transport,
trade more extensively than other Member States do with their respective former colonies, etc. Gowa’s net cost condition implies that the higher the 
divergence in trade interests are among Member States towards a particular third country the more difficult it becomes to obtain a trade-flag  convergence.
37 E g. Gambari (1989:146).
38
fundamentally, the areas o f  competence such as trade, FDI, intellectual property rights and services overlap with each other, for instance, “...because 
trade in goods and trade in services are hard to disentangle, and must therefore be negotiated together” (Woolcock 2000:2).Moreover, the actual delegation 
of competence from the Member States to the EU institutions is blurred. As Meunier and Nicolaidis notes, exclusive competence does not guarantee a 
single voice while one voice may be obtained in areas of mixed competence o f common foreign policy (1999).
39The TEU amended Article 113 and the European Courts o f Justice rule Opinion 1/94 establishes that the international trade agreements in services 
(GATS). Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and Investments (TRIMS) are not to be considered part of Article 113. Opinion 1/94 was de facto a shift 
away from supranational competence (Meunier 1998). The opinion notes that services belongs to Title IV o f the Treaty and thus not to Article 113. In the 
treaties the so-called “Kompetenz-Kompetenz” or enabling clause, article 133.5. establishes that regarding these areas "the Council, acting unanimously, 
may decide to extend the application o f  Article 113 [¡33] international agreements on services and intellectual property rights (TEC Article 133 (5) (See 
also Woolcock 2000).
40 This is Mode 3 in GATS that regards “Commercial Presence", ie.. the supply o f a service by a service supplier of one Member through commercial 
presence of another Member. It involves e g. corporations, joint ventures, partnerships, representative offices and branches. Often representative offices are
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the Union still has the competence to decide despite its lack of exclusive competence to finalise 
agreements. The Community in general has the same limited competence as regards FDI as in services. 
However, as a result of the TEU, investments are also included in the authority of Article 228a based 
on Article 73.1 (Article 60.1 EC) and thus subject to an ECOFIN Council decision on which measures 
to apply (Nuttall 2000:192).41
Over time, the Single European Act authorised the EU to enter international negotiations on 
environmental issues. In the TEU, monetary policy, research & development and development 
cooperation became Community competence. The settlement of the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam further 
enshrines the partial competence of the Member States over key items of the global trade agenda, such 
as services and intellectual property rights which Meunier and Nicolai'dis interpret as a **temporary 
setback fo r  the integrationisi project” (Bretherton & Vogler 1999:478, 19-22). There is a discussion 
whether competence of the Union has actually been extended despite very limited treaty revisions as, 
e.g., Young holds (2000), and the opposite argument that the Union in fact has lost competence over 
time (Meunier & Nicolaides 1999).
When discussing the impact of competence of the external economic relations on the CFSP it is 
however not enough to analyse these broad competence changes. One further needs to take into account 
the contents of the specific trade and cooperation agreements of the Union towards specific third 
countries. This holds, for instance, regarding the ACP group of countries where the external economic 
relations through the Lomé Conventions has had extensive institutional competence that furthermore 
has changed over time. This will be discussed in Chapter 6.
(c) From external economic competence change to European foreign policy?
How does the external economic relations’ competence then relate to the CFSP decision-making? 
Clearly, the Union’s high competence in an issue area such as trade negotiations does not necessarily 
facilitate co-operation in the CFSP, and vice versa. Meunier points to the importance of negotiating 
competence (and voting rules) in determining the probability that negotiating parties conclude an 
international agreement and the substantive outcome of the negotiations (2000). Importantly however, 
Meunier also claims that her approach may be useful for explaining the effectiveness of EU in other 
international settings such as foreign affairs. The question is whether the delegation of authority to the
represented through foreign affiliate established as a result of FDI (Sauve & Stem 1995)
■*' It says, ‘i f .  in the cases envisaged in Article 228a. action by the Community is deemed necessary the [ECOFIN] Council may, in accordance with the
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Community also structures Member State choices about how to participate in European foreign policy?
One of the conditions for this is that the authority o f the Union in one economic issue area would have 
an impact o f the Union’s ability to mobilise resources from this issue-area to CFSP actions. This 
assumption may appear strong. However, it could be justified arguing firstly that the information 
involved in representing a specific issue area is exclusive and costly. Secondly, the Union probably 
implicitly has the legitimacy to suggest restrictions or changes in the allocation o f certain economic 
flows in areas where they usually act with exclusive competence.42 Thirdly, as one permanent 
representative expresses it, “one always goes to the first pillar to fin d  instruments” for ones objected 
policy.43 This means that the competence of the Union on first pillar issues, e.g. in the external 
economic relations, becomes a determinant factor when deciding on the measures to be adopted by the 
CFSP and the resources mobilised in order to implement and enforce this measure. Finally, by 
representing external economic relations’ interests iteratively economic agents will be aware of the 
possibility o f policy deliberations and exchanges over time and will thus be more likely to accept a give 
in the short term for an expected take in the longer term. As one legal advisor of the Council notes, the 
increased competence o f  the Union has not paralysed decision-making. Instead, by using the 
instruments, decision-makers have “learned how to circumvent” the rules.
One example o f the importance of competence o f the Union is the financing disagreement between 
Britain and the Commission regarding the South Africa Joint Action o f  1993. According to Winn, the 
action only came about after a dispute about its proper financing (1997). This dispute emerged between 
Britain and the European Commission since Britain found that resources o f the budget of the European 
Commission should finance the action. The European Commission argued that the financing should be 
50/50 between the Community and the Member States. The Commission’s view actually prevailed. 
Winn calls this a clear “intergovernmental isation o f  a supranational policy”. More generally, an area of 
competence that may influence the CFSP is the competence of the Union on development aid. In 1993, 
the development policy was explicitly included under the treaties, as set out in Article 130w. Article 
130w furthermore allows for multi-annual programmes carried out following the legislative procedures 
of Article 189c. Empirically, one may thus look after changes in EFP that could be linked to the 
competence increase regarding development aid around 1993. *
procedure given by Article 228, take the necessary urgent measures on the investment of capital and payments as regards the third countries concerned.
* Both trust and mistrust to the Community may here be important in shaping the foreign policy room of manoeuvring (Young 2000 101. 13-24).
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In the linkage between external economic relations’ competence and the CFSP, the European 
Parliament also plays an increasing role through its budgetary powers. The EP’s increasing powers 
should strengthen the effects delineated above. First, one may note that the parliament has the power to 
reject the budget o f the EC/EU, and thus also EPC/CFSP expenditure. Immediately after the creation of 
the CFSP, a budgetary struggle took place among the Commission, the Parliament and the Member 
States (1993-1994) regarding whether CFSP operational expenditures should be allocated from the 
Commission’s account or charged the CFSP directly. This mattered since the EP traditionally only 
exercises control over the operational expenditures o f the Commission, but not on the Council, the so- 
called “Gentleman’s Agreement” (Krenzler & Schneider 1997:141 ).43 4 Because of the dispute, the 
Member States from 1994 broadly accepted to allocate CFSP operational expenditure within the 
operational expenditures o f  the Commission. In return, the Parliament promised to apply its 
Gentleman’s Agreement. The more competence exercised by the Commission, the more power will the 
Parliament thus have on decision-making of the CFSP. Since the EP in general is more susceptible to 
suggest active intervention by the Union towards violations of human rights or democratic principles 
increased powers of the Parliament should also influence the EFP positively.
Changes in this institutional authority o f the CFSP over implementation of first pillar actions would 
matter in facilitating agreement on CFSP actions (Nuttall 1997). Regelsberger & Wessels indicate that 
the powers o f implementation vary extensively (1996:38-39). Innovations since the start o f the EPC in 
1970 include:
a) reforms of the decision-making mode towards more communautarization (e.g. Article 228a on 
economic sanctions,
b) abstention voting,
c) qualified majority voting on implementing joint actions/common positions etc),
d) changed procedures (inclusion of working parties, COREU network, recommendation 
procedures vis-à-vis the Parliament) and
e) regular inclusion o f new measures (such as Common Positions and Joint Actions that often 
involves the use o f economic resources).45
As regards economic sanctions, Article 228a delineates qualified majority voting for the
43 Interview EU government permanent representative. May 2000.
44 In general, the EP is becoming a more visible “underdog” in EFP (Thomas Grünen in Regelsberger et al 1997). The adding o f the Commission to the list 
of those regularly informing the Parliament strengthened the stream of information to the EP. This increased the possibility of the Parliament to execute 
control Moreover, the "recommendation" procedure (Article J.7) was implemented by the Parliament’s rule o f  June 1994 and an annual debate on CFSP is 
now held. See. however, the EP is still the least important actor in EFP -  an issue that is illustrated in the two case studies of Chapter 4 and 6
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implementation o f  sanctions and the responsibility for the implementation is given to the Commission. 
On other issues, the powers o f implementation are often de facto  given to the Commission since the 
Member States themselves have had difficulties in administering actions on ad hoc basis. On defence 
issues, such as the implementation o f the Petersberg Tasks (Article J.7 (2) o f the Treaty of 
Amsterdam), the Member States have the exclusive power to implement actions. In most diplomatic 
actions, the Union vests its competence to either the Presidency, the Troika,46 the High Representative, 
or a special envoy (/representative) that subsequently carry out the objectives o f the Union. It must be 
expected that the CFSP will be more frequently engaged in areas where its competence is high.
Finally, institutional changes might lead to adverse effects, such as harmful competition between 
various bureaucratic units. One example is the recent conflict between the Council Secretariat’s 
General Directorate E led by Brian Crowe and the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (“Policy 
U nit) established in 1999 led by Christoph Heusgen,47 the strained relationship between the 
Commission’s External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten and Solana and the Deputy Secretary 
General Pierre de Boissieu’s ambitions to get the job as High Representative reportedly causing 
problems in the workings o f the Council.48
To sum up this section, one way of expressing the impact o f the external economic relations is to 
combine economic preferences and institutional competence in a joint index. As an example, below one 
may find a table that indicates different values o f European foreign policy for various levels of 
institutional competence, intensities of preferences and diversity o f  preferences.
Table 3.1 The impact of the external economic relations on the CFSP
Institutional
Competence
Preference
Intensity
Preference
Diversity
European Foreign Policy “Score”
Low High High 0
High High High 1
Low High Low 2
Low Low High 2
High High Low 3
High Low High 3
Low Low Low 4
High Low Low 5
45 The informal rule on issues that legally are no longer decided by unanimity is still consensus.
46 Before the Amsterdam Treaty the Troika was past, present and future presidencies. After Amsterdam it consists of the General Secretary o f the Council 
(and High Representative o f the CFSP). the President of the Commission (or a senior substitute for him), and the President of the Council.
4' Interview Council Secretariat. May 2000.
4* Interview. Member State Embassy. October 2000
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As may be seen from Table 3.1, the impact of external economic relations on EFP is suggested to hold 
three dimensions: i) the degree of competence (from high competence to low competence, ii) the 
degree o f  trade/investment diversity (from high to low diversity), and iii) the degree of 
trade/investment intensity (from high to low intensity). The numbers 0-5 mark increased degree o f EFP 
capability-presence. “0” is the lowest degree o f EFP possible and “5” subsequently represents the 
highest obtainable degree of EFP. The values are strictly ordinal thus only ordering the different 
combinations of preferences and competence to each other without suggesting the specific function of 
the relationship.
As competence is the institutional constraint on the preferences, it may be assumed that a low (high) 
degree o f competence initially determines a low (high) degree o f EFP capability-presence. As shown in 
the table, the higher the intensity o f economic preferences, the lower EFP capability-presence. This 
holds for constant levels o f competence and constant diversity of interests. Finally, the table also 
indicates that the more diverse interests are, the more difficult EFP becomes for a given level of 
competence and intensity o f preferences. For example, low competence and high intensity yield the 
score “0 ” for high diversity o f economic preferences, while resulting in the score “4” for low diversity. 
One may note, that in order to simplify, Table 3.1 does not suggest any difference between the potential 
impact o f the diversity and intensity of economic preferences on EFP. Hereby, low competence yields 
the score “2” regardless of whether it is the intensity or the diversity o f the two economic variables that 
is high.
Table 3.1 could in principle be extended, for instance, according to the discussion in Section 3.5 (a), by 
making a distinction between intensity and diversity o f trade in general and towards a specific target 
country. In other words, the model would now include not only the economic relations with a specific 
third country, but the relations with a group of countries, or the rest o f the world. The effects o f “the 
intensity o f  economic relations” are in this case expected to differ from the ones delineated in Table 
3.1. As mentioned in Chapter 2, it is widely disputed among IR-scholars which signs such general 
effects may have. This framework suggests that, that the higher the intensity of economic preferences 
among EU Member States towards the world, the more EFP will be generated, and vice versa, 
however, this effect might be difficult to separate from the competence effect in practice.
$1
3.6 Measurement and estimation
However plausible the learning model may (or may not) seem, its success depends on its applicability, 
i.e. how empirical data may be attached to the model, and whether it can be tested. There are here 
several problems related to this. First, how should beliefs be measured? Breen notes there is a direct 
and an indirect approach to estimation o f the model (1999). The direct approach is to measure the 
beliefs of individuals directly. This strategy is, however, only feasible with panel data or other forms of 
data that follows individuals over a long period. As Breen notes, one would need some “testable 
implications which were not built in as part o f what the model set out to explain, and which are not 
entailed by rival explanatory m o d e l s With the indirect approach, one could e.g. find out whether the 
same learning mechanism would be traceable in each Member State, cross-nationally, or different 
patterns o f relationship between outcomes appeared for different countries. The latter would suggest a 
role for factors such as beliefs, if  it seemed plausible that interests were relatively constant in those 
particular cases.
Welch Larson also advocates for indirect procedures ( 1994). Welch Larson notes that, “beliefs, 
attitudes, and schemas are all constructs which cannot be observed but must be inferred from  data ” 
(Conover & Feldman 1991 cited in Welch Larson 1994:28, 31-33). Welch Larson continues saying that 
one of the options for measuring beliefs is George’s congruence procedure, where the idea is to 
determine whether political decisions are consistent with the subject’s beliefs ( 1976, in Welch Larson 
1994). George delineates another method too, the process-tracing method. The process-tracing method 
requires the reconstruction - step by step -  of the decision-making process in order to trace the extent 
to which cognitive beliefs and other relevant variables influence decision-making (Verbeek 1994:312- 
313). As Welch Larson however notes, UIR scholars do not have available such indicators o f  schemas 
as reaction time or recognition or recall tests*1. She then suggests using public or private statements of 
decision-makers in order to develop proxies for indicators on beliefs.
It is vital not to simplify the demands to how learning is operationalised too much. For instance, a too 
simplified operationalisation would be to suggest that learning takes place whenever the lagged 
variable representing European foreign policy is significant. In statistical analyses learning has in fact 
previously been operationalised using such naive measurement o f the lagged term only. This is not 
regarded as an appropriate profile to aim for with this learning model. First, as in the above example, 
many other reasons than learning could be attributed to a change where variables of two periods
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apparently hang together. Similarly, lagged terms have previously been used to express other effects 
than learning. In the early budgeting literature, Aaron Wildavsky makes an argument that the lagged 
term of an action stands for the incremental nature o f bureaucratic decision-making (1975). Similarly, 
strategic game-theorists have pointed out that the lagged dependent variable o f  cooperation captures the 
inertia o f a given action (Goldstein & Freeman 1990:67-68).
Second, this learning framework is not a model o f adaptive learning. Learning is thus more than just 
inertia in the sense expressed above. In fact, there is a constant information accumulation taking place, 
where actors compare previously held beliefs with their effort and the outcomes in international affairs. 
This does not mean that the significance o f  the lagged term or “autoregression” (see Chapter 4) should 
lead us to conclude that learning is absent. No doubt, the lagged dependent variable is an important 
ingredient of the learning mechanism. It can never be the only ingredient however.
As a result, the solution suggested is to define learning (in cumulative studies) comprising two parts: 1) 
autoregression or significance o f the lagged dependent variable representing European foreign policy 
and 2) significance o f the lagged explanatory variable reflecting the outcome in international affairs. If 
a successful operationalisation can be found, the learning model also suggests to include the 
significance o f actors’ lagged beliefs. In practice, this third dimension is probably the most difficult one 
to measure, for example, it has not been included in the proceeding empirical analysis.
The significance of outcomes would by strategic game theorists better be known as the significance of 
the response, for instance, the bilateral response. The interpretation given to the significance of both the 
lagged dependent variable o f European foreign policy and the “bilateral response” variable reflecting 
the outcome in international affairs is that this follows a learning pattern compatible with the learning 
framework developed in this Chapter. The interpretation that should be given to the significance of 
only one o f these variables such as the lagged dependent variable is that learning in the sense described 
in this learning model is not an appropriate description of the developments.
As regards, qualitative case studies, the approach should be to follow developments in actions and 
outcomes over time as precisely as possible and combine them with an analysis -  despite the 
aforementioned difficulties -  of the perceptions and change in perceptions^eliefs among decision­
makers over time. Learning is thus also in qualitative case studies neither the lagged dependent
variable, the lagged outcome variable or the lagged belief only, but a combinatory significance of the
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three. Hereby, this project adheres to an indirect testing o f the framework based on recognising 
“learning-patterns” in “actions”. Put differently, the project seeks to observe changes in the patterns of 
the output to see if  this could be related to learning. For instance, if  two outcomes, e.g., the policies of 
the Union in 1985 and in 1986 towards the persecution of the Baha’i community in Iran (see Chapter 5) 
are non-correlated judged from the available empirical data, but similar events in 1995 and 1996 now 
suddenly appear to correlate, it is plausible that some sort of learning mechanism has begun to play a 
role in the absence o f other explanations for the change. If the development o f actor’s beliefs confirms 
this change, this is another reason to believe that learning has taken place in the sense defined in this 
project.
Testing the learning model successfully thus necessitates both case study and cumulative research 
analysis. Cumulative analysis barely seems capable o f capturing “beliefs” adequately -  despite that, it 
may be possible having sufficient resources available. Qualitative case study analysis captures all 
ingredients of learning in the sense of this learning model, but per definition fails to provide any 
systematic assessment.
3.7 Limitations of the learning model
As mentioned, EU institutions enter the learning models through 0, the returns to effort at the European 
level and through the no learning cases where the role of institutional competence was underlined. A 
particular weak point of the learning model is the lack of attention to Minstitutional choice” and 
“interaction”. For instance, not all adhere to the view taken here that institutions cannot “learn” 
because they do not “act”. One could imagine that the failures o f  the CFSP in the Balkans created a 
desire for reforms not only within the Member States but also internally in the CFSP and its related 
institutions (the Commission, the Parliament). Such desires actually seem to have operated in reality at 
the constitutional level of the CFSP. The proposals and to some extent the outcome o f the Amsterdam 
intergovernmental conference show an internal institutional dynamic o f  the CFSP, where the WEU is , 
slowly being phased out, the Petersberg tasks are introduced and the High Representative and the 1 
Policy Unit are created. It may be that most o f these proposals may be traced back to the Member I 
States. However, the institutional degree o f “actomess” or ability to selftransformation in the light of I
i
events should be looked at when extending the model in the future. One could, for instance, imagine a 
formal decision-theoretic approach looking at this by capturing the interaction between governments,
between governments and institutions, or between different EU institutions.
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The learning model indicated that there are several points where learning cannot take place. 
Institutions, if they were able to learn, would thus sometimes have a hard time finding out what the 
governments’ strategies actually are. The harder it is for the government to learn, the more complicated 
will it become for the institutions to develop. In other words, if the government’s own learning does not 
exist, it affects the internal dynamics o f the CFSP as well. As an example, this is what Nuttall (2000) 
argues was the major reason, why there was such limited internal institutional dynamics of the CFSP 
after the THU. This issue also needs further attention in future models.
Another limitation o f the model is that the application of the learning model necessitates knowledge 
about how successful an action was. As discussed in Chapter 2, EFPA has yet not been able to measure 
success in a coherent way. There is therefore no reason to assume that this framework can be applied 
with more accuracy than earlier frameworks, which o f course reduces the strength o f this model. 
However, one of the declared aims is to obtain a more systematic approach to the registration of 
successes and failures in HFP.
The model does not cast light on why decision-makers hold particular prior or initial beliefs. Yet, the 
model accounts for why decision-makers hold posterior beliefs as the outcome o f learning. It therefore 
claims to be able to tell the story o f how the beliefs about a particular idea, the idea about the CFSP 
may have developed from some initial beliefs (which we know only little about) to where it stands 
today. The perspective remains on individual Member States’ belief about the CFSP and the internal 
dynamics o f these beliefs. Needless to say, the framework does only say little about the development o f 
factors outside the control o f Member States. The framework offers many opportunities to incorporate 
such factors in the framework at a later stage. Moreover, by analysing the conditions for learning in 
terms o f  strategic visibility and coherence of economic interests with institutional competence, the real
strength o f the framework is that it has the ingredients to capture the dynamics of EFP.
.■. >
Another problem with the learning model is that it seemingly asserts independence of governments’ 
beliefs o f each other. However, one may imagine that beliefs of some smaller countries in the 
effectiveness of the CFSP depend on the beliefs of certain larger countries in the CFSP. Henrik Larsen 
suggests that the British shift in San Malo 1998 is at least one o f the factors behind the recent shift in 
Danish attitude towards a European defence policy (1999). What the learning model however does
suggest is a contagion effect that goes from the change in expectations, to the outcome, to the CFSP,
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and further to the beliefs about the effectiveness o f the CFSP. This phenomenon seems to echo Hill’s 
theory about the Capability-Expectations Gap,
Finally, the model is an individualistic decision-theoretic model at this stage. This is appropriate to 
simplify and because the decision-making rule is unanimity in the CFSP, thus not posing any 
aggregation problems. However, a transformation o f the model to a collectivist one, including all 15 
Member State governments, would be possible. This could for example be done by regarding the 
literature on the Condorcet Jury Theorem extending the model with two parameters -  n standing for the 
number of Member States and k for the number o f states holding a particular belief (see Schneider 
2000a,b).
3.8 Conclusion
The Chapter presented a learning model o f  European foreign policy-making. The model in essence 
captures the dynamics of capabilities and expectations (about the workings o f EFP), which is the main 
topic of the literature over the past decade.
Learning is actors’ ability to update their beliefs about the returns to effort o f a multilateral (European) 
foreign policy strategy. Learning relies on information aggregation o f the outcomes in international 
affairs, previously held beliefs about the workings o f a unilateral versus multilateral (European) 
strategy and the hereto-attached efforts to unilateral and multilateral foreign policy. Learning is not 
possible when either no effort is attached to European foreign policy, or when beliefs are hubris like |
beliefs (representing a wrong expression of ones own capabilities), or when beliefs are already in |
accordance with the correct values (perfect information). |
Learning may take place as either a virtuous or a vicious circle. In the terminology of learning, this J
means that the ability o f actors’ to leam the right lessons from the past may be either improved or |
weakened. It does not mean that (the capability-presence of) European foreign policy automatically j
enters a similar virtuous or vicious circle. Whether there will be any absolute effect on the Union’s I
capability-presence crucially depends on the actual workings of European foreign policy which one can ■
only have a more or less correct belief about. Another characteristic o f the learning model is that the (
level of entrance (i.e. the initial weighing o f unilateral and multilateral effectiveness of action) into the
learning dynamics plays an important role. It determines, notably, how far one is able to aggregate
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information about the correct values of the workings of EFP as there may be some initial beliefs about 
the workings of the CFSP that for example never will lead to the devotion o f  all resources to European 
foreign polices. In other words, without external pressures that could shift beliefs from one level of 
learning to another, and assuming that interests are held constant, beliefs may converge towards an 
internal point where actors are indifferent between the utility stemming from the correct assignment of 
values to EFP and the current (beliefs related) assignment.
The main alternative hypothesis to learning -  that no learning takes place -  covers a huge area of 
unknown variables and parameters. An integrated approach to determining which variables should be 
included or not was suggested allowing some o f the parameters that had been held constant in the 
learning model to vary, such as interests and institutional competence. A link has now been made 
between ideas, interests, and institutions in order to assess their relative impact on European foreign 
policy. The impact of interests and institutions hereby becomes complementary to the explanation 
focusing on the impact of ideas.
No modelling for the sake o f modelling only, a horror scenario warned against in Chapter 2. Many 
difficulties will have to be overcome to avoid this with the current framework. Notably, a successful 
application o f the learning model will involve, 1) the combining o f  qualitative and quantitative 
research, in 2) searching for the joint significance of a) past values o f  European foreign policy, b) 
variables representing the outcomes in international affairs, and c) proxies for the development of 
actor’s beliefs about the workings of the CFSP. Chapters 4-6 have the high aim of seeking to provide 
such a successful application o f the learning model.
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CHAPTER 4
EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE GULF STATES:
A TIME SERIES ANALYSIS
This chapter applies the learning model from Chapter 3 to European foreign policy towards the 
(Persian) Gulf States. The evaluation will be based on a statistical time series analysis. The aim is, 
firstly, to measure the Union’s capability to act and mobilise resources towards the Gulf States over 
the last two decades. Using this estimate o f the Union’s capability-presence as a benchmark, the 
purpose, secondly, is to assess the importance o f learning for European foreign policy. This 
includes tests regarding a government’s ability to learn about successes and failures in European 
foreign policy and the conditions under which learning may take place. In accordance with the 
framework of Chapter 3, thirdly, a selected group of other explanations than learning will be 
examined. In particular, the chapter will assess the relevance o f the impact o f the external economic 
relations, the influence of strategies from other actors, such as those from the US or the larger 
Member States, and the relevance of systemic factors, such as the end o f  the Cold War.
The first section introduces the data set o f the statistical tests. It mainly derives from the KEDS Gulf 
data set o f  foreign policy events in the Persian Gulf States from 1979. The section includes a 
description of how the data set was created as well as an assessment o f the advantages and 
drawbacks involved in its use. This includes a general discussion on the use of events data set 
analysis for studies o f European foreign policy. The second section contains the specification o f the 
statistical model focusing on the variables and the choice of indicators for these variables. Basically, 
there are five sets o f variables and indicators discussed. These are 1) the learning variables, 2) 
factors causing inability to leam, 3) economic interests, 4) institutional change, and 5) some control 
variables. The third section determines the statistical time series to test given these indicators and 
the data representing them. It also provides an analysis of the various time series in terms o f their 
stationarity, autoregressivity and collinearity in order to specify the appropriate model. The fourth 
section presents the results of the statistical model. Those are subsequently discussed in the fifth 
section.
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4.1 The data set
The statistical tests will be based on time series observations from an existing data set of 
international foreign policy events, namely the Kansas Event Data System (KEDS).1 According to 
KEDS’ terminology, international event data is “nominal or ordinal codes recording the 
interactions between state and non-state global actors (Schrodt 2000:1). In essence, the data set 
contains a set o f values o f the degree o f international cooperation (both hostile and cooperative 
actions) between different international actors in thousands of such interactions. The raw material of 
events data may derive from various news sources such as Keesings Contemporary Archives, the 
New York Times, Agence France, or as in KEDS, Reuters News Agency’s news leads.2 The data 
set used includes 57,000 international events3 *5in the Persian G ulf States covering the period 1979- 
1999.
Those events that are used in KEDS may, for instance, have the following outline:
“Copyright 1987 Reuters Ltd Reuters
July 20, 1987, Monday AM cycle
Headline: Iran tells EC countries their diplomats can help French
Body: Iran agreed today to allow embassies of European Community (EC) countries to kelp French 
personnel in Tehran following its diplomatic break with Paris, Danish foreign minister Uffe Ellemann- 
Jensen said. ”
KEDS is a Macintosh program for the machine coding o f such international event data, and bases 
its coding on pattern recognition on word structures. In the above body sentence KEDS would 
particularly recognise patterns such as “agreed to allow”, “help '\ and “sa id 'l4 More precisely, if a 
news lead contains the following sentence, “in February 1995 the French Presidency o f  the 
European Union warned Nigeria about the continued setbacks fo r  the human rights situation in the 
country \  KEDS would read this as if one actor, A, had warned another actor, B. KEDS would here 
-  using an imported coding scheme from McClelland - provide a nominal code measuring the 
degree of cooperation or hostility from ac to rs  towards actor B, which in this particular case is 160. 
Had the EU instead of just warning Nigeria, threatened Nigeria, KEDS would take this as an 
increase in the degree of hostility from Nigeria towards the Union. Compared to the previous case 
this would resemble a decrease in the degree o f cooperation from the EU towards Nigeria which
1 Currently KEDS offers the following data sets: 1) the Levant data set (Gulf States and the Arabian Peninsula). 2) the Balkans. 3) Central Asia. 4)
Bosnia, and 5) the Middle East. Last year a data set for West Africa was added (URL: htttv'.-'www ukans cduMeeds data html).
: McClelland’s World Event Interaction System (WEIS, sec below) was coded from the New York Times. COPDAB was created from multiple
sources, but primarily from the New York Times. See Azar 1980: 152 and communication w ith Philip A. Schrodt
5 See the detailed conceptualisation of events in later in this section.
* See the KEDS URL: http:/Avww.ukans.edu/~kcds/data.html.
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will be provided with the nominal code 170. Had the EU finally engaged militarily with Nigeria, 
KEDS would give this type o f  increased hostility the nominal code 223, etc. The key to KEDS 
ability to code Reuters news leads is the following of a sparse parsing technique focusing on the 
subject - verb - object structure o f each sentence. That being said, KEDS is optimised for events 
coding o f  leading sentences with relatively simple declarative sentences (Schrodt & Gemer 1994; 
Schrodt 1998).
The nominal values of cooperation that enter the statistical model are arrived at by applying 
Goldstein’s weighted version o f  Charles McClelland’s World Event Interaction Survey (WEIS) on 
the KEDS data set (Goldstein 1992). Originally WEIS was created in a realist milieu which placed 
emphasis on diplomatic and military behaviour. This bias was intentionally reduced somewhat in 
Goldstein’s version of WEIS. As Section 4.1 (c) will discuss, Goldstein’s version still has problems, 
for instance, by operating with a conflict -  cooperation continuum that fails to take into account the 
depth o f  a  foreign policy action.5
(a) Gathering events data
Compared to ordinary data collection through downloading from Eurostat or OECD sources, events 
data set creation involves several additional steps: 1) the search for and downloading o f events, 2) 
the reformatting and filtering o f data to fit KEDS, 3) the updating and revision of dictionaries, and 
4) the autocoding of the entire data set including the aggregation o f  data into timeseries suitable for 
statistical testing.
The first step is the search for and downloading o f  events. The choice o f  source of the events has, 
according to Schrodt, been one o f the “perennial problems o f  events data set creation, however, 
during the 1990s, most event data projects (whether human or machine coded) shifted to the 
Reuters newswire source” (2000:35). Schrodt justifies the use o f Reuters on the basis o f its superior 
world coverage and its global reach. His Gulf events were initially obtained from the NEXIS 
“REUNA” file (Reuters North American news service).5 6 According to Schrodt, the searches 
involved looking for words covering the states o f the Gulf region and the Arabian peninsula for the
5 The PANDA project {the Protocol for the Assessment o f Non Violent Direct Action) in comparison uses an even more elaborated system of 
categories from WEIS It basically uses KEDS to generate its data and only varies in terms o f a much broader spectrum of actors and actions than 
KEDS. Large-scale data-set project at Harvard University covering approximately 500.000 different events. Many different event data and events data 
generation methods and programs exist. Finally. Azar's Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPD.AB) is a data set that codes a genera! "issue a r e a '-  
whether an action is primarily military', economic, diplomatic or one of five other types of relationship (1980). WEIS, in contrast, codes for specific 
"issue arenas" such as the Vietnam War. Arab- Israeli conflict and SALT negotiations.
6 Reuters News Leads are now only available directly on the Reuters News Service (in the Archives), although they were previously available through 
the LEXIS/NEXIS data service as well.
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period from 15 April 1979 to 31 March 1999. The source texts prior to 10 June 97 were located by 
using the NEXIS search command:
"(SAU D I! OR SA U D I ARABIA! OR IRAN ! OR IRAQ ! OR KU W AIT! OR G C C  OR O M AN ! OR YEMEN! OR QATAR! 
OR BAH RAIN! OR UAE OR EM IRATE! OR D UBAI! O R A B U  DHABI!) AN D  N O T  (SOCCER! OR SPO RT! OR 
O LYM PIC! OR TENNIS OR BASKETBALL OR NBA OR T S T R M  OR H EAD LIN E(H IG H LIG H TS OR (W ORLD W/2 
OUTLOOK) O R (K E Y  W /I FACTS) OR (EVEN TS W /I SCHEDULED) OR (HISTORICAL W /i CALENDAR) ) ) ’’
Texts after June, 10, 1997 were downloaded from the Reuters Business Briefing service. The data 
set that this project uses is a version o f the data coded from the lead sentences containing 47,882 
events.7 The lead sentence is “the first” sentence o f a newswire report. One example o f a lead 
sentence is the following from the 1990 Iraq-Kuwait Crisis:
July 25, 1990: IRAQ WARNS IT  WON'T BACKD O W N IN  TALKS WITH KUWAIT 
Iraq made clear Friday it would take an uncompromising stand at conciliation talks with Kuwait, 
saying its Persian Gulf neighbour must respond to Baghdad's “legitimate rights " and repair the 
economic damage it caused (Schrodt 2000, citing Reuters).
The idea is that lead sentences as this 4following standard journalistic practice usually summarises 
the story that follows and has a relatively simple declarative structure” (Schrodt 2000:37).8 9This 
makes it suitable for further processing through the second step, which is the filtering and 
reformatting of these leading segments o f the Reuters news wires into readable data for the so- 
called Kansas Events Data System (KEDS) software. This is more a technical step, involving the 
conversion o f the source text, the Reuters news leads, to a standard form using a simple filter 
program “Nexis Filter
The third step involves the modifying o f dictionaries on actors and verbs according to the specific 
characteristics o f the filtered data set in hand. In general, KEDS uses three types o f information to 
pattern recognise and code the interaction of an event, the actors, the verbs and the phrases. The 
modification o f dictionaries is done by manually coding a sample o f events according to these 
patterns. The actors are proper nouns that identify the political actors. New actors are detected 
through the KEDS utility program “Actor Filter" and incorporated into the so-called “actors'
7 Schrodt remarks that the full version comprising 304.000 events (in full stories) is better suited for smaller actors. Since this thesis mostly 
aggregated cooperation at a national level the lead sentence data set of a smaller number of events was selected (2000).
*Schrodt defends this narrow coverage o f the event by assessing that in most situations "juU-sfoty coding o f neusnire text will not result in a dramatic 
increase in the number o f  events because o f  the high level o f  redundancy fo u n d  in the texts".
9 The program basically changes all letters to capitals, commas are delimited with spaces, irrelevant information such as page headings are removed 
and the date is formatted in KEDS readable text. In this process another utility program Nexis Verify is also used to check the dates for missing 
intervals, bad date formats and the like.
9 2
dictionary” to be recognised by KEDS when reading the events.10 In the Iraq-Kuwait event above, 
KEDS would identify Iraq as the source and Kuwait as the target o f the action. As previously 
mentioned, event data primarily distinguishes the actions that one actor takes towards another one. 
This means that the verbs are the most important part o f the sentence in determining the event code. 
KEDS operates using verbs dictionaries that specifically contain information about the verbs and 
the phrases within which the verbs (plus associated words) are found. The phrases distinguish 
different meanings of a verb. For instance, the verb ‘Vo accept” has a different coding if it is 
combined with the words “refused to accept" than if  the combination o f  words is “proposal was 
accepted \  The pattern recognition typically distinguishes between direct objects such as in the 
distinction between “Promised Military A id ' and “Promised to Veto".
In the fourth step, each data set is finally autocoded on the computer with the revised dictionaries 
and all remaining events. The autocoded events are then usually transformed into time-series for 
each given actor dyad using the event aggregation program “KEDS COUNT \  This program 
indicates for a given period how “co-operative" a given actor has been towards another actor. 
Goldstein in particular defines net-co-operation, which is the weighted sum o f  all co-operative acts 
in the tim e period minus the weighed sum of all hostile acts (Goldstein & Freeman 1991). In the 
Iraq-Kuwait 1990 event mentioned above, the event would, for example, receive the WEIS coding 
160 W ARN, equal to -0.7 on the Goldstein revised WEIS scheme. If another event in the same 
period was coded to +2, and there were only two events in this period, the net-cooperation would 
subsequently have been 1.3. As will be shown below, the case o f European foreign policy 
necessitates some minor revisions of these measures to enable them to address the questions o f this 
thesis. Notably, European foreign policy will here be measured in terms o f the gross cooperation 
towards a  specific target, and not as net cooperation. This is a measure that aggregates the various 
values for cooperation irrespective of their positive or negative values and thus provides a measure 
for the intensity of cooperation, as will be further elaborated in Section 4.2 (b).
For this project, a quarterly aggregation has been chosen. This is mostly due to methodological 
reasons: to reach a suitably high number of periods in order to perform statistical time series 
analysis based on a data set from 1979-99. Smaller aggregation periods, such as two weeks or one 
month, have been seen in KEDS studies before. This study however included the variable trade, 
which does not exist in smaller aggregations from 79-99. A relatively long aggregation period o f 
three months is compatible with a perception that events are probably less discrete in nature than,
lu in principle the program should automatically compare the old actor dictionary with the actors deriving from the events in question and list all new 
actors. In practice, one must manually check whether each actor already has been placed in the dictionary or not.
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for instance, King have indicated (1989, see below). Analysing groups of events and finding 
relationships which continue from one quarter to the other thus rather indicate that the groups of 
events hung together, not because they were discrete, but for some other reason, such as, for 
instance, the impact of learning.
(b) Arguments in favour o f  machine coded event data analysis |
I
Events represent according to Laurance the preferred level o f analysis of the policy community I 
since events describe “conflicts and co-operationn which is the “essence o f  foreign policy analysis” 
(1990).11 KEDS is here particularly relevant. It offers a unique possibility to build an extensive and 
relatively consistent data set on one o f the most important variables in international affairs, namely 
co-operation.
There are several other reasons behind the decision to use the KEDS G ulf data set in this project. 
Firstly, availability played a significant role and the fact that the KEDS Gulf data set had a suitable 
long time horizon. Secondly, the KEDS Gulf data set had been positively assessed and was 
generally considered reliable (Schrodt 2000:3, from Schrodt & Gemer 1994). Thirdly, it was an 
updated data set extended to cover a period until the second quarter o f  1999 (1999q2). In total and 
measured in quarters, this yielded 64 quarters. 40 time periods are usually the minimum 
requirement for using statistical time series analysis, such as ARIMA models. Fourthly, the 
advantage of KEDS compared to other data sets, is that KEDS is stronger in its precision towards 
international cooperation with a specific region or country having focused extensively on, for 
example, the Gulf (Huxtable & Pevehouse 1996). The Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) 
and the World Events Interaction Survey (WEIS) are on the contrary global data sets attempting to 
code “a// interactions by all states and some non-state actors fo r  a period  o f  time" (Schrodt 2000 
from Azar 1980). These data sets may therefore be more suitable for testing more global 
hypotheses. This also applies to the Protocol for the Assessment o f  Non Violent Direct Action 
(PANDA), which may be regarded as an ambitious attempt to provide a new generation o f KEDS 
extending the dictionaries and being more sophisticated than KEDS in terms of the number and 
types o f actors included (Bond, Bennets and Vogele 1994).12 In the choice of data set, particularly 
between PANDA and KEDS, it was important that KEDS provided a superior service by being 
more transparent, updated and cooperative towards external use o f the system than PANDA.
11 For a discussion on the use o f large scale datasets, see e.g. Ayres and Andriole (1980:216*218); or Andriole and Hopple (1984).
12 URL: httn ://data. fas harvard.edu/cfia/pnscs/DQCS/cbcontent htm.
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As regards the instrumentality o f using event data, one o f the arguments is that it “reduces 
journalistic descriptions o f  international interactions to categorical data that can be analysed 
statistically” (Schrodt, Davis and Weddle 1994:2, 1-2). Event data analysis thus represents a 
systematic approach to describing large empirical data sets that may give a hint about the existence 
or non-existence of correlation among different variables. With the help o f “machine coding” of the 
events, large machine-readable data can now be categorised and coded by a single researcher. In 
addition, similar occurrences o f a particular pattern are not subject to inter-coder disparities.
One should not forget that KEDS deals with qualitative variables and an extensive degree of 
judgement lies behind the creation o f the dictionaries that are used for the machine coding. Schrodt 
estimates that one must expect that up till 15-20 % of all events are enoneously coded whether they 
are humanly or machine coded (1998, Manual: 18). As Schrodt mentions, “ifyo u  can *t cope with the 
fact that probably 15 % o f  your data are erroneously coded, you shouldn't be doing event data 
analysis. End o f sermon
Despite the fact that creating a machine coded events data set involves a few more steps than for 
instance downloading an already existing data set from the internet, e.g., using the Behavioural 
Correlates o f War data set (BCOW), KEDS remains highly user-friendly.13 In many ways, one may 
see KEDS, related programs such as PANDA and the newly developed TABARI programs as 
responses to Laurance’s quest for more transparency, suggesting, for instance, to produce manuals 
covering each single step o f their analytical process.14 Illustratively, this author was able to develop 
a preliminary data set within two months mainly based on the detailed 215-page long “KEDS 
MANUAL”.
(c) Arguments against machine coded event data analysis
A major disadvantage of machine-coded events data analysis stems from the far from similar 
definitions scholars give o f “events”. Events used to be defined as in Schneider & Seybold as 
“single action items o f  a non-routine, extraordinary, or newsworthy character that in some sense 
are directed across a national boundary; and have, in most instances a specific foreign targetM 
(1997). Laurance is more concrete arguing that an event involves “(1) an actor, (2) a target, (3) a 
time period, (4) an activity, and (5) an issue which the activity revolves'X 1990). In this view, an 
event is some activity undertaken by an international actor (a nation state, a major sub-unit o f  a 1*
11 Different converting programs exist though or are being developed.
1-1 Schrodt, Davis and \Veddle 1994; Goldstein & Pevehouse 1997 or the Philip A. Schrodt: "KEDS Manual", Version 0.9B7 Draft February 1998.
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nation-state, an international organisation)... “undertaken at a specific time and which is directed 
toward another actor for the purpose o f conveying interest (even non-interest) in some issue
Similarly, Schrodt provide a practical definition o f events related to the actual discipline of 
machine coding events (2000). He notes that an event “is an interaction associated with a specific 
point in time, that can be described in a natural language sentence that has as its subject and object 
an element o f  a set o f  actors and as its verb an element o f  a set o f  actions, the contents o f  which are 
transitive verbs.” This definition is, according to Schrodt, not an attempt to justify machine coding 
a priori, but is a result o f “years o f  experiments with ...the gradual realisation that interactions that 
do not meet this criteria are likely to be ambiguous to humans as well as machines.” The question 
one ought to ask before proceeding with event data analysis is, however, whether real actors share 
Schrodt, Laurance’ and other scholars’ conceptualisation o f an event? If  this question is not 
addressed, it can lead to adverse effects.
The KEDS project in general addresses this question but some recent work has had a tendency to 
underestimate the implication o f the gap between events data analysis and real world phenomenon. 
For instance, Pevehouse & Goldstein used KEDS generated events data to predict, “that Milosevic 
would never give in to the NATO bombings in the Kosovo’X 1999). The article had been sent for 
review 27 April in the midst o f the NATO bombing campaign. By the time it was published, the last 
Serbian soldier had left Kosovo and NATO’s KFOR force had been controlling Kosovo for about 
two months.
That a model can lead to a wrong prediction in one case like this is not really the problematic issue 
here, as the purpose of systematic research is to generalise. However, it seems to be a dubious 
exercise to use KEDS to measure the influence o f  a  bombing campaign on a dictator since KEDS 
cannot capture the length and the depth o f  a bombing campaign. For instance, the coding for an air 
strike (coded as 196 or -6.0 in Goldstein’s updated version of the WEIS coding scheme, where the 
coding ranges from -10 to 10) does not consider either the number o f fighter planes engaged, the 
number and type o f bombs used in the strike, the duration of the strike or the damages caused by the 
strikes. This criticism does not imply that KEDS is useless. On the contrary, KEDS’ strength is its 
ability to distinguish between various types of action, thus capturing the scope of an action. This is 
crucial in the analysis o f EFP. Moreover, as this project is less preoccupied with influence, i.e. 
whether the Union may actually force Milosevic, Nigeria’s Abacha or Iran’s Khamenei to give in. 
but rather addresses the capability and presence o f EFP compared to its potential, previous
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capability-presence and compared to other foreign policy actors, the features o f KEDS are relevant 
to the analysis.
In the past, events data analysis has also received criticism for allegedly advocating a reductionist 
worldview focusing on action -  reaction and not on, for example, the impact of ideas or identity. 
Keohane mentions, (using events data analysis) “ instances o f  cooperation and discord could all too 
easily be isolated from  the context o f  beliefs and behaviour within which they are embedded* 
(1984:56, 1-21). However, as this thesis uses events data analysis to test a theoretical framework 
regarding exactly the impact o f beliefs, Keohane’s worry for the exclusion o f ideas is in this context 
not really relevant.15
4.2 Specification: variables
The starting point for constructing a relevant statistical model is the specification of the variables 
needed (and available) to test Chapter 3’s learning model. Table 4.1 below lists the different 
variables that were chosen. The first row o f Table 4.1 lists the dependent variable o f this thesis 
indicating its (data set) description and notation. In those cases where the KEDS Gulf data set was 
used to observe the variable (all except the economic variables), the column “EVENTS” lists how 
many events that in total were observed o f the specific variable in the KEDS data set.
(a) European foreign policy (EFPGU)
On the dependent side, the Union’s capability-presence or European foreign policy is measured 
using an indicator from the IR-literature on cooperation and conflict. The indicator measures the 
intensity o f action (or cooperation) from the European Union towards the Gulf States. The 
cooperation among Member States is measured in absolute (or gross) terms. In other words, 
cooperative and hostile acts towards a given third country are added up to provide the value of the 
variable in a given period.
The measure for EFP is calculated on a quarterly basis from the Gulf data set using Goldstein’s 
revised WEIS coding scheme (1992). The Goldstein scheme has been reproduced in Appendix 4.1.
15 A similar note may be attached to Ring's observation "that scholars in this fie ld  often think in terms o f the continuous but unobserved processes o f  
international conflict and co-operation", hereby, [wrongly] "attaching] statistical techniques that are designed fo r  continuous time-series" to 
discrete events. This really does not concern this project since the data set o f  the project consists o f continuous time series where the aim precisely is 
to find out to which extent the different events actually are discrete or may be related to each other (Ring 1989:125: Schneider et al 1993:329).
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mTable 4.1 List of variables
HYPOTHESIS DESCRIPTION OF 
VARIABLE
NOTATION EVENTS
EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY (EFP) Gross EFP versus (vs.) the GULF EFPGU 235
LEARNING Lagged EFP variable EFPGUt-i,t-2....t-n As above
Gulf net cooperation vs. EU GUEU 318
Gulf net cooperation vs. World GUWO 2228316
INABILITY TO  LEARN Gross Member States cooperation 
vs. Gulf
GMSGU 7782
US Foreign Policy vs. the Gulf USGU 9420
UK/France/Germany Gross 
Foreign Policy vs. the Gulf17
GUKFRGEGU 3214
Import Diversity vs. the Gulf IDEUGU -
Export Diversity vs. the Gulf EDEUGU -
Import Average vs. the Gulf IAVEUGU -
Export Average vs. the Gulf EAVEUGU -
Import Average vs. the world IAVEUWO
Export Average vs. the world EAVEUWO
Import Diversity vs. the world IDEUWO
Export Diversity vs. the world EDEUWO
O TH ER Balkan cooperation vs. the World YUWO
Goldstein’s revised WEIS’ coding scheme classifies events into 109 specific categories organised 
into 22 general categories such as “Consult”, “R ew ard ’, “Protest” and “Force”. These form “a very 
*ough cooperation-conflict continuum (Laurance 1990 on the WEIS scheme). The numerical scale 
}f Goldstein goes along a continuum from -10, which indicates the most hostile act that an actor 
nay pursue towards another actor (military engagement), to +10, which is the most cooperative act 
n the scheme (merger/integration). In-between, the value of 0 is given to neutral declaratory acts, 
;uch as a comment. If in a given period, the aggregated values of the hostile acts (all in minus) 
equals the aggregated values o f the cooperative acts (all in plus) the results would thus be that the 
legree o f (net)-cooperation had been 0 or neutral in this period of time. Using the gross measure 
nstead, the degree o f (gross)-cooperation would amount to 20.
t  may be noted that KEDS analysts have normally used the degree of net-cooperation as a measure 
>f cooperation and not the absolute (gross) value as is preferred in this study. This stems from the
Bahrain (131); Djibouti (5); Iran (3058); Arab World (1063); Iraq (7122); Israel (2296); Kuwait (1132); Libya (412); Lebanon (10%); Palestine 
253); Qatar (106); Saudi Arabia (1379); Syria (825); and Yemen (405).
The number o f  events from the three countries was: UK 1667. France 1042 and German v 505.
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TI study’s emphasis on the Union’s capabilities to act and mobilise resources, which is something that 
| includes both cooperative and hostile actions. As mentioned in Section 4.1, measuring EFP as net
I cooperation (i.e. cooperative minus hostile acts) is indeed problematic, in that it is not possible to
I detect the depth of EFP. Had the Union, for example, managed to establish a military force to
| intervene between the Serbs and the Croats in support of the European Community Monitoring
I Mission (ECMM, now EUMM) as proposed by France in autumn 1991, the perception o f EFP as
I paralysed and incapable o f acting would probably have reversed. The proposed use of force would
I have counted as a hostile (negative) act according to the WEIS scheme. On the other hand, the
| convoying o f humanitarian assistance in Bosnia later during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia
| would have been counted as a cooperative (positive) act. Using a net-measure thus would have a
I neutralising effect on the value o f the two EU actions, while a gross measure adds the two together.
I (b) The learning hypothesis
I
| To reiterate from Chapter 3, learning is the ability o f actors to form beliefs about the workings o f
| EFP based on previously held beliefs and the observed outcomes. The previously held beliefs
| determine the allocation of effort between unilateral and multilateral (European) foreign policy -
| everything else held constant. The demand on the learning hypothesis for the quantitative analysis
| was according to Section 3.6 the joint significance o f 1) the lagged values o f  the dependent variable,
I reflecting the allocation of effort to EFP, and 2) the observed outcome, in this case the degree o f
1 cooperation (or hostility) of the target. Only with both these indicators turning out significant, may
j the patterns o f this analysis be identified as compatible with what learning is about.
On the explanatory side, the statistical model therefore includes, i) a measure o f the target’s degree 
of cooperation/hostility vis-à-vis the Union/the rest o f the world and ii) a measure o f the lagged 
dependent variable, i.e. past quarters’ values of EFP. Apart from demanding significance of both 
these two indicators, the joint significance of more than one lag o f the above variables should 
strengthen the justification for the learning hypothesis.
The measurement of the lagged dependent variable follows directly from the description of the 
dependent variable above. The other indicator for learning, the lagged value o f cooperation from the 
target, is expressed as the net value of cooperation/hostility from the target towards the rest o f the 
world/the Union. The reason for not using the gross value here as well is that the cooperation o f the 
target is supposed to be a proxy for the observed outcome. The perception o f the degree of success 
or failure o f  the observed outcome is believed to relate to the degree o f  compliance o f the target
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versus the Union/the rest o f  the world. One thus needs to differentiate between cooperative and 
hostile acts, as the net value (unlike the gross value) does.
(c) Inability to learn
If the null-hypothesis that learning does not take place is confirmed, Chapter 3 discussed several 
factors that could account for this inability to learn or simply could have suppressed any ability to 
learn that the government might have had. Among these factors were those directly related to the 
government’s ability to observe the outcome. These internal factors included notably the impact on 
EFP from competing strategies either from other international actors such as the US, single Member 
State governments or international institutions. The less integrated the competing strategies had 
been into the government’s own perception of the workings o f EFP, the higher was the risk that the 
outcome would change without the government being able to observe the causality behind its own 
action and the change and thereby being able to learn from the outcome.18
The impact of competing strategies on EFP is, as suggested in Chapter 3 approximated, by focusing 
on the possible influence on EFP of US foreign policies versus the Gulf. US foreign policies 
towards the Gulf are measured as the degree o f net-cooperation from the US towards the Gulf. 
Related to the discussion above of when to use net and gross values, the net-value is chosen to 
capture the impact o f the directions set by the US regarding a crisis and/or conflict. Had the present 
framework rather emphasised investigating power politics oriented hypotheses, for example, 
hypotheses on hegemonic power, the use o f the gross value might have been more suitable as that 
would better have captured the intensity o f  US pressure.19
A proxy representing the actions of the three big Member States, France, Germany and Britain on 
EFP measures the impact o f individual Member States’ foreign policies on EFP. The proxy 
represents the summed values o f cooperation/hostility of these three countries towards the Gulf. 
Contrary to the US variable, the gross or absolute values o f cooperation is used to arrive at this 
proxy since the issue is whether an increase in the intensity o f  unilateral action from one or more 
Member State could act as a locomotive for more depth and scope o f EFP, or the relationship 
instead is a trade o ff between Member State foreign policy and EFP.
Clearly, outside actors/strategies might also be able to alter the government's interests regarding a particular strategy. This could happen within 
more traditional power political options using, for instance, blackmailing or coercing the Member States to comply with a certain mode of behaviour.
19 In fact, both measures were included at an early stage o f the statistical specification of the model and no correlation could be found between gross 
US foreign poliev towards the Gulf and EFP. Omitting Gross US foreign policy thus did not bias the results.
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(d) Economic interests
As described in Chapter 3, the impact of economic interests and institutional competence within the 
external economic relations o f  the Union are regarded as complementary explanations to learning. 
Firstly, the impact of external economic relations on EFP is tested for by using a measure o f 
Member States’ trade preferences: the intensity and diversity o f trade among Member States 
towards a given third country as well as towards the rest o f the world. Trade figures were derived 
from OECD’s Monthly Trade Statistics in its quarterly form. Figures were available only from 
1983q2 -  1999q3 regarding EU trade towards the world, and from 1984ql-1999q3 towards the 
Gulf.20 There were no quarterly foreign direct investment figures available.21 2Both import and 
export figures were included in the model. The diversity of EU trade was calculated by using a 
formula for “variance” among observations in a sample equal to the total population. The 
interpretation of the variance is the deviation of each Member State’s trade from the mean. The 
intensity o f  trade was estimated by the average degree o f imports or exports measured as absolute 
values o f imports or exports.
According to Chapter 3, increased diversity of trade should lead to less EFP. The effect of an 
increase in the intensity of trade, on the other hand, should differ according to whether the trading 
partner in question was the target country or included all trade o f the Union towards the rest o f the 
world. In the former case, Chapter 3 predicted a negative correlation between trade and EFP; in the 
latter case, the relationship ought to be positive instead.
(e) Institutional change
Nuttall takes the view that institutional changes are an integral part o f European foreign policy 
(1997; 2000). Chapter 3 suggested that the more institutional competence is transferred to both the 
external economic relations and the CFSP, the higher is the capability-presence of the Union in 
international affairs. Qualitative case studies offer the opportunity to go into detail regarding the 
country specific competence o f the Union. Informal institutional changes are also more adequately 
dealt with in single or comparative case studies. By being able to detect structural breakpoints in the
10 Available at the EUI, the University of Konstanz and the LSE.
21 Yearly figures are available and may be used as an estimator for FD I, which could be converted using various conversion programs, e g. SAS.
22 The formula for variance, i.e. the average squared deviation o f each Member State's trade from the mean. can7 using simple algebra, be expressed
as:
* (  x */ )2- ( 1 L x >j "i=i i =i where x( stands for the i’th Member State’s trade, and n is either IS (1995-1999). 12 (1987-1994). or 10 (1983-1986)
Member States. This takes into consideration the successive entry of Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Austria and Finland to the Union.
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This thesis accordingly looks at the impact of the intergovernmental conferences’ treaty changes 
hypothesising that these have been able to provide new constraints and opportunities for EFP. This 
means that one should be able to observe changes in EFP according to the institutional changes in 
the period since the treaty came into force. Controlling for the impact o f institutions is thus here a 
control regarding the impact o f the SEA, the TEU and the Amsterdam Treaty. Despite the many 
problems o f the CFSP one should expect all three treaties, the SEA, TEU and the Amsterdam 
Treaty to induce more depth and scope into EFP. Structural breakpoints should thus appear in the 
second-third quarter o f 1987 and around the fourth quarter 1993-first quarter of 1994 for a direct 
institutional effect.
(f) Other variables
The model also included a number of other variables, notably, the impact o f the three wars, the end 
of the Cold War, the Gulf W ar and the war in the former Yugoslavia. As regards the end o f the Cold 
War, a structural breakpoint in the events data set nevertheless should occur around 1990 if one 
could speak about a direct Cold War effect. It m ight occur in the first quarter after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall had started with the initial opening o f  the wall in Bomholmer Strasse on November 9, 
1989, i.e. in 1990ql. Until that point “the Western Europeans and the Americans still remained 
cautious in their attitude to the events” (Nuttall 2000). If the structural breakpoint appeared later, 
one cannot exclude a Cold War effect either, but it would then be more difficult to link the effect 
directly to the end o f the Cold War, in particular, due to the institutional changes o f the Union at the 
beginning o f the ’90s.
The literature described in Chapter 2 suggested that the end of the Cold War, i.e. the end of the 
balance o f power, increased the external pressure on the EU to react externally which thus should 
have led to more EFP cooperation. The literature, however, does not give any direction as to what 
the impact o f the Gulf War would have been. Nuttall notes that one should not underestimate the 
impact of the G ulf War 1990-91 on the formation o f the TEU (2000). From that we may expect a 
positive impact o f the G ulf War on EFP, i.e. a jum p upward in EPF cooperation from 1990-1991.
The most traumatic of all EFP experiences was the experience with the break-up and wars in the 
former Yugoslavia, 1991-1995. Winn (1997) notes that the crisis in the former Yugoslavia
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highlighted the “paucity o f political will regarding the operation o fjo in t actions”. To control for 
the impact on the conflict in the former Yugoslavia on EFP, the data set thus comprises the conflict 
in the Balkans using the KEDS-team’s coverage o f that conflict from April 1989 to May 1999. 
Despite including 52,729 events the Balkan data set however only contains 40 quarters, which as 
mentioned is a critical low number for time-series analysis. The project instead uses the Balkans 
data set to provide a rough statistical indication on the relationship between the Balkan conflict and 
the Gulf events from 1989-1999. To the model is thus added a variable measuring the degree o f 
cooperation from the former Yugoslavia towards the rest of the world to see how the Union’s 
results in the Balkans might have affected EFP elsewhere. The net value is used for the same 
reasons as it is used to measure GUWO and USGU.
The geographical proximity is often included in studies on cooperation and conflict. In the 
democratic peace literature, for instance, geographical proximity is significant in most major 
studies, such as in Bruce Russett & John Oneal’s analysis based on the Correlates of War data set 
(Oneal 2000). This project, however, will not control for the impact of geographical proximity due 
to the focus in the quantitative study on the Gulf region only.
Colonial ties are also often tested for in studies on cooperation, war and conflict (see e.g. Schneider 
& Seybold 1997). Special relations indeed exist between certain Member States such as France and 
Britain and third countries in the Persian Gulf deriving from colonial ties. However, the quantitative 
study does not explicitly test for such impact. However, colonial ties implicitly enter among the 
explanatory variables as information and knowledge about the region that certain larger Member 
States are supposed to have due to their size and historic engagement in third countries. This is 
tested for by looking at the impact of the three big Member States, Germany, France and Britain, on 
EFP as described above.
In conclusion, the data set will be tested separately for structural breakpoints due to various wars 
and institutional changes in the following periods: 1) 1983q2-1997ql (whole period); 2) 1983q2- 
1993q4 (test for TEU-effect); 3) 1987q3-1997ql (SEA-effect) and 1990ql-1997ql (Cold War- 
effect).
4.3 Specification: statistical model
Based on the above list of variables, the following specification procedure is applied to determine 
the adequate statistical model. First, all time-series of the variables are tested for stationarity and
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unit-roots. Second, all variables are tested for autocorrelation in order to establish the auto­
regressive model to be applied. Third, multicollinearity tests are performed to avoid bias from 
correlation between the various explanatory and supposedly independent variables. A narrow 
criterion is applied in this process implying that all variables that do not fulfil the specification tests 
are excluded in order to propose a suitable statistical model.
The attempt was to analyse the time series within the auspices o f ARIMA models, i.e. 
autoregressive integrated moving average models. However, it should be noted, that the fact that the 
number of observations are at the lower level o f what is regarded as required for a time series 
analysis, efficiency and consistency, the question o f which are large sample properties, almost 
becomes irrelevant. For example, a temporary (but possibly random) change in the direction of a 
relationship will appear to be a trend and therefore has a non-stationary component. But if that same 
series were embedded inside a longer series the trend would disappear. There is thus logic behind 
complementing the time series analysis using ARIMA methods below with a test that clearly did 
not originate from time series, but on the other hand appears robust in particular in small samples, 
the property of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The strategy is therefore to develop a time series 
model using ARIMA models as the primary tool but to complement the results of these tests with an 
OLS test.2 *3
(a) Unit root test -  test fo r  stationarity
The most important restriction on the use o f time-series is the stationarity condition.24 *Tests for 
stationarity is a test for a root less than 1.0. One o f  the approaches to test for stationarity departs 
from the unit root test. Unit root tests test for the root equal to 1.0. Cromwell et al have argued that 
tests for stationarity are “really ju s t tests fo r  non-unit roots” (1994). This is probably a debatable 
statement, especially since any root greater than 1.0 will induce a trend. Unit roots are however not 
compatible with stationarity and therefore needs to be tested for to establish non-stationarity. In the 
specification process, unit roots were tested for using the Phillips-Perron Tests for unit roots.23 In 
some doubtful cases the Phillips-Perron tests were supplemented with the augmented Dickey Fuller 
tests (Hamilton 1994:528-529; STATA 6.0, 298-299).26 The augmented Dickey Fuller tests control 
for serial correlation by including higher-order auto-regressive terms in the regression (Hamilton
2i I am particularly grateful to Professor Schrodt for explaining the advantages and disadvantages o f different statistical methods using K.EDS.
w A time series is weakly or covariance stationary if  neither its mean nor its autocovariances depend on the date t. A process is strictly stationary if
the joint distribution of the variable depends only on the intervals separating the dates. The relevant ty pe of stationarity for this data analysis is the
w eak stationarity (here just stationarity). Autocovariance is the covariance o f a variable with its own lagged value (Hamilton 1994; 45^16).
2i Hamilton 1994. Respectively DF: 516, 528; PP: 506-515. The Phillips-Perron tests are based on simple OLS regressions o f  the dependent variable 
on its own lagged value and a constant with corrections for serial correlation made to the standard OLS coefficients and t-statistics.
26 The Augmented Dickey Fuller Tests controls for serial correlation by including higher-order auto-regressive terms in the regression.
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1994:516). Appendix 4.2 lists the results o f  the unit root tests using the Phillips-Perron tests for unit 
root and the augmented Dickey Fuller tests for all the variables o f  Table 4.1.
As shown in Appendix 4.2, all variables from Table 4.1 except YUWO, EDEUWO and 
EAVEUWO, were statistically rejected to have a unit root composition. After differencing YUWO 
once (hereby becoming YUWOl it obtained a non unit root composition. EAVEUWO and 
EDEUWO could not become stationary either by including a trend term or by differencing (both for 
Phillips-Perron and Augmented Dickey Fuller) and were subsequently dropped from the analysis. 
The Phillips-Perron tests for IAVEUWO could not reject the unit root hypothesis (p =0.12), but the 
Augmented Dickey Fuller test could (p=0.004). IAVEUWO was thus allowed to remain in the 
model without differencing or including a trend term.
(b) Test fo r  auto-correlation
Proceeding with the developing o f the ARIMA model, the remaining time series were now tested 
for auto-correlation. The purpose was to see whether and to what degree the variables were 
autoregressive in their disturbance terms. This information is crucial to determine the correct 
number o f lags included hereby correcting inferences, given both cross correlation between 
different time-series (especially to avoid over aggregation) and the autocorrelation o f each series 
through time.
The correlograms o f the variables were drawn including the autocorrelation (AC), partial 
autocorrelation (PAC), Q-statistics and a  character based plot of the AC and PAC (Stata 6.0 
1999:261; Box and Jenkins 1994; Hamilton 1994). All variables could approximately be interpreted 
in terms o f  zero or one lag o f autocorrelation in the error terms and no moving average terms.28 
Based on this information it was decided to test the Gulf model on an AR(1), i.e. ARIMA (1,0,0) as 
follows:
2~ The methodological validity o f expressing non-stationarity time-series in differenced or time-trend form thereby generating stationarity is 
contentious (Cromwell et aI 1994:11; Hamilton 1994:Chapter 15). Hamilton describes it as the traditional trade-off between efficiency and 
consistency (447) and suggests not suppressing a unit-root expression if  the assumption is true in order to achieve the most efficient estimates. 
However, if  a unit root assumption is false, Hamilton maintains that the estimates will be wrong no matter how large the sample. He thus suggests 
testing the model both with and without the unit root imposed. His advice will be followed here in the sense that all variables that were not both 
rejected by the Phillips-Perron and the Augmented Dickey Fuller test were included in the models that were carried on to statistical testing.
From the correllograms of the autocorrelation (AC) and partial autocorrelation (PAC), a picture appeared o f EFPGU, GUEU. IDEL'GU and 
1AVEUGU being autoregressive. EFPGU, IDEUGLL and IAVEUGU all showed autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation correspondent w ith an 
AR(1) process. GUEU's conellogram showed a mixed picture with both AC and PAC seemingly making a sharp cut after the first lag. A closer 
inspection o f  the actual values o f  AC and PAC from the 1-3 lag however more likely pictured PAC making a sharp cut after the first lag white AC 
rather decaved exponential I v thus suggesting an AR (1) process for this variable as w'ell.
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( 4 . 1 )  MODEL GULF y t = x , P  + / / ,  , where
M i = PM i- i  + £ ,
In 4.1 the upper equation is the structural equation where y is the dependent variable, and x 
illustrates a vector of explanatory variables. The lower equation is the disturbance equation. et is 
white noise, i.e. et ~  i.i.d. N  (0, a). A special case o f (4.1) is where the model is solely auto­
regressive o f 1st order in the dependent variable, thus reducing (4.1) to (4.2) below.
( 4 . 2 )  y , =  P  , y  , .  , +
If  structural components were necessary as suggested by the hypotheses o f this chapter, combining 
the upper and lower equation o f (4.1) would thus lead to the following vector auto-regressive model 
for the GULF data to be tested:
(4.3) MODEL GULF y = x 0 +p (y - x  P) + e
t t I t -  1 t -  1 t
Clearly, (4.3) only makes sense for structural components that are not individually auto-regressive. 
Due to individual autoregressivity as described above, GUEU, IDEUGU and IAVEUGU could thus 
be excluded from the further testing based on (4.3).
(c) Multicollinearity
As mentioned above, before estimating the model we further looked at the correlation (covariance) 
matrixes and the pair-wise correlation coefficients among all variables. This was done to establish 
possible multicollinearity o f the model. The correlation and partial correlation matrixes are shown 
in Appendix 4.4. In the G ulf model, the relatively high pair-wise correlated variables seemed to 
exist between IDEUGU and IAVEUGU, and, between EDEUGU and EAVEUGU (approximately 
0.6). The correlation between the import and export variables stems from the fact that both diversity 
and average intensity o f trade uses the intensities o f  trade as their raw material of calculation. 
Since our aim was to show the impact o f external economic relations per se rather than determining 
whether specifically diversity or intensity of economic relations explains EFP towards the Gulf, 
both variables w'ere included in the model. Higher pair-wise correlation was found between USGU 
and GUWO (~.88). The collinearity between USGU and GUWO was suggested to stem from a true 
causal relationship between the two variables where US policies towards the Gulf were reactive to
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how the Gulf States acted towards the rest of the world. It could not be excluded that a large part o f 
the Gulf States’ actions towards the world were also highly determined by US actions. In the 
testing, both variables were included in the aggregate model. As will be shown, after the initial tests 
the exclusion of each o f the two variables was attempted in order to see whether this improved the 
significance o f the model or not.
4.4 Results
The model (4.3) could now be tested including -  according to Section 4.3 - the following dependent 
and explanatory variables: EFPGUt; t-i, GMSGUt; n ,  GUKGRFRGUt; t-i, GUWOt; t-i, USGUt. t-i, 
EDEGUt; m , EAVEUGUq m , YUW01t; t.,, IAVEUWO,; n , and IDEUWOt; ,.,.30 Hie tests were 
performed in four steps. First, all the explanatory variables were tested separately, The results o f 
these ARIMA tests are shown in Table 4.2 below. Table 4.2 should be read as follows. The left 
column divides the results into 10 different double rows, 1-10, showing the results for each variable 
tested against the dependent variable according to equation (4.3). For instance, in 4, both the 
explanatory variable GUWO and the lagged dependent variable EFPGUt.] are significant at the 1 % 
level, a  is the estimated variance of the white noise disturbance and also appears significant (as it 
should in this setting).
Table 4.2 shows that 5 o f the 9 explanatory variables are significant, namely, GMSGU (at 5% 
significance level), GUKFRGEGU (10%), GUWO (1%), USWO (1%), EAVEUGU (5%) and 
IDEUWO (1%). The AR(1) term, i.e. the lagged dependent variable, is also significant separately 
(as in “1”) and combined with the significant explanatory variables. The coefficients to the lagged 
European foreign policy variable are positive in all separate models and lie in the range of 0.3502 
and 0.5526, implying that a one unit increase in the Union’s capability-presence in the previous 
period will contribute between approximately 0.35 and 0.55 to the next period’s capability presence. 
Among the significant explanatory variables, GMSGU and GUKFRGEGU and the two trade 
variables EAVEUGU and IDEUWO have positive signs. The positive signs indicate according to
(4.3) that an increase in the variable in period t influences EFP positively in period t. However in 
period t+1 the initial increase would be counteracted, albeit not fully outweighed by a paralysing 
effect.
The coefficients of the two remaining significant explanatory' variables, USGU and GUWO, were 
negative. This implies that these variables affect EFP negatively in the present period t. but that in
Using OLS generally showed positive correlation with adjusted R1 at around 67% for a model containing only these two variables.
107
Table 4.2 Results of the G ulf Model: Robust Estimators of Explanatory Variables
GULF-VARIABLES Coefficients P>|zl MODEL I (GULF) Coefficients P>|z|
1 EFPGU EFPGU,., 0.483017 0.027**
o 19.75043 0.000***
2 EFPGV EFPGU,., 0.3831 0.004***
GMSGU 0.0828 0.042** o 17.00788 0.000***
3 EFPGU EFPGU,., 0.3786 0.005***
GUKFRCEGU 0.0841 0.079* o 17.5663 0.000***
4 EFPGU EFPGU,., 0.4109 0.007***
GUWO -0.01907 0.000*** o 14.9548 0.000***
5 EFPGU EFPGU,., 0.5118 0.000***
USGU -0.0386 0.000*** CT 14.9487 0.000***
6 EFPGU EFPGU,., 0.4836 0.028**
EDEUGU -2.8x10-* 0.969 a 20.229 0.000***
7 EFPGU EFPGU,., 0.3502 0.113
EAVEUGU 0.237 0.035** a 19.7057 0.000***
8 EFPGU EFPGU,., 0.4726 0.033**
YUVVOl -0.0118 0.663 <7 24.686 0.000***
9 EFPGU EFPGU,., 0.5166 0.103
IAVEIWO 12.1124 0.126 a 16.7771 0.000***
10 EFPGU EFPGU,., 0.5526 0.057*
IDEUWO 3.195 0.000*** a 17.814 0.000***
Note: (T is estimated variance of the white noise disturbance e. “**” and “***” indicate that the variable is significance at 10%. 5%  and 1% 
significance level respectively. Ail estimates from STATA 6.0. In order to neutralise symmetric non-normality in the disturbances including as a 
special case heteroscedasticity a robust (quasi maximum likelihood) estimator (the Huber/White/sandwich estimator, see STATA 6.0, 113 or 
Hamilton 1994, 389) was introduced in the model. All non-trade variables were tested in the interval 1983q2-1999q2. All models including trade 
variables were only tested in the interval 19S4q2-1997q 1.
the period t+1, this initial decrease would be counteracted albeit not fully outweighed by an 
increased capability-presence o f the Union. One should recall that both o f  these two variables were 
measured as a net-value. As both variables primarily take on negative values, increasing values of 
these variables imply that either the US is acting less harshly than before towards the G ulf or that 
the G ulf States are generally less hostile towards the rest of the world than they were before. If the 
US is acting less harshly towards the Gulf States, EFP will, according to the results, increase its 
capability-presence (counteracted but not fully outweighed by a decrease in the next period). If  the 
G ulf States are acting less hostile, towards the rest of the world, EFP will similarly increase its 
capability-presence (counteracted but not fully outweighed by a decrease in the following period). 
Appendix 4.4 contains an extended version of the results summarised in Table 4.2.
Second, those variables that proved significant in the separate models were integrated as structural 
components to an aggregated ARIMA model. The results of these tests are shown in Table 4.3 in
;n Note that the lasged variables strictlv speaking enter through the autocorrelated disturbances according to the derivation of (4.3) from (4.1).
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the left column (1984qi-1997ql). In this aggregate model, only the lagged explanatory variables, 
USGU and GUWO, are significant; the former variable being significant at the 1% level and the 
latter at the 10% level. The coefficients of both these two variables remain negative and fairly 
similar to the coefficients obtained in the separate testing above.
T able  4.3 Results of the aggregated Gulf M odel: ARIMA MODEL
I9$4ql-1997ql 1983q2-1993q4 1987q3-1997ql 1990ql-1997ql
GULF-
VARIABLES
Coefl. P>|z| CoefT. P>|z| CoefT. P>|zj CoelT. P>W
EFPGU
EFPGU,., 0.587 0.001*** 0.67421 0.000*** 0.6299 0.001*** 0.4819 0.219
GMSGU 0.0393 0.695 0.0033 0.944 0.0511 0.366 0.0368 0608
GUKFRGEGU -0.0304 0.607 0.01340 0.794 -0.0507 0.425 *0.035 0 663
GUWO -0.009 0.058* -0.01216 0.019** -0.0099 0.114 -0.0159 0.202
USGU -0.0266 0.003*** -0.0180 0.020* -0.026 0.019** -0.0197 0.306
EAVELGU -0.0019 0.784 -0.0107 0.317 -0.0020 0.775 -0.0027 0825
<T 9.4139 0.000*** 8.1362 0.000*** 10.3641 0.000*** 10.707 0.000***
Log likelihood -194.2529 -140.8919 -146.7897 -1100361
Note: As Table 4.2. The variable 1DEUWO was dropped due to multicollinearity.
Third, the results were controlled for any structural breakpoints according to the control variable 
hypotheses described previously. As one may recall, there were three periods that needed specific 
control, namely 1983q2-1993q4 (Treaty on European Union), 1987q3-1999ql (Single European 
A ct), 1990ql-1999ql (Cold War). The tests of the models for these periods are shown in Table 4.3 
in  the remaining three columns to the right. As seen, the value of EFP remains significant in all 
three periods except the last, 1990ql-1999ql. Apart from that, GUWO and USGU are significant 
from  1983 to 1992 and USGU is significant from 1987 to 1999 as well. The signs of the coefficients 
remained unchanged from the separate models. Appendix 4.4 provides an extended version of the 
results shown in Table 4.3.
Fourth, the model including the explanatory variables was tested in an OLS-setting. As this should 
serve as a complementary analysis to the ARIMA tests, the strategy was to limit the analysis to the 
explanatory variables used in the ARIMA model. Following the auto-correlation analysis in Section 
4.3 (b), EFPGU entered on the explanatory side with one lagged term only.
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Table 4.4 Results of the Gulf Model : OLS31
G ulf Variables 1984ql-1997ql I983q2-1993q4 1987q3-1997ql 1990ql-1997ql
EFPGU CoefT. P>|z| CoefT. r>W Coeff. P>W Coeff. P>|z|
EFPG Un 0.148 0.073* 0.12 0.165 0.149 0.073* 0.137 0.104
GM SGIÎ 0.283 0.812 -0.110 0.232 0.028 0.812 -0.041 0.746
GUKFRGEGU -0.248 -0.19 0.123 0.212 -0.025 0.851 0.039 0.779
GUWO -0.210 0.008*** -0.021 0.003*** -0.021 0.008*** -0.028 0.000***
USGU -0.129 0.388 -0.010 0.274 -0.013 0.388 -0.004 0.768
EAVEUGU -.0574 0.472 -0.301 0.021** -0.057 0.472 -0.089 0.229
EDEUGU 5.24X10-6 0.508 0.0003 0.068* 5.2 x lO* 0.508 7.9x10^ 0.275
IAVEUGU 0.056 0.54 0.289 0.03** 0.056 0.591 0.099 0.319
YUWOD1 -0.0339 0.107 -0.020 0.143 -0.034 0.107 -0.052 0.044**
o 0.2405 0.755 0.241 0.072
Num ber ofobs. 52 19 32 29
F-Test; P>F 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***
Root MSE 11.378 7.861 11.378 11.396
R 1 0.849 0.95 0.85 0.888
Durbin-W atson 1.9536 1.326 1.954 1.959
(Transform ed)
Note: The estimates were computed in STATA 6.0 using the Prais-Winsten regression.
The results o f the linear regression shown in Table 4.4 comprise tests for the period as a whole (the 
left column), and the three separate periods (the remaining three columns to the right). The lagged 
value of EFP is significant (10% level) for the whole period. However tested across the separate 
periods it is only significant in the period 1987q3-1997ql (10%). The sign of the coefficient is 
positive and about 1/3 o f the value obtained in the ARIMA model. The whole period and the period 
after the SEA in 1987 have similar coefficients. Among the other explanatory variables only 
GUWO is significant (1%) for the whole period, a property that GUWO keeps when tested in the 
three separate periods.
The sign o f GUWO is negative as in the ARIMA model and should be interpreted similarly. 
Whereas none o f the economic variables are significant tested in the period as a whole, all three 
economic variables are significant in the first separate period from 1983 until the TEU. EAVEUGU 
and IAVEUGU are significant at the 5% level and EDEUGU at the 10% level. The Durbin Watson 
statistics (DW) is close to 2, as it should. This holds for all periods except for the first period from 
1983q2-1993q4 w7here DW  is 1.3. Unlike the ARIMA models, the control variable for the influence 
o f the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, YUWOD1 is significant in the period 1990-1999. The sign 
o f YUWOD1 is negative and since YUWOl is measured as net value, as GUWO and US WO, the 
interpretation of YUWOl should be the same as those. This, however, requires that the lagged value
Jj The Prais estimator used is a generalised least square estimator (GLS). Since it preserves the first observation, it can be of significant advantage in 
small samples like this. Prais estimates a linear regression o f the dependent variable on the explanatory variables that is corrected for first-order
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of EFP be significant and thus enter the model (with a positive sign). However, exactly in the period 
1990-1997 the lagged value o f EFP is not significant and this case will therefore have to be 
investigated further (in the discussion below) in order to establish the most probable sign o f an 
eventual Balkan effect in the data.
4.5 Discussion
To show the existence o f a learning pattern in the data, there were two requirements, 1) the 
significance of past EFP and 2) the significance o f  the outcomes in international affairs. The results 
in Table 4.2 illustrate the significance o f the G ulf Model as specified by (4.1) and (4.3). EFP 
towards the Gulf from 1983-1999 may thus be depicted as an AR (1) model. Even in the case where 
all significant structural terms are included simultaneously, the AR(1) model proves its validity. 
The other component o f learning, the outcomes or here the degree of cooperation/hostility from the 
target (GUWO), was, as mentioned, significant both in the separate and the aggregate model. A 
framework, as defined in Chapter 3 and operationalised in this chapter, is thus compatible with 
European foreign policy towards the Gulf States using Schrodt et aVs Gulf data set. The 
complementary linear regression analysis confirms the results o f  the ARIMA model that the data 
contains patterns of learning.
The signs o f the coefficients do not provide input as to whether learning has taken place or not, but 
are useful to understand the dynamics o f European foreign policy under learning. In general, it was 
reinforcing for the results that the signs remained stable in the different tests and the coefficients 
only varied slightly in absolute values. According to the signs o f  the coefficients, past European 
foreign policy has an unambiguously self-reinforcing effect on future European foreign policy -  as 
predicted. The reinforcing effect from the other component o f  learning, GUWO, shows that the 
better the target behaves, the easier it is for EU to cooperate towards the target.32 Likewise, the 
worse the Gulf States behave the more difficult it is for the Member States to produce European 
foreign policy. In terms of the learning framework it is what happens in the following period that is 
important. Here, increased hostility o f the Gulf towards the rest o f the world leads to an increase 
(but not fully compensating increase) in European foreign policy compared to previously.
Based on this result, one may try to speculate as to the whereabouts on the learning curve depicted 
in Figure 3.2 of a representative Member State government. The results resemble a situation where
serially-correlated residuals using the Prais-Winsten (1954) transformed regression estimator and a version o f  the search method suggested by 
Hildreth-Lu (1960) (STATA 6.0 ¡999).
>2 The negative coefficients of GUWO.
I l l
a given government is moving along a trajectory like in the area from ”0” to “z*” in Figure 3.2. 
Here, the effort to EFP is less than to unilateral policies and if  the government experiences a failure 
in this area it will move along the trajectory zf+l towards “z*’\  The experience of increased hostility 
o f  the target will increase the Member States’ belief in the need to incorporate multilateral 
(European) strategies into the crisis and conflict. This is confirmed by the significance of the lagged 
European foreign policy variable.
That the government initially dedicated less effort to EFP than to unilateral strategies only holds 
true, however, i f  one regards the Union as a whole or the larger Member States individually. Some 
smaller governments such as Portugal and Denmark reacted practically only to the conflicts through 
European foreign policies. Their beliefs are thus more likely to initally have been in the upper right 
hand comer o f  Figure 3.2. Increased non-compliance from the target should, according to the 
learning model, thus have led to less effort attached to EFP from these smaller countries. As the 
Union acts unanimously and the sign o f the lagged dependent variable is positive, one must 
conclude that the results are less compatible with the learning framework for smaller Member 
States. O f course, these countries may also learn about the workings o f different foreign policies, 
but their influence on EFP is not confirmed by the model. It should be mentioned though that if one 
regards the degree of effort that a government attaches to EFP as something that is determined ex 
ante to the GAC negotiations based on the learning mechanism, one could argue that if some 
governments were discouraged about EFP and reduced their proposed effort to EFP, this might have 
resulted in a more realistic departure point for reaching an agreement with governments that were in 
the midst of raising their stakes in EFP.
One would, however, probably have to go outside the learning model to find explanations for this 
feature. Larger Member States may have the ability to influence smaller Member States towards a 
particular outcome. Here, the separate model indeed established the significance of the foreign 
policies of the three large Member States, France, Germany and Britain, in influencing EFP. In the 
aggregate setting this effect could however not be established.
Following Table 4.3 and the results presented above, EFP apparently experiences a structural break 
point situated around the beginning o f  the 1990s at the end of the Cold War. The structural 
breakpoint implies that the EFP, which over the period as a whole could be explained as an AR(1) 
process with one lagged term, will have another representation from the end of the Cold War on. 
Several other representations o f the data from 1990 were tried, for instance, a model without lags,
an AR(2), AR(3) and an AR(4) model. The results of these attempts (shown in Appendix 4.6)
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suggest that the best performing model from 1990 is an AR(3) model thus with three lagged terms 
o f the dependent and structural terms included. Two structural variables were here significant: 
GUWO and EAVEUGU.
The result on the enhanced learning was confirmed by the linear regression. As in the ARIMA 
model, the period 1990-1997 was tested for by including different lags o f  EFP in an OLS-setting. 
The results o f these tests are shown in Appendix 4.7. They indicate that unlike the period as a 
whole, the period 1990-1997 would be better expressed using two lagged terms of EFP. In other 
words, the linear regression analysis confirms the ARIMA model’s result on the intensified patterns 
o f  learning towards the end o f the last two decades.
With EFP now included with (two) or three lags in the decision-making o f the governments and the 
other learning variable GUWO outperforming the impact of the US (see below), the structural 
breakpoint in 1990 seems to suggest that the decision-making o f EFP after the end of the Cold W ar 
enters a process of learning beyond the capacity o f a very short-termed reactive memory. The 
increased number of lags after the end o f the Cold War tells us that while EFP may continuously 
have been weak in the whole period, the weak actions hang more strongly together after the end o f 
the Cold War than before. Importantly, this is not a test showing that EFP has become more 
efficient or cohesive; it is rather a result indicating that the government’s decisions about EFP have 
become more linked to the past performance of EFP and thus more capable of incorporating past 
performance into their present performance since the end of the Cold War.
When the actual change occurred and why it occurred is difficult to determine. The change in the 
impact on EFP seems to have taken place gradually in the period 1987-1993 with a clear structural 
breakpoint visible by the end o f the Cold War and the Gulf War. It is not possible to point to any 
exact impact of either the SEA or the TEU on the EFP. On the other hand, there are no signs o f  
increased learning or structural breakpoints before the SEA. None of the war- or institutional factors 
can therefore be excluded from playing a role. In fact, it is likely that all three events, the SEA, the 
end of the Cold War/start o f G ulf War and the TEU influenced governments towards more learning 
about EFP in the period 1987-1993.
In the case o f a Gulf War effect, this effect might have been partly linked to learning as described in 
Chapter 3 regarding Bosnia/Kosovo and the development of the CESDP. In other words, the G ulf 
War may have visualised the limitations o f pursuing foreign policies towards the Gulf at a unilateral 
level at a time where the effort attached to European foreign policy was very lowr compared to the
113
unilateral efforts. The assumption in Chapter 3’s example was that the correct (or true) value of 
pursuing a multilateral (European) solution was higher than the unilateral option. Under this 
assumption, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait would have been the failure  o f the initial unilateral response 
that according to Chapter 3 should have forced the Member States to pursue a multilateral 
(European) option. This did not happen in the Gulf. The multilateral option pursued in the Gulf War 
was not primarily a European foreign policy. The multilateral force was led by the US, authorised 
by the UN and so were the economic sanctions against Iraq. What is missing in the interpretation is 
in other words, the impact of other multilateral institutions on EFP. One could imagine that the 
relative success of the actions in the Gulf War, in terms of decreasing the degree o f hostility from 
Iraq towards the rest of the world, would have led to a strengthening o f the effort attached to UN 
policies at the expense o f EU policies. This allows for a different interpretation of the Gulf War 
than the one presented by, for instance, Nuttall (2000). According to the results in this chapter, EFP 
may have gained in strength from the Gulf War not because governments learned about their 
limitations vis-à-vis the UN. The reason is that for a given level of effort attached to EFP, the only 
thing a given government would have learned at that time was not to use EFP as much as 
previously. Instead, any positive effect on EFP from the Gulf W ar must -  according to the 
framework presented here -  simply stem from the immediate effects o f  decreased hostility from the 
Gulf States, a sort of peace dividend for EFP.
The bottom line o f the significance of USWO is that EFP cannot be regarded independently of US 
policies. In fact, the US is the strongest alternative explanation to the fluctuations in EFP apart from 
learning. If in this context one limits the discussion on the US influence to  the notion of competing 
strategies from Chapter 3, the Union indeed seems distracted in its learning every time the US 
makes a move. For instance, imagine what would happen if  the G ulf States became more hostile 
and the US accordingly reacted with a harsher policy towards the G ulf States than before. In this 
case, the hostility of the G ulf States would initially paralyse the Member States. Then due to the 
presence o f learning, the governments may slowly start to see the gains o f  cooperation towards the 
hostility and regain some o f  the lost capability-presence. Due to the harsher policy of the US, a 
given EU government would however prefer to cooperate even less at the European level now than 
before. In sum, despite the fact that the existence of learning might counter weigh some of the 
paralysis o f the governments, the effect o f the US is to make it much more difficult for the Union to 
agree on anything that would emphasise the European level. What would induce EFP cooperation is 
thus also clear from these results. The weaker or more cooperative the US becomes towards a 
specific target, the easier it is for the governments to agree on joint policies at the European level.
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Due to the correlation between US policies and the policies of the Gulf States, tests were carried out 
to see the impact of the exclusion o f either US WO or GUWO from the model. These tests shown in 
Appendix 4.5 indicate that if  one were to exclude any o f the two variables from the model, the best 
performance for the period 1983-1999 as a whole would be achieved for a model excluding GUWO 
and thus including the variable USWO. Contrary to what one might have thought, this result does 
not make the learning framework irrelevant. Rather it emphasises that learning co-exists with other 
explanations and that learning is one factor among others explaining EFP. Moreover, the influence 
o f the US on EFP seems to diminish in the 1990s compared to the 1980s as learning becomes more 
important.
Only sporadic evidence was found for the importance o f economic interests in determining EFP 
from the data. This evidence indicates that the higher the average intensity o f exports from the 
Union towards the Gulf, the higher EFP were to be expected (net effect). Similarly, the greater the 
diversity o f imports from EU Member States towards the world, the more likely it is that EFP will 
be strengthened. Both these results contrast with the political economic framework presented in 
Chapter 3 if isolated from the institutional structures. The inability o f the data to confirm the 
political economic framework is further confirmed by the aggregate model where none of the 
economic variables were significant in the ARIMA setting. The reason for this lack of consistency 
between the results and the theoretical framework may be that 1) the operationalisation o f the 
external economic relations only includes economic trade preferences, and thus fails to include FDI 
preferences and external economic competence o f  the Union, 2) the dependent variable largely 
overlaps with the external economic relations, so that it is rather obvious that when exports increase 
the Union’s capability presence also increases as exports are under the competence of the Union, or 
3) that the theoretical framework is wrong. Rather than jumping to the third conclusion at this 
moment, the case studies should be used to gain detailed insight into how economic factors may 
have become more or less important for EFP over the last two decades and seek as much as possible 
to integrate this into a discussion on the impact of competence in the external economic relations.
It may be added that the fact that the economic variables in the linear regression are all significant 
before the TEU cannot be taken as a confirmation o f  the impact o f economic preferences on EFP. 
The DW value is insignificantly low.33 The signs o f  the significant economic variables, however, 
point to a problem regarding Chapter 3’s hypothesis on the impact o f an increase in the intensity o f  
EU trade. The question is which sign should be expected of the effect when the increase in trade 
among EU countries is neither defined as being towards one specific target country or towards the
53 The Durbin-Watson d-statistics (9.19)=0.5598.
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rest of the world as a whole, but towards a  region or group o f target countries? Future theoretical 
models would have to develop this more explicitly.
The results o f the separate models suggested that multilateralism (European foreign policy) has 
been a complement rather than a substitute to unilateral foreign policy. In other words, enhanced 
Member State action towards the Gulf generally led to more EFP. Notably, this is a non-learning 
effect. The impact from learning has been (in  the following period) to lower any initial 
strengthening o f EFP from unilateral policies. Such a trade o ff follows directly from the learning 
framework of Chapter 3. In the empirical tests, multilateralism depends negatively on the latter. 
This implies that if  a government decided to pursue the multilateral (European) option, less 
resources (effort) were dedicated to the unilateral option. Another interpretation o f the trade-off 
result would be that European foreign policy towards the Gulf was more likely in situations where 
no strong Member State foreign policy existed beforehand and where a European strategy thus 
received less competition from individual foreign policies/strategies. Despite the fact that the 
aggregate learning model does not confirm the existence o f such a complementary impact from 
unilateral foreign policy on European policy, the issue seems to have enough potential for further 
investigation. Notably, such studies would include the reverse causality as well, the impact of a 
Europeanization on national foreign policies.
Finally, there was no indication that the conflict in the former Yugoslavia had a significant impact 
in determining European foreign policy towards the Gulf in the ARIMA model. This contrasted 
with the linear regression indicating a role for a Balkan effect on EFP towards the Gulf. The fact 
that after the Cold War, EFP towards the Gulf may be expressed as patterns of learning that not 
only include experiences from the Gulf but also the experiences gained in a completely different 
area such as the Balkans is not directly compatible with the learning model of Chapter 3. However, 
it would echo the empirical literature well i f  the tragedy in the Balkans had an overall (destructive) 
effect on EFP. Moreover, the example given on the effects o f Bosnia and Kosovo on the subsequent 
development of the CESDP also indicated that the former Yugoslavia probably played a specific 
role for the formal and informal institution building o f  EFP in the 1990s. This would then explain 
the positive impact o f the former Yugoslavia on EFP Uwards the Gulf later in the 1990s. The fact 
that the ARIMA tests did not find the same correlation naturally limits the weight one should attach 
to the possible existence o f  a  regular Balkan effect on EFP towards the Gulf-based data used in this 
analysis.
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Concerning statistical uncertainty, the number o f  observations were generally too small with only 
63 observations for the period as a whole and in the testing for structural breakpoints down to only 
29 observations for the post Cold War period (1990ql-1997ql). The fact that both linear 
regressions and ARIMA tests were performed should, however, have increased the robustness o f 
the results presented above. Future studies will have to extend the number of periods used to 
provide more robust results. Since trade data generally are not found on less than a quarterly basis 
back to 1983, the only way to increase the number o f observations seems to be to await future 
periods, or to look only at the learning variables, excluding factors such as economic preferences to 
be investigated. The latter is not a preferable solution. First, one has to see learning as a facilitating 
or intervening element in the process o f generating EFP, and not as a major explanatory factor for 
the policy outcomes. Removing other variables from the learning model would thus lead to failure 
in capturing the relations with and the importance o f other explanatory variables. Second, testing on 
shorter time spans would probably always show a  higher correlation between outcomes than longer 
time spans. Reducing the time interval is thus likely to increase the probability o f specifying the 
model wrongly.
4.6 Conclusion
This empirical chapter served as a statistical evaluation o f EFP and the learning framework 
suggested in Chapter 3. It provided one o f the first empirical studies o f the capability-presence o f 
EFP using statistical tools on time series. The study was also the first explicitly to apply the KEDS 
G ulf data set to hypotheses on European foreign policy.
The chapter is only one input among others in the assessment of the learning framework. The 
results cannot stand alone, but should be perceived of as complementary to the remainder o f  the 
empirical analysis. Patterns o f learning were convincingly found in the data using the convention 
that learning could be expressed as the combinatory significance of the lagged values of European 
foreign policy and the international compliance o f the target, proxies for the effort attached to EFP 
and the outcomes in international relations respectively.
Evidence was found that learning intensified from the late 1980s. In other words, when deciding 
whether to act, unilaterally or by European foreign policy, governments in the last ten years were 
more inclined to base this decision on previous efforts at the European level and the degree o f  
compliance o f the Gulf States towards the Union than they had been in the previous decade. The 
increase in learning does not necessarily say anything about whether the capability-presence o f  the
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Union increased from the 1980s to the 1990s. However, one o f  the reasons that learning at all had 
the possibility o f intensifying in the ’90s was that it was not before then that there were actions 
enough of the Union to be able to build any experience on. Learning is thus less apt to explain either 
progress or paralysis o f EFP in the ’80s than it is in the ’90s.
The intensification o f learning was difficult to attach to one single factor. It could either have 
resulted from the SEA, the end of the Cold War or some other structural factor with the end of the 
Cold War as the most likely main source of the effect. The effect cannot be seen at all before the 
institutional upgrading o f  the foreign policy area by the SEA. It is thus likely that the change was 
triggered by the institutional reforms o f the SEA, after which it gradually accentuated. Windows of 
opportunity for this may have been the end o f the Cold War, the G ulf War and the TEU, which 
followed the SEA as in a row.
A distinction is necessary between the effects o f some of these wars, such as the end o f  the Cold 
War and the Gulf War that appear to be different. The Gulf W ar forms part of the observations of 
the Union of the outcomes in the Gulf States, and the Gulf W ar is thus likely to have been part of 
the lessons that the Union learned throughout the ’90s. The effect o f  the end o f the Cold War in 
intensifying learning is more related to a general shift o f the expected utility of multilateral 
(European) action for the governments.
The empirical data reflect the relevance of the learning framework for larger and previously 
relatively active foreign policy actors in the Union. One could imagine countries, such as France, 
Britain and Germany, belonging to this group. This is also supported by this particular data set. The 
learning framework seemed less applicable for smaller countries such as Belgium, Denmark and 
Portugal because their initial level of action at the unilateral level was not sufficiently high to be 
able to conclude anything. In other words, the learning dynamics resemble the case where EFP is 
more effective than unilateral policies, but where the initial effort attached to European foreign 
policies is less than the effort attached to unilateral policies.
Only sporadic evidence was found for the impact on EFP by the external economic relations. The 
little evidence found confirms Schneider & Seybold (1997), who demonstrate the significance of 
economic salience in the decision-making of the EPC. However, in the light o f the limited results of 
the quantitative study, the qualitative studies o f the following chapters should seek to examine in 
depth the impact of external economic preferences and external competence on EFP. As the failure 
to conclude that external economic relations mattered also stemmed from data constraints, future
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studies should include a proxy for quarterly FDI as well as an indicator for the increase in the 
economic resources attached to the CFSP, which would mirror the learning framework of Chapter 3 
more precisely. In general, the sporadic significance of external economic relations raises more 
questions about the impact o f  the political economy on European foreign policy than it answers. To 
the extent these questions cannot be answered by the proceeding chapters they become important 
tasks o f  future research to address in order to understand European foreign policy and international 
relations better.
Finally, the data suggests a crucial role for the US in determining EFP. There are many reasons, 
why the US has been able to influence the Union. One has to do with power. This thesis, however, 
suggests that some o f the U S’s influence on EFP within the notion o f competing or distracting 
strategies to the learning mechanism, be regarded as factors that hinder Member State governments 
in updating their belief in accordance with previously held beliefs, their effort and the outcomes in 
international affairs. As the learning dynamics accentuated towards the end o f the period, the impact 
of the US (on EFP) apparently diminished.
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CHAPTER 5
EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS IRAN:
LEARNING A DIALOGUE?
This chapter examines European foreign policy towards the Islamic Republic o f Iran. The purpose is to 
complement Chapter 4 ’s quantitative study on EFP towards the Gulf States by zooming in on one o f the 
most important o f these policies. The goal remains similar to the previous chapter to gain more 
understanding on how European foreign policy may be enhanced and/or sometimes reduced by changes 
in explanatory factors such as learning, external economic preferences, and the institutional competence 
of the Union in foreign and/or external economic affairs. As introduced empirically in Chapter 4, 
attention will initially stay on the factual assessment of the Union’s capability-presence towards Iran 
during the last two decades. This is seen as a necessary condition for the further explanatory exercise. 
Then, with a thorough description o f the EFP towards Iran in hand, the aim is to estimate key actors’ in 
the EU’s ability to observe the outcomes o f their actions and adjust their beliefs about the workings o f 
their policies will be provided, i.e. to verify the learning hypothesis. Finally, an investigation will be 
performed regarding the influence of the various preferences for trade and FDI that CFSP actors may 
have, which is sought combined with an analysis o f the institutional competence of the Union. In total, 
the chapter should provide additional items of evidence regarding how important learning is, what may 
hinder learning from taking place, and to which extent the external economic relations o f the Union 
interacts with the CFSP in determining European foreign policy.
The first and second sections describe the developments in Iran under the Islamic Republic from 1979- 
2001 and EFP towards these developments. As Chapter 4 explained, information on developments in 
the target country, here Iran, is used as a proxy for the outcome in combination with the description of 
EFP, which is a proxy for the effort attached to EFP. The intention is to evaluate qualitatively whether 
EFP follows a pattern compatible with learning. The third section confronts this pattern and the 
developments in Iran with the null-hypothesis and some of the proposed internal and external factors, 
notably, strategic uncertainty, external economic preferences and institutional competence. The fourth 
section complements the qualitative assessment with a quantitative analysis o f EFP towards Iran similar
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to Chapter 4. The idea is to assess the validity o f the qualitative results and possibly to confirm or reject ' 
results obtained in Chapter 4’s regional quantitative analysis. i
5.1 Developments in Iran , 1979-2001
I
Only a few foreigners have been able to “penetrate the Iranian mind and judge the events” in Iran since 
the revolution in 1979 (Hoveyda 1990:185). The following is therefore a very rough estimate of the | 
Iranian context. It goes beyond the aims o f this thesis to discuss developments in Iran per se.1 The aim I 
o f  this section is rather to provide a simplified benchmark o f the developments in Iran from 1979 to
2001. I
Three separate eras of regimes come to mind. The first era is under Ayatollah Khomeini’s “First I
Republic” (Hoveyda 1990:185) from 1979-1989, which Mozzaffari simply refers to as the 
revolutionary period (1999). The second era is roughly contained in the Ayatollah Khamenei/Akbar i
Hashemi Rafsanjani government from 1989 to 1997. Although others have referred to it as either the |
Second Republic (Hoveyda & Ehteshami, cited in Struwe 1998:21) or the Thermidorian era I 
(Mozzaffari 1999), this era is here simply referred to as the period o f reconstruction using the name and 
agenda of Rafsanjani’s own party (Wright 1996:166-168). The third era is the Khamenei/Sayed |
Muhammad Khatami regime from 1997 which may be called an era of progressing reforms. I
I
(a) The revolutionary period \
I
The revolution in 1979 was carried out with an “ enormous political base ”  (Ghoreishi &  Zahedi 1997) J 
vesting Iran’s supreme religious authority (“Wali Faqih”)2 34in the Shiiti leader Ayatollah Ruhollah I
Khomeini and with Bani-Sadr as President.5 The new Islamic Republic immediately entered into a 1
fierce fight for survival. Traditionalist clerical elements as the President from 1980 Hojatoleslam |
Ayatollah Sayed Ali Khamenei soon gained in force and suppressed more moderate forces.4 1
1 Developments in Iran are discussed in, for instance, the special issue, Iran since the Revolution. Social Research, 2000, 67 (2), Summer. The Khomeini 
years are, for example, covered in Hall ¡day 2000.
1 It is the Council of Experts (Majlis-e Khobregen) consisting o f 83 elected experts that appoints the Wali Faqih.
3 The President is the chief executive and has to be approved by the Council of Guardians (Shura-e-Nigahban) consisting of 12 appointed lawyers.
4 A distinction is generally made in Iranian politics -  at least from a Western perspective - between moderates (modem, reformers, essentialists) and
conservatives (hard-liners, fundamentalists). There is no clear dividing line between any of these concepts. Yet, one may roughly say that the concepts 
relate to which extent one supports the revolution of 1 9 7 9 .  According to Mozzaffari, fundamentalism refers to a strict and dogmatic interpretation of 
religion. Essentialism contains a less dogmatic and more “liberaF  reading o f religion. Khomeini was thus a fundamentalist (usuli) who believed not only 
in the holistic character of Islam, but also in its holy nature which must be respected in even.' detail. Khatami may be called an essentialist (jawhari) 
because he makes a distinction between what in religion is essential and not (Mozzaffari 1 9 9 9 :  1 7 )  and emphasizes ethics instead of dogma One could b e
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The most critical moment for the Iranian revolution was the Iraq-Iran War 1980-1988. Iran was 
attacked by Iraq at a vulnerable point in time, not least because Iran’s army remained partially destroyed 
and weak because o f “numerous executions, purges and desertions” (Cann & Danopoulos 1997). Iran 
was isolated internationally in most of the conflict with Iraq. Iraq was supported by the Arab world, and 
initially also by the US* 5 with the Europeans being neutral. The relationship with the US was 
particularly strained after the Hostages Crisis broke out on November 4, 1979, when Iranian students 
took 63 American diplomats (and initially several other nationals) as hostages in the US embassy in 
Tehran demanding in exchange for their release the return o f the Shah to stand trial. Fifty-two o f the 
American hostages were kept hostage until January 21, 1981, when the Accord in Algiers finally led to 
their release. In early 1982, the first Iranian counteroffensive took place in the Iran-Iraq war and Iran 
effectively stopped Iraq from any further armed expeditions into Iran until May 1986.
Internally, the revolution became less democratic, i.e. with an almost total elimination of political 
representation of opposition groups and political freedoms during the 1980s (Halliday 1998:139, 14- 
18). The public base o f the revolution continued to shrink, and was in one place reported to be below 
5% (Wright 1990, cited in Hoveyda 1990). It became necessary to ensure turnouts at elections, by 
forcing students, often without advance notice or subsequent choice, to polling places. Iran hereby 
reinforced its role as an international pariah. The UN, Amnesty International and the Human Rights 
Watch all reported restrictions in the freedom of speech, massive executions o f opposition, 
disappearances and deaths o f writers, and social injustice “that grew wider than in the years o f  Shah 
Reza PahlavF  (Wright 1990, cited in Hoveyda 1990).6
Despite its fight for survival on both internal and external frontiers, Iran was soon settled enough to 
start implementing its constitutional aim of exporting its Islamic revolution, “ensuring the continuation
reformist in a particular case, a conservative in another, radical in a third, and moderate in a fourth depending on the issue For instance, Rafsanjani was 
once considered reformist but later became labeled radical/conservative (Dr. Amr. Sabet 2000, Email correspondence). Khamenei replaced Bani Sadr who 
fled to France.
5 An exception was the Iran Contra Deal o f the Reagan administration. In October and November 1986, two secret U S. Government operations were 
publicly exposed, potentially implicating Reagan Administration officials in illegal activities. These operations were the provision of assistance to the 
military activities of the Nicaraguan contra rebels during the October 1984 to October 1986 prohibition on such aid, and the sale o f  US arms to Iran in 
contravention o f stated US policy and in possible violation of arms-export controls (httn /Awvw. wehcom.com/oinkrioiVYco vert/iesummarv him I V
6 The UN Human Rights Commission claims in their report o f February 1987 that at least 7.000 opponents o f the Islamic Republic were executed between 
1979-1985. Comparing reports from Amnesty International under and after the Shah shows only small differences in the violations addressed in Iran.
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ro f  the Revolution at home and abroad” by transferring ideas, men and money from Iran to other 
countries in support of Islamization (Piscatori 1990:785).7
(b) Reconstruction
The Islamic Republic and the ideals set out during the revolution continued to hold after Khomeini’s 
death on June 3, 1989. However, under the Supreme leadership o f Ayatollah Sayed Ali Khamenei and 
President Rafsanjani for two presidential terms, the post Khomeini era was different from the 
revolutionary era.8 A policy emerged of preservation o f the revolution based on reconstruction (“Sazan 
degi”) and pragmatism.9 Already in early 1989, Khomeini had declared some rather extensive reforms 
o f the theocratic regime, most notably, that “effectively the national interest” should take “precedence 
over the Islamic law" (Ansari 1996:210).10 I Khamenei clarified Khomeini’s intentions saying that 
important trade interests should not be abandoned just because Islamic law would suggest Iran to be 
hostile to the country where these trade interests were located. Amendments were thus adopted to the 
Constitution on July 28, 1989, following Khomeini’s initiative earlier in 1989. Here, the limited powers 
o f the president were slightly increased, for instance, by abandoning the prime minister post and instead 
letting the president have the responsibilities related to this post. The most important implication of the 
change was Iran’s announcement on July 18,1988, o f  her unconditional acceptance o f the UN Security 
Council Resolution 598 adopted in 1987. This resulted in a cease-fire in the Iran -  Iraq War, Later, Iran 
approached Western views with its “condemnation ” o f  the Iraqi invasion o f Kuwait, by observing the 
UN economic sanctions against Iraq, and by generally keeping a neutral position during the Gulf War 
(UN-Iraq-Kuwait) and its aftermath." Notably, Iran did this despite the provocation of the ruthless 
suppression by Iraq’s Saddam Hussein of the uprising in Southern Iraq in 1991-1992 and a 
simultaneous influx of over 1 million Kurdish refugees in the Northwest of the country.12 Iran also 
“helped’ France and other Western countries to free their hostages taken by the Lebanese Hezbollah 
(Party of God).13 Iran also finally withdrew its troops from certain disputed border areas (Halliday 
1998:142).
7 In particular, in the development of international relations, the Constitution will strive with other Islamic and popular movements to prepare the way for 
the formation of a single world community (in accordance with the Koran verse “This your community is a single community, and /  am your Lord, so 
worship A/e"”(21:92]), and to assure the continuation of the struggle for the liberation of all deprived and oppressed peoples in the world (Constitution 
adopted on 24 Oct 1979, effective since 3 December 1979, Amended on 28 July 198) (httn://www.uni.wuer7burg.de/law/1r indx.htmlY
I Ibid.9
In Iran after Khomeini see also Shireen T. Hunter (1992),
10 See URL: http://www.uni.wuer7burg.de/law/ir indx.html.
II Interviews. EU Member State diplomats, various. May, November 1999
12 Email correspondence senior EU Member State diplomat, June 6.2001.
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Optimism both internally and externally soon diminished. Internally, clientelism increased in the huge 
developing technocracy, and Rafsanjani was not able to reverse the downward trend of an economy 
desperately in need of reforms (Kanovsky 1997). Iran is dependent on oil for nearly 90% of its foreign 
exchange revenue. The gradual slide of oil prices during the 1980s had therefore hit the Iranian 
economy hard. This continued during the ’90s, only interrupted by a short peak of oil prices during the 
Gulf War, the so-called oil boom. Struwe noted that towards the end of 1990 “Iranian policies were 
still not as pragmatic as perceived’ (1999). From 1991, several riots were reported including an 
attempt on Rafsanjani’s life in 1994, and reports on Iranian human rights violations continued to arrive 
(Halliday 1998:141-142).13 4 In the 1996 elections, the Council o f Guardians disqualified 40% of the 
candidates.
In external affairs, Iran more than ever before performed a two-faced diplomacy. Western concerns 
centred on a seemingly more intense Iranian aspiration to regional power (Piscatori 1990).15 16Iran 
controversially declared sovereignty over the disputed Abu Musa and Tunbs Islands in the Gulf in 1992 
and the relationship with Iraq continued to be strained not the least because of border disputes as 
these.'6 In the Middle East peace process, Iran in October 1992 opened its doors to Hamas, a group in 
violent opposition to the Arab-Israeli Peace Process. There were various accounts -  most of them from 
US sources - of Iran sponsoring international terrorism by, 1) providing training in camps in Northern 
Iran, and 2) helping to create, finance, arm, and train the radical Shiite Hezbollah movement in 
Lebanon and the Hamas and Islamic Jihad on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Waxman 1998; 
Philips 1994). In September 1992, four high-ranking dissidents, members o f the KDP1 (the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party of Iran) were murdered, based on what later proved to be Iranian senior level 
officials’ “official liquidation order” at the Mykonos Restaurant in Berlin (Waxman 1998:5).
Towards Western Europe, the most important issue became the Fatwa against the Muslim author and 
British citizen Salman Rushdie. Already since February 14,1989, when Ayatollah Khomeini issued the 
Fatwa against Rushdie, Iran had placed a natural upper limit on its credibility externally (towards the
13 Ibid
14 In December 1995. a UN panel agreed on a UN resolution condemning the human rights violations in Iran and in 1996, the annual report of Human 
Rights Watch contained intensive accusations of violations of human rights in Iran.
Iran and Saudi Arabia has long been locked in fierce competition of leadership of the Muslim world and influence in the Gulf region. Disputes involved, 
for instance, the annua! pilgrimage to Mecca.
16 Iraq, on their part, continued to support the terrorist movement Mujahaddin-e-khatq (MJK.)
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1non Muslim world). From the time of the issuing o f  this “shocking death sentence ” a certain amount of 
flexibility in its implementation was noticed, in particular after the spokesman o f the Council of 
Experts, Ali Akbar Mechkinin, on June 17, 1994 declared Khamenei’s right to lift the Fatwa in the
interests of Iran (Bedford 1995).17 y - '• '
u,
In the aftermath o f the Fatwa, several people linked to Rushdie were, however, attempted killed, 
assassinated, or died mysterious deaths.18 Since June 1994, Iran also continued to send ambiguous 
messages to the outside world regarding whether it would carry out the Fatwa, or not. Illustrative were 
the messages sent from Iran at the beginning of 1995, when Iranian deputy foreign minister Vaezi, on 
February 7, in a meeting with the Danish foreign minister Niels Helveg Petersen, promised not to send 
any murder squads against Salman Rushdie.19 Next day, Vaezi stopped in Paris on his way back to 
Tehran. There, he underlined, in sharp contrast with this statement the day before, the necessity of 
carrying out the Fatwa. On February 10, two days later, the Danish government -  upset after Vaezi’s 
Paris statement - received a note from the Republic o f Iran signed by the Iranian ambassador in 
Copenhagen saying that “the Iranian government has never sent, is not sending, and will in the future 
not be sending anyone to kill Salman Rushdie” (Bedford 1995:3, 15-21). As the pressure intensified, a 
letter from Iran’s foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati was offered to the EU delegation at the Critical 
Dialogue session in Paris on June 22 as part o f  the negotiations trying to bring a halt to the Fatwa, 
noting that Iran “is not going to dispatch anybody, any commandos, to kill anybody in Europe... and., 
it is our determination to expand our relations with Europe” (Saidabadi 1998:2).
(c) Reforms 1 ?-
The declared reformist20 cleric Sayed Muhammad Khatami won the presidential elections on May 23, 
1997 as the “people's choice”.21 After the election o f  Khatami, one began to observe a difference in 
Iran’s internal as well as her external relations.22 Significant was President Khatami’s public plea for 
dialogue among civilizations arguing for the need for a discourse in international relations based on
17 Fatwa is the "advice" given to a question in Islamic law, theology or ethic made by a mufti, i.e a specialist in Islamic law. According to the rules, the 
one asking the question decides himself whether he should follow the Fatwa or not.
11 A Japanese translator was killed, the Norwegian publisher o f the Satanic Verses translated into Norwegian William Nygaard and an Italian translator 
were seriously injured. Penguin, who had published the Satanic Verses, received 25 bomb threats and 5.000 abusive threat letters (CNN September 1998).
19 http://www dasbladet no/kronikkeriQ60426-kro-l.html
20 Whereas Khatami was elected among three pre-selected candidates, he was considered as a reformist, not the least after his dismissal as Minister of 
Culture and Islamic Guidance in 1992 failing to carry out some proposed censorship laws. See also Khatami’s collection of essays (1997).
21 Former President Rafsanjani’s words, after Khatami was elected.
22 This was not obvious from the start with Amuzegar noting, "the president must first seek God's blessing, then solicit the Rakbar's guidance, and only 
then begin to hear the peoples wishes."
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pluralism (Lynch 2000). In an interview with CNN’s Christiane Amanpour in January 1998, Khatami 
mentioned, “all doors should now open for such a dialogue and understanding and the possibility fo r  
contact between Iranian and American c i t i z e n s In Europe, President Khatami visited Italy 9-11 
March 1999 and France 27-29 October 1999.23 The visit to Italy was the first visit by an Iranian leader 
to an EU country since the revolution. In Florence, Khatami pledged dialogue to build the relationship 
with the West on,24 and in Paris, he called for a world of “peaceful coexistence where all nations 
respect each other1\  An official in the Council Secretariat noted that the gradual opening up of Iran had 
been “tremendous" since 1997.25
In September 1998, the Fatwa was implicitly removed at the meeting between Foreign Minister Robin 
Cook and Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi in New York.26 At the meeting, Kharrazi declared that “The 
Government o f  the Islamic Republic o f Iran has no intention, nor is it going to take any action 
whatsoever to threaten the life o f  the author o f The Satanic Verses or anybody associated with his 
work, nor will it encourage or assist anybody to do so  ”. Other signs of opening up towards the West 
were seen in the Middle East peace process. Here, Iran took sides against Israel but refrained from 
interfering (Ansari 1999).27 The elections for the Islamic Consultative Assembly on 18 February 2000, 
(Majlis-e-Shura e Islami), which gave reformers a significant victory, confirmed this view o f Iran as 
becoming gradually more open and pluralist. The reformist party 2nd of Khordad here gained 148 seats 
in the first round out o f a total o f 290 seats, and reformists in total gained more than 2/3 o f the seats 
despite that the elections had been seriously flawed by a massive disqualification o f registered 
candidates.28
Iran as a potential developer o f WMD continued to be subject to Western debate in the end of the ’90s 
(Struwe 1998; Eisenstadt 1999:124; Philips 1994:6, 21-28).29 *In 1991, Iran’s Ataollah Mohajerani said, 
“since the enemy has atomic capabilities, Islamic countries must be armed with the same capacity”?0 
and several CIA reports as well as papers from other institutes have confirmed Iran as a potential near­
23 CNN from URL: http://cnn.com/WORLD/europc/991Q/27/francc khatami 02/indcx html
:4 httD /.'wvvvv.iuc it/Gcneral/Ks html or contact the EUI to receive a hard copy o f the speech Khatami gave at the EUI.
23 Interview, official, Council Secretariat, November 1999.
■6 http://www fco gov.uk/news/newstext asn^l 544. Already February 16, 1998, Robin Cook met with Rushdie after Rushdie had discussed the
possibilities o f solving the problem at a private dinner with Prime Minister Tony Blair the week before (BBC News at URL: http://www.bbc.co.uk).
See also Hooglund (1995:94),
In an editorial leader in International Herald Tribune (“Washington Times”). "Iran's Flawed Elec lions", 12-13 February 2000.
19 See extensive literature on this issue. For instance. Richard M. Peny: Matthew R. Schwonek (1997); Albright, David (1995) or selected overviews of
literature at URL: httrv//ww\v fas org/nuke/cuide/iran/nuke/indcx litml or httpV/wwwcnn com/2P00/WQRLp/mca s t/02 ,'Q Vi ra n weapcmindcx html
http-'Vwv\vv.fas.or&',niikc/guide,,iron/nnke/indcx html.
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future nuclear threat.31 *Not all support this view, however. The independent US institute ACDA notes 
that Iran is, probably, not seriously considering developing a bomb at this moment. Not only did Iran 
ratify the nuclear and non-proliferation treaty in 1990, but since February 1992 it has also allowed 
IAEA to inspect any of its nuclear facilities, with the result that ’Wo IAEA inspections have revealed 
Tehran s violations o f the N P T \n
Khatami at the turn of the Millennium has increasingly and strongly urged Iran and the conservatives to 
concede towards reforms. However, Iran has not stopped speaking “with several v o i c e s In what 
presumably was a result o f  domestic pressure, Khatami in the aforementioned Italy speech, for instance, 
restricted the dialogue to “be conducted with the true representatives o f  the Islamic culture and
thought” only. “Otherwise,   this would not be a dialogue; it would not even amount to a
monologue.34 Moreover, although the Iranian government had distanced itself from any attempt to fulfil 
the mandate of the Fatwa, it allowed a powerful revolutionary foundation, ‘7 5  Khordad\ to continue 
announcing a high price on the head of Rushdie, without condemnation or contradiction.35
The split between reformist and non-reformist movements now seems to have entered a very critical 
stage. The legitimacy of the clerical regime appears to have almost completely vanished (Bramming 
2000:12, 22-28). Yet, a number of trials36 and violations of the freedom o f speech, disappearances, and 
executions in recent years give no clear indication o f where the Iranian “ship” is moving.37 According to 
Human Rights Watch “Human rights progress (in 1999) continued to be held hostage to increasingly 
polarized conflict within the leadership o f  the Islamic Republic.”38 This spring, the organization 
Journalists Without Frontiers moreover accused Iran o f holding the largest number o f journalists in the 
world imprisoned.39 At the Intifada conference in Tehran 24 April 2001 Khamenei left no doubt about 
the kind of resistance that reformist movements in Iran are confronted with. Khamenei noted, for 
instance, “there are documents showing close collaboration o f the Zionists with the Nazi Germany, and
■>1 http://vww nixoncentcr.org/D»blications/monoflraphs/Ir3n,s%20Nuclcar%2QW,,capons%200ntions%20-%20IssLies%20and%20Anaivsis2 pdf
j2 httn://www fasors/nuke/euide/iron/nuke/index html.
”  ibid.
54 Khatami’s planned trip to France was for a long time postponed since France intended to serve wine at the official dinner, which was rejected by Iran.
35 In June 1992, the movement "IS KhordacT had declared that apart from the $2 Million bounty on Rushdie they would now also pay "any additional 
expenses connected with the assassination" (Mehrdad 1996:13).
36 For instance, the trial against 17 reformists for participation in a conference in Berlin and the preparations o f  a trial against Mohammad-Reza Khatami.
37 For instance, in December 1998, three Iranian writers, Mohammad Moukthari, Majid Sharif and Mohammed-Jafar Pouyandeh, all disappeared and 
died, Moreover, another writer Pirouz Davan disappeared and the leader o f the unauthorized (but officially tolerated) Iranian people’s Party Darioush 
Forouhar and his wife Parvaneh Eskandari were murdered. The metaphor o f  Iran as a ship was used by Ambassador Cogan, former Irish ambassador to 
Iran in his intervention at the EU-IRAN Relations Round Table, Centre for European Studies, University o f  Limerick, March 15, 2001.
j8 httn://www hrw.org/wr2k/mena-04.html.
Politiken. 15 February. 2000. Iran: verdensrekord i faengslede journalister, The article informs that since April 2000 Iranian authorities have 
imprisoned 15 journalists and closed down 25 newspapers At URL: httr» /Avww Politiken dW.
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exaggerated numbers relating to the Jewish holocaust were fabricated to solicit sympathy o f the world 
public opinion, lay the ground fo r  the occupation o f  Palestine and to justify  the atrocities o f the 
Zionists.™0 As a senior EU Member State official commented, “the statements by the leaders are 
hardly the result o f  any responsible system. Rather, the statements illustrate how fa r away the leader 
and his aides are from reality. The statements indicate that reforms, in the long run are conditioned 
upon the liberation from the religious supreme authority.™'
The conditions for the liberation from the religious supreme authority are however difficult. As a high- 
ranking Iranian diplomat summarized it, "people may be following you, although you are paranoid'".40 12 
President Khatami’s landslide victory in the elections 8 June 2001, winning 74% o f the public votes, 
should certainly increase the probability o f reforms gaining supremacy over reactionary elements in the 
Iranian society in the longer term. In the short to medium term, continued clashes between 
conservatives and reformists may however seem inevitably, as the power base of the former 
increasingly will be sought overtaken by the latter based on the public mandate. This was confirmed at 
the constitutional crisis that emerged over the investiture of Khatami in August 2001 where the Council 
o f Guardians threatened to block the investiture if two conservative elements were not accepted by the 
Parliament to the Council of Experts.
In sum, developments in Iran have been intensive and complex since 1979. The changes from period to 
period have been extensive, for instance, in openness and public support for reforms, even though the 
Islamic Republic and the core ideas behind it has remained the most powerful expression of thought 
during the period as a whole. All these fluctuations in Iran have o f course increased the complexity of 
timely, cohesive and successful Western reactions towards Iran. It is therefore no wonder that EFP 
towards Iran never became a high profiled flagship o f the CFSP, as will be discussed below.
5.2 EFP towards Iran , 1979-2001
This section will assess EFP towards Iran. The aim is as earlier mentioned to determine the Union’s 
capability-presence as defined in Chapter 2, i.e. in terms of primarily the depth, scope and decision­
making mode of the Union’s foreign policy towards Iran. EU-Iran relations in the last two decades have
40 Arabic Ncws.com/IRNA.
41 Email correspondence May 2001.
4: Comment on conference the author took pan in The connection to the Iranian context did not appear in the high-ranking Iranian diplomats’ comment
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either been bilateral relations between Member States and Iran or multilateral activities using second 
pillar instruments only (earlier the EPC) vis-à-vis Iran. Both the bilateral and multilateral activities 
deserve attention, but the focus here is as mentioned in Chapter 1 on the policies agreed to at the EU 
level. As the analysis proceeds, however, it is useful to remember that most EU Member States have 
had their own contacts and their own agendas in their relations with Iran in the last two decades and 
that what is covered in this chapter necessarily only remains a fraction o f the total EU-Iran relations.
(a) EFP in the 80s: not much ado about either hostages or wars
The EC kept a low profile during Iran’s revolution and the events of the first years of the revolutionary 
regime. It was however forced to react to Iran on the hostage crisis, when it became clear that it would 
not be brought to an end immediately. The Union’s response was considered rather “bungled’ (Nuttall 
2000:16). Five months after the hostages were taken, the EU foreign ministers agreed to (Hufbauer & 
Schott 1990):
•  reduce diplomatic representation in Iran
• suspend arms sales
•  require visas for Iranian travel in Europe
• discourage purchase o f Iranian oil at prices above OPEC standard o f $32.5/bbl43
•  threaten Iran with an export embargo if  decisive progress were not made by May 17,1980.
Although one commentator reported about “one o f  the most important foreign policy actions in EEC's 
history”, Hill & Mayall describe the Union’s response as “/oo little, too late (1983).44 None of the two 
views is completely wrong, illustrating the paradoxical dual faced nature of European foreign policy. 
On the one hand, the Union’s action was one o f  the more cohesive actions o f the EPC, and the most 
cohesive yet seen towards Iran. On the other hand, the scope o f the Union’s action was rather narrow 
and the implementation o f  the sanctions occurred in an ad hoc fashion in the respective Member States 
without any sincere coordination.
43 Iran was demanding 535.5/bbl.
44 Quoting John Wyles in the Financial Times. May 19th. 1980 and pages 15*17.
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In the course of the 80s, the EC performed so-called “regular reviews o f  the situation” in Iran but 
actions o f  the EPC were limited to demarches and representations to the Iranian authorities.41 These 
were not insignificant foreign policy measures since according to EU officials “the Iranian authorities 
particularly hated demarches”.45 6 A proposal for a trade agreement between the EU and Iran was 
exchanged in 1982, but was never carried out due to opposition from the EU Member States.47 
Characteristically for EU’s policy towards Iran, the existing institutional instruments were only used to 
a limited extent. For example, there were only five statements of the Council on Iran from 1979-1988.48
Another feature o f EFP towards Iran is the contrast between the low profile o f  the Council and the EP’s 
high engagement towards developments in Iran. In this period, the EP virtually bombarded the EPC 
with questions concerning human rights (41 in total) and in addition issued 14 resolutions. The Council 
often gave very short replies to the various questions that often avoided the core problems and thus 
could be interpreted to be almost arrogant. MEP, Mr. John Iversen, in September 1987, for instance, 
asked whether the export credit guarantees o f Danish Feta cheese exports to Iran worth 500 million 
DKr (~€ 80 million) were compatible with the Union’s human rights policies in the light of the many 
reported Iranian human rights violations. The Presidency, represented by Danish foreign minister, Mr. 
Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, replied by referring the issue to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
Ellemann-Jensen furthermore asserted, “besides, Mr. Iversen is getting things mixed up: the export 
refunds which are paid out are not paid to the country receiving products”.49 Technically, Mr. 
Ellemann-Jensen was correct. There is no discrimination in relation to the operation of the export 
refund system between “recipient” countries, nor can there be under CAP rules. However, Iversen’s 
point was probably that there existed the possibility o f banning EU exports to certain countries, a step 
that apparently was considered too far for most EU Member States.
In the Iran-Iraq war, the Member States took a neutral stance. They maintained their diplomatic 
relations with both Iran and Iraq but froze all high level visits to and from Iran. As an exception, 
Germany kept diplomatic activity with Iran at a relatively high level. In 1984, a de facto arms embargo 
was “initiated by the US and widely followed by its European partners” on a unilateral basis, and
45 EFPB 85/206 9 October 1985 and 87/116 4 March 1997. In 1987, the Union expressed “serious concern" of the human rights violations.
46 Interview, Council Secretariat, May 2000.
4* Mr. Kachouieian, Head of Bureau of West Europe in the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs in Tehran, Round Table, March 16th 2001, Limerick.
41 EFPB: 86/087 25.02.1986. 86/105 08.04 86. 86/246 06.08.1986, 87/077* 26.01.1987. 87/189 25 May 1987, 87/261 13 July 1987, 88/241 21.07 88, 
88/229 15.07.88. 88/244 10.08 88, 89/068 20.02.89.
4“ EFPB 87/318 and 384/87 16 September 1987.
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without any official EPC action being initiated.50 The Union’s primary activity was the engagement of 
other international organizations and countries against the human rights situation in Iran, e.g., in the 
Commission of Human Rights51 and in the UN, twice presenting a draft resolution in the UN General 
Assembly.52 534
(b) The legacy o f  Rushdie
From 1989-1997, the EFP started playing a more distinctive role in the relationship between Member 
States and Iran. The eye-opener for the Union was the outbreak of the Rushdie affair. The Union 
condemned the Iranian behaviour, suspended exchanges of high-level official visits and recalled their 
ambassadors for consultation. The Union demonstrated unity and rigor but the action was implemented 
in a clumsy way. Only one month later, the ambassadors could return to their former duties, a 
development which Bulletin Quotidien Européen (Europe) evaluated by saying “in reality Ayatollah is 
laughing in his beard at the ambassadors * returning with heads down as their faces were covered by a 
1chador \ Was this farce really necessary?™ Despite this ambiguity, the Rushdie affair in practice 
excluded any ordinary relations such as trade agreements between the EU and Iran from developing, 
“the Fatwa came in between”.5* Even today, the legacy of Rushdie roots deeply in the EU-Iran relations.
After the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the Union lifted all remaining sanctions towards Iran in 1990. 
Despite the Fatwa, the EU noted the encouraging attitude o f Iran towards the Western world and for the 
second time since the interruption of the trade agreement, there was revival o f the idea of a 
trade/association agreement, however, no more than as an informal approach.55 When Iran’s attitude 
changed after 1990, the Union sharpened its tone marginally.56 Three months after the Mykonos 
murders, which were quickly linked to Iran (Struwe 1998), the Council on 11-12 December 1992, 
defined a new policy of Critical Dialogue (CD) towards Iran. Critical dialogue was,
“concern about Iranian behaviour and calls for improvement in a number o f  areas, particularly human rights, the death sentence 
pronounced by a Fatwa o f  Ayatollah Khomeini against the author Salman Rushdie, which is contrary to international law. and  
terrorism. Improvement in these areas will be important in determining the extent to which closer relations and confidence can be 
developed. The European Council accepts the right o f  countries to acquire the means to defend themselves, but is concerned that
50 World Fact Book 1998.
51 EFPB 85/223 Question H -143/8 5 23 October 1985.
52 See EFPB 95/424 22 December 1995 (Res. L.35) and 98/332 17 November 1998 (Res. L. 38), EFPB 85/068 24-25 April 1985, 85/069 29 April 19S5. 
85/217 17 October 1985, 85/241 5 November 1985, 86/246 6 August 1986; 86/376, 87/119 11 March 1987; 87/189 25 May 1987; 87/261 13 July 1987
53 Issue, Late March 1989.
54 Interview Council Official May 1999,
53 Struwe 1998: 19. Interview Council Secretariat May 2000; Mr. Kochouieian, Head of Bureau of West Europe in Iran's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
56 EFPB 92/356 19 October 1992. Email correspondence EU Member State senior diplomat, June 6.2001.
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Iran's arms procurement should not pose a threat to regional stability. In view o f  the fundamental importance o f  the Middle East 
peace process, the European Council also expresses the wish that Iran will take a constructive approach here ’\ 57
We do not know much about what went on in CD since all information on this topic from the Council 
is classified and thus not available to the public. CD, however, was remarkably different from the 
Union’s previous policy, first, by being a bilateral series of discussions that both Iran and the Union had 
agreed to.58 These discussions took place at biannual meetings between Iranian authorities and the 
Union, between a delegation o f up to six persons from the Foreign Ministry o f  Iran and an equivalent 
amount o f  persons representing the Troika. The meetings were held in the capital o f the Presidency 
country.59 The PoCo prepared the meetings in conjunction with COREPER. PoCo normally would 
agree on a “steering brie f ’ to be given to the Troika that included all issues that the Union wished to 
raise with the Iranian authorities.60 The agenda of the meetings were said to derive from the discussion 
points and results of previous CD sessions with due consideration given to developments in Iran since 
the last meeting. The first issue on the agenda was “Areas (or Issues) o f Concern” including mainly 
those areas pinpointed at the Edinburgh Council.61 An important issue was the attempt to start a written 
correspondence with Iran on the Fatwa. The aim was to encourage the Iranians to maintain their 
promise given in Copenhagen not to execute the Fatwa.62 The second issue on the agenda was 
44Regional Questions”, for example, the Middle East Peace Process. Moreover, attention had always to 
be paid to protocol questions such as whether alcohol could be served, or not.63 In addition, Iran 
originally opposed the participation of women not wearing a headscarf and coat.64 *Whereas alcohol 
remained banned from being served in the presence o f the Iranians, the Union eventually managed to 
have women included in the meetings. In the beginning, the negotiations were characterized by caution 
on both sides, with the Europeans acknowledging the complex constituency o f  Iran, and the Iranians 
still needing to learn the rules and opportunities of CD. Soon, the wregular critical dialogue sessions” 
became very “tough” f  and44strong” statements were issued towards Iran.66 One official even described
37 Extracts from the Conclusion of the European Council meeting in Edinburgh, 11-12/12-92 (EFPB, 92/449). See also EFPB 95/342 14 November 1995. 
Interview, Council Secretariat. May 2000
i9 In the following order; the Danish and British presidency in 1993; Athens, June 1994; Madrid, November 1994; Paris, June 1995; Bonn, November
1995; Rome, June 1996 and finally in Dublin in December 1996.
60 Interview, Council Secretariat, November 1999.
61 Ibid.
63 Email correspondence, senior diplomat, EU Member State, Spring 2001.
63 In June 1995, CD was supposed to have a meeting followed by lunch in Paris, but a discussion emerged on the issue o f serving French wine for the 
lunch, which the French insisted on. The Iranian delegation categorically refused to participate in the CD under these conditions and a working breakfast 
was held instead at Quay d'Orsay (Interview, Official Council Secretariat, November 1999).
w For instance, this was reportedly discussed concerning the participation of the first Council official formally in charge o f preparing Council Secretariat
policies on Iran, the British diplomat Mrs, Ann Pringle.
t>; Answer to the question from MEP Mr. Ephremidis 95/342 14 November 1995.
66 Interview, Council Secretariat, November 1999.
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the sessions in the mid-90s as a professional diplomatic “exchange o f nasty remarks”.*1
CD also increased the scope o f EFP by explicitly including human rights concerns. CD became the 
basis o f the Union’s actions regarding Iran in international organizations.67 8 Several UN resolutions 
were drafted, e.g., the resolution of 1995 on the lack o f improvement o f  the human rights situation in 
Iran addressing, in particular, 1) the high number o f executions, 2) incidents o f torture, 3) absence of 
guarantees of due process o f law, and 4) discriminatory treatment o f religious minorities, notably the 
Baha’is and widespread discrimination against women.69 CD in this sense became an “umbrella” for 
the Union’s ambassadors in their discussions with Iranian authorities.70 The effect was according to 
Council officials to raise the threshold o f criticism o f  Iran beyond the bilaterally possible level.71 *In 
defence of CD, Ansari also stated that “neither (the American containment policy or critical dialogue) 
policy is a perfect solution, but ..even limited and critical communication at an official level is a more 
subtle, flexible and constructive strategy than no communication at a ir  (1996:209).
The decision to use the Troika to perform CD was a compromise but it reflected a firmer commitment 
to the EFP than previously. Despite the Troika being formed by these governments, it had been an issue 
whether to let the Union be represented by all 12 Member States or by a smaller representation of 
Member States such as the Troika or, even the Presidency alone, as was once suggested.
An important limitation o f the CD was that new instruments given to the CFSP by the TEU, such as 
Common Positions and Joint Actions, never were used against Iran. Despite this, one official in the 
Council Secretariat said that, “Common Positions and Joint Actions exist towards Iran; they are just 
not written down” and added that formal declarations might have worsened the atmosphere of 
deliberation of the meetings with the Iranians.73 This is contentious, as Common Positions and Joint
67 Sometimes metaphors were used as just before lunch at the Dublin 1996 CD meeting under the Irish Presidency. As one may know, in line with Iranians 
demands lunch was to be served cold and without alcohol for the European delegation. The Irish Presidency remarked -  inspired by the poor performance 
o f the Iranian reforms o f  the economy at that time - that it now was important for Iran to provide some more Iranian spices into the Iranian kitchen and 
added that Iran should turn up for the heat. The interlocutor of the Iranian delegation Vaezi, a tough and sophisticated negotiator replied, "as the 
European Union is well aware of. we Iranians prefer the soup to be served cold".
61 For instance, in a statement in 1996, the Council distinguished between CD on the one hand, and the resolutions and statements at the UN General 
Assembly or by the UN Commission of Human Rights, on the other hand.
69 EFPB 95/424 22 December 1995. For an extensive analysis o f the interaction between the UN human rights system and the Baha’i community, see 
Ghanea-Hercock (1999).
70 The expression “umbrella” was used, for instance, by an EU Member State diplomat, interview November 1999.
71 Interview', Council Secretariat. May 2000.
71 Interview, former Council Official (currently Member State diplomat). September 2000.
T- Interview. May 1999
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Actions could also function as measures to “constrain'* and remind Member States of their obligations 
as a Council legal advisor pointed out.74
Apart from CD, the EP from 1992-97 continued its active engagement concerning Iran and issued 19 
resolutions.75 The Council remained highly critical towards the views of the EP. At least one Council 
official has admitted the strained relationship towards the EP noting that it is difficult to say uif MEP 
are illiterates, stupid or just playing stupid*.76 The positive change in the Council’s attitude was its 
increasing eagerness to persuade the EP that it had taken on board the EP’s preoccupations on human 
rights issues.77 According to Struwe, “EU has /with its CD] shown a clear commitment to address its 
concerns about human rights abuses, terrorism...” (1999). Under the Italian presidency, in spring 1996, 
Ms Jackson asked about the destinies o f the members o f the Iranian Baha'is sentenced to death for 
“apostasy from  Islam”.78 In a very polite and explicative answer, the Italian foreign minister Mr. 
Ferraris replied, *7 hardly need reassure Mrs. Jackson that human rights are a key concern o f  the EU in 
its relations with Iran, especially now that the matter has moved up the international political 
agenda”.79
(c )  The Mykonos verdict and its repercussions
CD was interrupted after the Mykonos verdict on 10 April 1997. Due to disagreement among the 
Member States the Presidency o f the Union issued a statement on behalf o f the Union (and not a 
Council declaration) on the day o f the verdict saying that, “The Presidency invites Member States to 
recall their ambassadors for coordinated consultation on the future relationship o f the European 
Union with Iran”, noting that under the “present circumstances there is no basis fo r  the continuation o f
w Chris Hill made a similar point at the ECPR Summer School in Geneva2000.
75 OJ C323, 21/11/1994 p. 0166 (depopulation and ruin of Kurdish settlement areas in Iran and violation of human rights); C 020 24/01/1994 (human 
rights abuses); OJ C255, 20.09.1993 p.0156 (denial of human rights to the Baha'i Community); C l50, 31.05.1993 p. 0263 (continuing persecution o f 
Baha'i community); Cl 15, 26.04.93 p. 0247 (militarisation); C284 02.11.1992 p.0107 (human rights); C176 13.07.1992 p. 0127 (human rights 
violations); C l 76, 13.07.1992 p.0126 (persecution o f Baha’is and other human rights violations); C 094 ,13.04.1992 p. 0267 (violation of human rights); 
C328 26.10.1998 p.0192 (capital punishment); C098, 09.04.1999 p. 0296 (human rights); C080, 16.03.1998 p. 0248 (human rights); C167, 02.06.1997 
p.0151 (Iran); C l 15, 14.04.1997 p. 0176 (earthquake and need for humanitarian aid); C085, 17.03.1997 p. 0145 (Iran); C096, 01.04.1996 p. 0295 
(Political and human rights violations); C l66,03.07.1995 p. 0127 (continued human rights violations), C109,01.05.1995 p. 0162 (human rights); C l28, 
09.05.1994 p. 0312 (human rights).
76 Interview, November 1999.
77 The procedure o f  formulating the answers is the following. The Council Secretariat provides a fust and second draft of the answer, sends it to the 
Presidency who offers it to hearing by the Member States. In this process, the Presidency is free to correct anything, but it seldom does so
71 Ms. Jackson also asked questions regarding Nigeria which will be discussed in Chapter 6. Apparently, she linked the two cases saying, ‘7  remember last 
time 1 asked a similar question o f  a president-inoffice, sadly it was in relation to Mr. Ken Saro-Wiwa in Algeria". See Section 6.2 (b).
79 EFPB 96/073 13 March 1996 [extracts],
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the critical d ia lo g u e80 A package of measures was introduced at the next Council meeting on April 
29, including,81
• the suspension of the official bilateral Ministerial visits to or from Iran under the present 
circumstances,
•  confirmation o f established policy of the Member States not to supply arms to Iran, and
• co-operation to ensure that visas are not granted to Iranians with intelligence and security functions.
According to some authors, the Mykonos case expressed a high degree o f European “collective action” 
(Allen & Smith 1998:70, 14-15). Similarly, one official has noted that Mykonos was “one o f the 
isolated examples where the system worked\ 82 He referred to the way the verdict had been anticipated 
with reactions prepared for various scenarios by an efficient Dutch Presidency. According to Council 
officials, a predecessor to the current Policy Unit in the Council Secretariat played a key role in the 
formulation o f these scenarios. This unit, which was informally organised, prepared an “options paper” 
to the Presidency delineating different strategies to be pursued under the various scenarios of the 
verdict.83 These scenarios were that 1) the Iranian government be acquitted, 2) the Iranian government 
be implied to have been involved “somehow”, and 3) the Iranian government’s involvement be “openly 
asserted'.** On the day o f the official verdict, April 10,1997, the PoCo met extraordinarily all day long 
in Brussels where reports from the High Court in Berlin were distributed and discussed.
The relatively strong and swift reaction of the Union made, according to Council officials, an 
impression on the Iranians. The same sources also point to a certain surprise effect springing from the 
Union’s measures o f 29 April. Already the following day, Iran’s spiritual leader reacted by suspending 
permission for the return o f  the German ambassador Horst Baechmann 'for the time being”?6 One 
official notes that “the Iranians fe lt pressured and reacted desperately”.87 Under these circumstances, 
the Dutch Presidency called for, and largely achieved, solidarity towards Germany. This solidarity 
may in fact have impressed the Iranians who preferred a policy o f “duality o f  voices” with the EU. As 
Reza Saidabadi notes, EU solidarity is “likely to be at the centre o f any calculation in Iran *s foreign 
policy  ’ since “it will be difficult for Iran to deal with the EU  as a bloc rather than as individual 10*457
10 EFPB 97/058 10 April 1997. The document underwent several revisions before it was agreed to (Interview, Council Secretariat, May 2000).
11 http:/teuropa eu iniOapid/start'cgi/guesten.ksh'h? action.geitxt=gt<£:doc=PESC/97/41 [0IAGED&!g=EN.
Interview, Council Secretariat, May 2000. ¡.■
x> Interview, former Council Official, currently EU Member State diplomat May 2000.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
*6 http://www.neda net/iran-vvnd/vol 1018/fl 018-04 htm
17 Interview, Council Secretariat, May 2000. Some references mention that the return of the Danish ambassador also was declared undesirable for the 
moment. This seems to be a misunderstanding based on a misinterpretation by a Chinese journalist of some Iranian statements. Email correspondence 
Senior diplomat. EU Member State. Spring 2001.
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countries” (1998:3). In the diplomatic deadlock that emerged, a deal was only established after long 
negotiations. The deal instructed the ambassadors to arrive in two groups to Tehran. The first group o f 
ambassadors from 12 Member States arrived on November 14, 1997, and the second group, consisting 
of the French and German ambassadors arrived one week later.89
Mykonos also demonstrated some behavioural features in the CFSP o f the new Member States 
(Sweden, Austria, and Finland). Sweden initially opposed the withdrawal o f the ambassadors. Sweden 
argued that 1) a continued political dialogue was preferred in line with traditional Swedish neutrality 
policies and 2) that it would be difficult to return the ambassadors once having withdrawn them, since 
there were no really obvious “exit” strategies, or “re-entry” strategies.90 Sweden nevertheless decided to 
be loyal to the other Member States and took part in the action.
Sweden’s reservation pointed to the weakness of the Union’s policies, the lack of clear and logical 
strategies. A diplomat from another EU country than Sweden commented on the Swedish reservations, 
“Sweden here thought what many more Member States should have thought about”.91 The suspension 
of CD was as admitted by an official in the Council Secretariat, “the most inconsistent o f  all things that 
could have been done”.92 93CD had been initiated because of and three months after the Mykonos 
murders, which the verdict concerned. On April 11, 1997, CD should thus have been “intensified — not 
s u s p e n d e d 'The problem with the suspension of CD was that the EFP towards Iran hereby ceased to 
exist for about half a year.94 When questions regarding violations of human rights or democratic 
principles were raised in the EP in the months following the Mykonos verdict, the Union had to admit 
to having “raised the question with Iranian authorities until the discontinuation o f  the critical 
dialogue”.9S
*® See http.7Avww.neda net/iran-upd/vollOlS/flOl 8-06.htm.
19 httpYAvww. neda.net/iran-wpd/vol 1046/f1046-3.htm. The Portuguese ambassador was reportedly not among the first group as planned, so there were 
only 12. A joke in the Council may illustrate the problematic dilemma of the EU Member States. The German ambassador thought o f two options for his 
return to Tehran. There are two flights Friday aftemoon/evening from Frankfurt to Tehran, an Iranian Air and a Lufthansa flight. The solution for the 
German ambassador would accordingly be to board the Iranian Airlines flight since it departed earlier. The German ambassador would -  besides not using 
Lufthansa -  hereby signal to his German constituents that Germany had not complied with obscure Iranian demands about having him arrive last among 
the EU ambassadors. The other ambassadors would either board his plane or board the Lufthansa plane that departed later. The German ambassador could 
then be sure that the Iranian Airlines flight would be delayed in arrival in Tehran and arrive later than the Lufthansa flight. Hereby, he had satisfied both 
German and Iranian demands (Interview Council Secretariat, May 2000).
90 Interview Swedish Permanent Representation to the EU, Brussels. May 2000.
91 Email correspondence, senior diplomat, Spring 2001.
91 Interview, Council Secretariat, May 2000.
93 ibid.
94 EFPB 97/058 10 April 1997
95 EFPB 97/255 26 November 1997. the order o f  words has been slightly changed
Moreover, the importance o f the informal development o f scenarios for the Mykonos verdict that was 
emphasized by former officials in the Council Secretariat has been partly rejected by senior diplomats 
o f the Member States. According to one o f  these, confusion about the Union’s strategy options on the 
Mykonos verdict was widespread. Notably, “no Member State really wanted either to take any clear 
position beforehand nor enter any ‘reality' discussion regarding the options ”.96
Some EU officials suggested that the Union’s policy of interrupting bilateral ministerial visits at 
Mykonos had a negative effect on the bilateral trade relations between Iran and EU.97 *The specific 
fluctuations in trade between the Union and Iran will be discussed in Section 5.4 (c). Speaking against 
any direct effect from the visa restrictions to trade was, though, that EU Member States participated as 
usual in the yearly Tehran International Trade Fair in 1997.*
Less important, but still illustrative for the immaturity o f EFP, were a couple of classical defection 
dramas in connection to the withdrawal o f ambassadors. Greece and Italy were the moderates among 
EU Member States that had favoured a compromising stance towards the Iranian regime. In particular, 
Greece tried to defect from the Union’s Mykonos verdict reactions. In fact, two (or three) days after the 
rest of the ambassadors had left Tehran, the Greek ambassador still reportedly was in Tehran continuing 
his duties, including a reception on the Greek national day.99 10
The other moderate, Italy, generally seemed to comply with the Union’s reactions except, maybe, for 
one incident. The Union, two weeks after the withdrawal of the ambassadors, decided to return the 
ambassadors on April 29, 1997. Within two days, on May 1, this decision was changed to “a  wait and 
see attitude ”, after the Iranians, as mentioned above, had declared the German ambassador’s return 
“«or desirable fo r  the moment”. 100 The Council asked the Member States not to return their 
ambassadors awaiting a response from Iran before taking the final decision.101 At that time, however, 
the Italian ambassador was already in Tehran having left Rome on the day of the Council declaration on
96 Email correspondence, senior diplomat, EU Member State, Spring 2001.
97 Interview, Council Secretariat. May 2000.
91 Email correspondence, senior diplomat, EU Member State, Spring 2001.
99 European Report. No. 2222. May 8th: 11; No. 2220 April 30th 1997; No, 2221 May 3rd 1997. E-mail correspondence. Senior Diplomat. EU Member 
State, Spring 2001.
100 One official even noted that the ambassador had been declared Persona Non Grata which was a breach o f  the Vienna Convention (Article 9(1), 1961). 
In the Vienna Convention it is stated that “the receiving state may at any time and without having to explain its decision notify the sending state that the 
ambassador is Persona Son Grata. A person may be declared non grata or not acceptable before arriving ”. According to interviews with one of the 
ambassadors of the Member States, Iran did not directly declare any ambassador Persona Non Grata, but simply used the expression that the German 
ambassador's presence was undesirable for the moment as referred above.
101 European Report, May S. 1997, No. 2222, V.l 1
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April 29. Instead of returning from Tehran to his home country as the French ambassador did in a 
similar situation,102 the Italian ambassador remained in Tehran for another three weeks reportedly to 
seek to find a solution to the conflict.103 Council officials referred to this incident as a 
“misunderstanding”, and sticking to this diplomatic language, one may say that the incidents, though 
part of an expression o f increased capability-presence o f the Union, also showed how clumsy and 
inexperienced the CFSP apparatus still was when it came to even small diplomatic operations such as 
this.104
Within the problem of the Greek ambassador referred to above, one actually finds a neat illustration of 
the arbitrary manifestations o f this progress o f EFP. Greece actually ended up complying with the 
Council decision albeit in a rather awkward way. As the defection of Greece became clear for the 
Council Secretariat and the Presidency, the Council Secretariat decided to invite all ambassadors with 
their spokesmen to Brussels for a meeting o f  the G ulf Working Group. It was argued that this would 
provide “o qualitative improvement o f  the debate” in the Council Working Group and since all 
ambassadors had officially been taken off duty it should not have been a problem had the Greek 
ambassador simply complied with the decision.105 This creative initiative o f the Secretariat subsequently 
pushed the Greek ambassador to leave Tehran so he in fact turned up at the Working Group. Although 
the Greek ambassador did not go back to Tehran before the return of the first group of the rest of the 
ambassadors, he apparently -  unlike the other ambassadors -  forgot to give the agreed upon notice to 
the Iranian authorities saying that he had been called home for consultations.106
In sum, Mykonos illustrated gradual progress of the capability-presence of the CFSP, but also contained 
many elements of paralysis. Neither the progress nor the paralysis followed any streamlined 
straightforward movement but rather an ad hoc reactionary path of development emphasising the 
intergovernmental decision-making nature o f the CFSP plus a gradual, but weak, strengthening o f the 
Union’s organisational capabilities.
102 The French ambassador returned from Dubai after a stop on its way to Tehran after receiving the new orders from the Council.
10'’ httn /Avww neda net/tran-wnd/vol 1019/fl0 19-05.htm. E-mail correspondence. Senior Diplomat. EU Member State. Spring 2001.
10,1 Interview, Council Secretariat, November 1999.
105 Interview, Council Secretariat. May 2000.
|n6 Interv iew. Council Secretariat, May 2000. Instead, the Iranian authorities were informed that he had left on vacation for the Greek Orthodox Easter
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After the ambassadors’ return to Tehran in November 1997, a new dialogue emerged between Iran and I
the EU. It was too sensitive for both parties to refer to the new dialogue as critical or even mention the j
word dialogue, but unofficially the new dialogue was referred to as a “constructive”™1, “globaFm  or I
“comprehensive”107 *09 dialogue. The relations under the new dialogue quickly improved. In 1998, the J
dialogue for instance was told to take place in an atmosphere described as “neither friendly nor |
hostile”, but one year later the dialogue was now pursued in a *'friendly a tm osphere110 I
I
I
One of the novelties of this dialogue was that the biannual meetings now took place in Tehran as well |
as in Member State capitals. The (ministerial) Troika represented the Union and the ”highest level |
representatives” represented Iran. Those were the Iranian Deputy Minister o f Europe and the Americas, I 
Morteza Sarmadi, and later Ali Ahani, accompanied by senior officials. The meetings were held in 
Tehran under the Austrian Presidency in June 1998, Vienna (Austrian Presidency in December 1998), |
Tehran (German Presidency, May 20, 1999), Helsinki (Finnish Presidency, December 1999), Tehran I
(Portuguese Presidency, June 23, 2000) and in Stockholm (Swedish Presidency, February 13, 2001). '
The meeting under the German presidency was reportedly the most successful one discussing a j
comprehensive list of issues,111 whereas the meeting in Helsinki was reported as the least successful [
meeting in terms o f achieving Iranian compliance with the EU demands after Mykonos.112 In addition, 1
the planned comprehensive dialogue meeting in Paris in December 2000 was cancelled after Iran could j
not accept the French level of the dialogue. France was according to a spokesman of the Iranian i
government, sending “only a senior civil servant” to the gathering, the deputy secretary general of the 1 
foreign ministry, which was unacceptable to the Iranians.113 I
The scope of comprehensive dialogue was greater than previous dialogues by expressing the attempt to 
find “practical ways o f  co-operation” between the Union and Iran.114 Moreover, by trying to signal ,
107 Defined at the European Council in Brussels 30/31 March 1998 (See Struwe 1998).
10* European Report No. 2334, July 23, 1998, V.6, according to the Austrian Presidency on a Trojka visit to Tehran 18-19 July 1998 j
109 Call«! so by the German representatives and twice under the Finnish Presidency. See EFPB 99/167 21/9-1999 and 99/222 9/11-1999.
110 Interview, Commission, May 2000.
1,1 The issues included co-operation o f Organization of the Islamic Conference. Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). Iran-EU co-operation. i 
Afghanistan, Kosovo. Persian Gulf. Iraq, Central Asia, Caucasus, Caspian Sea, Middle East, Dialogue among Civilizations, human rights. International 
terrorism (MKO) and disarmament
117 Interv iew, Council Secretariat, May 2000.
113 Tehran, for its part, had named its deputy' minister with responsibility for European affairs.
http ,,'uv\vv listbot conri'cci-hin/subscribcr0Act-view incssaac&list id=daneshioo ncwsAmsg num=624&start num=624
114 Mr. Kachouieian. Head o f Bureau o f West Europe in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tehran, Round Table. March 16. 2001.
(d) Comprehensive dialogue
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different things to reformist and non-reformist groups in Iran, the new dialogue necessitated more 
sophisticated analytical and operational co-operation in the CFSP and the external relations of the 
Community. A novelty on the agenda was that Areas o f  concern no longer comprised the Rushdie case 
after the agreement between Britain and Iran in September 1998. Human rights issues were still 
addressed despite that Iran maintained their opposition towards including this point on the agenda. Only 
once does this de facto seem to have taken place, namely under the Austrian Presidency.115 The 
proliferation o f Weapons of Mass Destruction remained an agenda-point and drug trafficking was 
increasingly discussed. Terrorism was gradually removed from the points the Union wished to raise in 
line with the apparent reduction in Iranian supported terrorist activities after 1997.116 Instead, the 
Iranians raised the issue of terrorism, finding that the Union should officially condemn the Mujahedin- 
e-Khalq Organization (MKO). The Union had never specifically addressed the MKO, but had only 
condemned -  typically through a statement by the Presidency and not by the Union -  “all forms o f  
terrorism and regardless o f  motive” "7 The British declaration in July 2000 o f all MKO activities as 
illegal,”8 however, seems to put some pressure on the Union to specify its stance on MKO in their 
future dialogues with Iran.
The second agenda point was “Extension o f  co-operation”1'9 or “issues o f  common interests” which 
further illustrated the increased scope of EFP in this period.120 This included first pillar issues such as 
trade and technical co-operation, notably within the energy sector and on environment issues, and 
specifically regarding projects in the Caucasus region. Working groups were established to discuss 
‘'possible EU-Iran co-operation in certain areas'\ with the Working Group on Energy of 1999 being 
the first Working Group to be established. It met for the first time in Tehran in May 1999 and had its 
second meeting in Brussels in March 2001. Its purpose was to discuss the possibilities o f technical co­
operation between the EU and the Iranian energy sector regarding projects in Iran. In 1999, working 
groups on trade and investment were also established, with the first meeting being held on 28-29 
November 2000. Apart from this, so-called “Experts meetings ” were held on Drugs and on Refugees 
(European Commission 2001:6).
n i Iran Review, Jan 1999, No. 26. At URL: http://wvvw.Ttifa.gov.ir.
116 Interview, Council Secretariat, May 2000.
117 Interview, EU Member State diplomat, May 2000.
11* July 12, 2000. URL: httrr//www.fco aov.uk/news/newstect.asn?3946.
119 Interview. Council Secretariat. May 2000.
i:° EFPB 99/167 21/9-99
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When assessing the value o f the increased scope o f the CFSP that this reflected, one may notice that the 
initiative to the Working Group on trade was Iranian and not European. Moreover, the Iranians wished 
to have what they called a “trade and investment agreement” with the Union.121 Neither the 
Commission nor the Council took any initiatives from 1991 to spring 2001 in this regard. Then the 
Commission, on request o f the Council’s decision during the French Presidency, delivered a report to 
the Council that included the proposal o f initiating negotiations for a “trade and co-operation 
agreement’ with the Union in accordance with Article 300(1) o f  the TEU (European Commission 
2001:9). The Union’s policy contrasted somewhat with the Member States’ gradual opening up in their 
trade and investment relations with Iran, notably with the various deals struck between private EU 
companies and Iran as well as several bilateral investment protection deals between EU Member States 
and Iran involving countries such as Italy, France, Germany, United Kingdom and Finland.122
The Amsterdam Treaty opened up for introducing Common Strategies in which the broad range 
relations, political, economic, social and cultural will be taken into account. In this respect, it was 
according to an EU Member State senior diplomat “perhaps a weakness o f  the critical dialogue that it 
“concentrated solely on political issues, such as human rights and the Middle East, which in 
themselves were not conducive to receiving warmer relations between the EU and Iran”.'23
The bottom line of the Union’s approach towards Iran at the turn of the Millennium was thus a still 
highly cautious policy lacking a real momentum in increasing the Union’s capability presence 
significantly. Under the label “European Silence”, a report by the European Parliament’s Foreign 
Affairs Committee “considers that EU should respond more actively to the recent successes scored by 
more moderate forces within the political establishment in Iran ”.124 Incentives such as the targeting of 
aid to Iranian moderate forces in the late 1990s were simply “not politically possible ”, as noted by an 
official in the Council Secretariat.125 Aid was only given as refugee aid through the UNHCR and 
through non-governmental organisations. In the beginning of 2001, a sanitary and maintenance project 
was furthermore launched, implemented by the French Médecins sans Frontières (MSF). Together with 
a humanitarian (hospital) project which was initiated after the earthquakes in Iran some years ago, these
121 Iranian government official, informal talks with the author, April 2000.
122 The Commission was also included in the September 1998 ban of all EU imports of Iranian pistachios, which is Iran’s second largest export item 
Iranian free trade violations were reported as the reason for the ban, but the international society, including the US, largely perceived it as strengthening of 
the European stance towards Iran. Yet, the ban was already removed in late 1998. The information on bilateral deals stems from e-mail correspondence 
with a senior diplomat of an EU Member State.
I2i Email correspondence. June 6 2001.
124 EP. 23.4 99 A4 0242/99 39.
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are however “the only activities o f  the Union in Iran fo r  the moment”.* 126 127As such, no significant inter 
pillarization of the Union’s policy towards Iran has taken place so far, i.e. other pillars have not been 
sufficiently integrated into those European foreign policies that are formulated in the CFSP (See also 
Chapter 6). Illustratively, until Spring 2001, the Commission never explicitly proposed any policy 
towards Iran, either under critical dialogue, or under comprehensive dialogue despite being “fu lly  
associated” in the tasks o f the CFSP (Treaty o f Amsterdam: Article J.8 (4)).
In response to the disappearances and executions o f various Iranian writers in 1999 and the attempts to 
organize an uprising commencing with the student demonstrations on 8 July 1999, the Union took a 
neutral stance calling it a “a situation that primarily is fo r  the Iranian people to resolve within Iran”.'11 
Similarly, the restrictions in the freedom of speech through the closing o f more than 30 newspapers 
from 1999-2001 and the persecution and verdict involving thirteen members o f the Jewish community 
in Iran and eight Muslims accused of spying did not lead to any visible change in the Union’s 
declarative policies towards Iran.128 Instead, the Union’s “quiet” diplomacy continued to approach the 
Iranian authorities with their various concerns through demarches, discussions on the dialogue meetings 
and various messages.129 *
The Union’s reactions were under comprehensive dialogue thus much more proactive and wide-ranging 
than before but the real movements in active co-operation at the EU level were however still so limited 
that an outsider could easily see the Union as being paralysed as usual. Indeed, the Union did suffer 
from a sort of strategic laissez-faire in that its policy from 1997 seemed to be a widened wait and see 
policy. Symptomatically, for the Union’s approach the Commission’s proposal to the Council o f 
opening negotiations with Iran regarding a trade and co-operation agreement was in May 2001 reported 
to have “deadlocked”.'™ In this sense, EFP towards Iran thus neatly mirrors the puzzle of this thesis 
regarding the co-existence and interchange between paralysis and progress in the EFP. The remainder 
o f the chapter will subsequently explore the extent to which this pattern reflect decision-makers ability 
to learn or not from the their actions and the outcomes in EU-Iran relations.
,2i Interview, Council Secretariat, November 1999.
126 C89 E/148 OJ Da 20.3.2001.
127EFPB 99/119 15 July 1999
l2* Brussels. July 1 2000. 9883/00 (Presse 237); Brussels. September 25 2000. 11565/00 (Pnessc 335); Brussels. 16 January 2001, P 11/01. Press Release.
129 C89 E/l 48 OJ. 20.3.2001 and Email communication. EU Member State diplomat. Spring 2001.
1 Interv iew Iranian senior diplomat. May 2001.
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T5.3 How much learning took place in and  between the dialogues?
(a) The rise andfall o f  Critical Dialogue
This section will look at how much of what the Member States agreed to regarding CD including the 
abandonment of CD and the instalment o f comprehensive dialogue in 1998, may be attributed to the 
dynamics of learning, as suggested in Chapter 3. According to one Council official, the aim o f the CD 
was to “unite the Union on a delicate matter, to defend European interests hoping Iran would listen 
and more channels would ope«”.131 The belief in the advantage o f the Union to “speak with one voice” 
was a lesson the Union had learned from the years o f the EPC and other EC relations.132 It may even be 
a belief that originated in the reasons the European Community and the EPC were founded in the first 
place. As the game went on between EU and Iran, the belief in “speaking with one voice” was however 
both reinforced and reduced on several occasions.133
As different as the positions of the Member States were in the ’80s, uniting the Union on Critical 
Dialogue was a diplomatic accomplishment. The contours of the divisions in the Union continued even 
after the initiation of the Critical Dialogue. Generally, the Union was divided into a hard-line and a 
moderate group o f Member States. Britain became a hard-liner after the Rushdie case, because of the 
evident violation of elementary human rights principles towards a British citizen and because o f  their 
sensitivity to the uproar from the large Muslim society in Britain after Salman Rushdie’s book, “The 
Satanic Verses”, which “precipitated a sense o f political crisis in Britain” (Asad 1990:455 & 457,17- 
20). The Fatwa further spoke to the low British sensitiveness o f appeasement towards other actors.134 
However, the fact that Rushdie’s novel caused outrage throughout the Islamic world, not only in Iran, 
complicated the message o f condemnation of the obvious breach o f human rights that Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s “shocking death sentence” over Rushdie had implied.
It has been stated that the British change was based on the increased importance of human rights norms 
in international politics per se, but here it seems that the British change o f course was mainly a result of 
the Fatwa and other tensions in the relations with Iran. Among the latter was the kidnapping in 1989 of 
a British diplomat. In terms o f the learning framework, all these incidents made Britain realize its
131 Interview, Mav 1999.
,5: Ibid
133 Ibid
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limitations as a unilateral foreign policy actor. Clearly, as a former Council official noted, “human 
rights issues were the focus o f  E P ’s attention” P 5 Human rights norms per se probably -  as Struwe 
, contends - played a major role in establishing an “action-sphere” o f the Member States, where they 
| believed some action was necessary. The choice o f the Union and multilateral policies to voice these
i human rights worries, in contrast, relates to Britain on the one hand, beginning to react pragmatically to
1 the changes o f the end of the Cold War and, on the other hand, starting to see the EFP in this new
[ context as a better instrument to pursue her objectives than many other international institutions (Hill
I 2001). Britain simply needed a buffer for her dealing with this matter, a buffer that became the EU’s
1 foreign policy because of her increased belief in comparative advantages of the CFSP.i
This change was initiated in 1989, when Britain used the EC as a forum o f her protests against Iran, 
thereby providing a buffer towards domestic escalation of the divide between the Muslim and the 
Christian society in Britain. Even protesting at the EU level was at that time not easy, as illustrated by 
the swift British counter initiative to return all the ambassadors to Tehran. During the following two- 
three years, the external structural environment caused by the end of the Cold War also changed the 
beliefs o f British decision-making, so Britons had fewer problems in participating in a multilateral 
European framework when it was proposed in 1992, than they had had in 1989. This issue will be 
further discussed in Chapter 6.
The ad hoc institutionalised CD framework towards Iran at the end of 1992 was in no way a British 
invention. Germany was a key player in the emergence of CD reportedly pushing the issue forward at 
the Council level (Struwe 1999:20-25).* 136 Historically, Germany was a moderate compared to Britain. 
In the mid-80s, Germany kept special bilateral relations with Iran. Notably, from 1984-1988 at the time 
when no other Western country wished to do so, Germany held the belief and acted upon that belief that 
a more moderate “political dialogue” was the best way to address issues towards the Iranians.137 In 
some cases, Germany actually decided to halt earlier cooperation with Iran, such as regarding the civil 
nuclear power project at Bushehr in Southern Iran that had been initiated before the fall o f the Shah by 
the German multinational corporation Siemens.138 Generally however, Germany had preferred bilateral
lj4 Comment by Hill in the LSE Foreign Policy Workshop, June 9,2000.
|ji Interv iew, former Council official, September 2000. Sentence reconstructed from author s notes.
,-’6 Interview, former Council Official, now Member State diplomat, September 2000.
Ij7 For example, it has been argued that “political dialogue" had been instrumental in causing major changes in the Iranian willingness to compromise in 
the Iran -  Iraq where Germany had been the first Western country criticizing Iraq’s attack on Iran as a major cause o f the war. (Struwe: 20). Rahnema and 
Nomani not even mention Germany among the combination of factors causing the end of the Iran-Iraq war (1996 354-356. Kanovsky 1999).
’■’* Iran has more recently tried to have this project taken over by Russian nuclear expens.
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political dialogue with the Iranians to protect the extensive German commercial interests in Iran, a 
matter that will be returned to in Section 5.4.
With such an initial position, the German move towards a multilateral critical dialogue seems 
compatible with learning dynamics, as those in Chapter 3. Germany learned in particular from the 
Fatwa that political dialogue, as a unilateral policy, did not work against Iran. The German foreign 
minister Hans Dietrich Genscher therefore decided to propose stronger measures against Iran than even 
Britain could agree to. This was induced by the fear in Germany of a possible spillover of the Iranian 
extraterritoriality policy regarding a British citizen. This fear seemed valid, taking into consideration 
the 1.7 million Muslim Kurds living in Germany at that time. The Mykonos murders in September 
1992 only reinforced this belief about the non-sustainability of a unilateral political dialogue. 
Consequently, Germany grew in favour o f a more critical and multilateral attitude towards Iran. The 
German foreign minister, Klaus Kinkel, from spring 1992 reinforced this introducing a (unilateral) 
German CD.139 Watching the Mykonos murders a few months later taught Germany the lesson that a 
unilateral CD was not enough towards Iran. It also played a role that multilateral (EU) critical dialogue 
was in line with Germany’s post World War II emphasis on multilateral frameworks and Germany’s 
particular support for the European integration project. Finally, like Britain, Germany could also use the 
Union as a buffer, to comply with the strong demands for a reaction, while continuing trading with Iran 
almost as it did under political dialogue. Germany’s attitude was symptomatic for the Member States. 
They were aware that they needed a policy to substitute for the lack of normal EU relations with Iran.140
The Member States took a risk installing the Critical Dialogue. Any dialogue with Iran could be seen 
not only as a harsher course towards Iran, but as an indirect recognition o f the policies of Iran. The fear 
o f failure was, however, helped overcome by the relative improvement of the Iranian government’s 
position on a number of issues in the late ’80s and the early ’90s; as mentioned in Section 5.1, notably, 
by the example Iran was for the rest of the world in its treatment of Kurdish refugees from Iraq.141 *As 
one senior diplomat notes “awareness o f  this was the positive factor in the critical dialogue’V42
139 Kinkel became foreign minister after Genscher voluntarily left his post 18 May 1992.
140 Opinion expressed by official in the Council Secretariat, May 2000.
141 Comment by the Irish ambassador, Mr. Cogan, former ambassador to Iran. 1990-1993. Round Table. EU-Iran Relations. Limerick. March 15,h 2001.
I4: Email correspondence, June 6lh, 2001.
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Whereas a hard learning process thus initially induced CD, the ’90s sustainability of CD, in contrast, 
was less compatible with the optimal learning dynamics. The decisive factor in sustaining CD, 
however, was that the alternatives to CD were worse. Unofficially Member States had sincere doubts 
about the effectiveness o f CD, but for instance, Britain was convinced that CD automatically assured a 
harder European line towards Iran than if it was abandoned. Moderates such as Italy and Greece also 
knew they would not get far by going against both US dual containment (described below) and major 
European countries such as Germany, Britain and France.143 As CD became de facto institutionalized 
with the credibility of any EU Presidency being at stake if it refrained from holding it, some of the most 
moderate presidencies such as Greece sought to get the best out o f the situation and used the CD 
session to boost bilateral trade relations with Iran.144 Eisenstadt has noted, “the EU believed that the 
dialogue was itself the major incentive fo r  \good behavior’ by Tehran” (1999:139, 16-19). This was 
also part o f the reason, why it was sustained for such a long time. Yet, as a former official noted, the 
governments knew that CD was no **pretended quick f ix ”.'45 What kept CD together until Mykonos was 
the sincere lack of the belief in appropriate alternatives to CD. Believing in the superiority of one 
solution over another is a priori compatible with the learning dynamics o f Chapter 3. Yet, it is 
questionable how much the Union actually took the workings of the alternatives to CD properly into 
consideration in this period. Therefore, it remains doubtful how much learning actually took place 
during CD among EU decision makers.
In line with this, it is hard to say why it took such a long time to dismiss CD. Five years’ experience 
and learning about the workings o f CD may account for the inevitable end o f CD, but not the time it 
took to reach this end. When CD died at Mykonos, it was sick and had been dying for a long time. As 
one official noted, “consensus began to break down... had it not been for Mykonos, the CD would have 
ended in the course o f  1997-98 anyway”. A majority o f Member States were discouraged by the lack o f 
“real movement” in Iran despite the fact that ambassadors to the Member States reported that “Iranians 
are sensitive to external pressure”, and “engagement” towards Iran.146 *Britain, for instance, found CD 
“non-conclusive”.w  Already in spring 1996, Denmark was the first country to decide to bring a halt to 
its bilateral CD claiming that it “made no sense"}** If CD really had been effective in terms of trying to 
achieve goals of human rights and democracy, Denmark who advocated these issues despite its
|4j Interview. Council Secretariat, May 2000.
144 Interview, former Council official. May 2000.
145 Interview, May 2000.
146 Interview, Council Secretariat. May 2000.
14' Interview, former Council officials. May 2000.
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extensive economic interests in Iran might not have abandoned their CD.* 149 150On the opposite side were a 
minority of countries such as Italy and Greece that interpreted the mere holding of each dialogue 
session with Iranians as a “stepping stone” or “evidence” o f the need to abandon CD and quickly enter 
into normal (trade) relations with Iran. Iranians were well aware of the division among the Member 
States and preferred that EU-Iran relations developed within the framework of “duality o f voices” with 
both bilateral and multilateral ties.’50 A positive effect o f CD was, however, that such Iranian attempts 
to divide the Union became more visible and on several occasions, the Union managed to remain loyal 
to the EU policy despite sincere differences and attempts to divide the Union. The general feeling 
resulting from the experiences of CD was that “Critical Dialogue could barely deliver as promised".iil
In conclusion, learning seems to be significant in explaining the discouragement regarding CD among 
Member States and thus one o f the more fundamental reasons why CD ultimately had to be abandoned. 
Still, it seems incompatible with what one may call a normal learning path that it took almost five years 
for the Union to realize that its policies needed major adjustments. Moreover, the vacuum that was 
created after Mykonos also reflects that the Union was still rather short-sighted in terms of which policy 
options were effective and which were not towards Iran.
(b) After Mykonos
The replacement o f the CD initially with a vacuum did however constitute a lesson for the Union. The 
respect that the actions gave vis-à-vis the Iranians were more than offset with the inability for almost a 
year o f not moving either back or forth towards developments in Iran. This combined with the 
experience gained from CD and the fortunate coincidence that brought the reformist Khatami into 
power laid the foundations for the Union’s improved comprehensive dialogue. Economic interests also 
played a role in the eagerness of the governments to reinstall relations with Iran as will be discussed in 
Section 5.4. The simple argument about learning is that comprehensive dialogue was more in line with 
learning dynamics since comprehensive dialogue was both in line with developments in Iran and can 
logically be traced back to a series of reactions to failures in the past, CD, the vacuum after CD etc.
l4i K.R. Timmerman: “Denmark Takes the Lead on Jran\ Wall Street Journal Europe; 27/11-1996 cited in Struwe (1998:34).
149 Denmark however maintained its participation in EU's CD until Mykonos and thus took a rather ambiguous stance on Iran from spring 1996-1997.
150 As expressed by Mr. Molaei Head o f European Studies. Iranian Institute o f  Political and International Studies. Round Table. March 15.200!.
151 Interview. Council Secretariat. May 2000.
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The Union was, however, more than satisfied with the new dialogue. It reported that the dialogue is 
“progressing well”,152 which probably reinforced the Union in its belief about its policy towards Iran. 
The Union’s decision-makers started to believe in Khatami and in the reforms, and this reinforced the 
belief in comprehensive dialogue that was implicitly seen as a fruitful environment for the reforms. As 
will be discussed below, however, there are plenty o f reasons to question the Union’s interpretation of 
the policy as a success.
In accordance with Chapter 3, the crucial issue is whether the Member States had a decent possibility o f 
drawing an inference between Khatami’s reforms and the workings o f  the comprehensive dialogue. Put 
differently, did learning take place, or not? One of the cases where one would have expected learning to 
take place, but where apparently it did not work, was with respect to the two withdrawals o f 
ambassadors from Iran in 1989 and in 1997. According to one Council official, the Union had learned 
from  the first withdrawal of ambassadors in 1989 when the Rushdie case peaked, that it was important 
to  remain united,153 However, the Union’s initial response to Mykonos carefully followed the Dutch 
Presidency’s “Options-paper” and the official who wrote this paper reported that the Union in its later 
decision largely followed the suggestions delineated to the different scenarios in the options paper, 
w hich were not at all based on previous EFP experiences. In fact, the official said he had no knowledge 
about the 1989 ambassadors’ withdrawal at the time he drafted the paper.
The belief about the workings o f CD was further influenced by how the Iranian political dynamics was 
perceived. For EU governments, the confusion (or illusion) about Iran was most widespread in the 
1980s (Hoveyda 1990:136, 34). From a Western perspective, the revolution in a horrifying way 
visualized Islamic fundamentalism for the Western world (Waxman 1998:1). Clearly, Iran’s number 
one enemy was the Great Satan (the US) or the twin Satans (the US and the USSR), Iraq’s Saddam 
Hussein (Apostate/Kafir), closely followed by Israel (Hoveyda 1990:131, 4). The EU was thus not 
immediately included among Iran’s fiercest enemies, and there was a widespread lack of interest at the 
EU level in the added value of using more resources on learning about Iranian dynamics.
During the 90s, Europeans learned several lessons about Iranians Reza Saidabadi notes that a 
“fundamental and necessary step in the development o f  the EU ’s policy o f  ‘critical dialogue ’ with
152 EFPB 99/167 21/9*1999 Memorandum at the 54* session of the United Nations General Assembly. In this period there was indeed "more agreement 
on Iran than imagined". Interview. Council Secretariat. November 1999.
1 Interview, Council Secretariat. May 2000.
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Iran" was the change in Iranian behaviour that “diluted Western European perceptions o f Iran as a 
source o f  regional instability” (Saidabadi 1998; see also Eisenstadt 1999:135, 26-27 and Waxman 
1998:24, 6-14). Initially, Europeans had the impression that “Iranians have not really learned the tricks 
o f the (negotiating) game and the Iranian response was not regarded as very sophisticated”.™ 
Officials in the Council Secretariat recognized that gradually the meetings held less and less “tension” 
the more Iran learned that “Rushdie and other human rights issues would have to be mentioned every 
//me” 155 European negotiators report that the Iranians were very “sophisticated\ “able”, “skilled’ and 
“very well aware o f  the rules o f  the diplomatic game ”.156
This was illustrated by the criticism from Iranians on the Union’s policies regarding human rights and 
non-proliferation. The Union was harshly criticized for being selective, for instance, by not addressing 
the violations of human rights in Saudi Arabia or the Israeli nuclear proliferation. Diplomats also report 
that Iranians despite being increasingly friendly and willing to engage in discussions could seldom be 
engaged in real negotiations. As one diplomat noted, “they were never willing to move one single 
m e /?” .157
i .
This still held towards the end of the period with diplomats reporting that the dialogue is largely a 
“talking past ” each other.158 In fact, this may be one o f the lessons learned by EU decision makers from 
their dialogues, that the efforts only make a small contribution if any to changes in the Iranian 
environment. The belief in the dialogue has thus decreased in the sense that the ambitions and 
expectations have been lowered. The question that will be dealt with in the next section is the extent to 
which this decrease in beliefs about the capability o f  the Union’s policy towards Iran at all have been 
able to reflect the actual workings of EU policies, or whether other factors were more important or 
disabled decision makers in their learning.
As mentioned in Section 5.2, the Union’s increased capability-presence under comprehensive dialogue 
was not matched by any renewed eagerness from the Member States to use the CFSP to respond to the 
reported deterioration of the human rights situation in Iran from 1999-2001. The sporadic responses of 
the Union seem to reflect the decreased belief in the ability of any EU foreign policy reaction not to *15
154 Interview, Council Secretariat, November 1999.
15i Interview, Council Secretariat, May 2000.
Ibid.
Ii7 Email correspondence EU Member Slate senior diplomat. Spring 2001. 
l?* Interview, EU Member State diplomat September 2000
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upset the Iranians and thus deteriorate the prospects of reforms even further. The question is, however, 
whether this analysis from decision-makers of the workings of the CFSP was correct. In particular, the 
analysis missed the importance o f the Union for Iran and the impact that a reliable partner such as the 
EU could have vis-à-vis Iran. The conclusion is thus that learning indeed has taken place at several 
stages o f the development o f the dialogues, but that learning also have been impeded from taking place 
or simply been superseded by more important factors at other several other stages.
5.4 Inability to learn
The null-hypothesis is an umbrella covering a range of factors that may prevent learning or may be 
more important than learning. One of the parameters that may have led decision-makers to trust the new 
policies towards Iran was that the Member States did not only look at how Iran in general performed 
but were more interested in how Iran behaved towards the Member States. Hereby, a certain bias 
developed whereby the Member States became confident that everything was reasonably on track 
whereas the US would arrive at a completely different conclusion from their perspective.
(a) Relationship with the US
There are many reasons to believe that the US implicitly caused trouble for the Union’s learning 
mechanism to function optimally. The US has according to Halliday and others influenced EU’s 
policies more than anything else. Despite this fact the EU and the US have approached Iran in 
completely different ways in the last two decades, especially since 1992-1999. Illustratively, one US 
official remarked that CD was “the Europeans and the Iranians getting together to criticize the 
Americans” (Ansari 1996:209). The US was convinced about the attributes o f active engagement in the 
eventual reforming o f Iran. The fall o f the Shah led to a reversal of US policy towards Iran. In the 
following years, the Hostages crisis “created a major crisis in U.S.-Iranian relations that has yet to 
heaF (Zunes 1997; see also Khan 1996). Until the end of the Cold War, the US policy was a policy of 
using Iraq as the instrument to contain Iran. From 1993-1999, US policy towards Iran became a policy 
of “dual containment ” attempting to contain both Iran and Iraq at the same time (Sabet 1999; Tarock 
1994:267, 8-11 & 270-271). In 1996, the US strengthened its containment policy further by the Iran and 
Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA). ILSA made any company eligible for US trial that invested more than $40
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million in Iran or Libya during 12 months that directly or significantly would contribute to the 
enhancement of the Iranian or Libyan ability to develop their petroleum resources.
From 1999, US policies changed slightly again to what policy observers have called “Containment 
Lite”. The idea of Containment Lite was to contain Iran and Iraq by seeking to play one actor against 
the other, for instance, by easing the relationship with one party. This policy was a more ambiguous US 
policy than before.159 That is, there were both strong forces pointing to a US engagement in Iran and 
worry about loosening up towards Iran, thereby increasing the risk o f another humiliation of the US 
(Chubin, Shahran and Green 1998). This resulted in the lack of a specific US strategy towards Iran. The 
advantage o f this was that the policy has lately contrasted less with EU’s policy. The announcement of 
the easing of economic sanctions o f the US towards Iran on 17 March 2000 marked an interesting 
change in US coercive and containment policy towards Iran but the US continued to be highly cautious 
about giving in to Iran.160
Halliday notes that the Union’s policy towards Iran in the 1980s "reflected the need for the Europeans 
to avoid conflict with the US”, which basically is an argument about the impact of power politics on 
EFP (1998). In the ’90s, the Union’s policies were more a reaction to US policies than to the actual 
situation in Iran. This reaction often seemed to contrast vividly with US policies. Below the surface, the 
contrasting elements were however rather murky. One Council official mentions that there was an 
extensive degree of “nannying” from the US behind the decision to engage in CD. This nannying was 
the constant pressure from the US among others on the US-EU Troika meetings to pursue a harsher 
course towards Iran, a pressure that only intensified after the US had installed their dual containment 
policies in 1993.
Government representatives o f the Member States hardly ever admit that they in fact were influenced 
by the US. In their perspective, “the EU listens and has a dialogue with the US [regarding Iran] while it 
sets its aims itself'?61 Yet, Britain in particular found US arguments on Iran reasonable. R.J. Dalton 
notes in 1992, “ƒ do not believe that Iran is simply after s e lf  defence... I  see no reason to doubt US
155 The ambiguity of US policies could not be better illustrated than by the story one EU official told about the reports US officials made at one Gulf 
Cooperation Council about the limited progress of Iran in its co-operation with neighboring countries. Later at the meeting, another US ambassador 
arrived starting to describe the large human traffic from Saudi Arabia to Iran due to the more democratic conditions and the greater cultural freedom in 
Iran (Interview, Council official, May 2000).
IW) The easing of sanctions included 1) steps toward the return of those assets frozen in Iran since 1979 pending resolution of legat claims through a global 
settlement, and 2) lifting a ban on imports o f Iranian luxury goods involving a) carpets, b) caviar, c) pistachios, and d) dried fruit. In 19S5, this amounted 
to S85 million in earnings (International Herald Tribune, March IS-19,2000)
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sources that they are at least 5 and maybe 10 years away from a bomb.”16 62 As a more general comment, 
Danish representatives have said that while Danish policies remain flexible within EFP development 
(trying not to follow only one alliance), the purpose of Danish foreign policy is to “seek to maximize 
own interests while being close to the US position”.163
Another example on EU-US contacts regarding Iran is the German presidency’s attempt towards the 
end o f  1995 to introduce so-called “benchmarks” which conditioned concessions to the Iranians in CD 
on progress in Iran.164 The benchmark proposal was reportedly received very negatively by some o f the 
other Member States allegedly because the proposal had initially come from the US. The Union’s 
movement vis-à-vis the US illustrated a highly ambiguous “get away from  me closerf you are near me 
toyar”-approach as Peterson (2000) has formulated i t  In other words, the Union clearly held the belief 
that its policies were better than the US policies. At the same time, the US was always able to play a 
sort o f  devil’s advocate when the Union’s policy became a little bit too loose or, as in the case o f ILSA, 
too tight.
On the one hand, the Union’s decision-makers continued to believe that CD was superior to dual 
containment.165 16*As one official commented on Khatami’s election in 1997, “i f  dual containment may 
account fo r  let us imagine 0.01% o f the outcome, critical dialogue accounts fo r  0.1%”.'66 On the other 
hand, the decision-makers’ beliefs about their policies were vulnerable to outside pressure since they 
were well aware that the policy of the Union only reflected “a hope This hope was that Iran could 
“undergo peaceful transformation to more democratic conditions, fo r  instance, by withdrawing some 
constitutional restrictions in democratic activity and in the power o f  the clergymen” As any other 
hope, this strengthened the Union’s legitimacy when events in Iran were favourable to the hope, but had 
the unfortunate tendency to weaken the basis of the Union’s policy when events did not meet the hope.
161 Interview, Council Secretariat, May 2000.
!6: Chatham House speech 30 April 1992. Dalton is a British diplomat that has held several posts in the Middle East region.
163 Interview Permanent Representative o f Danish Delegation, May 2000. In fact, Denmark also had the strongest reservations about the EU’s counter 
sanctions in November 1996 against the US Helms Burton Act and ILSA. Denmark was hesitant o f using Article 235 of the Treaty of Rome as the legal 
basis o f  the actions (European Report 2170 October 30* 1996. External Relations: 7; Europe, No. 6842, 28/29 October 1996). It was indicated that the 
Danish reservation might have been linked to the on-going Danish High Court trial against the Danish Prime Minister, Mr. Poul Nyrup Rasmussen whose 
acceptance o f the TEU was considered against the Danish Constitution. See European Report 2170, October 30, 1996.
IW Interview-, EU Member State diplomat, September 2000,
l(,i Interview, Council Secretariat, November 1999.
166 Ibid.
I<>7 Ibid
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The most ambivalent EU-US clash over Iran resulted from the Helms Burton Act168 and ILSA, as 
briefly touched upon in the previous paragraphs. EU considered both these acts extraterritorial and 
initially reacted to them with the Joint Action o f  22 November 1996 (agreed 31 October) and 
subsequent acts. The reactions, which EU Trade Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan described as historical, 
included:169
i) the lodging of a complaint in the WTO;
ii) a strong objection to the US rules of conduct;
iii) a European Council regulation in order to “protect the interests o f  the Community (the Union's 
external relations) and o f natural an legal persons exercising rights under the Treaty 
establishing the European Community”',
iv) a Joint Action allowing “Each Member State [to] (shall) take the measures it deemed necessary 
to protect the interests o f any person referred to and affected by the extra- territorial 
application o f  laws and actions based thereon or resulting there from , insofar as these interests 
are not protected under that Regulation.”
On the whole, this reaction was indeed of unprecedented scope. The action was namely based on a 
combination o f the three pillars, using as a legal basis for the Joint Action J.3 (of the CFSP) and K.3 (of 
Home and Justice Affairs) apart from involving a Council regulation under the first pillar. Moreover, it 
was swiftly installed targeting a close ally, the most important trading partner and the world’s only 
remaining superpower.170
Soon negotiations started between the US and the Union to resolve the issues, and the Union slowly 
started to break ranks (e.g. Spain) as to how much the principles matter that go against a major trading 
partner and that collide with human rights violations.171 *There were no major defections though, but the 
issues did not become less contentious within the Union when the Iranians applauded the Union’s 
actions towards the US at the Dublin CD in December 1996 and took them as a concession to the 
Iranian regime. The following exit o f CD was as a Council official noted, “extremely convenient”, not 
least because it happened “w  a time with strained relations to the US”.r2
l6* Under Helms Burton the US set rules o f conduct for "any person in the world" who is unauthorized to "traffic", i.e. trades, invests in, or expands, in 
properties, belonging to Americans (or Cubans who later became Americans) but expropriated in 1959-1960 by Cuba,
169 Europe, No. 6843, 30 Oct. 1996, 6.
170 Council Regulation No. 2271/96 and Joint Action 96/668/CFSP (EFPB 96/343) of 22 November 1996, OJ 1996 L 309/1 29.11.1996, 7.
171 Spain's reluctance was more related to the Helms Burton Act than it actually concerned Iran and ILSA, but the two issues were at that time closely 
related to each other due to the extraterritoriality question.
17: Interview. November 1999,
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After the tough EU reaction towards Iran upon the Mykonos verdict, the US delegation now instead 
praised the Union’s “compliance with the US course o f  action towards Iran” at the next EU-US 
Summit In fact, the day after the Mykonos reactions on April 11, 1997, the Union dropped its 
complaint at the WTO,173 and the EU and the US issued a Memorandum of Understanding that said, 
“taking into account the measures taken by the EU  in particular those recently announced with respect 
to Iran, the US will continue to work with the EU.. .’V74
Struwe implicitly suggests a connection between the Mykonos trial at its height in autumn 1996 and the 
EU issuing “its strongest statement so fa r  condemning the Fatwa” (1998). This analysis would suggest 
that the end of CD after Mykonos was also influenced by the damages made to US-EU relations by the 
extraterritorial dispute which otherwise has been considered more or less an EU win. It is of course a 
mistake to conclude as some authors have done that “critical dialogue..was interrupted upon US 
request ” or was orchestrated by the US.175 However, it seems beyond doubt that the US and the EU 
actions towards Iran correlated from December 1996 to mid 1997.176 If any factor is important for this, 
it is not learning. Instead, the US policies created an obstacle for the learning in addition to the general 
impact that US policies and its superior capabilities is believed to have had on the EU considerations. 
More recently, the US Containment Lite policy has caused fewer problems for the Union’s ability to 
learn due to its ambiguity making it less controversial. Biannual summits were held discussing issues in 
the G ulf where both sides reported about EU-US rapprochement regarding Iran.
(b) Unclear strategies
“ When goals are unclear, it creates a big problem fo r  the ability to learn” as a government official put 
it commenting on European foreign policy towards Iran.177 In the 1980s, the EFP towards Iran was both 
impeded by the lack of clear strategies and by the lack o f EFP per se. After the initiation of CD, some 
learning started to take place, but the strategies were still too unclear to provide any learning process. 
For instance, the CD under the Greek presidency was reportedly “chaotic” and no one had a “clue what
175 Press Release Brussels 18-4-1997 Press 110, No. 7362/97.
174 Memorandum of Understanding concerning the U.S. Helm-Burton Act and the U.S. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, April 11, 1997. Cited as 36 I.L.M. 
529(1997).
175 Skuhra said “ein sogenannter ’Kritischer Dialog ' wie einige Zeit mil dem ¡ran. bis er au/Wunch der USA suspendiert wurde'' (1996445)
, 'l> From mid-1996 to mid-1997. the US witnessed the election of Khatami on 23 May only 5 days after the settlement based on the existing Memorandum 
of understanding came into force after a meeting in London (Krenzler & Wiegand 1999). In 1999, the Union noted in the UN General Assembly. “ the EU 
continued their intensified dialogue on Ira n ’ (EFPB 99'167 Memorandum at the 54lh Session o f the UN General Assembly 21/9-1999
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CD meant”.™ The guidelines attached to CD throughout 1992-1997 were also limited. The Union 
“calls for improvement in a number o f  areas... linking them to further development o f co-operation and 
relations. m  Specifically what was meant by further development o f  co-operation and relations remains 
unknown.
This changed after 1997 in the sense that now the strategy behind the Union’s policy was, as a Council 
official described the dialogue, implicit “support o f  everything that Khatami and reform-minded forces 
do”.m  However, the Union still failed to define criteria for the enforcement of policies, for instance, 
what a fair trial meant, as in the trial 1999-2000 against the 10 Iranian Jews accused of spying for 
Israel. Moreover, one EU Member State senior diplomat points to the lack of consensus in the EU on 
which degree of responsibility that should be attached to Khatami for actions committed by his 
predecessors.
(c) The impact o f  the external economic relations: institutional competence
Intuition would suggest that the external economic relations have played a significant role in 
determining EFP towards Iran. This idea is reinforced by the low EU competence on Iranian issues, and 
a high intensity of trade (in particular oil imports) for almost all EU Member States.
Since the Union has had no trade agreement with Iran since 1977, the competence o f the external 
economic relations has been low, a fact that should have influenced EFP negatively over the period as a 
whole. The ’90s institutional reforms and general competence increase of the Union should, in contrast, 
have affected EFP positively also on Iranian issues. Perhaps this is the effect seen in the historical Joint 
Action of 22 November 1996 responding to the US ILSA and Helms Burton Acts. This EU response 
appears as the perfect example that a link between the external economic relations and the CFSP grew 
in the ’90s despite the dual pillar structure. The objective o f the various parts o f the Joint Action was 
that they “would constitute together an integrated system involving the Union's External Relations and 
the Member States each in accordance with its own powers”.181 The Iran case is thus interesting for our 
competence hypothesis. The specific policies appears to be in line with the proposition that low 1789
177 interview, EU Member State representative, Brussels, May 2000.
178 Interview, EU Member State diplomat. September 2000.
179 Edinburgh Conclusions, December 1992.
I*(l Interview. Council Secretariat. November 1999.
1X1 Sir Leon Brittan, EU Commissioner for Trade. November 1996
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institutional competence will lead to low EU capability-presence. At the same time, the study suggests 
that if  the general competence of the Union increases, as was the case, this will not lead to specific 
increases in the Union’s capability-presence vis-à-vis a certain third country, unless a specific 
competence increase backs it up. The general competence increase is however in line with the general 
trend o f EU-Iran relations, that is the small increase in the Union’s capability-presence.
(d) The impact o f  trade and investment
Practically all the Council officials interviewed have emphasized the importance of trade and 
investment interests in determining EFP towards Iran. As one official bluntly noted, “probably, I  have a 
rather cynical perspective, but my task basically is to keep pressure regarding human rights and 
democratic development in awe while enabling Member States and their trade ministers to do their 
yoò.”182 The development o f the intensity o f trade with Iran is shown in Figure 5.1 below. The thick line 
illustrates the quarterly average share of imports of total imports among Member States vis-à-vis Iran. 
The thin line in contrast measures the quarterly average share of exports o f total exports among 
Member States to Iran.
As may be seen from Figure 5.1, during the Iran -  Iraq War imports and exports to/from Iran 
continuously decreased until mid 1988. From late 1988, the Union became a net importer of goods, in 
particular, from 1988-1990 and from 1993-1998. This was mainly due to the trade deficit on petroleum. 
From 1988, the Union steadily decreased its total share of oil imports from Iran from 11 % in 1989 to 
8% in 1997. The large decrease in exports to Iran from 1991 to autumn 1996 may be seen in connection 
with the way the Iranian government again ”sharply curtailed imports which dropped to about half 
their 1991 leveF (Kanovsky 1997:15, 6-9; Karbassian 2000). In particular, the trade curves peaked 
around the “business boom” 1992-3 when CD was initiated. Iran’s business boom was caused by the 
increase in oil prices caused by the Gulf War. During this period, Iran became the second largest oil 
exporter in the world, and simultaneously the exchange rate crisis of ERM broke out in summer 1992, 
lasting until 1994. The Union’s exports 1992-94 were thus affected negatively (Sapir & Sekkat 1993). 
Trade with Iran -  even though it was in deficit -  thus became even more important than before. In fact,
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imports from Iran suffered a double tax. The first tax came from the ERM crisis and the second tax was 
a consequence o f the Gulf War. The Union hereby became aware o f the strategic advantages of 
“(Iran's) huge market” (Reza Saidabadi 1998:2, 1. cl., 31-38). At the same time intervention in the 
political environment caused by Iran became inevitable for the Member States. As this pressure 
amounted when ‘Very lucrative trade interests” were present, the CD became an instrument to secure 
that these could be maintained while having to comply with human rights concerns.183
In the years that followed, average trade decreased and the diversity o f trade among Member States 
increased as shown below. FDI was not allowed during the first and second Republic and therefore do 
not explicitly play a role before in the late 1990s (Mehrdad 1996). One o f Struwe’s main arguments is 
that since the average EU-Iran trade has steadily decreased since 1992, the Union could not have 
pursued a policy based on serving either Iranian or European economic interests. Several factors 
contradict this argument however. First, Figure 5.1 shows that from the second quarter o f 1994 -  which
,8“ Interview, May 1999.
Interview, Council Secretariat, May 1999.
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is when CD started becoming more effective following the chaotic start -  trade with Iran was relatively J stable. In the same period, Iran’s GDP fell 50% measured pro capita and 1/3 measured as total GDP.
j Although the Union’s trade decreased, the decrease could have been much larger.
j One o f  the main individual economic interests o f an actor in the EU were French Total SA’s $600
I million deal with Iran to build two oil and gas fields together with Malaysian Petronas and RussianJ Gazprom (Saidabadi 1998:2, 2nd cl., 24-30). E lf Aquitaines also had investment plans in Iranian oil
| industries. Council officials note that France did not express any points o f view on Iran that were
I particularly distinct from other countries. Yet, they admitted that France was particularly “anti-ILSA, it
I was there the French problem was”.184 In fact, in the negotiations that followed the ILSA deadlock
[ with the US authorities, Total SA, after intensive EU-US negotiations, got a specific waiver under the
I ILSA Act declared in a “US Non-Paper”} %s
I
[ Britain’s Anglo Dutch Shell had since 1995 become a key foreign direct investor in various drilling
I fields and the UK in 1995 was the primary foreign investor in Iran, investing $613 million or nearly
J half o f  the total FDI flows. Among the smaller Member States, Denmark had highly conflicting
[ interests regarding ILSA where particularly the trade links with the US played a crucial role. In a
I discussion paper from the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs it is noted, “Danish business in general
J has expressed scepticism towards the Commission's anti-ILSA proposal. In the proceeding sentence,
| the briefing says: “from a political assessment it is in the current situation crucial to avoid a further
I deterioration o f  the conflict between EU  and the US about the sanction acts...”.™6 In sum, from an
j economic perspective it made sense for the Union to react harshly against the US in this case and as
| mentioned above, the Union’s exclusive competence on trade facilitated this reaction.
I
1 Apart from the petroleum imports, the Union had considerable counter trading with Iran. In 1992, for
| instance, the Union among others exported chemicals for around 618.5 Million ECU in exchange of
| mainly oil (United Nations 1995). The largest net exporters o f chemicals to Iran from the Union were
I Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden. The Union also held extensive economic interests in the
| armaments industries. Germany, Belgium, Spain and the UK were the main suppliers of military
lw Interview. Council Secretariat. May 2000.
1,5 Due to settlement of IS May 1997 as described in Krenzler & Wiegand (1999).
I**‘ L'denrigsmmisteriet. Nordgruppen. N 1 j.nr 400.A.5-0-0. September 23 1996. Radsmode (udenrigsminisire) den 1 -2. oktobcr 1996.
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equipment to Iran.187 The armaments export was disputed in the EP, but the Member States were 
divided as regards a possible arms boycott towards Iran. Illustrative o f this was the answer by Dutch 
foreign minister, Mr. Van den Broek, to a question in the EP about why there was no arms embargo on 
arms sales to Iran. Van den Broek noted that, “7n the capacity as a Dutch Minister ... the Dutch 
government believes all supplies o f  arms should be suspended. ” The result of the Union’s division was 
as Eisenstadt indicates, that “EIF  Member States “were involved* in the increase in Iranian military 
spending in recent years (1999).
Figure 5.2 below depicts the diversity among Member States in their export and import shares towards 
Iran from 1987-1997 measured as shown in Chapter 4.
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As one may see from Figure 5.2, imports in general vary more extensively than exports. This is 
probably linked to the fact that some countries in particular depend on Iranian petroleum imports, the 
prices of which fluctuate more than other consumer prices. As for exports, the period 1989 to the third
1,7 EFPB 89/003 16 January 1989
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quarter o f 1993 saw an increase in export diversity among Member States. Then since mid 1994, export 
diversity has been practically non-existent. If the diversity of interests would have had any influence on 
CD it would thus have been, first, to decrease the capability-presence o f the Union at the time of the 
initiation o f CD, and second, to increase the capability-presence from the mid 1990s. Following this 
logic, the initiation o f CD does not seem to have much to do with diversity of economic interests, but 
have slightly reduced the substance of it. On the other hand, the diversity o f economic interests seems 
to be yet another factor that have been in such a state as to facilitate the increased capability-presence o f 
the Union from the mid 1990s. In comparison with the other factors discussed, such as learning, the 
US, lack o f  clarity o f strategies, general competence increase, and intensity o f economic preferences, 
the diversity of economic preferences do in this particular case not seem to be o f any major importance.
5.5 A time series analysis of EFP towards Iran
This section will look at EFP towards Iran from a quantitative perspective. The aim is to complement 
the qualitative analysis in trying to assess the validity of the framework presented in Chapter 3 with 
respect to the EFP towards Iran. Chapter 4 is recommendable as background reading for this analysis.
(a) Variables
The time series model used for the statistical analysis is built from the same data set as in Chapter 4. 
The specification o f the model uses exactly the same terminology and methods for specification as 
those o f  Chapter 4. The dependent variable now regards (gross) European foreign policy co-operation 
towards Iran (GEFPIR) as indicated in Table 5.1 below. This variable represents the total intensity of 
cooperative action among EU Member States towards Iran. The suggested explanatory variables are in 
a similar way expressed with Iran as the target or the sender where Chapter 4 used the Gulf States. The 
variable IREU thus represents Iran’s degree of co-operation or hostility towards the EU. Similar to the 
variable GUEU in Chapter 4 and for the same reasons, the net value is used. This also holds for the 
variable IRWO that has a similar interpretation as IREU above, being the degree of co-operation (or 
hostility) from Iran, here towards the rest of the world. The explanatory variables are arrived at in a 
similar fashion. First, GMSIR is the total degree o f cooperative (or hostile) action undertaken by the 
individual Member States towards Iran. This also holds for the economic variables except for those 
economic variables that express intensity and diversity o f trade among Member States towards the rest
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of the world (i.e. IAVEUWO, EAVEUWO, IDEUWO, EDEUWO) as well as the control variable of 
European foreign policy towards the Balkans. Table 5.1 shows the notations and description of the 
variables in the Iran model. It resembles Table 4.1 apart from the points mentioned above.
Table 5.1 L ist of Variables
V A R I A B L E N O T A T I O N E V E N T S
EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY Gross European Foreign Policy GEFPIR 38
towards the Iran
LEARNING Lagged dependent variable G E F P I R t . ) ^ « ; as above
Iran’s net co-operation towards EU IREU 4 2
Iran’s net co-operation towards World IRWO 5 0 5 9 1*8
INABILITY TO LEARN Gross Member States FP towards Iran GMSIR 482
US Foreign Policy versus Iran USIR 1094
UK/France/Germany Gross Foreign GUKFRGEGU 3214
Policy towards the targett89
Import Diversity towards Iran IDEUIR
Export Diversity towards Iran EDEUIR -
Import Average towards Iran IAVEUIR -
Export Average towards Iran EAVEUIR -
Import Average towards the world IAVEUWO
Export Average towards the world EAVEUWO
Import Diversity towards the world IDEUWO
Export Diversity towards the world EDEUWO
CONTROL Balkan co-operation with the World YU WO
(b) Test for stationarity
Appendix 5.2 lists the results of the unit root tests using the Phillips-Perron tests for unit root for all the 
variables in Table 5.1. In the IRAN model the following variables failed to reject a hypothesis of unit 
root; IRWO, IDEUIR, IAVEUIR, EDEUIR and EAVEUIR. It was however decided to include 
IAVEUIR expressed by the natural logarithm, i.e. In (IAVEUIR) (i.e. IAVEUIR2) as a proxy for a trend 
that could be found. IDEUIR and EAVEUIR were kept in the model without having to take the 
difference or to add a trend term. As in the GULF model it was further not possible to reject the unit
’** Bahrain (131); Djibouti (5). Iran (5058); Arab World (1063); Iraq (7122); Israel (2296); Kuwait (1132); Libya (412); Lebanon (1096). Palestine 
(12531, Qatar (1061; Saudi Arabia (1379); Syria (825) and Yemen (405).
IH0 The number of events from the three were; UK 141. France 157 and Germany 106.
1 6 2
root hypothesis for the variables YU WO, EDEUWO and EAVEUWO. These three variables were then 
not included in the further specification.
(c) Autocorrelation
In the next step of the specification procedure, the remaining variables were tested for autocorrelation. 
Here, the Iran time series held several auto correlated variables and generally expressed a more 
complicated picture than Chapter 4’s Gulf model. Based on the analysis o f correllograms and testing o f 
various alternatives of AR- and moving average (MA) terms, the best statistical expression of GEFPIR 
in an ARIMA setting was the ARIMA (1,0,1), i.e. ARMA(1,1) process. This implied that a model on 
European foreign policy towards Iran could be suggested to be an extension o f (4.3), with the extension 
being the MA-term 0i£t-i+£t as shown below in (5.1).
(5.1) M O D E L  IR A N
______y , = *tP + Pi (y,-i -  xt_,P)+0i£,-\ + £,
The left-hand side of (5.1), the dependent variable yt or in this case GEFPIR, is thus suggested to 
depend on its lagged value p\ y t.i or in this case pjGEFPIRt.j appearing on the right hand side o f (5.1). 
Moreover, several structural terms or explanatory variables are hypothesized to influence yt. These 
enter as the term xt p -pixt.ip where the bold indicates a vector o f different explanatory variables with 
their respective coefficients. A positive sign o f pi for 0<pi<l thus illustrates that the structural 
influence o f the explanatory variable on European foreign policy in period t, for instance, the influence 
of MSIR on European foreign policy, is lower than it would be in a linear setting since yt in the ARIMA 
setting depends on its lagged term. The MA term 0 i£ n +£t concludes (5.1).
Not all hypothesized explanatory variables still left in the specification were able to fit (5.1) due to 
autocorrelation of these variables. The analysis o f the correllograms indicated that the variables USIR, 
GMSIR, GUKFRGEIR, EDEUIRD, and EAVEUIRD were auto correlated to a different degree. This is 
shown in Appendix 5.4.190 Including these terms would necessitate an even more sophisticated co- 
integration expression than (5.1). As STATA 6.0 does not allow such further complication of its time 
series analysis and the gains of such undertaking may be disputed, the following strategy was chosen.
l9n APPENDIX 5.4 presents ARIMA regressions for these variables showing significance in accordance with the ARIMA processes: EDUIRND as AR(t), 
EAVEUIRND as ARMA (1.1). GMSIR as MA(1). GUKPRGEIRN as AR(1) and finally NUSIR as either AR(1) or MA(I), and certainly not ARMA (1,1),
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As a primary analysis, a narrow interpretation o f  the results o f the specification above was preferred 
implying that all the variables USIR, GMSIR, GUKFRGEIR, EDEUIRD and EAVEUIRD were 
excluded from any further testing. As a secondary analysis, the OLS estimation used to complement the 
AR1MA modelling in Chapter 4 should be given particular attention in this very small sample situation 
when conclusions are derived.
O f the aforementioned five variables excluded from the primary analysis, the empirical loss of the 
exclusion of GMSIR was less problematic due to the fact that 1) it was neither part of the learning 
hypothesis, nor the major inability to learn variable, 2) high multicollinearity was found between 
IRWOl and GMSIR and 3) IRWOl remained in the model. The latter meant that the impact o f GMSIR 
was still at least partly captured. As for the two export variables EDEUIR and EAVEUIR, both were 
rather crucial for the aims o f  testing the inability to learn hypothesis although the model still contains a 
few remaining economic variables. The excluded export variables were mutually correlated so 
inclusion of both might have disturbed the statistical power of the model, yet inclusion of neither might 
lead to the same result. Finally, the impact o f the US was measured in the Gulf model and was found 
significant. This implied that the US was not unlikely to be significant in the Iran model as well (since 
the Iran data set derives from the Gulf data set). Moreover, the qualitative study o f Section 5.1-5.4 also 
suggested a significant influence o f US policies on the EU policies, in particular, during the end of CD, 
1995-1997, emphasizing the need to complement the primary analysis by a secondary analysis that 
could somehow indicate the impact of the US on EFP towards Iran.
(d) Multicollinearity
The correlation matrixes for the Iran data set are shown in Appendix 5.5. Similar to the Gulf model, 
relatively high correlation was found between the trade variables in the Iran model (import 0.68; export 
0.5). As mentioned above, multicollinearity was moreover found between IRWOl and GMSIR with the 
pair-wise correlation coefficients being -0.42. This illustrates the correlation and attachment of 
individual Member States’ foreign policies to the actions and developments of Iran. One may recall that 
IRWOl represents the 1st difference o f Iran’s net co-operation towards the world and that GMSIR is the 
total gross co-operation o f the Member States towards Iran, the negative pair-wise correlation 
coefficient indicate that the more hostile Iran has become, the more intensively have the Member States 
individually reacted towards this hostility. This pair-wise correlation coefficient may be compared to 
the pair-wise correlation coefficient between IRWOl and GEFPIR, which is only -0.14, and thus only
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one third o f the pair-wise correlation found between the individual Member States and Iran* USIR and 
GUWO again show an even higher degree o f collinearity than the economic variables, thus 
emphasizing the importance o f checking the impact of USER on EFP in a complementary OLS setting.
. (e) Results
The tested ARIMA model thus contained the variables GEFPIRt, t-i, NIRWOlt, t-i, IAVEUWO*. t-i, 
IDEUWOt, M, IAVEUER2t.i, IDEUIRt.]. It was tested similar to the tests described in Chapter 4. The 
results may be seen from Table 5,2 and 5.3 below. As in Chapter 4, Table 5.2 thus shows the results of 
the ARIMA model consisting o f each explanatory variable tested individually towards the dependent 
variable.
Table 5.2 Result of the Iran Model (1983q2-1999ql)
IRAN -VARIABLES Coefficient P>M MODEL I (IRAN) continued coefficient M z l
1 GEFPIR,-, 0.8636 0.000***
MA(1) -0.633 0.002*** a 3.5295 0.010***
2 GM SIR 0.01897 0.155 GEFPIR«-, 0.8358 0.000***
M A(I) -0.6074 0.006*** CT 3.4838 0.009***
3 IRW OI -0.0055 0.002*** GEFPIR,., 0.8657 o.ooo**
MA(1) -0.6291 0,001*** c 3.478 0.013***
4 IAVELWO 0.4837 0.047** GEFPIR,.1 0.5652 0.024
MA(1) -0.4189 ■ 0.002*** a 1.2882 0,000***
5 ID EL'WO -0.2127 0.367 GEFPIR«., 0.9787 0,000***
MA(1) -0.8928 0.001*** o 1.3244 0.000***
6 1AVELIR2 -0.3465 0 186 GEFPIR,., 0.9285 0.000***
MA(1) -0.7307 0.000*** o 3.4854 0.018***
7 IDEUIR 11940.27 0.281 GEFPIR,., -0.4683 0.279
MA(1) 0.9069 0.000*** a 2.9756 0.000***
Note: As table 4.2. The first double row (marked “1 
significant at the 1% significance level, that.
’) thus indicates that AR (1) term, the lagged dependent variable, as well as the MA(1) terms are
The results of Table 5.2 (“1” row) confirm that EFP may be described in terms of an ARMA (1,1) 
model as (5.1). This result is consistent for all suggested explanatory variables “2-7” in Table 5.2 at the 
1% significance level. The signs o f the coefficient for the AR (1) process, or the coefficient of 
GEFPIRt.j are generally positive. In the ARIMA model (“7” in Table 5.2) with the suggested structural 
terms, IDEUIR is negative but IDEUIR is insignificant. The coefficients o f the MA (l)-term have the 
same generally consistent properties, however, being negative for all ARIMA models except “7” with
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the structural term IDEUIR which as mentioned is insignificant. The structural variables IRWOl and 
IAVEUWO are significant (1% and 5% level respectively); IRWOTs coefficient with a negative sign 
and IAVEU’s coefficient being positive.
Similar to Table 4.3 of Chapter 4, Table 5.3 below on the contrary is an aggregate ARIMA model of 
GEFPIR tested against the two structural terms IAVEUWO and IRWOl that were found significant in 
the individual models above. In accordance with the hypotheses on institutional change and controlling 
for the impact of the end o f the cold war, Table 5.3 moreover lists the results of the ARMA (1,1) model 
in three separate periods, 1983q2-1993q4,1987q3-1999q 1, and 1990q 1 -1999q 1.
Table 5.3 Results of the Iran Model All Periods
1983q2-I997ql 1983q2-1993q4 1987qJ-1999ql 1990ql-1999ql
IRAN -
VARIABLES
CoefT. r>W CoefT. P>|z| Coeff. P>[z| Coeff. P>|z[
G E FPIR n 0.5558 0.034** ‘0.6174 0.224 0.4677 0.108 0.4327 0.211
IAVEUWO 0.4933 0.046** 0.2980 0.008*** 0.6533 0.026** 0.7795 0.044
IR W O l -0.0033 0.004*** *0.0019 0.006 •0.0043 0.012*** -0.0128 0.023**
M A( 1 ) -0.3774 0.015*** 0.4992 0.315 -0.3158 0.069* -0.2315 0.413
o 1.2425 0.000*** 0.753 0.000*** 1.4260 0.000*** 1.5459 0.000*
Log Likelihood -91.6454 -48.8287 -69.1957 -53.808
Note: see Table 4.2.
For the period 1983-1997 as a whole, it may be seen that the aggregate model performs well. All 
variables are significant and only one variable is “only” significant at the 5% level namely IAVEUWO. 
Furthermore, there is no change of the signs compared to the results obtained in the individual models 
shown in Table 5.2. The testing o f the ARIMA model for the three separate periods indicates that the 
ARM A (1,1) setting in this environment becomes invalid for all three periods separately. O f these three 
periods, the period 1987-1997 seems to express the whole period better than the others do with only the 
AR (1) term being insignificant here. IAVEUWO is furthermore significant from 1983-1993 and 
IRWOl is significant from 1990-1997,
The results of the OLS tests are shown in Table 5.4 below. There are only few significant variables. 
This was to a certain extent expected given the fact that the model had been specified as more 
complicated than a linear regression could capture, e.g. with MA-terms. The lagged EFP variable 
remains significant in all periods (1% level), but IRWOl is now only significant in the period as a
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whole (10% level). O f the economic variables, only IAVEUWO is significant in one o f the periods 
(1983q2-1993q4, 10% level). The Durbin Watson statistics are generally in the lower but acceptable 
range. The coefficients remain stable with unchanged signs compared to the ARMA (1,1) model.
Table 5.4 Results o f the Iran Model: OLSw
GulfVariables 1984ql-1997ql 1983q2-1993q4 1987q3-1997ql 1990ql-19i>7ql
GEFPIR Coeff. P>|zl Coeff. P>l*l CoefT. P>H Coeff. P>w
GEFPIRm 0.632 0.004*** 0.3868 0.002*** 0.612 0.003*** 0.5538 0.028**
GMSIR -.0036 0.513 -.0025 0.631 -.0032 0.809 0.042 0,333
IRWOl -.003 0.064* -.002 0.153 -.0045 0.092* -.015 0.104
IAVEUWO 0.408 0.158 0.408 0.095* 0.4048 0.218 0.971 0.112
IAVEUI2 -.0198 0.772 0.014 0.809 -0.0826 0.373 0.117 0.521
IDEl'lR -3810.84 0.129 -1720.8 0.150 -6269.2 0.082 -7580.8 0.128
USIR -0.0004 0.843 -.001 0.563 0.0015 0.798 -.023 0557
ff -0.511 -0.465 -.508 -.493
Number of obs. 52 42 39 29
F-Test; P>F 0.0133** 0.0033’ ** 0.0114** 0.0294**
Root MSE 1.3034 0,782 1.467 1.6003
R1 0.506 0.362 0.361 0.6214
Durbin-Watson
(Transformed)
1.824 1.988 1.83 1.921
Note: The estimates were computed in STATA 6.0 using the Prais-Winsten regression.
it) Discussion
As in Chapter 4, the two variables that are the minimum condition for learning, i.e. EFP (GEFPIR) and 
Iran’s relations with the rest o f the world (IRWOl) are both significant in the separate and aggregate 
model. The testing of the individual explanatory variables in the Iran model is as seen from Table 5.2 
different from the results of the overall Gulf Model. Only one economic interest variable turn out to be 
significant, namely IAVEUWO. The fact that trade at least on one occasion was shown to be significant 
in explaining EFP towards Iran, a result similarly found for two of the separate periods, and that the 
Gulf model also had significant economic variables, further strengthens the argument for economic 
interests playing a role in European foreign policy despite the dual pillar structure.
The existence o f some kind of short time learning (of one time period) seems to be an adequate 
description of EFP for the period as a whole. Similar to the Gulf model, it was tested whether a longer
11)1 See Chapter 4, Table 4 4.
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time lag would be a more adequate representation o f the data in the more recent period. Here, it seems 
that the learning does not intensify in the ’90s as in the Gulf model. Hereby, there is a quantitative 
justification for the impediments to learning that were demonstrated qualitatively to exist earlier in this 
chapter, particularly towards Iran. That being said there seems to be a structural breakpoint of EFP 
around the end of the Cold War.
With the specification o f the Iran model as an ARMA (1,1) model the OLS setting in general was 
expected to prove less compatible with the data that in the simple AR (1) model of Chapter 4. The 
weak OLS results were therefore expected. The results o f the OLS tests supports however that the 
learning hypothesis in general is more weakly expressed in the Iran case than in the general Gulf model.
As with the Gulf model, various alternative models were suggested to express EFP in a better way 
before and after the structural breakpoint around the end o f the Cold War. Attention centred on ARMA 
models with the AR-term in respectively 0 ,2 , 3, or four lags including those explanatory variables that 
had proved significant in the testing o f  the separate ARMA (1,1) models, i.e. IRWOl and IAVEUWO. 
The results are shown in Appendix 5.5 indicating for each o f the three time periods (1983q2-1993q4; 
1987q3-1997ql; and 1990q 1 - 1997q 1) the significance o f an ARMA (2,1), an ARMA (3,1) and an 
ARMA (4,1) specification. The 1980s, the period 1983q2-1993q4, does not support the inclusion of any 
o f the AR-terms. This changes looking at the period from the SEA (or the end of the Iran -  Iraq) war 
until now. Here, an ARMA (3,1) setting is supported seen by the AR (3) term becoming significant at 
the 5% level and the MA (1) term at the 10% level. Both structural terms IRWOl and IAVEUWO are 
also significant here. Finally, looking at the period after the end of the Cold War until now an ARMA 
(3,1) is no longer sufficient to express the data set. Instead, the testing o f an ARMA (4,1) model proves 
significant as regards the AR (4) term at the 5% level whereas the MA (1) term now is insignificant 
(p>|z |= 0.105). These results suggest the necessity o f including more lagged terms of EFP the further 
one moves away from the Iranian revolution. In fact, until 1987 there is no indication o f patterns 
compatible with learning visible from the data set used in this project. After 1987, learning patterns are 
increasingly present and seem even to intensify after the turn of the decade coinciding with the end of 
the Cold War, the Gulf War and the steps taken towards the TEU. There are as in the Gulf model 
unfortunately too few observations to provide firmer statements regarding the significance of these 
patterns. Yet, the EFP as expressed with the G ulf data set became increasingly dependent on its past 
performance and developments in Iran in the 1990s than it had been in the 1980s.
168
In comparison with Chapter 4 ’s study o f the EFP towards the Gulf States, one important difference 
regards the relative importance o f Member State and European foreign policies. Compared to Chapter 
4’s multicollinearity analysis, where both the pair-wise correlation coefficients of GEFPGU-GUWO 
and GMSGU-GUWO were at a relatively high level (-0.54 and -0.66), a larger diversity between the 
EU and Member States’ policies appear in the Iran case. The correlation analysis indicates that the 
Member States individual policies take up relatively more space compared to the strict European Union 
policies towards Iran than towards the Gulf States in general. The correlation between Member State 
foreign policies and developments in Iran is an important signal that the EFP towards Iran may have 
varied equivalent to other European foreign policies over time; however, the levels of capability- 
presence were generally below the average of the region.
5.6 Conclusion
European foreign policy towards Iran has been formed by the necessity o f the Member States to react to 
events in Iran for domestic reasons, and to a certain extent due to international pressure, mainly from 
the US. After a period o f European silence towards Iran from 1979-88, EFP emerged as the only 
collective diplomatic instrument o f the governments to react against political developments in Iran in a 
convenient low profiled manner without jeopardizing crucial bilateral trade interests. The Rushdie case 
and the convergence of beliefs among hard-liners and moderates o f the governments induced and 
facilitated this change towards more European policies. Hereby, Rushdie was the eye-opener and 
window of opportunity, paving the path for the Critical Dialogue at a time where institutional 
innovations of the Union created expectations (that had yet not been discouraged) of a future effective 
role to play for the Union in international relations.
The capability-presence o f the Union from December 1993 was still limited compared to the 
instruments and options that had been created in the beginning of the ’90s. Despite progress at the 
cultural and social level in EU-Iran relations, the individual governments became disillusioned in their 
initially held beliefs and the Critical Dialogue inevitably had to be abandoned. The idea of the Critical 
Dialogue had been to protect vital economic interests while satisfying critical human rights voices. As 
this failed and trade continued to fall, Critical Dialogue became a losing game for the governments.
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The flaws of the EFP were not so much about capabilities as about willingness, interests and being 
disabled in learning. For instance, Mykonos illustrated many problems in the EFP and the need for joint 
planning and operation to take place in actions such as the withdrawal o f ambassadors. Less learning 
took place in a period from mid 1990 to the beginning of 1997 mainly due to the impact o f the US. In 
the Union’s policies towards Iran as a whole, the US acts as an important intervening variable. The 
results in Chapter 4 regarding the US playing a distracting role on the ability of governments to learn 
have thus been confirmed in this chapter.
Put differently, whereas the Union might think that they learned immensely much about the workings 
o f EFP towards Iran precipitating for instance the end of Critical Dialogue, the actual level of learning 
achieved seems to have been less. The question is what type o f conclusions could be drawn regarding 
the impact of the Union, or the Union’s capability-presence in the world, when it is demonstrated that 
even the decision-makers would be unlikely to deduce from the outcome any sound conclusions 
regarding which policies worked, and which failed. Struwe (1998) suggested that Critical Dialogue 
might have had an impact on the election of Khatami in 1997. This chapter is deeply sceptical towards 
such proposition, not in principle, but due to facts.
No trade agreement yet exists between EU and Iran. The prediction o f  the framework would be that if 
the Commission’s recent proposal for a trade and co-operation agreement is accepted by the Council, 
the Union should become an actor that in fact could also allow itself to engage more actively in areas 
such as human rights, democratic principles etc. This contradicts the fairly “open” fear in the Council 
Secretariat and among the governments in the early days of CD that if  the Commission had become 
responsible for the policy towards Iran by, e.g., a trade agreement it would have been a “less critical' 
policy than the Member States wanted it to be.192 Struwe is thus only partly right arguing that “once 
business as usual reigns Western Iranian relations there will be little space left to address serious 
human rights violations”. The former proposition is also supported by the fact that initially it was Iran 
who wanted the trade agreement.193 This would imply that for pure economic reasons, Member States 
might take advantage o f the human rights violations in Iran to argue against an EU trade agreement 
with Iran.
1,2 Interview, former Council official, September 2000
l9‘ Iran is still considering, whether to pursue the European Union option or to seek bilateral agreements with the Member States individually (First 
Secretary Vahid Karimi, Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Kingdom, Durham Conference May 1*2,2001.
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A more normative conclusion, is that learning from past EFP towards Iran would imply that the 
economic relations -  at least in the foreseeable future -  remain constrained by the political dynamics in 
Iran. Learning would thus imply that the Union develops the ability to react more instantly and 
smoothly to changes in the political dynamics in Iran. If this is the lesson to be learned, it should not 
end up in a complete politicization of every move a trader or investor seeks to make in Iran, as some 
believe is now the situation for US policies. However, the argument is that the governments have not 
learned in truth if they do not start spelling out conditions and using the leverage from external relations 
towards Iran. The reason is that the past has shown that there otherwise is a risk that the relations 
between Iran and the EU will only blossom for a while until the sensitive public opinion in one of the 
EU Member States regarding democratic principles and in particular human rights will contradict the 
Union’s policy.
One may o f course simply take the position of waiting and seeing, which pressure may turn up. This, 
on the other hand, would hardly reflect those ambitions that exist within the EFP framework at the turn 
of the Millennium, developed among others by Member States’ own initiatives towards the end of the 
1990s. The most sustainable EFP is one that is able to link politics and economics, that can change 
direction swiftly, and that is aware of the lessons that can be learned or not from various outcomes in 
international relations given different circumstances. This means that if the Union agrees on negotiating 
a trade and co-operation agreement with Iran after the re-election of President Khatami earlier this year, 
the linkage to the dialogue on issues such as human rights is in the interest also of oil companies and 
other potential investors in Iran. As long as the Union does not follow events more directly in its 
responses towards developments in Iran, the governments might have difficulties in seeing this clearly. 
This is the lesson to be learned from the past.
Previously, it was noticed that the Union’s policies towards Iran were based on a “hope" that Iran can 
“undergo peace fill transformation to more democratic conditions, for instance, by withdrawing some 
constitutional restrictions in democratic activity and in the power o f the clergymen". In a recent Round 
Table in Ireland on EU-Iranian Relations, Dr. Sajjadpour, Director General of the Iranian Institute of 
Political and International Studies reminded the participants of the saying that “hope is for the diplomat 
what water is for the fish". In order for the EU to fit into this saying, one could say that w hat the EU 
still has to leam is to use hope as the fish uses the water. Hope is an asset, but it should be in constant 
motion with the context in Iran in order for the Union to be successful in its foreign policy.
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CHAPTER 6
EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS NIGERIA: 
LEARNING ABOUT MEN WEARING DARK GLASSES?
This final empirical chapter examines EFP towards Nigeria. The Nigerian case is interesting not 
only because of its usefulness in assessing the validity o f the learning framework. It appears also to 
be a test case for the Union’s capability-presence in Africa. Moreover, it may be used as an indicator 
for the status of the Union’s crisis management and conflict prevention abilities per se.
The chapter is organised as the first part o f Chapter 5 (Section 5.1-5.4). The aim is thus, firstly, to 
assess the Union’s capability-presence towards Nigeria over the last tw o decades, and, secondly, to 
test the learning model on this development. The first section describes the major events in Nigeria 
since the late ’70s: the different military regimes, the many unfulfilled promises o f democratic 
transition, and the destiny o f  the occasional attempts to install democratic governments. The second 
section aims at measuring the Union’s capability-presence towards these events. As this Chapter 
only uses qualitative methods, the focus is on measuring the change in depth and scope o f the 
Union’s policies over time rather than providing an exact number for the degree o f net or gross 
cooperation over time. The third section confronts these patterns with the hypothesis on learning, 
examining whether governments in the Union have learned about the workings o f EFP towards 
Nigeria from observing the outcomes o f their actions and have changed their strategies accordingly. 
The fourth section deals with the case o f no learning or the inability o f decision-makers to learn 
about the workings of EFP towards Nigeria. Among the alternative explanations discussed are the 
influence o f US policies, and the impact o f the external economic relations including the changes in 
economic preferences and institutional competence. The impact o f institutional competence on EFP 
is in the Nigerian case determined by how the EU-ACP co-operation agreements influenced the 
CFSP and thus the Union’s capability-presence in Nigeria.
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6 .1 Major events in Nigeria, 1979 - 2001
(a) 1979-1993: the Shagari, Buhari and Babangida military rules
Nigeria is ethnically, socio-economically and politically one o f the world’s most complex | 
countries.1 She is Africa’s most populous country (108.5 million inhabitants in 1994) and her ethnic
i
composition is “polyglottal” with more than 250 ethnic and linguistic fractions. Despite enormous 
oil-revenues from the beginning of the 1970s, she has experienced “underdevelopment”, steadily 
growing “social injustice” and widespread corruption. Internal ethnic and regional rivalry has 
largely paralysed the country, hindering it from solving any of its many problems effectively. When 
ethnic and religious rivalries in some periods have appeared to be lower, this has mostly been due to 
the restraints imposed by the changing but almost continuous military rules. In particular, the 
conflicts between the three ethnic groups, the Yoruba, (Christian) Igbo and (Muslim) Hausa/Fulani, 
including the struggle between the politically powerful North and the resource-rich South, are key 
components o f the complexity and the difficulties domestic and external decision-makers are 
confronted with in Nigeria. The resource-rich Niger Delta has traditionally been among the least 
stable regions. Here, ethnic groups have claimed ownership o f all natural resources found in their 
territories and frequent and intensive clashes have occurred amongst them (like the Ijaws, Itsekiri 
and Urhobo in the W arn State in 1997). Western oil and gas multinational corporations are 
important economic and political players in this area and have been fought against for allegedly 
promoting an unfair revenue allocation and resource control.
The response to the complexity and instability o f  Nigeria has been a series of military dictatorships. 
After Nigeria gained independence in 1960 and her first civilian rule came to a violent end in 1966, 
Nigeria’s military rulers issued numerous unfulfilled assurances of returning to civilian rule 
(Ohwahwu 1997:9; Nwosu 1996). It was not until 1977 that the military ruler General-Lieutenant 
Olusegun Obasanjo, now Nigeria’s democratically elected President, became the first leader to 
actually keep a transition promise. Civilian rule under the leadership of Alhaji Shehru Shagari 
followed in 1979, but it soon came up against insurmountable problems stemming from the 
dangerous combination o f economic downturn and economic and political mismanagement (Lewis | 
et al 1998:39-42, 14-20; Kukal 1999). The Nigerian people thus initially welcomed Major-General ' 
Muhammadu Buhari’s bloodless coup on New Year’s Eve 1983. He immediately initiated an !
1 See e.g. NISER 1998; Lewis 1995:19,5-6,1999; Lewis et al 1998:9; Herbst 1996; Klay Kieh & Agbese:409; Maier 2000. Apart from the sources 
explicitly mentioned in the footnotes, various encyclopaedias have been used, among which. Uweschue (1996).
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internal cleansing process o f the corrupted Nigeria,2 3but for many Nigerians, Buhari’s regime 
became too “draconian” and “stiff” to accommodate the diversities in the country and the interests 
in the intensified drug trading.
Consequently, in May 1985 Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida overthrew Buhari. Babangida, who has 
been described as a populist, successfully exercised the technique of side paying any problematic 
opposition to gain silence to criticism. He de facto  institutionalised corruption.4 Still, Nigerians in 
the beginning witnessed a number of visible democratic improvements, but later Babangida’s 
regime grew increasingly authoritarian (Lewis et at 1998:43, 19-34; Ingram 1999).5 It moved away 
from its initial commitment to democratic transition and as early as July 1985 made the 
announcement that there was “no schedule fo r  the restoration o f civilian rule p la n n e d Several 
proclaimed plans for democratic elections were later postponed, for instance, after the allegations of 
another coup attempt on April 22,1990 by Major Orkar, which led to his execution together with 69 
other prisoners in July.
It was only after considerable internal and external pressure that elections were finally held on June 
12, 1993. Confidence in the democratic transition was by that time extremely low with a voter 
turnout o f only 35%. The unofficial results pointed to an overwhelming victory by Moshood K.O. 
Abiola (Lewis et al 1998:45; 1995); a win across the North-South divide of the country.6 Since he 
was a Muslim Southerner, his victory brought back hope among Southerners of finally being able to 
match Southern resources with federal influence. The hope was soon destroyed, however, since the 
election results were annulled on 23 June 1993 “ ... violently robbing the Nigerian people o f  their 
nationhood’ as literature Nobel Prize laureate of 1986 Wole Soyinka expressed it.7
(b) The Abacha military rule, 1993-1998
Massive internal and external protests led Babangida to step down on 27 August (Babatope 1995; 
Lewis 1995:25, 7-9), but from then, things only grew worse. On November 17, 1993, the interim 
government after Babangida, led by Chief Ernest Shonekan, was impelled to transfer all powers to
! Imerview. Nigerian officials. Mav 2000.
3 Ibid.
* Ibid.
' For instance, the release o f a number o f political detainees, the creation of a Political Bureau of transition to Chilian rule, and participation in 
structural adjustment programs supported by the IMF and the World Bank.
6 Abiola reportedly received 58% of the votes across all regions in elections generally perceived of as fair and free.
T Soy inka referred to Abiola being the first Southerner to gain power (Interview. Nieerian official. Brussels. Mav 2000).
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General Sani Abacha, “the man with the dark glasses” (Onadipe 1997).8 As during previous 
transitions, with Nigeria in chaos, the change o f military rule was initially widely supported 
(Babatope 1995:7-12 & 17-18,1-2). Later any optimism turned into disappointment as “Abacha's 
government reflected] the most repressive rule in N igeria’s  history” (Lewis 1999:146, 5-8; Baker 
& Stremlau 1999:182, 8-13).
Things deteriorated seriously during summer 1994. Lack of internal economic progress led 
NADECO (the National Democratic Coalition) to demand that the military government stood down 
by the end of May (Africa Research Bulletin 1994, 31 (6): 11459-11462). The government’s failing 
to comply with this demand led to a national strike which only gave Abacha a further excuse to 
become even less compromising than he had been before (Africa Research Bulletin, 2000, 
31:11575). As part o f tightening the regime, Abiola, who in the meantime had declared himself 
president, was arrested in June. The harshness o f the regime grew worse during the year. After 
reports about a coup attempt in March 1995 — which the opposition claimed were fabricated - 
around 150 military officials, including Gen. Obasanjo and his former Vice President Gen. Shehu 
Yar’Adua, were arrested and sentenced to death. After widespread national and international 
protests, these sentences were commuted to tough terms o f imprisonment.9 In May 1994, the writer 
and leader of the Movement for the Support o f  the Ogoni People (MOSOP) Kenule Beeson Saro- 
Wiwa, was detained on allegations that he had incited his supporters to commit the murders of four 
Ogoni “traditionar  leaders.10 In January 1995, the Saro-Wiwa trial commenced; on November 8 his 
conviction was confirmed and two days later, a  “brutal execution” (hanging) of him took place, as it 
was widely considered.
The opposition to Abacha was far from united towards these atrocities, but in May 1997, a loose 
alliance, called the United Action for Democracy, of 22 pro-democracy and human rights 
organisations (including MOSOP) was formed. One Nigerian official noted that this “teamed up the 
message not to contest elections [in 1998 -  1999] - whether the pressure could have solved the 
problem nobody knows”.11 The increased resistance was further illustrated by a series o f bomb 
attacks in Lagos in 1997. The government reacted harshly by charging Wole Soyinka (who was in 
exile), and in December 1997 by detaining Lt. Gen. Diya and others, accusing them of coup 
attempts. As seen earlier, the government further used the resistance to break a promise o f returning
8 Allegations pointed to a possible deal between Abacha and Babangida paving the way for Abacha's coup d'etat. As Minister o f  Defence under 
Babangida. Abacha was the only Babangida minister left in the Shonekan government {Interview. Nigerian official. Brussels. May 2000).
9 Yar'Adua and Obasanjo got 25 years and 15 years imprisonment respectively. Yar'Adua died in prison in 1997.
10 Saro-Wiwa received the “Alternative" Nobel Price in literature, i.e. the Right Livelihood Award in 1994.
11 Interview, Nigerian Officials, May 2000.
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to civilian rule, as it did with its promise in July 1997 scheduling transition to be completed by 
April 25,1998.
Just as tensions at that time seemed to grow again, a turning point occurred with the sudden death of 
the 54 year old Abacha on June 8, 1998, followed by the almost simultaneous death o f Abiola.12 13A 
Nigerian official called these two deaths for the work o f “faith"  that “removed the two impediments 
for survival o f  the nation”. According to him, “the problem was that Abiola still thought that he 
was the only true democratic president five years after his elections”.14 Hereby, Abacha’s death 
became the obvious window of opportunity for democratic transition, and this was further facilitated 
by Abiola’s death, which reduced the number o f civilian government alternatives.
(c) Démocratisation, 1998-2000
Under the new military government o f Gen. Abdulsalam Abubakar, Nigeria implemented a  fast 
track plan towards democracy.15 First, Abubekar became the second military ruler in Nigeria’s 
history keeping his election promise. Legislative elections were held on February 20, 1999.16 
Second, presidential elections followed on February 27, when Olusegun Obasanjo, now representing 
the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), won 62% of the public votes and took office on May 29. 
Obasanjo internally launched an offensive campaign against members o f the old regime, in 
particular, against hitman rights violations17 and corruption.18 Externally, Nigeria started the 
restitution of its regional power status, for instance, by the critical role Nigeria played in achieving 
the peace agreement o f July 7,1999 in Sierra Leone (European Commission 1999b).19
The transition lost some o f its momentum in autumn 1999 (Vick 2000), shaken in particular by the 
re-emergence of bloody ethnic and religious conflicts. In the fighting between Ijaws and Itsekiris 
near Warri in the Niger oil production delta at least 200 people died, and many violent clashes 
occurred from the forced introduction o f Sharia on non-Muslims in several districts. The violence 
was worst in Kaduna, where 1000 people were killed in February 2000, and another 2-300 people in
12 Abacha was suffering from Cirrhosis Hepatitis. His death was triggered by a collapse during a visit by two oriental looking prostitutes {Interview 
Nigerian officials May 2000. Baker & Stremlau 1999. footnote 3. 200).
13 Abiola had been detained for almost five years and had heart problems caused by diabetes. Reportedly, he was denied health care before he died. 
Interview. Nigerian officials. May 2000.
14 ibid.
15 See also EFPB 98/195 18 September 1998.
16 Abubekar had no vested interest in keeping power and had never held political posts (Baker & Stremlau 1999. footnote 3; and 2).
17 A Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission (HRVIC) {September 1999) w'as set up, HRVIC opened up for investigations in the period 
1966-May 1999 thus including the civil war period. By March 2000 it had received 10.000 different submissions from the public.
Is See. for instance. International Herald Tribune. 24 November 1999. In January 2001, Obasanjo. still not content with the progress of his country 
towards démocratisation and anti-corruption, dismissed the whole government.
19 Nigeria's commitment to peace enforcement has been extensive in the past, committing in the 90s around $10 billion to peace missions in West 
Africa (Africa Research Bulletin, 2000. 37 (8). August 16th -  September 15th: 14459).
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May (Africa Research Bulletin, May 1-31, 2000:13979). The sporadic, but serious violence 
continued throughout 2000 and 2001, for instance, in Lagos where hundreds of people have been 
killed in ethnic fighting between the Yoruba and Hausa group.
In sum, Nigeria has undergone one o f the most remarkable democratic transitions in recent years in 
Africa. Yet, the democratic transition o f Nigeria remains extremely fragile. In the last two years, 
Nigeria has seemed determined to keep its military at arm ’s length from internal conflicts. As 
Obasanjo stated in late March 2000 after the violent clashes in Kaduna, “people want me to act, but 
what do these people want me to do...should I  send in the military which led to such tragic 
outcomes in the past?''20 There are growing fears, that the failure o f  Obasanjo to revive Nigeria’s 
economy, the ethnic tensions and the bitter battles between the President, the Senate, and Nigeria’s 
corruption plagued-national assembly,21 may eventually lead to a new military rule.22. The main 
question seems to be how much patience parties such as the military and major economic 
beneficiaries o f less strict democratic rule o f law will have when Obasanjo one day leaves office.23
6.2 European foreign policy tow ards N igeria, 1979-2000
(a) Silence
The first observation is that EFP towards Nigeria is a relatively new  phenomenon. "There was no 
European foreign policy towards Nigeria before the TE IT\ except for the external economic 
policies inherent in the EU-ACP agreements (Section 6.4 (c)).24 *This meant that European policies 
towards Nigeria were detached from the political realm described above. In fact, the EPC only 
produced one single statement concerning Nigeria from 1980 to 1990, namely the statement 
addressing Buhari’s coup d ’état in 1983. As there was no policy, one cannot even speak about a 
rhetorically biased strategy of EFP as after all existed towards other third countries.
The numerous questions and resolutions from the EP concerning Nigeria gained almost no active 
attention from the Council. A few meetings were held with the Nigerian authorities addressing 
various human rights concerns of the Union, but the institutional strengthening of the European
20 Interview, Nigerian officials. M ay 2000.
21 Africa Research Bulletin. 2000. June l*1 -30*. Nigeria. Things fa ll  apart. 14011.
22 The Guardian, 20 October 2000.
2j In the October violence the military was used in an internal conflict for the first time since the restoration of democratic rule in Nigeria.
24 Interview. Council Secretariat May 2000.
"  See EFPB 86/014 9 January 1986 and: Resolution on the mass expulsions from Nigeria; Official journal No. C 175. 15/07/1985 P. 0224: 
Resolution on the expulsion o f immigrants from Nigeria; Official journal No. C 175 , 15/07/1985 P. 0223 Resolution on the situation in Nigeria; 
Official journal No. C 068,14/03/1983 P. 0059.
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foreign policy co-ordination framework by the SEA in 1987 did not at all seem to force EFP out of 
its silence towards Nigeria (Nuttall 2000:2-3). At the beginning of the 1990s, there were a few signs 
of increased depth of action as illustrated by a relatively shaiply formulated statement in 1990, 
where the Council “viewed with no sympathy'’ the coup attempt by Orkar (See Section 6.1 (a)), but 
regretted “that those accused o f  involvement led to executions on the scale announced by Nigeria 
on 27 Ju ly  1990".26 A more general implication of the Union’s increased capability-presence was the 
building o f  the Union’s first common chancery in the new capital Abuja (for EU Member States 
who wished so) -  a decision that had been delayed for five years before being carried out 
(Bretherton & Vogler 1999:30).
(b) EU sanctions against Nigeria
In 1993, the depth and scope o f EFP increased significantly. Here, various economic restrictions 
were introduced against Nigeria that de facto established a light economic sanctions regime. 
Compared to earlier practice, these sanction policies were rather wide in scope, as they comprised:
• Suspension of military co-operation,
• A ban on visas for members of the military and of the security forces including their families,
• Suspension of visits by members of the military to countries of the EU, and
• Suspension of further development co-operation aid.26 *8
Moreover, the sanctions were installed before the TEU came into force and despite divergent 
opinions among the Member States. Britain, for example, preferred a harsher course towards 
Nigeria along the lines o f US policies -  a course that was tacitly opposed by France and Germany 
(Lewis e t al 1998:47, 12-14). Also, during the first period of the sanctions regime (1993-1995), the 
Union more automatically than previously reacted to developments in Nigeria and in doing so it 
referred to the 1993 EPC actions, hereby demonstrating a certain continuity of actions over time. 
The subsequent deterioration o f events under Abacha from 1994-1995 similarly induced a series of 
statements and official communiqués to Nigerian authorities that linked back to the initial reactions.
Clearly, the sanctions regime o f 1993 was still a rather rudimentary and non-influential package of 
measures, which some diplomats wrould not even define as sanctions.29 *The main weaknesses were
26 EFPB 90/295 2 August 1990.
17 The Council based its decision on 1) political desirability of increasing co-operation, and. 2) technical reasons. A temporary building of 1992-1996 
had been constructed to house the Member States chanceries (EFPB 91/390 20 November 1991. Question H-967.91 by MEP Mr Bende)
:s EFPB 93/305 13 July 1993.
29 For instance, the lack of involvement o f the UN in the sanctions and the inability to impose petroleum sanctions have left the impression that what
EU actually initiated could not be defined as sanctions, but as a range of measures (comment on Chapter from Member State diplomat March 20011
Following Hufbauer et at (e.g. 2000). however, the measures were sanctions being economic measures taken to partly or fully interrupt the
relationship with Nigeria to fulfil a political aim.
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that the sanctions neither targeted the vulnerable Nigerian petroleum sector,30 nor comprised an 
actual arms embargo. In addition, the sanctions were not legally binding and as a consequence not 
really taken seriously by decision-makers in the Union.31 The 1993 sanctions also lacked any 
follow-up conditions that could facilitate further measures to be taken in the case of non-compliance 
(or compliance). This implied that the declaratory nature o f EPC continued with the CFSP until 
1995. For instance, Abacha’s coup led to nothing further than a statement from the twelve, which in 
its text did not even refer to the existing sanctions regime.32
This changed during 1995. Here, the CFSP statements became more critical than before and in 
March 1995, the Union expressed “serious c o n c e r t  about the Obasanjo/Yar’Adua arrests.33 The 
ministerial Troika visited Nigeria, and representations were made to the Nigerian foreign minister 
from the French Ambassador (representing the EU-Presidency),34 *367all aimed at pressuring Nigeria’s 
regime. Another novelty was that the Council attempted to link the first and the second pillar 
instruments with each other. For instance, before the mid-term negotiations of the Fourth ACP-EU 
Lomé Convention, the threat was formulated that “failure to respect human rights may result in 
total or partial suspension o f  the C o n v e n t i o n Another example was the Union’s reaction to the 
decision by Abacha in October 1995 to commute all death-sentences to terms of imprisonment. The 
Union “welcomed’ this development and added that it “will adapt the future o f  its co-operation with 
Nigeria in the light o f  the evolution o f  this process”. Both were examples on the general increase 
in EU conditionality in the 1990s linking economic restrictions to human rights norms or 
democratic principles.
Despite this progress, it was not until after the Saro-Wiwa execution that some of the Union’s 
threats were finally carried out. The Union demonstrated rather substantial (organisational) 
capability-presence by the efficient way the Spanish presidency, chaired by foreign minister Javier 
Solana (from October 1999 High Representative o f the CFSP), issued a rather rigorous Common 
Position on 20 November 1995.39 Apart from providing guidelines for the Union’s action, the 
Common Position included a complete arms embargo, visa restrictions, and the annulment of future
■>0 See Section 6.4 (d).
■>l One official called the EPC sanctions "a document that wars difficult to track in the internal mess" (Interview. Council Secretariat May 2000). 
j2 Similarly, EU only expressed concern about "the continued setbacks fo r  the democratic process" upon Abiola's arrest during the NADECO crisis. 
EFPB 94/164 30 June 1994, EFPB 96/460 19 November 1993.
53 EFPB 95/098 22 March 1995 and EFPB 95/301 20 October 1995.
34 Answer to question in EP (EFPB 95/242 7 September 1995).
■>i See Section 6.4 (c). EFPB 95/060 14 February 1995: Answer by the French Presidency to a question from Ms, Jackson,
36 EFPB 95/272 2 October 1995.
37 EFPB 95/322 9 November 1995.
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim Dada Otisa could sign the Amended Convention on behalf of Abacha in Mauritius on 4 November 1995.
19 The Commission was asked by the Council to make proposals to draft a Common Position on 9 November 1995. COREPER then quickly worked 
out a draft to the Common Position installed 20 November 1995.
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development co-operation.40 The measures added on to the 1993 sanctions were few, but included, 
1) the visa restrictions on members o f  the Provisional Ruling Council, the Federal Executive 
Council and their families, and 2) an embargo on arms, munitions and military equipment. However 
limited this innovation might appear in hindsight, it marked a crucial change that the sanctions were 
based on a Common Position. Hereby, they became closer to being treated as though they were 
“legally binding” than before. This did not imply anything like jurisdiction o f the European Court o f 
Justice (ECJ) over the implementation and enforcement of the sanctions, but the mere fact that the 
Common Position was based on EU (CFSP) legislation and published in the Official Journal helped 
to constrain governments towards compliance with the sanctions. Moreover, judged from trade 
statistics, the Common Position also more effectively halted co-operation with Nigeria than the 
1993 EPC sanctions had done. This effect should be added to the direct effect o f the sanctions, 
namely the freezing of all official development aid programs to Nigeria.41
Undoubtedly, the Common Position still represented a weak policy o f the Union. First, it left 
considerable confusion about the enforcement with respect to arms export. Enforcement was 
according to the Council’s answer to an MEP’s question on this issue in 1996, something that it was 
“up to Member States, who apply controls on arms exports at national level, to put into practice.”42 
However, this answer ignored two important points: first, that according to the 1995 Common 
Position it was the Council that “will monitor” the Common Position, and, second, that the Council, 
according to Article J.l, was responsible for ensuring that systematic co-operation was established - 
in accordance, with among others the Common Positions under Article J.2. Indeed, there was 
suspicion that some Member States continued to deliver military equipment after the instalment o f 
the embargo in 1993.43 Much debated were also the allegations that Shell as late as in 1995 had 
negotiated for the purchase o f weapons for the Nigerian police for protection of their oil fields 
(Human Rights Watch 1999). Finally, the Council soon forgot to refer to the commitment that a de 
facto arms embargo had already existed since the sanctions of July 13, 1993.44 45
Second, the Union’s reactions suffered from a lack of automaticity that one otherwise could have 
expected from the guidelines given in the 1995 Common Position.43 For instance, whereas the 
Union seemingly expressed rigour by withdrawing their ambassadors “for consultations”
40 EFPB 95/350. 20 Nov 1995; OJ L298. 11.12.1995.1-2.
41 For instance. Germany from 1993-94 had increased its net aid (i.e. OSA. OOF. Private) to Nigeria (from $-11.4 million to $111.5 million) and 
despite the trade increase from 1995-1996 from 2 to 2.3 billion ECU. trade decreased until 1999.
42 Same formulation is found in EFPB 96/091 2 April 1996.
43 EFPB 96/166 11 June 1996.
44 The Council instead referred to the press release published on 7 December 1993 announcing inter alia, a case- by-case examination, with a 
presumption o f refusal, of all new export licenses for all kinds of defence equipment.
45 EFPB 95/387 11 December 1995, See statement asking for free and fair elections without violence in EFPB 98/051 24.04.98,
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immediately after the executions o f Saro-Wiwa, at least Sweden did not follow this decision at 
once.46 Similarly, one should not forget that already on January 16, 1996, the Council decided to 
return their ambassadors to Nigeria.47 The British High Commissioner had however already returned 
to Nigeria on January 15. He had done so reportedly together w ith the other ambassadors.4* The 
reasons for the ambassadors’ early return was that their presence “would facilitate the 
Commonwealth mission ” to investigate the human rights situation in  Nigeria. The Nigerian foreign 
minister, Ibrahim Ikimi, later effectively shattered this plan. After the ambassadors had returned, 
Ikimi simply refused to receive any Commonwealth mission i f  the Commonwealth did not 
simultaneously “investigate human rights abuses elsewhere. ” The failure of the Union was accepted 
at the next GAC two weeks later, where the Council stated that the “the mission was floundering”.49
(c) Inter-pillarization
One o f the limitations of the Union’s 1995 sanctions regime was the narrow focus on restrictive 
measures (threats and sticks) without using incentives-related measures (promises and carrots). 
From 1997, the scope o f EFP towards Nigeria began to widen.50 In 1997, one may first notice the 
rhetorical shift when the policy unofficially was defined as “critical dialogue” or “constructive 
dialogue”.51 The aim of this policy was reportedly to “punish Nigeria without breaking the 
relations”.52 *At the core o f the change was the emphasis put on moving "from a manifesto o f  good 
intentions " (on human rights progress) “to a  policy that implemented these high objectives”. î 5  In 
practical terms, this took place as increased inter-pillarization, whereby the instruments of mainly 
first pillar instruments were more intensively integrated into the implementation of the goals set 
under the second pillar. In specific, the role o f  the ACP-EU co-operation in EU’s relations with 
Nigeria increased, hereby amplifying the influence o f the Union’s first pillar on the second pillar.54 
Several EU-ACP Joint Assembly resolutions strongly condemned Nigeria’s military regime, for 
example those in March and September 1996. The March 1996 Assembly backed the Union’s 
harsher course of action by proposing the freezing of all bank accounts of Nigerian military leaders,
46 Reuters News Serv ice 14.11.95.
v  Ihonvbere 1996; Akinrinade 1997; Ageoce France Presse Internationale 22.03.96; and Financial Times 17.01.1996: 4.
48 Keesings’ Record o f World Events 1996:40888.
49 Interview Council Secretariat May 2000. See also answers o f Council to MEP: See, for instance, EFPB 97/197 10 April 1997 and 97/224 2 July
1997. Similarly, a border dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria only led to one official CFSP reaction coinciding with Cameroon's request of 
French military support in opposing the adding to the Bakassi region o f  Nigerian military (EFPB 94/080 28 February 1994).
50 Illustrative for the use of threat o f sticks is EFPB 96/228 14 October 1996.
51 EFPB 97/224 2 July 1997 and 97/197 10 April 1997. In the answer from the Council to the MEP Mr. Robles Piquer. the Council maintained that 
“ we shall continue to pursue with the Government o f  Nigeria what has been referred to as a critical dialogue.."
52 Interview. Council Secretariat. November 1999.
Sj Illustrated by the report adapted by the HP's Committee of Foreign Affairs on 28th October 1998 and the Common Position on Africa of 25 may
1998. EP News Report. 30.10.98 from http://www.europarl.eu.int/dg3/sdp/newsrp/ Cited from EP: 23 April 1999 A4 0242/99. Report by the Foreign 
Affairs and Defence Committee; OJ L I58 2.6.1998.1-2.
54 See Section 6.4 (c).
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an action that would have been more comprehensive than any CFSP measure seen before. The 
March 1997 Assembly became the most critical ACP-EU manifestation against Abacha, and it 
ended in turmoil and confrontation between the Nigerian delegation and the EU-ACP 
Parliamentarians. The reason was that it upset the Nigerian delegation that the EU-ACP Assembly 
had invited members of the opposition in Nigeria such as Wole Soyinka to the session. The 
assembly was then interrupted after the Nigerian delegation accused Mrs. Glenys Kinnock55 of 
implicitly giving the green light to some of the bombings in Lagos in spring 1997. Mrs, Kinnock 
had apparently issued a warning at a meeting in Luxembourg three months before the bombings 
saying that people would hold the Nigerian government responsible for whatever measure was 
imposed on the Nigerian opposition.56 An increasing number o f  EP resolutions, 11 resolutions from 
1994-199857 compared to only 1 from 1979-1993, supported the intensification o f EFP towards 
Nigeria in this period.
As the Union started to act more rigorously, several classical cases o f defection in cooperation and 
lack o f  implementation occurred, as in the Iranian case. In fact, that the Council did not initiate a 
harsher tone, besides some relatively strong statements concerning the arrest of Wole Soyinka58 and 
Lt. Gen. Diya59 during 1997, suggests that a truly more comprehensive EFP course did not emerge 
before Abacha’s death. The 1995 sanctions in particular were partly undermined by three 
exemptions given at the end o f November 1997.60 The first exemption was the “granting o f  visas to 
Nigerian nationals participating in international conferences” in Member States o f the Union. This 
particular exemption, achieved by the Dutch presidency, was justified, since without the Nigerians 
around the table, the objectives of using the ACP-EU partnership to obtain concessions from 
Nigeria when negotiating the exchange o f the Lomé IV Convention would have been impossible to 
carry out.
More problematic, however, was the exemption for Nigeria to play in the 1998 World 
Championships in Football and the 1998 World Basketball Championship. Some Council officials 
called these sports exemptions “embarrassing”, and one official suggested that it was legally
iS MEP for the Group of the Party of European Socialists.
56 The Assembly was only continued after the Nigerian Chargé d'affaires had apologised by stating “0« the grounds that you have misconstrued my 
statement I  hereby withdraw i t Interview Council Secretariat and Nigerian officials May 2000.
5i Resolution on Nigeria; Official Journal C 292,21/09/1998 p. 0154; Resolution on the European Union's attitude towards Nigeria; Official Journal 
C 080 . 16/03/1998 p. 0233:Resolution on Nigeria; Official Journal C 014.19/01/1998 p. 0204; Resolution on Nigeria: Official Journal C 362 , 
02/12/1996 p. 0261 Resolution on the murder of Mrs. Kudiratu Abiola in Nigeria; Official Journal C 198.08/07/1996 p. 0206:Resolution on 
Nigeria; Official Journal C 166.10/06/1996 p. 0200; Resolution on Nigeria; Official Journal C 323.04/12/1995 p. 0091; Resolution on Nigeria; 
Official Journal C 287.30/10/1995 p. 019; Resolution on human rights violations in Nigeria; Official Journal C 056.06/03/1995 p. 0108;
Resolution on the violent prolongation o f dictatorship in Nigeria; Official Journal C 305.31/10/1994 p. 0096. A reference to the resolution of 
14.12-1995 on human rights: Resolution on the threatened deportation o f Nigerians from the UK as reported on the EP official URL was not found.
5Ï EFPB 97/197 10 April" 1997 and 97/224 2 July 1997.
5,1 EFPB 97/143 26 December 1997.
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dubious to introduce exemptions referring to the 1995 Common Position since “no exemptions [in 
the OJ] meant no exemptions”.61 Indeed, the whole incidence looked like one of the “price 
specimen” o f the Union’s I  want -  yet, I  do not want policies o f  the ’90s (Nuttall 2000:34, 18). 
Apparently, France had pushed forward for this exemption being herself the host of the World 
Cup.62 Britain was against the exemption and the issue was settled by a compromise, after a 
“collective assessment” had been made to see which areas could be exempted pursuant to the 
provision o f a so-called “head-quarters” agreement. In terms o f overall efficacy, this exemption 
was dubitable because according to Nigerian officials, the sports sanctions would have been “a 
highly effective measure” raising “public anger towards the Abacha regime”.63 This was also the 
opinion held by the EP, which commented angrily “an opportunity to influence human rights policy 
in Nigeria had been lost”.64
The third exemption lifted parts of the arms embargo. It allowed arms to be sold to supply Nigeria’s 
participation in the ECOMOG (Economic Community o f Western African States Monitoring 
Group) peacekeeping force in the civil war in Sierra Leone. In practice, “this ECOWAS thing was a 
success thing”65 for Nigeria by de facto  halting the civil war (Commission 2000; Human Rights 
W atch 2000). Allowing the selling o f arms to Nigeria might thus have been a geo-strategically smart 
move by the Union since the emergence o f another undemocratic state in the region would have 
increased the instability o f  the region as a whole.66
The Union’s action could, however, just as well have resulted in a backlash for the EU had Abacha 
remained in power. Notably, it was impossible to control whether the arms sold under the 
exemption really were used for the conflict in Sierra Leone and not for internal repression of the 
Nigerian opposition. It certainly did not increase the Union’s credibility as a rigorous foreign policy 
actor either. As a Nigerian official put it (while smiling) - “this was ridiculous ...can you imagine 
one o f  the most undemocratic states at that time - Nigeria -  in a fierce crusade to install democracy 
in another state -  fu lly  supported by the international society?”67 In a letter from the Nigerian 
Embassy in Brussels to the Nigerian authorities in mid-March 1997,68 the Nigerian Chargé
w EFPB 97/024 28 November 1997 published in OJ L 338,9.12.1997. 7.
61 Interviews. Council Secretariat May 2000.
62 France (and Germany) was accused o f granting visas for Nigerian officials in violation o f the EU sanctions (Human Rights Watch 1999).
63 Interview, Nigerian officials. May 2000.
M Resolution on Nigeria, Situation in Nigeria. 16/7-1998 OJ as mentioned previously. 
b:> Interview. Council Secretariat. May 2000.
64 Interview. Council Secretariat. Mav 2000.
67 ibid.
68 Date unverifiable. but is either 15 or 17 March.
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d’affaires reported that the EP is “deeply split on this issue (Nigeria) and so is the Council and the 
Commission and the Member States ”.69
Despite these problems, the capability-presence of the Union augmented towards the end o f  the 
’90s. This was already clear when Nigeria failed to meet its new electoral timetable in 1998 and the 
Council “expressed its deep concern o f  the developments in Nigeria”.70 After Abacha’s death and 
the democratic initiatives o f Abubekar, the Union immediately reacted by “warmly welcoming” the 
positive changes. In October 1998, the Union further repealed part o f its 1995 Common position.71 
Compared to the Union’s “welcoming” strategy in 1995 (to the Yar’Adua and Obasanjo commuted 
sentences), the Union in 1998 adopted a more balanced approach. Now, it attached equal effort to 
the progress Nigeria had made and the areas where progress had (yet) not occurred.72 There were 
thus signs o f increased scope or “pillarisation ” o f EFP. One illustration o f this was the text o f the 
Common Position repealing the 1995 sanctions.73 It said that, “programs supporting human rights 
and democracy, ... poverty alleviation and, ..the provision o f  basic needs fo r  the poorest section o f  
the population  ”, may “continue” .74 *The Council added “should there be any deterioration in the 
respect fo r  human rights or the democratic processes in Nigeria, the Council shall immediately 
review this Common Position with a view to adopting additional measures”.15 After the return o f  the 
civilian rule in Nigeria in 1999, all remaining sanctions were lifted as o f  17 May 1999. The depth o f 
EFP was further increased when the Union issued a Joint Action towards Nigeria in December 
1998,76 gathering €810.000 in support o f the holding of democratic elections in February 1999. In 
other words, the EU conditionality was beginning to take a more complete form, including 1) threats 
or conditions, 2) measures implemented in case conditions were not fulfilled, and 3) follow up 
measures, relief or more active policies depending on the degree o f compliance.
Towards recent developments, almost full discretion has been handed over to the Commission 
regarding Nigeria. The conclusion of the Council May 21,1999 invited the Commission to present a
69 Particularly the “clever ' Dutch Presidency reportedly “supported the view not to play harsh towards Nigeria" (2). The EP criticised the Union’s 
arms export exemption and policy in resolution of 19 January 1998 on the European Union’s attitude towards Nigeria. OJ as mentioned previously.
7(1 EFPB 98/077 27 May 1998.
71 Those were the visa restrictions for members of the military or the security forces, and their families, suspension o f visits o f members o f the 
military, - restriction o f movement o f  all military personnel o f Nigerian diplomatic missions, suspension o f all high-level visits that are not 
indispensable to and from Nigeria: and visa restrictions on members o f the Provisional Ruling Council and the Federal Executive Council and their 
families, cancellation of training courses for all Nigerian military personnel for non-combative courses to encourage respect for human rights and to 
prepare the military for the democratic control by a civilian government o f  the armed forces.
72 Similarly balanced were the EP Resolution of the ACP-EU Joint Assembly in 1998 noting “the joint Assembly’s support for a twin-track strategy 
towards Nigeria, welcoming progress b u t at the same time, maintaining pressure and sanctions until human rights violations have ceased and there is 
real prospect for the establishment of a democratic constitution and a legitimate civilian government (9.03 .99, A4-0065/99).
73 John Peterson uses this expression about the links between external economic relations, the CFSP. and the Justice and Home Affairs representing 
the Union's three pillars as created by the TEU (in comments to an earlier version of this paper at the University o f Geneva, September 2000).
74 EFPB 98/275 30 October 1998.
7i Article 4 (2).
74 EFPB 98/383 22 December 1998.
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National Indicative Program aimed at taking into account good governance, the fight against poverty 
and support o f civil society. The “inter-pillarization” o f the Union’s policy is further demonstrated 
by the resumption o f a “Community dialogue” with Nigeria. In Abuja on May 31, 1999, the 
Commission and the Nigerian authorities issued a Joint Communiqué outlining future plans for co­
operation.77 *The Communiqué paved the way for the allocation o f  €330 Million accumulated from 
the 6-8 European Development Fond (EDF) payments that had been frozen from 1995.
The accomplishments o f  EFP towards Nigeria the last 5-12 months seem to be less impressive than 
they were from the spring 1998 to the end o f  1999. EFP at that time probably came as close as it 
could to its own capability-presence potential against a country such as Nigeria under the Union’s 
contemporary institutional structure. Lately, the Nigeria files in the Council Secretariat have been 
archived and replaced with files on “Zimbabwe”, “Sierra Leone”, and “Burundi”. What remains to 
be seen is which role the CFSP will give itself under the still transitory and fragile Nigerian 
democracy. It is also unclear who will assure that the line taken by the Community on Nigeria is in 
accordance with overall CFSP objectives. If  developments in Nigeria turn worse again, the Union’s 
strategy could only work under two conditions. It assumes, firstly, a high degree o f coherence 
between aims followed in the first and second pillar, and second, that what the Community deals 
with in its relations with Nigeria practically are all embracing for the Member States’ relations with 
Nigeria. Clearly, none o f  these assumptions seems to be fulfilled.
6.3 Learn ing
Did these policies o f the Union reflect an ability o f the EU governments to leam about the workings 
o f EFP? There are in fact several indications that this was the case, at least for some o f the main 
actors or larger Member State governments. The beliefs about Nigeria’s willingness to comply with 
EU demands clearly underwent their own dynamics from 1979-2001. Unsurprisingly, European 
governments in the whole period perceived decision-makers in Nigeria as very different from those 
o f the Member States. As an official in the Council Secretariat noted, the Nigerian decision-makers 
come from a completely different background where for them the opposition is “a gang o f  robbers”, 
and it is tempting to cheat a little “bit with the ballot boxes”.79 European decision-makers were also 
well aware o f the dubiousness of Nigeria’s military’s various promises to return to civilian rule. For
'7 Joint Communiqué by The European Commission and the Federal Republic o f Nigeria. Abuja. 31 May 1999.
7* Investigating proper development programs to be implemented both as regards the released funds from the 6Ul -  8th EDF and the subsequent 
payments of the Post Lomé agreements.
79 See also Agyeman (1988). The US Secretary of State. Colin Powell, has also been quoted for having said, "all iSigerians are crooks and thieves" 
(The Economist January 6, 2001:81).
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several reasons, Nigeria was however not considered either unpredictable, hopeless or unsusceptible 
to change (Lewis et al 1998:9, 14-20). As the Council expressed it, Nigeria remains “¿7 long 
standing friend and partner”.*0 Crucial was the belief by many governments that the different 
regimes o f Nigeria were less motivated by any ideological crusade, as the case was, for instance, in 
Iran. Governments understood that particularistic (often economic) interests and Nigeria’s extreme 
ethnic and religious complexity were more important in underpinning Nigeria’s problematic and 
sometimes rather hostile foreign policy.
From 1995, the Union realised that its belief about Nigeria needed revision. The more critical 
statements the Union issued in the beginning of 1995 stemmed from the fact that the issue under 
scrutiny regarded human rights and in particular trials against specific individuals that received high 
public attention in Europe. The eye-opener for the Union was the Saro-Wiwa killings and the 
appointment in February 1995 of foreign minister Ikimi. He was “the arrogant, irrational and 
adamant”*1 foreign minister that “hated' the EU.82 Already in July 1995, Ikimi summoned British 
and American envoys and warned them that cordial relations would be jeopardised by their hostile 
actions against Nigeria. On 14 November, Ikimi then recalled Nigerian ambassadors in all EU 
countries as a reaction to EU’s reaction, which Ikimi called a British “plot”,83 As a Council official 
noted, we started to “dream” about a possible exchange of Ikimi.84 What Ikimi, Abacha and the 
Saro-Wiwa executions caused were a reduced belief in the effectiveness of a “wait and see”*5 policy 
towards Nigeria. The belief emerged that tougher messages had to be sent to Abacha. 
Illustratively, one Council official confessed having experienced EU policies towards Nigeria, that 
“what really makes a difference is embargo or aid, all the rest is bla, bla. bla
Clearly, the Abacha and Ikimi unpredictability also indicated the limits o f  intervention and thus the 
limited expected benefit o f  aid and embargoes. This might have complicated the introduction of 
restrictive measures and reduced the use of incentives related measures.87 However, on the bottom- 
line the Union in the 1990s preferred a light interventionist policy to a laissez-faire policy. One of 
the reasons for not just letting Nigeria come away with its policy was probably linked to the 
perception that Nigerian personalities such as Abacha and Ikimi were not truly and adequately
i0 EFPB 94/217 26 August 1994.
*’ Interview with Minister Oda Olisa. Nigerian representation, Brussels. November 1999.
Interview. Council Secretariat, May 2000.
*■’ Keepings Reports o f World Events. 1995 :40806.
Interview. Council Secretariat. May 2000. See also Keesings' Record of World Events. 1995. September. 40711. Ikimi also recalled the Nigerian 
ambassadors for consultation from all EU countries (14806).
Nuttall (2000:3) uses this expression about the EPC reactions to Glasnost and Perestroijka,
** Interv iews. Council Secretariat. November 1999.
*7 Interview. Council Secretariat. May 2000.
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reflecting the potential in Nigeria to get back on track again - possibly by external i n f l u e n c e The 
Union also knew Nigerians from sitting around the same negotiating table on numerous occasions, 
e.g. the negotiating of the Lagos (Association) Agreement (1966) and the Lomé Conventions (Sanu 
& Onwoke 1997). That Nigeria was an active member of the international system, her strife for a 
permanent seat in the UN Security Council and her contribution to peace-keeping activities, 
summed up to the perception of Nigeria as an actor that understood the importance of giving and 
taking in the international system (Nwosu 1996). The Union realised that the harshness of 
Abac ha’s dictatorship was a long-term bluff - out of line with previous military rules and the 
Union’s perceptions o f  Nigerians. The bluff had to be called. Since it is always dangerous to do so 
without knowing that it is a bluff for sure, the Member States called it by using the CFSP.
Abacha’s presence was living evidence of a strictly speaking unsuccessful EFP towards Nigeria. 
The policy changes o f the Union did also reflect that the individual Member States had perceived 
the previous policies as unsuccessful and the Council in 1998 stated that the transition to civilian 
rule “is a failure”.90
In sum, a learning dynamics o f EFP towards Nigeria started to evolve in the 1990s. First, the policy 
became truly more sensitive to the success or failure o f previous policies. Second, the government 
started realising that previous unilateral (or non-EU) policies had been unsuccessful bringing the 
need for a European approach to the Nigerian question to the forefront. Similar to Chapter 5, the 
updating of beliefs about EFP towards Nigeria minors a situation where a given Member State 
previously attached less belief to European policies than to unilateral policies and therefore had to 
allocate more effort to other than European foreign policies. This was the situation depicted in 
Figure 3.1 in the area between “0” and “z*”. As Abacha’s regime grew increasingly repressive, 
when EU governments perceived their actions as unsuccessful in changing Nigeria’s attitude they 
reacted to this perception o f failure by increasing their stakes in CFSP. It should be noted, that the 
effort continued to rise towards a certain upper limit. This ceiling was in practical terms, the 
Common Position of 1995 (including economic sanctions but excluding any petroleum sanctions) 
and the Joint Action o f 1998.
As in Chapter 5, it seems as if the learning framework is most relevant for larger Member States that 
previously have had a policy towards Nigeria. Moreover, in this specific case the learning model
KN ¡bid.
In Liberia. Nigeria says to have spent $4 Billion on UN deployment. Other contingencies have been deployed in Lebanon, Angola. Yugoslavia. 
Somalia, and Rwanda, mostly for the UN but also for OAU and the ECOWAS.
188
does not really seem to be applicable to the Union’s policies towards Nigeria before the mid-1990s 
where governments did not engage in learning about EFP towards Nigeria, but may have learned 
immensely much about other things.
6.4 Inability to learn
In the ’90s, one o f the predominant reasons for the lack of learning was the lack o f actions from 
which one could learn. In general, a range of factors may have impeded the learning as put forward 
in the preceding chapters. In many ways, these reflect what Lewis once stated as a precondition for 
successful intervention in Nigeria, “In short, when outside actors are motivated, united, and 
focused, and parties to the conflict are vulnerable to outside influence, intervention can be 
successor  (1995:18,23-25).
(a) The role o f  the US: the devil’s advocate again?
Nigeria is one of the few exceptions o f the CFSP where European and US policies seemingly went 
hand in hand (Nuttall 1997; Baker & Stremlau 1999:180,16-18).90 1 US policies were comparatively 
harsher than EU policies in the Nigerian case as US policies had been towards Iran as well. Yet, US 
policies towards Nigeria were not contradictory to EU policies. In 1994, the US classified Nigeria as 
“a leading global drug trafficker” and assistance to Nigeria through its Export-Import Bank ceased. 
It further agreed on a compelling veto from US representatives in multinational institutions. Yet, the 
US expressed general uncertainty about its proper course towards Nigeria as illustrated by the 
unwillingness to engage in any oil-boycott despite not excluding it (Baker & Stremlau 1999:192, 8- 
12; Reuters Info Service 6 June 1996).92 This might have strengthened the Union’s resolve in the 
light o f Chapter 3’s description of the destructive impact that intensively competing strategies may 
have on decision-makers’ ability to learn. The Union’s capability-presence probably did not benefit 
directly from the vague US strategies. However, their weakness implied that pressure on Nigeria 
was not as fruitless an undertaking as towards other pariah states in terms of learning the EU 
governments lessons about the workings of their policies. Put differently, the Union’s attention 
could be focused on Nigerian politics rather than on US policies.
90 EFPB 98/058 5 May 1998.
91 Commenting on one o f the half-yearly political dialogues in Brussels between the Troika and the US delegation in Washington in 1996, one EU 
official noted that the Americans “were in line with us " (Interview. Council Secretariat. May 2000).
92 The weaker US policy towards Nigeria was related to Nigeria's strategic importance for the US oil interests, now that several other petroleum- 
producing countries were sanctioned and the fact that Nigeria had shown loyalty towards the US in the past (Hoffman 1996).
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(b) The strategies
The facilitation o f learning from the light US position was reversed by the lack of clarity of the 
Union’s strategy. In the ’80s, no strategies were formulated at all and in the 90s, the strategies failed 
to produce clear directions for reactions to developments in Nigeria. For instance, before 1993 the 
Union had no formal or informal strategy towards Nigeria. As a result, the Union had no experience 
to learn from other than Member States’ unilateral foreign policies (and other external economic 
relations’ policies) when the sanctions were installed in 1993. The emerging capability-presence 
from 1993 was indeed a strategy of sanctions, including restrictive measures and conditions under 
which these could be eased. Yet, the Union’s ability to learn remained impeded by the still very 
vague formulation of the sanction strategy until the 1995 Common Position came in place. For 
example, the Union lacked as in the case of Iran an objective criterion for what was a successful 
policy towards Nigeria. The deterioration of events during 1995 only led the Union to “continue to 
keep a careful watch on the situation and assess any further decisions that might be necessary to 
face up to development,”93 thus applying an “ad  hoc” principle as to whether further intervention 
would be necessary or not. In the Saro-Wiwa and Yar’Adua trials in 1995, the Union repeatedly 
referred to the importance o f  the prosecuted to receive “fair trials”. The problem was that since the 
Union never defined what the notion o f “fair triaV’ meant, it allowed for whatever interpretation of 
the outcome that suited decision-makers.94 One may say that this resulted in a legitimacy problem of 
EFP affecting negatively the government’s ability to learn about the CFSP.
The Common Position o f  1995 defined the Union’s policy more precisely than the EPC sanctions of 
1993, and any other statement previously had done. The strategies were also well attached to the 
developments in Nigeria towards the end of the 1990s. This implied a high degree of information 
flow about the causal relationship between EU strategies and outcomes. One of the facilitating 
elements was the impact from Britain (Regan 2000; Aspen Institute 1996; Dana 1998.).
Britain’s colonial ties w ith Nigeria made her a natural source of information about the workings of 
Nigerian politics.95 Despite periods o f  strained relations, Nigeria and Britain maintained cordial 
relations after Nigeria’s independence in I960;96 not the least they did so through both countries’
”  EFPB 95/197 30 June 1995.
Q4 ll is not before the Ócalan case that the Union said that a fair trial "means fa ir and correct treatment and an open trial according to the rule of 
law before an independent court, with access to legal counsel o f his choice and with international observers admitted to the trial. "
V5 Chatham House speech by Professor Jibril Aminu. Hon. Minister o f  Petroleum Resources. 29/10-1991. Britain conquered Nigeria in the 19th and 
20th century and remained the colonial power of Nigeria de facto  until 1954. gave Nigeria a new federal constitution in 1947.
V6 Interview. Council Secretariat, November 1999.
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involvement in the Commonwealth.97 Observers characterise Britain’s initial policy (in the 
beginning o f the 1990s) as a “wait and see” policy (Lewis 1995). This changed, when Saro-Wiwa 
was executed, where Britain reacted more harshly and was in the frontline of both EU’s Common 
Position and the Commonwealth’s suspension o f  Nigeria.98 9Britain had been reluctant to use the 
Commonwealth as a “netw ork  that was instrumental of foreign policy in the years after the 
“disputatious arguments about sanctions on South Africa” (Robertson 1990:700). Put differently, 
Britain probably possessed beliefs resembling the hubris-beliefs in Chapter 3." Nuttall similarly 
describes Britain’s understanding of the workings o f multilateral foreign policies saying “the very 
concept o f  multilateral security was foreign to her ideas about how the world looked’.
After 1990, a more participatory and involved Britain had emerged. Britain now wished to use the 
Commonwealth, being still “by [our] fingernails at the heart o f  Commonwealth”, to gain influence 
in Europe (Nuttall 2000). The Harare Commonwealth Declaration in October 1991 renewed the 
British interest in the Commonwealth. In 1992 the chairman o f the House o f Commons Foreign 
Affairs Committee David Howell noted, that “meanwhile we have our links with the Commonwealth 
to strengthen (not dismiss as some have inclined to)”.100
The idea that EFP would be able to contribute gained in force during the 1990s. Britain never 
developed any illusions about the effectiveness o f EFP, but the New Labour government changed 
the orientation of British foreign policy to what Robin Cook called “enlightened self-interest” (Hill 
2001; Human Rights Watch 1999:193). In June 1996, Shadow Foreign Secretary Robin Cook 
argued for a British “constructive approach” towards Europe.101 *Similarly, Tony Blair had launched 
his “Britain in Europe ” plan declaring that “to be a significant influence in the world Britain must 
be a significant influence in Europe”) 02
Britain thus slowly moved away from its unilateral hubris about its ability to deal with the Nigerian 
question and took a more multilateral (European) approach. Britain became by no means at the heart
97 Educational ties are immense Approximately 20.000 Nigerian students study in Britain and several Nigerian leaders Generals Obasanjo. Buhari. 
and Abacha attended the same officers school in Britain, the Mons Officer Cadet School in Aldershot
9* Interview Council Secretariat. May 2000; Still, the strongest demand for suspension of Nigeria from the Commonwealth may have come from 
other countries than Britain, e.g. Canada (Akinrinade).
99 As Tony Blair said in his Britain in Europe Speech. 5 April 1995. Chatham House: ‘7/ is not that Britain lacks self-confidence**.
100 Chatham House speech. 28/10-1992. Linder the conservative foreign minister Malcolm Rifkind. the African Commonwealth also gained 
momentum in British foreign policy, not the least due to Rifkind's personal engagement in the area. Upon his taking office in 1995, Rifkind declared 
that “a new Commonwealth can benefit Britain and all its members" -  since "punching above ones weight is not enough -  ire have to increase our 
weight". In 1996. Rifkind noted that "In Nigeria....the transition to democracy has been repeatedly interrupted. We cannot support this. But we 
hope that with the encouragement o f the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group and our Commonwealth partners. Nigeria will achieve a lasting 
t r a n s i t io n Rifkind had taught two years at the University of Rhodesia, now University of Zimbabwe. Chatham House speech, 21/9-1995 and 28 
November 1996.
101 Chatham House speech 6 June 1995.
101 Chatham House speech 5 April 1995.
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o f EU. However, the new foreign policy framework and the TEU allowed for a restructuring of the 
British-EU relations with the Commonwealth, which provided an incentive for Britain to promote 
both the Commonwealth and the EU strategy when dealing with Nigeria. This was, e.g., clear from 
the widely extended Lomé Convention of 1990, where half o f the ACP country signatories were 
former British colonies.103 In practice, the result was that important information was channelled to 
the other Member States from, for example, the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group that 
continued meeting with Nigerian authorities during the Union’s sanctions regime.104
Yet, strategies continued to lack clarity. For example, the Union failed to determine the criteria for a 
“deterioration in the respect fo r  human rights” in the October 1998 Common Position that as earlier 
mentioned was supposed to condition its review.105 As regards arms trade some o f the confusion 
and the ability o f Member States to defect from the common decisions came from the inconsistency 
found in the treaty between Article J.8 (2) o f the CFSP and the Communities’ C (Art. 3) (Nuttall 
2000).
(c) The impact o f  EU 's external economic competence
The Union’s external economic competence vis-à-vis Nigeria is primarily expressed in the special 
agreements between Nigeria (as an ACP Member State) and the EU, notably through the subsequent 
Lomé Conventions and EU-ACP agreements. This is shown in Table 6.1 below.
Table 6.1 lists the contents of subsequent Lomé Conventions including information about the 
number o f countries participating, the amount o f resources and the involved issue areas. One may 
interpret the table as a rough estimate of the Union’s external economic competence vis-à-vis the 
Member States in dealing with issues regarding Nigeria, which adds to the Union’s general treaty 
based competence on trade, etc., discussed in Chapter 3.
Since “the Lomé Convention is an international agreement (between the Union the Member States 
and 70 ACP states”), the Union per definition has high competence in those relations with Nigeria 
that are listed in Table 6.1. However, Table 6.1 shows that the contents of the Lomé Convention 
have changed over time. The Union’s competence in its external economic relations with respect to 
Nigeria has consequently varied among the various Lomé Conventions. Based on Table 6.1,
105 Sec Section 6.4 (d). The EU Handbook (1996:68) provided the view adopted here.
104 Interview. Council Secretariat. May 2000.
105 EFPB 98/275 30 October 1998.
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subsequent Lomé Conventions should have led to more competence o f the Union because more 
issues and resources have been added to the Convention over time. This echoes Sanu & Onwoke 
noting that, “the Treaty has grown in capacity fo r  problem-solving” (1997:25,29-35).106
The question is now, whether this increase in external economic competence has influenced EFP
Table 6,1 Contents and competence of EU-ACP agreements
EU-ACP
agreement
Competence of the Union
Lomé I 
(1975-1980)
46 ACP countries / 9 EC countries 
Free trade arrangement 
Set of joint institutions 
STABEX107
Co-operation to diversify ACP industrial production 
Strict rules of origin with free entry for products with 50-60% of local content 
Non-reciprocity: tariff free entry to over 95% of exports of the ACP countries 
Resources: 3.450 million ECU
Lomé II 
(1980-1985)
58 ACP countries / 9 EC countries
Sugar protocol
More products in STABEX
SYSMIN created including all mineral products except petroleum and except precious minerals, 
however, including gold101 
Resources: 5.700 million ECU
Lomé III 
(1985-1990)
65 ACP countries! 10 EC countries
Fisheries
Co-operation
Socio-cultural co-operation 
Investment guarantees 
Policy dialogue 
Human rights concern 
Resources: 8.5 million ECU
Lomé IV 
(First term 
1990-1995)
To last i0 years instead of 5 years and including a Mid-term review
Centrality of human rights
Environmental protection
Services included, but overshadowed by GATS
Strict rules of origin with free entry assured for local contents of 45%
Resources (1. + 2. Term): 12.000 million ECU
Nigeria received the highest resources of all ($440 million)
Aid also for macro-economic adjustment programs
Lomé IV 
(Second term 
1995-Feb 
2000)
70 ACP countries /15 EU Member States
South Africa included
Uruguay results included
Reduction of role of state in economic activity
Consultation procedure
Human rights, good governance and democratic principles 
Shift to competitiveness of ACP products
Commission’s green paper proposal of 1996, and suggestions of 29 October 1997 for a sector-based 
or sub-regional division of the convention
Development aid in three dimensions: aid. monitoring, implementation
ACP-EU 
Convention 
(June 2000 
-2007)
€ 13.5 billions in aid from 2000*2007 
Replacement of STABEX and SYSMIN
SYSMIN was replaced by a system to counteract short-term fluctuations in exports which the ACP 
countries can be attached to through National Indicative Programs and not as previously as a general 
system.
Commission review of May 1999: co-operation involved in armed conflicts should be part of a 
comprehensive strategy for conflict management and resolution within the CFSP framework”.
Source: Woodliffe (1996); Commission (1999a); Sanu & Onwaku (1999); Dr. Magane Coulibaly from the ACP General Secrétariat.
106 Despite this growing capacity, it is important to note that the Conventions have not at any time been all embracing in the Union's external 
relations with Nigeria Notably, a large grey area exists as regards FDI that include the important petroleum investments (Interview, Council 
Secretariat. November 1999),
iljl Stabilisation of export earnings. Protection scheme from falls in ACP countries’ export earnings due to fluctuations in primary commodity prices. 
If export earnings from a particular commodity fall by more than a certain "trigger threshold" and if the commodity account for more than a certain 
“dependence threshold' EC would provide financial assistance.
10* System for Safeguarding and Developing Mineral Production. Similar scheme to STABEX covering certain mineral products.
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towards Nigeria, or not? Comparing Table 6.1 with the development of EFP does not immediately 
support a correlation between external economic competence and EFP. For instance, the increased 
depth of EFP in 1993 did not match any equivalent expansion in competence. Moreover, the 
amplification of competence between Lomé II and Lomé III took place in the midst o f the long era 
o f EFP silence. The only real coincidence between competence change and EFP is the policy change 
towards Nigeria in 1995 simultaneously with the Mid-term review o f the Convention providing the 
introduction o f the consultation procedure (Article 366a (1-3)).
Despite that the consultation procedure never was used against Nigeria, it may have worked as an 
implicit threat towards her. Under the consultation procedure, the Community/Member States and 
the ACP states may invite each other to consultations (366a (2)) i f  they find that principles of 
“human rights, democratic principles and the rule o f  law” are breached.109 If no solution is found, 
partial or full suspension of the Convention may take place.110 After 1997, a genuine approach to 
the consultation procedure started to develop marked by the first use of the consultation procedure 
in 1998.111 Apart from the consultation procedure, the Commission’s proposals for a new Lomé 
Convention with higher priority given to regional powers such as Nigeria also became known in 
1997 and may have been a carrot for the Nigerians. Clearly, the functioning of this carrot was 
largely blocked by Abacha’s regime. However, as described previously, it teamed up a message to 
Nigeria which under more appropriate conditions (e.g. Abacha’s death) might have been one o f the 
factors that influenced Nigeria’s return to democracy. In May 1997, the Commission, furthermore, 
proposed a more comprehensive framework for action in areas o f armed conflict in Africa, although 
some “dragging” hindered progress on the m atter.112
As previously mentioned, it was not before 1997-1998 that economic transactions between Nigeria 
and EU effectively came to a halt despite that the sanctions were in place from November 1995 (and 
even from 1993). Without suggesting any one to one relationship between competence and EFP, the 
scope of EFP towards Nigeria seemed to widen from 1997-8 exactly at the time when the Mid-term 
reviewed Lomé Convention came into force. Supporting the hypothesis, the most important general 
competence change came with the inclusion o f economic development policy in separate chapters of
,09 Chapter 1, Article 5 (1).
110 366a (3).
111 http://www.europarl.eu.int/dg3/sdp/newsrp/en/1997/n9704l8.html in article "Sanctions and Human Rights: Development Committee seeks new 
procedure" Until November 1999 Niger. Togo. Guinea Bissau and Comoros had been calied for consultation under Article 366A respectively Com 
( 1999) 204 final; Com ( 1999) 295 final; Com (1999) 361 final; Com (1999) 491 final
112 The Finnish Presidency intended to take it forward but did not do it.
At the GAC May 2000. the EU however expressed its willingness “where appropriate to make fu ll  use o f  Lomé instruments, and other relevant 
budget lines''. 2264th GAC 22/23 May 2000 8875/00 (Presse 160) Provisional Version. Press Release Africa.
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the TEU already in 1993. Since ACP was the most favoured group o f developing countries 
receiving 50% of all development aid, the ACP group evidently had gained a special status in the 
European Investment Bank in the past. Some of the funds Nigeria had received through the 
European Development Fund were Lomé aid; others came from trade-aid packages or other 
agreements. The impact o f this transfer o f competence could have been to change the focus o f the 
Union’s actions. Importantly, the actions o f the Union towards Nigeria from 1993 comprised 
restrictions on development aid. Admittedly, the first sanctions regime from 1993-1995 was 
installed about six months earlier than the TEU came into force, but the ability to act with authority 
on this issue could have been established de facto  from the agreement on TEU 1 % years earlier.
(d) Economic preferences
The importance o f Nigeria as a trading partner became crucial -  and the geo-strategic importance of 
Nigeria increased - when Nigeria entered as a net oil supplier to European countries from the late 
1960s. The economic preferences towards Nigeria have varied over time, across sectors and among 
Member States. This may, for instance, be seen from Figure 6.1 below, showing the average trade 
shares among EU Member States towards Nigeria calculated on a quarterly basis as in Chapter 5.
Figure 6.1 shows that the Union on average was a net-importer o f Nigerian goods from 1983 to 
1997. Due to this, it should have been harder to install import sanctions (boycotts), than to install 
export sanctions (embargoes). As none of these was installed except for an arms embargo, the data 
does not exclude that economic preferences have played a role in formulating CFSP policies 
towards Nigeria. However, it is difficult to be more precise regarding the sector problems of 
distribution of costs raised in Chapter 3. The changes in trade over time in Figure 6.1 indicate that 
the conditions for EFP improved after 1987. The Member States’ dependence on Nigeria was 
reduced in this period by almost 50% for both exports and imports. Intensities of economic 
preferences thus mirror relatively well, the progress o f EFP that took place in the ’90s.
The degree of diversity in Member States’ trade with Nigeria is shown in Figure 6.2 below (second 
of the two Figures). The diversity of imports among Member States was in the whole period higher 
than the diversity of exports. It should, thus, have been increasingly difficult for Member States to 
agree on measures involving restrictions on imports than those similarly involving exports. Figure 
6.2 further suggests that including EFP measures with import implications was not facilitated by the
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Figure 6.1 Intensity o f EU trade towards Nigeria from 1983q2 to 1997q3 113
Average Intensity of 
Trade
composition o f preferences, either over time or across sectors. Preferences simply worked against 
EFP expansion in the Nigerian case. This may explain why boycotts and embargoes were difficult to 
agree to even though the Union’s competence and overall capability-presence increased, and 
learning accelerated. This relates to the geo-strategic significance o f  petroleum and its total 
dominance o f EU-Nigeria trade. For the Union, oil has been the major import good from Nigeria 
throughout the whole period. For Nigeria, sanctions on imports on oil to the Union would have had 
immediate damaging effect on the Nigerian economy since the yearly Nigerian revenue from this 
sector ranges from 27% to 40% o f total GDP (1990) accounting for 97.4% of Nigeria’s export 
revenues (1995/96).
One should also keep in mind that questions and resolutions o f the EP alongside debates in national 
parliaments all indicated “calls fo r  an oil-boycott”, in particular, after the Saro-Wiwa hangings in 
1995.114 Yet, oil sanctions were neither installed, nor was the lack o f  oil sanctions subject to any 
particular contention among Member State executives. Whereas the Council was “fully aware that 
the European Parliament has called..an oil boycott”, 1 1 5  it stressed on several occasions that an oil-
1L' The data for imports 19$9q4 was set to 0.04 since the real value 0.6 seemed to be unrealistically high. 0.04 is the average of the past two values 
that is of I989q3 and 1989q2.
1M See, for instance. EFP8 96/091.
1 ls EFPB 97/209 27 May 1997.
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Figure 6.2 Trade diversify among Member States towards Nigeria from 1983q3 to 1997q2IJ6
boycott was out o f the question.117 *The official rationale was along the lines “that i f  we don't 
(continue trading) then somebody else wilT\ More important was, however, that first, petroleum 
never became part of the SYSMIN (see Table 6.1) and thus remained outside the Union’s 
competence towards Nigeria. Second, the petroleum preferences of the Member States clearly spoke 
against sanctions with the Union being a net-importer, though over time to a decreasing degree.
Apart from the opposition from the largest EU importers of Nigerian petroleum products such as 
Spain (11% of total Nigerian oil export), Italy (6%), and France (5%, 1997),119 Germany and 
Britain120 were also strongly opposed to sanctions. Germany’s import of Nigerian crude oil, the so- 
called “Bonny Light”, accounted for 45% of the German petroleum imports (Akinrinade 1997:204). 
In their resistance to the oil-boycott, Germany made it clear that their refineries were not specialised 
in the use of other crude oils than Bonny Light. Any oil-boycott would thus “make unacceptable 
demands on crude oil refining technology in Germany ” This argument contradicts Akinrinade who 
notes that British Brent Crude could easily have substituted for Nigerian "Bonny Light" (204). That
no | 9g9q4  was above 3.0 in value so it was instead estimated as the average of the past two values. 
m EFPB 86/177 16 June 1986.
"* Interview Council Secretariat November 1999.
119 CIA Factbook 1999. Nigeria. Economy, http^/wwvv.cia.gpv/cia'nuhlrcations/facthook'ni html-ccon.
120 Britain's interests were linked to the Anglo-Dutch Shell Petroleum Development Company {.Akinrinade 1997:198)
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Germany was so reluctant to boycott Nigerian oil when it could buy the same oil in Britain was 
more likely related to the linkage between German imports and exports o f petroleum by-products. 
This feature was not an isolated German-Nigerian phenomenon. 15-20% o f Nigeria’s total imports 
consisted of various chemical products o f which many were by-products o f previously exported oil. 
In the 1980s, so-called “counter-trading (barter) arrangements” were commonly initiated between 
EC countries and Nigeria partly to counterbalance the large trade deficit o f the European countries 
(see Figure 6.1) caused by the extensive oil import.121
Britain was opposed to such barter arrangements. Britain did not depend on Nigerian oil imports 
either, as British North Sea oil competed with Nigerian oil from the 1980s (Gambari 1989).122 
Instead, the FDI stock o f  the Shell Company played a role in the reluctance o f Britain to initiate any 
petroleum sanctions (Klay, Kieh & Agbese). The Anglo Dutch/Shell Company had the largest non- 
Nigerian share (30%) in the joint venture Shell Petroleum Development Company o f  Nigerian 
Limited (SPDC). This accounted for roughly 50% of Nigeria’s total oil production.123 Targeting 
Nigerian oil exports would thus target British shareholders o f  Shell. Notably, the other shareholders 
in SPDC were, besides the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, French E lf Aquitaine and 
Italian Agip. There was a fear in Britain, France and the Netherlands that sanctions would lead to a 
nationalisation of petroleum investments.124 125 French oil companies such as Total SA and Elf 
Aquitaine had operated in Nigeria since the independence, only interrupted by the civil war in 1966- 
1969. Unlike the EU in general (see Figure 6.1) a revival o f  French - Nigerian economic relations 
had taken place from the late 1980s. This high intensity of trade combined with the reduced French 
belief in Nigerians’ good intentions under the Abacha regime (See Section 6.3) clarify the French 
position. In sum, the larger and smaller Member States’ oil interests either as consumers, producers 
or investors were intrinsically bound together in Nigeria.
On the bilateral level, the economic relations between Nigeria and France intensified throughout the
t v
’80s. In 1989, France was the second largest foreign investor in Nigeria with $500 million in FDI. 
Still, French investment interests in Nigeria remained moderate compared to their trade interests and 
compared to British FDI interests. Germany was also intensively represented as investor in Nigeria 
with more than 250 companies operating in Nigeria in the 1980s, most notably, accounting for
121 France, for instance, had a barter delivery of goods and machinery for oil.
122 See also oil minister Aminu's Chatham House speech earlier referred to.
i:- World Investment Directors-1996. Apart from these, there were BP. Statoil. Total. British Gas. Tenneco. Deminex. Sun Oil. Pan Ocean.
124 Interview. Council Secretariat. May 2000.
125 Political relations had been tense however due to 1) the French Sahara nuclear tests. 2) French attempts to block Nigeria's associated membership 
with the EEC, and 3) French support for Biafra's independence. With French foreign minister Claude Cheysson's and Nigerian foreign minister 
Gambari's exchange o f official visits the relations started to improve (according to Gambari himself. 1989,155).
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approximately 80% of the civil construction contracts (Gambari 1989:160). Undoubtedly, the costs 
were thus high for external investors starting to disengage in 1992 (Lewis 1995).126 Since much o f 
the disinvestment was voluntarily performed, the general hostility o f Nigeria and the few sanctions 
imposed by the Union, the US and other countries provided an indirect restriction on trade and 
investment vis-à-vis Nigeria from 1992-1998.
Another area of importance for the Union’s external economic relations with Nigeria was the arms 
trade. In comparison with the petroleum area, an arms embargo was installed towards Nigeria 
despite that the opposition against petroleum trade with Nigeria was at least as large as against arms 
trade. The arms embargo was initiated because 1) there were UN and EU precedence for frequent 
use o f arms embargoes, 2) arms embargoes in general only imply a direct loss for the producers o f 
arms and only hurt few consumers indirectly, e.g. through the loss o f  jobs, and 3) Member States 
were neither highly dependent on arms trade with Nigeria, nor were there any particular linkages 
between arms export to Nigeria and imports from Nigeria to the Union.
Arms sales partly continued through the 1990s, though some substitution towards China and India 
took place. Those Member States with important armaments industry interests such as Italy, France, 
Germany and Britain127 were accused o f continuing their arms trade with Nigeria despite the 1993 
sanctions. France, Italy and Britain had allegedly delivered respectively armoured vehicles, self- 
propelled artillery and main battle tanks in 1994 after the sanctions had been initiated in 1993. The 
British government was accused of playing a double role by supplying the military that assassinated 
Saro-Wiwa with arms and other military equipment for years, including having supplied the rope 
that was used to hang Saro-Wiwa.128
The impact of the external economic relations on EFP towards Nigeria thus hold four dimensions. 
First, there is a representation o f a growing but still in implementation limited capability-presence o f 
the Union. Second, there is a tendency to stronger EU actions within those issue areas such as 
development aid where the Union in particular towards Nigeria held high competence. Third, 
windows o f opportunity and precedent use o f measures and instruments matter for the Member 
States to be confident enough about their workings to actually use them. Fourth, the more intensive 
and the more diverse economic preferences become regarding a particular third country as Nigeria, 
the more difficult is it for the governments to agree on CFSP measures.
i:s UN World Investment Directory. Foreign Direct Investment. Legal Framework and Corporate Data. 1996.
1:7 Britain has been called "addicted to arms trade". According to SIPRJ (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) covering the period
1993-1997. Britain ranked as the third largest exporter of conventional weapons in the world. 355.000 jobs are found in British defence industry-
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6.5 Conclusion
The analysis o f EFP towards Nigeria shows a significantly increasing capability-presence of EFP 
from 1980 to 2001. The trends were as follows. The long period from 1979-1993 was an era of 
silence. This late start o f EFP is interesting since whereas EFP towards Iran was relatively low- 
profiled in the whole period with various dialogues and reactions, EFP towards Nigeria more clearly 
changed in the beginning o f the ’90s. That being said, the increase in capability-presence towards 
Nigeria does roughly coincide with the pattern seen in the Iran and the Gulf States. From 1993- 
1996/7, the Union’s policy may best be characterised as an era of sanctions, i.e. a period where the 
depth of the Union’s actions sharply increased through the sanctions regime, within the institutional 
powers of the CFSP. There were however still only limited scope o f the actions and a couple of 
grim examples of incoherence and weakness o f EFP are found. Finally from 1998, the Union 
entered an era o f pillarisation where EFP besides using its instruments in more depth now seemed 
to move beyond its given instruments, for instance, involving other pillars in the actions of the 
CFSP thus widening EFP in a novel, but still low-profiled fashion. This chapter thus suggests that 
the CFSP in the Nigerian case expresses a growing capability-presence both in terms o f depth and 
scope o f actions. Finally, despite the difficulties in any comparison the capability-presence o f the 
Union towards Nigeria seems to have been higher than in the Iran and G ulf States cases.
There are two possible interpretations o f the weaknesses that still form a large part o f the Union’s 
performance in EFP. Either they reflect reminiscences o f the traditional EFP paralysis thus 
indicating that nothing has changed or at least things will not change unless the Union increases its 
capability-presence by, for instance, institutional reform. The inconsistencies might also express 
more permanent, but new features of the CFSP where Member States are increasingly willing to 
provide effort to the CFSP, but were they also seem capable of avoiding the negative effects of an 
action on their own political and economics spheres (almost so it looks like non-compliance with 
the Union’s action).
The first interpretation regarding paralysis has been intensively debated in the literature referred to 
in Chapter 2. As there are many indications that the Union’s capability-presence is at a significantly 
higher level today than, e.g. five years ago, paralysis can probably no longer fully describe EFP. 
This confirms the assumptions behind this framework regarding the existence of both paralysis and
EFPB 96/034 14 February 1996.
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progress in EFP. The latter scenario is one where the Member States attach resources to EFP as a 
matter o f  interests and beliefs about the workings of EFP in line with the assumptions o f the 
learning model. This tendency is not necessarily good for the future enhancement of the Union’s 
capability-presence as previously underlined. The key to whether enhanced effort attached to CFSP 
is good or bad is the question, why governments partly contribute to the increased capability- 
presence o f the Union? Is it because they, for instance, have become better in reallocating negative 
externalities o f any CFSP action on their own economics and politics. For instance, a given 
government may become experts in reducing the negative effects of a given CFSP action on own 
constituencies as the positive effects of contributing to EFP simply does not provide enough gains to 
validate a sustainable capability-presence towards a particular region. The increased willingness and 
belief o f  the Member States in contributing to EFP may also be subject to a real pay-off o f the 
government’s effort to European solutions.
The empirical analysis further confirms the earlier results o f this thesis that EU’s capability- 
presence depends on the level of hostility in the world or from the target, in this case Nigeria. The 
Union does in other words rather increase its capability-presence based on co-operative actions from 
external actors, rather than hostile ones. Notably, these results should in this chapter be less biased 
towards the impact o f the external economic relations, as the measure for capability-presence more 
clearly centres on the CFSP than in the quantitative analysis of Chapter 4.
In terms o f learning, foreign ministers may have learned immensely much about each other from 
participating in EPC from 1970. Yet, the silence of the EPC until 1993 indicates that learning about 
EFP from experiencing the outcome must have been practically impossible before 1993. There were 
simply no outcomes to learn from. This changes after 1993. Notably, governments altered their 
belief about the susceptibility of Nigeria to change the more Abacha’s unpredictability came to the 
surface in his interactions with the Union. The framework seems more appropriate in understanding 
larger EU governments’ decision to subscribe to the CFSP rather than smaller ones, partly because 
of lacking unilateral capacity to act from the smaller states. By using pre-Abacha experiences with 
Nigerians as friends and partners and drawing on Britain’s increasingly EU-and-Commonwealth- 
minded leadership on the Nigerian issue, the Union managed to agree on a light interventionist 
policy towards Nigeria in the 1990s.
There were indeed many impediments to learning in EFP towards Nigeria. Interestingly, the US did 
not pose as big a problem as the case was towards the Gulf States and Iran. In fact, the US was
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almost a facilitating factor. This is rather a confirmation of the general importance of US policies on 
the CFSP than it should be interpreted as a more autonomous EU policy per se. However, compared 
to Iran and the Gulf, the Union’s capability-presence towards Nigeria did actually perform as though 
it was more autonomous from the US than in the Iran and G ulf cases.
Particularistic economic interests reigned EFP on issues such as whether petroleum sanctions should 
be initiated or not. Characteristically, however, also economic interests and their sphere o f influence 
reduced in the ’90s through the increase in the institutional competence o f the external economic 
relations. The Nigerian case is the strongest manifestation o f the role o f competence in the Union’s 
external economic relations on the CFSP in this project. From 1995, EFP started to widen towards 
the first pillar and external economic relations. This development was initially rhetorically based. 
From 1997, the presence o f the external economic relations in EFP speeded up, notably through the 
increased competence o f  the Union in the EU-ACP partnership. Whereas one may have expected a 
smooth increase in capabilities amplified by the different treaty revisions the analysis quite on the 
contrary shows that the SEA did not lead to any particular change in EFP. The treaty revisions of 
Maastricht on the other hand coincided neatly with the emergence o f EFP towards Nigeria. For 
instance, it seems beyond doubt that the use o f TEU instruments such as Common Positions make a 
difference compared with earlier non-binding arrangements. Development aid that was brought 
under the Community flag was an important new  EFP instrument. This instrument could be used in 
the Union’s ambitions to provide the means to function adequately in crisis and conflicts or as in the 
Nigerian case when faced with a serious o f violations of human rights, democratic principles, good 
governance and the rule o f law. Clearly, it did not last long towards a country such as Nigeria where 
the response to the Union’s development aid restrictions, simply was to cut off any ODA funding 
from the Budget, as oil revenues were plenty.
This chapter basically shares Nuttall’s recent conclusion regarding the move towards more 
Community based foreign policy (2000). Importantly, however, this is no contradiction to those who 
argue that a more intergovernmental EFP also have emerged. The difference between EFP towards 
Nigeria now and four-five years ago is instead that governments think they have learned that actions 
should be more comprehensive to serve their purposes, including e.g. measures from the first, the 
second, and the third pillar. The willingness o f  Member States thus has become more dependent on 
the availability o f resources from the different pillars. The heaviest of these is o f course the first 
pillar. Here, the availability seems largely dependent on the extent to which the configuration of 
economic preferences overlaps with the Union’s external competence.
202
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
7.1 The model
The purpose of this project was to explain European foreign policy (EFP), in particular, its co-existing 
elements o f progress and paralysis. EFP was operationalised as capability-presence, i.e. the Union’s 
capability to act and mobilise resources. The main explanatory variable was learning. Learning is the 
ability o f  actors to update their beliefs about the workings of policies. Learning is the causal linkage 
actors draw between their observations o f the outcomes in international relations and their previous 
effort attached to a given policy aimed at influencing this outcome. The effort derives from the 
previously held beliefs about the workings of the given policy. Learning is thus a steering mechanism 
for allocating resources between unilateral and multilateral foreign policy making. The learning model 
in principle fits an environment where the multilateral option is the European Union’s Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, but could be extended to other multilateral forums, such as NATO, OSCE, 
and the Contact Group.
Learning is indirectly helpful in understanding why the Union’s capability-presence both contains 
elements o f progress and paralysis. If particularistic unilateral interests lessen the effort to multilateral 
(European) foreign policy, this may lead to paralysis. Learning, however, may have taught decision­
makers the lesson that such a downgrading of multilateral (European) policies is less likely to lead to a 
successful outcome. In this case, the learning effect induces progress o f EFP that runs counter to the 
paralysing interest effect, and vice versa.
In international relations, the information available about the workings o f policies is incomplete. When 
actors thus do not have perfect information, they are in principle able to enter a process of learning. 
Learning is about changing the beliefs about the workings o f  policies leading actors to adjust an 
otherwise interest-based allocation of effort between unilateral and multilateral (European) foreign 
policy.
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Over time, learning may enter either a virtuous or a vicious circle. This does not refer to the capability- 
presence o f EFP as otherwise intended, for instance, by Regelsberger. Here, it regards actors’ ability to 
learn. The argument for the virtuous circle is as follows. Assume that multilateral (European) foreign 
policy is more effective than unilateral foreign policies in solving a certain conflict in international 
affairs. Assume further that a given government holds beliefs in line with this assumption. The 
government will - if it experiences a successful outcome under these conditions -  reinforce its belief in 
EFP and thus increase its efforts to the European solution accordingly. Should this become a pattern, 
implying that the government for a second, third, fourth and maybe fifth time experiences a successful 
outcome under these conditions, the government’s belief may enter a virtuous circle. Despite the fact 
that this, as mentioned, is unrelated to the capability-presence, the virtuous circle o f learning may lead 
to a virtuous circle of EFP in the traditional usage o f the term. The condition for this to take place is 
that 1) other governments in the Union undergo the same learning process, 2) EFP remains more 
effective than unilateral policies, and 3) other factors do not change the basic allocation o f effort 
favouring the multilateral (European) foreign policy solution. Similarly, one could imagine a virtuous 
circle of learning, starting at beliefs such that the government regards unilateral policies as more 
effective than multilateral (European) foreign policy, and implying a lowering of the effort attached to 
EFP.
The vicious circle argument departs from the same assumption as above. If a government experiences a 
failure under this condition, the government will decrease its belief and will in order to maximize its 
utility (which is a composite o f preferences and beliefs) consequently also decrease its effort attached to 
EFP. However, subsequent failures will now force the government to enter a vicious circle o f learning. 
Due to the unanimity ruling system of the CFSP, one government’s entering o f a vicious circle of 
learning is in theory enough for the vicious circle o f learning to cause a vicious circle of EFP.
A vicious circle o f learning may also lead to the opposite effect, increased capability-presence of the 
Union. Should the government initially hold such beliefs that unilateral policies were more effective 
than EFP, repetitions o f failures would now increase the government’s effort attached to EFP. Should 
the other governments be in similar position, the capability presence o f the Union will increase. One 
could interpret this as a vicious circle of learning that leads to a virtuous circle of EFP.
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One would generally assume that the point of departure for Member States’ beliefs about the workings 
of EFP would be the scenario where they initially believe more in unilateral than European policies and 
then change their perception according to the outcome. In sum the model allows for enhanced EFP both
as a result of a virtuous and a vicious circle of learning. y
f
Further, there is no such thing as automaticity in the learning model. Automaticity is nice, but unlikely. c
First, in practice one may imagine various beliefs about the workings o f  EFP in different areas or on t
different issues, which makes the learning model rather partial in coverage. In other words, a lesson on 1
enhanced multilateral (European) foreign policy in the Western Balkans may not be applicable to the s
Middle East. Second, several conditions apply for governments to be able to learn at all. ,
s
There were three cases to consider of governments being unable to learn. I f  actors hold such beliefs that e
they are fully convinced that either the fully unilateral or multilateral (European) strategy is the only r
correct strategy to pursue, they are not able to learn about the workings o f  the CFSP (or their unilateral c
policy) from observing the outcomes. They commit hubris. e
O
Learning is also impossible if  actors hold the so-called confounded learning belief. The problem here is 
that the actor simply cannot deduce from the outcome whether to pursue a unilateral or multilateral 
(European) policy, the actor remains indifferent between the two options. In reality, one of the two e
strategies may be more effective than the other one, but the government is unaware of this causality. it
e
The confounded learning belief acts as an upper and lower restraint on the possible expansion and s
contraction of EFP deriving from entering virtuous or vicious circles o f learning. If EFP is most 
effective, and the government enters a vicious circle of learning (departing from beliefs attaching more 
effort to EFP), the government’s belief will eventually stabilize around the confounded learning belief e
even though it experiences failure after failure. On the other hand, a government that enters a virtuous i,
circle o f learning from an initial position favouring unilateralism (despite the European strategy being 'f
the most effective one), will in case it experiences failure after failure stabilize its belief around the 
confounded learning belief. The confounded learning belief thus acts as an upper limit to how much the 
beliefs can increase towards the correct one, i.e. that European foreign policy is the most effective. e
y
ir
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If other governments undergo the same dynamics, the capability-presence of the Union will be 
constrained and ceteris paribus not reach a level that reflects the Union’s actual effectiveness vis-à-vis 
unilateral policies. The reason for this is a combination o f the initially held beliefs about the workings 
o f unilateral and European foreign policies, unfortunately biased towards unilateralism, and the 
limitations of the learning mechanism, not being able to overcome the initial bias completely, ending up 
in the intermediate position of the confounded learning belief instead.
It follows that effectiveness can move EFP a long way along the path towards increased capability- 
presence. However, it is not enough for governments genuinely to start allocating more resources to 
EFP. At least this is the case if they start their engagement having more confidence in unilateral 
strategies. What can initially move EFP and the belief about EFP in this situation will probably have to 
come as a shift in the beliefs caused by external factors. For instance, a serious disbelief in unilateral 
strategies caused by a systemic shock, an identity change or maybe an institutional improvement 
making the lines between the effectiveness o f  unilateral and multilateral policies less blurred. The 
learning model thus gives some guidelines for how beliefs operate and intervene with interests and 
institutions in different zones of focus in the foreign policies o f Member States. Learning should be 
able to explain changes in the relative weight attached to unilateral and multilateral policies within this 
overall focus-zone.
The model comprises a political-economic part capturing the interaction between the Union’s external 
economic relations and the CFSP. The approach challenges the view of the first and second pillar issues 
being inadvertently divided. Contrary to previous analyses the causality under investigation here is the 
impact of the external economic relations on the CFSP. The model of learning belongs analytically to a 
neo-institutional model where interests, institutional change, and ideas are important variables of 
change. Notably, they are regarded as complementary explanations rather than substitutes.
The important issue is the dynamics of the interaction between the three variables interests, ideas and 
institutions. In this dynamic sense, the way ideas enter through learning is as an intervening variable, or 
as a facilitator. Another facilitator for the capability-presence to evolve in a dynamic perspective is the 
impact of changes in the institutional influence and eventual changes in the preferences. The thesis 
introduced the variable institutional competence o f the Community’s external economic relations as a 
variable that potentially could change the level of EFP. Community competence has the effect of
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pointing to measures or instruments that the Member States in principle have access to and which could 
be imposed assuring some sort of internal redistribution among the Member States. At least increased 
competence should raise the expectation that some sort o f compensation (whether direct or indirect) 
may take place for foreign policy actions imposing a cost on one or two Member States in particular. 
Competence will be important in foreign policy towards third countries where extensive external 
economic interests are at play, and where a trade and cooperation agreement may be one o f the few 
tools of control that the Union has at its immediate disposition. Viewed together with preferences, the 
proposition was that the more diverse and intense economic preferences towards a particular third 
country are and the less competent the Union’s external economic relations is in dealing with these 
preferences, the less capability-presence will be reached by the Union.
7.2 Empirical results
The empirical analysis confirmed that EFP simultaneously contains progress and paralysis. The 
capability-presence of the Union roughly progressed in three different stages: 1979-1989, 1990-1996, 
and 1997-2001. In the first period, the capability-presence o f the Union was generally low. The Union 
was seldom used as the basis of Member States’ foreign policies and the few actions taken were quietly 
diplomatic in nature without any binding or costly substance. In fact, one could not even say that the 
Union was a rhetorically very active actor towards Iran, Nigeria, and the Gulf States. Whereas at least 
some of the larger Member States were individually pursuing a relatively active foreign policy either 
unilaterally or by participating in cooperation in other multilateral organizations, primarily in the UN, 
the Union largely remained demobilised and silent. The scope o f  European foreign policy was 
subsequently very limited in this era. For instance, in the Nigerian case, the Lomé Convention was in 
force involving the external economic relations; but there was no link between this and the EPC.
Progress emerges from 1987, the year the SEA came into force and brought European foreign policy 
under the Treaty of Rome. The capability-presence deepened, mobilising quiet diplomatic instruments 
at the Union’s disposal such as demarches, statements, Troika visits, communiqués, high level 
telephone conversations, etc. When the CFSP came into force in 1993, the depth of action further 
increased, notably, by the frequent use of the new instrument Common Positions. Common Positions 
were in fact used beyond their original purpose of being guidelines, because they frequently served both
as mode of defining the Union’s strategy towards third countries, and as a way of applying concrete
I
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restrictive measures towards them. The scope o f the Union’s policies started to widen in the ’90s as 
well. Illustrative were the different forms of conditionality that the Union began to exercise against 
third countries. Economic resources from the first and the third pillar were mobilised in seeking to 
obtain political aims through the second pillar, thereby slowly providing a more integrated approach in 
EFP. A facilitating factor for this was the increased competence that the Union in the meantime had 
gained over the implementation of economic sanctions. Another significant development was the 
adding to the treaties (first pillar) o f the economic development policy area. This extended the arsenal 
o f applicable foreign policy measures in the Union’s relations with third countries. In sum, a weak but 
real European foreign policy emerged towards Nigeria, Iran and the Gulf States one or two years before 
the TEU which was strongly reinforced by the creation of the CFSP.
The difference between the second and third period is mainly one of scope. From 1996/97, the Union’s 
conditionality and other policies became more holistic. Earlier policies were slowly becoming 
benchmarks and not forgotten as previously. The actions were still limited and for instance avoided 
sensitive areas such as the petroleum sector. However, threats and promises became a frequently 
behaviour of the Council presidency in its relations with third country leaders, and some of these were 
actually carried out. Moreover, the Union started to make use of almost the whole spectrum o f its 
foreign policy instruments in a more cohesive way: common positions, joint actions, statements, 
demarches, troikas, communiqués, and joint positions in other international institutions, etc.
As regards the paralysis in the Union’s capability-presence, there were, from the end of the 80s and 
during the first half of the 90s, problems of:
• Lack of legal legitimacy of the EPC and later, although to a lesser extent, of the CFSP,
• Blurred guidelines regarding enforcement,
• Very limited resources attributed to the actions,
• Rudimentary operational capacity to implement even smaller actions,
•  Lack of automaticity at all stages o f EFP,
• Rhetorical bias o f the Union’s actions,
• A d hoc use of instruments, for instance, Common Positions or Joint Actions,
• Bias towards reacting to cooperative events rather than hostile ones, and
• Occasional vacuum and silence of EFP towards certain crisis and conflicts.
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In the last half of the 1990s, some of these problems were significantly reduced. Specifically, the Union 
gained more automaticity o f action, using its instruments in a less ad hoc way, and attaching more 
resources to its aims. The Union further demonstrated increased operational capacity in the day-to-day 
EFP-making. The scope o f the Union’s actions remained low with relatively few resources attributed to 
core policies, and the bias of reacting mainly to cooperative events remained.
On the explanatory side, learning became part o f the dynamics of EFP in the ’90s. The analysis reached 
this conclusion, despite o f the strong and non-trivial conditions set up for learning to be significant. 
Learning was thus operationalised as the joint significance of 1) prior capability-presence of EFP, 2) the 
degree of success of the policies (or the degree o f compliance of the target country) and 3) the beliefs 
actors hold about the workings o f EFP. Despite the obvious difficulties in measuring beliefs, an attempt 
to view this third indicator was made in the qualitative analysis by looking at changes in beliefs or 
perceptions among actors over time.
According to the results, from 1987 the first indications o f learning are present; in 1991 all the 
quantitative results suggest the presence of learning; and from 1993 all the data, both qualitative and 
quantitative, points to the existence o f this ability to learn from failures and successes as part o f EFP 
decision-making. Notably, the enhanced ability to leam does not automatically imply that the Union did 
things in a more consistent way, or that the Union should have obtained a higher capability-presence 
(although the results suggest this). It only indicates that the governments’ action through the Union 
became a better match for their previous actions and their perceptions of the workings of the CFSP 
than before.
Besides learning, there were several other factors influencing EFP, which created this picture of 
progress and paralysis. First, an important condition for the relevance of the learning model proved to 
be that the unit of observation was larger Member States rather than smaller ones. This relates to the 
almost total lack of unilateral foreign policies from most o f the smaller Member States towards 
countries such as Iran and Nigeria. For the latter, judgments about whether to participate or not in the 
CFSP were probably more related to factors such as sovereignty, neutrality, national interests, including 
the role of the larger Member States, or major external actors such as the US.
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Second, the ability to learn was negatively influenced - also after learning began to progress in the 
1990s -  by the intensive activity of the US in international affairs. US presence did not always lead to 
less capability-presence o f the Union. Instead, the US action was often followed by the Union, but at a 
much lower level o f intensity. The US however disturbed and disrupted some EU governments’ ability 
to learn about EFP, which indirectly affected the Union’s capability-presence. Instead o f learning about 
the effectiveness o f EFP, the governments often must have learned more about the US reactions to the 
outcomes in international affairs. Similarly, the more ambiguous and the weaker the US strategy was 
(as towards Nigeria), the easier it was for the Union to avoid this distractive effect and instead increase 
its own capability-presence.
Third, Member States’ change o f beliefs about the workings o f the CFSP played a role in facilitating 
cooperation. For instance, their increased belief in EFP often resulted in increased willingness to share 
information with the other Member States. The case studies further recognize the impact of Germany in 
defining the Critical Dialogue towards Iran as well as the influence o f France on the policies of the 
Union towards Nigeria. The British change in attitude to EFP is likewise seen as a stimulus for the 
learning mechanism of EFP in the 1990s as it both provided renewed resources and hereby enhanced 
the belief o f other Member States in the CFSP.
Fourth, the impact of external economic relations on the CFSP found some support, in particular in the 
qualitative analysis. For technical reasons several economic variables were not measured or included in 
the quantitative analysis. However, in the qualitative analysis, trade preferences neatly followed the 
same pattern as the Union’s capability-presence in general. The only important exception is that trade 
preferences could not explain why the Union from the beginning of the ’90s increased its capability- 
presence as remarkably as it did. Trade preferences thus are more useful in explaining the paralysis 
rather than the progress o f the Union. Moreover, economic preferences may be a good explanation for 
the bias o f the Union’s capability-presence towards more cooperative events, since reactions to 
cooperative events traditionally involve reestablishment or strengthening o f economic ties with a third 
country. An additional result found in the quantitative analysis indicated an effect on EFP from the 
overall trade among Member States towards the rest of the world in contrast to the bilateral trade 
relations between Member States and third countries.
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More helpful than economic preferences per se in explaining the progress of the 90s, especially the 
increased scope of the Union’s policies, was the institutional competence of the external economic 
relations. The higher the competence o f the Union in its external economic relations, the more able the 
Union became to propose measures towards given third countries that were robust towards 
particularistic economic interests of the Member States. The two case studies had the perfect match of 
respectively low competence as well as low capability presence in the Iran case, and increasing 
competence as well as capability presence in the Nigerian case. More studies should be performed to 
verify this pattern.
The analysis also highlights the importance o f the treaty changes o f the CFSP in 1987, 1993 and in 
1997. In the quantitative analysis, the TEU seems to have facilitated the general progress o f EFP, as 
well as the ability of the Union to learn about the workings o f EFP. The qualitative analysis is generous 
towards the hypothesis that particularly the TEU, and probably the Amsterdam treaty (given the 
sequence of events) created a momentum in the Union’s opportunities for increasing its capability- 
presence. Some of the increase in capability-presence relates directly back to institutional innovations. 
This regards, for instance, the Common Position towards Nigeria in 1995, the initiation o f dialogues 
and sanctions, and the embedding of first and third pillar issues into the CFSP, such as development aid 
from the first pillar and visa restrictions from the third pillar.
Finally, the project included some external structural effects such as the impact o f the wars in the 
former Yugoslavia, the end of the Cold War, and the Gulf War. Strongest support found the end of the 
Cold War effect for the ability of governments to engage in learning. The Cold War effect neither 
substitutes the learning effect, nor replaces the impact o f economic interests and institutional 
competence. Yet, it is an important intermediary variable that regulates the degree of learning and in 
this specific case might have shifted some EU governments1 belief towards a more multilateral focus. 
The logic would be that the end of the Cold War may have shifted some Member States1 beliefs out of 
a “hubris-belief ’ condition, which then might have helped the learning mechanism at its very 
beginning. Finally, the impact of the wars in the former Yugoslavia could not be entirely tested due to 
an insufficiently short time frame; however, some of the quantitative results indicated a possible 
Yugoslav effect on the overall capability-presence of EFP, a basis for more investigations in the future.
211
ifn n a im iu m N ju jiju iJu i m n
7.3 Conclusions
In a brochure produced by the General Secretariat o f  the Council for information purposes (1999), it 
says that “Member States ’ foreign policies have not, o f  course disappeared with the creation o f  the 
C F S P This is a euphemism. EFP has in fact been a dw arf the last two decades. This follows whether 
one compares EFP to the foreign policies o f the larger Member States, such as France, Germany and 
Britain, to the US, or to the economic integration o f  the European Union. Nevertheless, the Union’s 
influence in foreign policy is growing, especially when compared to the smaller Member States, such as 
Portugal, Sweden, or Belgium. For many o f these countries, EFP, in fact, has been their only policy 
towards a range of third countries. Hereby, the growing capability-presence o f the Union allowed these 
small countries to play a role beyond their unilateral capacities. Even for the larger Member States, EFP 
in some areas rescued them from certain sensitive political issues. Those now could be addressed in an 
increasingly authoritative way, albeit without overdoing things and without jeopardizing important 
economic interests.
Without trying to deny the evident weaknesses, the gradual progress o f  EFP over time needs to be 
emphasised since according to this analysis it seems to be the result o f an internal logic, or rationale. 
This logic is one of learning, formation of economic preferences constrained by institutional 
competence and by various windows o f opportunities from structural changes and institutional 
innovations. Given the complexity of the Union, the Member States’ diversity of interests and 
sometimes excessively strong beliefs in their own capabilities, not to mention the institutional 
weaknesses of the Union, the signals sent by the CFSP towards various international conflicts have 
been relatively harsh. For instance, whereas the Union’s policies towards Iran from an outsider’s point 
of view might have seemed insignificant compared to the hard-hitting US strategy, one should not 
underestimate the message the Union sends when it refuses to initiate negotiations for a trade and 
cooperation agreement with a country like Iran.
Learning appears to be a sound way of explaining progress and paralysis, and linking them with each 
other, albeit not forgetting that the role o f learning is primarily relevant in a dynamic context. Interests 
and institutions probably play an even more significant role in determining the actual policy output of 
the CFSP in a given situation. The governments o f  the larger Member States have entered a process of 
learning about the workings o f EFP since the beginning of the 1990s. The learning w as reinforced by
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initial beliefs that valued unilateral foreign policy more highly than multilateral (European), and 
therefore learning led to progress in the capability-presence o f the Union. Coming from this low level 
of belief in European foreign policy, learning could (in line with the theoretical model and the notion of 
confounded learning beliefs) not perform miracles on the capability-presence. There are several 
empirical reasons for learning not bringing EFP further than it did. Notably, the initial beliefs 
governments held about the workings o f the CFSP were probably more biased towards unilateral action 
than “the expectations” bubble that Hill and others claim existed at the beginning o f the ’90s. Further, 
and this is more in line with Hill’s conclusions, several real limitations o f EFP became evident for the 
governments during the ’90s engagements in the former Yugoslavia, Iraq and elsewhere.
This thesis recognises the impact of the institutional changes on EFP. It seems as if  the creation of the 
CFSP in 1993 is one o f the main reasons for establishing the momentum and the (limited) progress in 
the Union’s capability-presence in the mid 1990s. With the continued progress of EFP towards the end 
o f the ’90s, there is nothing suggesting that the Treaty o f Amsterdam should have impeded this 
progress. On the contrary, this treaty confirmed the legitimacy of the instruments introduced in the 
TEU, and added a few more, such as Common Strategies, and the regular high-level diplomatic 
contacts between the Council Secretariat and major external policy actors through the High 
Representative. Decision-making mode was not often touched upon in this analysis. However, the 
simultaneous softening of the decision-making rules, introducing abstention, qualified abstention and 
the possibility o f qualified majority voting under certain criteria (Article J.13) confirm that the 
institutional changes worked as stabilizers and catalysing factors towards the creation o f more 
deliberation among Member States helping to enhance the operational capacity of the CFSP. The 
question could be asked: what had EFP been without the current institutional structure o f the CFSP 
originally created by the TEU? The answer to this counterfactual question is that without the 
institutional changes o f the subsequent treaty revisions, the opportunities for the Union’s capability- 
presence to amplify would have been smaller than they are today.
This conclusion does not imply that the institutional deficiencies, e.g. the dual pillar structure of the 
CFSP have not had a damaging effect on EFP. This is illustrated by the intensive internal bureaucratic 
conflicts that take place between, for instance, the Council and the Commission, the Council 
Secretariat’s DGE and the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (“the Policy Unit”), or the High 
Representative for the CFSP Javier Solana and the External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten.
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Illustratively, the word “enemy” has frequently been attached to either the Commission or the Council 
when officials from either side refer to the other.1 Clearly, such usage is presumably ironical in the 
context o f relatively habitual inter-institutional competition. Yet, as one may find examples in the past 
where these conflicts prevented the Union from taking firm and cohesive action, they may also in the 
future establish setbacks for EFP. The results of this project suggest no automaticity o f further progress 
of the Union’s capability-presence, in the case, for instance, that bureaucratic conflicts should make the 
working environment of EU’s foreign policy institutions even more complicated than today. The best 
recipe for intensified learning and sustainable increase in the Union’s foreign policy capability-presence 
remains that the Union proves wrong those people who believe that unilateral foreign policy, or other 
multilateral solutions, are better alternatives.
The results regarding the impact of the US suggest the following. First, they run counter to the 
impression one sometimes gets from reading literature on European foreign policy about how 
autonomous the CFSP has been vis-à-vis the US. There are many examples where US and EU 
strategies go hand in hand and where the EU has followed up on the US course of action.2 Second, the 
correlation between EU and US policies also indicates that the governments have a tendency to become 
paralysed by the strong US alternative. The important new result is that the Union’s paralysis is not in 
its action initially, but goes through the impediments to learning. The confusion created by the arrival 
of an alternative strategy neutralises learning which leads to paralysis in action.
7.4 Relevance of the results and methods for the study of EFP
If Ernst B. Haas’ approach to learning referred to earlier in this thesis according to himself differs 
sharply from the more direct ideas o f  causation embedded in behavioural and in rational-choice 
approaches, then learning as developed here sharply differs from learning a-la Haas. However, just 
because the focus was on individually held beliefs about the workings o f policies, in contrast to either 
group based ideas as suggested by the constructivist school, or normative beliefs about how strategies *
Interview, Council Secretariat, May 2000.
* Adding to the examples in the analysis, one could add a recent finding as an illustration of this, An analysis o f the voting patterns of the EU and the US 
in the UN Commission of Human Rights in 2001 shows that in little more than Vi o f the cases (18 versus 16 o f the 34 resolutions (out of 84) where voting 
took place), the Union and the US voted the same way. Areas where this pattern was seen included I) civil and political rights, and 2) most country' 
resolutions, where the US and the Union differed over issues such as, i) the Israeli settlement, ii) Sudan, iii) Rwanda, iv) impunity, v) death penalty and 
vi) economic, social and cultural rights (Interview, Council Secretariat. April 2001)
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should be, this model seems to be complementary to rather than actually competing with other ideas- 
approaches.
The relevance of constructivism for the study o f EFP was implicitly one o f the main questions of the 
theoretical and empirical analysis. As regards previous constructivist work on EFP, for instance, on the 
importance of national identities in constraining the Union’s capability presence, these appear to be 
compatible with the results. The holding o f beliefs strongly dominated by actors’ sense o f specific 
historical and national identity instead of the workings of policies indirectly was included under the 
heading hubris beliefs. In terms o f capturing general patterns, this model therefore seems to be 
inclusive for a constructivist approach if one should wish to proceed with that. Clearly, a constructivist 
approach would fail to cover the important linkage between EFP developments and the workings of 
policies that this author believes is crucial in understanding the dynamics of EFP. However, a 
constructivist approach could seek to capture specifically what the ingredients and the internal 
dynamics are when learning about the workings of policies does not take place.
The highest degree of complementarity of this project towards other approaches is not towards 
constructivism. Instead, the inclusion o f ideas through a model of learning seems to complement neo- 
institutional research in its model combining ideas, interests and institutions. Clearly, the institutions 
are slightly less represented here than would usually be the case, but this was rather a matter o f trying to 
redirect the agenda of neo-institutional research rather than to contradict it. As previously mentioned, 
the study does not add anything brand new to the debate, as “ideas” is by no means a novel 
phenomenon, but it provides a new way of regarding some well-known characteristics o f EFP.
Finally, the project tries to be pioneering in the exercise of using quantitative methods for the study of 
EFP. Despite the many uncertainties surrounding this, the quantitative methods appeared to be an 
invaluable input by highlighting issues that would never have been given the same attention had the 
quantitative analysis not been performed. For instance, the whole idea that learning existed in the 
1980s, but intensified in the 1990s should be attributed to the statistical analysis. The result regarding 
the cooperative bias of EFP also initially derived from this.
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7.5 Lessons for policy-makers
Even though the thesis did not aim at formulating policy recommendations per se, it is difficult not to 
link the results to policy-making and try to suggest ways to improve the performance o f EFP. There are 
four main suggestions deriving from the analysis aimed at enhancing the ability of actors to engage in 
learning and at increasing the capability-presence o f the Union in foreign affairs,
1. The assessment and evaluation o f European foreign policy need strengthening. One way of 
doing this is to use the developments in the third country and previous EU policies as main 
guidelines when assessing the success and failure o f EFP. If this is done instead of, for instance, 
using the US policies as a point o f comparison, or not comparing at all, there is a higher chance 
that resources will be more effectively allocated in EFP. In those areas where EFP further is 
truly more effective than unilateral policies, it will also increase the Union’s capability- 
presence.
2. Aims need to be formulated with more clarity and operationality. This could be done by creating 
certain benchmarks for success and failures that would imply more concrete and detailed 
formulation o f aims than previously. It should be noted, however, that such an exercise 
necessitates more resources because the ability to formulate operational aims depends on the 
level o f information available. The mere attempt to formulate aims would, however, reduce the 
future cost of formulating viable foreign policy strategies and thus facilitate increases in the 
Union’s capability-presence. Related to this is the need to invest more effort in understanding 
the minds of the opponent in the third country. This includes enhancing the observation and 
collection of knowledge about the target country and the efficiency of already existing 
information about her. This may, for instance, imply a more open-minded approach to European 
foreign policy making, increasing the number of parliamentary hearings, discussions with 
NGOs, and the production o f more independent reports, including involving academia more 
intensively in the policy-making process.
In particular, a closer dialogue and coordination with NGOs seems to be an important tool to 
include in the CFSP. This could indirectly take place through the Commission that already has 
extensive contacts to NGOs through, for instance, financing o f parts of their activities.
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However, the CFSP also needs directly to mobilise NGO information at a very early policy 
formulation stage, in order to be on top o f the issue and to get the policies as appropriate as 
possible given the situation in the third country from the beginning o f an engagement.
More priority needs to be given to those intended (by the Treaty o f Amsterdam) to work on 
policy planning and early warning, i.e. the Policy Unit in the General Secretariat o f the EU 
Council o f Ministers. The consistency o f policies over time also needs to be assured more 
effectively than today. More priority needs to be given to follow-up policies and to ensure that a 
consistent leadership in foreign policy is maintained, although the entity responsible for the 
actual policies may shift between first, second and third pillars depending on the gravity o f the 
situation in the third country. With the current institutional structure of the Union, there seems 
to be no alternative to having the Presidency and the High Representative for the CFSP in this 
role of leadership.
3. A sa  rule of thumb, the number o f instruments available to the Union needs to be increased. By 
hereby widening the scope o f  the Union’s actions as broad a range as possible is created 
whereby the Union’s reactions can more easily be tuned towards the specific developments in 
the targeted country'. There are several options. First, the portfolio of diplomatic instruments 
available should be increased, for example, the use o f Member State representations in official 
EU tasks could be discussed. Besides trying to find a valid European formula which makes use 
o f the many traditional unilateral foreign policies such as the withdrawal o f ambassadors and 
demarches, one could also imagine morè institutional proposals. One could look at the 
possibility of two or three Member States (e.g. divided between small and large) jointly 
administering the representation of all Member States in a third country with more resources 
available than any single Member State representation has today. The representation may have 
the EC delegation as a subdivision that would feed information into the joint representations 
and one could think about whether one would wish to make a rotation o f the Member States in 
charge of each representation and across countries. Such a proposal would further rationalise the 
work of the EFP decision-making process without violating the Member States’ wish to remain 
a major player. Second, the adding o f the military dimension through the CESDP may - if 
successfully carried out broaden the scope o f EFP. Its usefulness still depends on its ability to fit 
smoothly into the foreign policy spectrum, for instance, the achievement o f a balance between
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military and civilian tasks. Third, it also matters that EFP provides more substance towards 
solving problems and not only increased visibility. One o f the most substantial items under this 
heading is the availability and readiness o f resources in order for the Union, 1) at all to be able 
to react, and 2) to support or reject developments in the target country. One suggestion would be 
to form working groups that dealt with the funding of EFP and how costs could be financed in a 
neutral way. A thought would be to earmark community funds each year for a foreign policy 
fund from which foreign policy actions could be financed, similar to the idea o f  having 
structural funds and the European Investment Bank. Fourth, one instrument that seems to have 
the potential o f becoming an important CFSP tool in the future is fact-finding missions. Fact­
finding missions gives the opportunity o f collecting information, responding diplomatically in 
an initial phase o f a  crisis, being better able to react with the appropriate instruments if  the 
problem persists or escalates and coordinating at an early stage Member States policies under 
and EU umbrella.
4. Linked to this, information sharing needs further attention as Member States now plan to 
proceed with their initiative on the CESDP. For instance, this project seems as a minimum to 
necessitate that all Member States may access intelligence reports at the supranational level 
produced by the unilateral intelligence services such as the British or French national 
intelligence service. Incentives should be created for the Member States to increase information 
sharing among with each other regarding developments in third countries. One way of 
facilitating this would be to let Heads o f Missions o f the European Union in third countries 
receive copies o f country reports from national delegations on an automatic and regular basis, 
just as Heads o f Missions of the EU now share with the High Representative for the CFSP (and 
thus with the Member States) their reports from third country capitals. Moreover, no talk or 
discourse can change the fact that in the end the Union’s degree of success or failure in 
achieving its aims compared to other international forums or unilateral policies is the most 
important parameter in determining the future willingness of governments to invest efforts in
7.6 Future studies
Future studies would necessarily need to say more about the general form of EU-US bargaining, 
describe their regular fora of contacts, the EU-US Troika meetings, the ambassadorial contacts and try 
to describe more in detail through which Member States the US influence on EFP was strongest. One o f 
the tasks would be to establish a link between the learning model and the extensive transatlantic 
literature. In addition to the work previously mentioned this could involve the work by Philippart & 
Winand (2001), Frellesen (1994), Haass (ed., 1999), Peterson (1996), Wiener (1996), Ginsberg (1994 
with Frellesen), Gordon (1998) or Blackwill and Stürmer (eds., 1997). In terms of case studies, it seems 
inevitable to include the reactions o f the Union to the terror attacks against the US September 11,2001, 
in any future assessment o f the learning framework. Here, one would initially imagine September 11 as 
a structural breakpoint in line with other structural breakpoints o f EFP in the past, such as the end of the 
Cold War. The task would be to establish a development in the degree of learning among EU Member 
States regarding EFP that indeed have shifted as a result o f September 11, but that still follows the logic 
of learning as it has developed over time, constrained also by various factors such as the impact of the 
US. However, the attacks on the US and the follow-up to the attacks open a huge but intriguing 
Pandora’s Box for all contemporary studies of international relations.
Moreover, there is a lot about how EU officials, government representatives, and academics saw the 
EFP, but there are only few accounts or summaries of how individual discussions actually went. Put 
differently, it would be welcomed if future studies could look deeper into the assumptions of the 
learning model in Chapter 3, and see how Europeans actually raise difficult issues, and how issues 
develop in interaction with what the representatives of the third country say.
Researchers aiming at evaluating EFP compared to unilateral policies would also need to assess more 
thoroughly the impact of bilateral Member State-third country relations, such as bilateral UK-Nigeria, 
UK-Iran, and Germany-Iran relations. Such an analysis would include a more precise assessment of 
how important the EU dimension was for these states, in commercial, diplomatic and military domains.
The learning model needs to be applied to more instances of EFP towards third countries in order to see 
patterns or categories of foreign policy conflicts where learning has been able to develop more strongly 
than others. Applying the wars in the former Yugoslavia directly to the learning model is another
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important task for future research. As a necessary extension o f this study, one needs to add a 
quantitative analysis of EFP towards Nigeria and the group o f West African States that could match the 
methodology used in the study of EFP towards the Gulf States and Iran.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, it would be desirable to extend the model to include interaction among 
Member States with different beliefs and to include the impact o f third parties other than the US. In 
short, looking at the model from, for instance, a game-theoretic angle, and opening up for a collective 
decision-theoretic model using for instance the literature on Condorcet’s Jury Theorem would be the 
next logical step of this model.
Socialization would deserve continued analytical attention taking up the work o f Nuttall, Tonra and 
others. A promising approach to this issue is Michael E. Smith’s model for how the EU “Europeanizes 
the domestic politics o f  its Member States through elite-socialization, bureaucratic adaptation, 
constitutional changes and public opinion” (2000). The location o f  Europeanization in relation to the 
learning model is that some of the ingredients in the concept o f  Europeanization as proposed by 
Michael E. Smith, such as socialization, may be key facilitating elements o f the learning mechanism or 
impediments to learning in those cases where it is underdeveloped. Yet, the whole concept of 
Europeanization, if it is to include public opinion, constitutional changes, elite-socialization and 
bureaucratic adaptation at the same time is probably less operational to be applied to the learning model 
per se, but could function as an important conceptual benchmark in grasping the developments of 
European foreign policies, recognising the fact those are by and large products/combinations o f EU 
Member States’ foreign policies at the EU level.
There is an opportunity and duty to take the analysis of the CFSP into a broader political economic 
discussion, as globalisation and further blurring o f lines between foreign policy and foreign economic 
policy makes any division between the external economic relations and the CFSP obsolete. One may 
suggest such a political economic model applied to the CFSP to include some of the topics that were 
raised like a sector analysis of the impact of the import / export sectors on the CFSP. Such an analysis 
may also look into the annuities of the opportunity costs o f restrictions in various trade, services, and 
FDI, and may elaborate further on the linkage between economic preferences as regards specific goods 
or services and the Union’s institutional competence.
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Finally, it is desirable to increase the number o f observations both in the quantitative analysis, but also 
by providing if possible more detailed survey data on the beliefs key decision-makers hold about the 
workings o f European foreign policy. This project has found a series o f proof items forming a clear 
pattern, pointing to the significance of the learning hypothesis. This includes some important features 
regarding the restrictions on learning in European foreign policy. The strength of the argument is 
probably the variety of analyses that have been imposed on the data and the results o f these that all 
broadly point in the same direction. However, future research should try to elaborate on some Member 
States’, or key actors’ relatively enhanced or diminished ability to learn. Any such finding is vital in the 
continued work towards drawing a more complete map o f learning in European foreign policy.
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ANNEX
Appendix 3.1 Form alisation of the learning model
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the government faces the choice whether to act or not to act towards a 
crisis or conflict situation in international relations.
The expected utility the government receives for acting, U(A), is given by (3.1) below:
(3.1) U(A) = U(S) P(S) + U(F) (l-P (S ))-C (ef.
In (3.1), S stands for success; F for failure and U for expected utility, and C(e) are the costs of 
investing an effort, e, to action at the multilateral (European) level. These costs were described 
under assumption (d) in Section 3.1.
P(S) stands for the probability distribution o f success. P(S) follows
(3.2) P(S) ~ ^ eu + S eE >
where ev is the unilateral capacity and x  is the return to that capacity. 0 is the return to
multilateralism (Europeanism). In (3.2), it is further assumed that the capacity or effectiveness of 
unilateral action is fixed.
The expected utility for not acting, U(N), is given by
(3.3) U(N) = U(N).
Further (as mentioned in the text), the government’s utility for acting, given the three possibilities 
o f 1) acting with a failure, 2) acting with a success and 3) not acting, is ordered as follows from
(3.4) below:
(3.4) U (S )> U (N )> U (F ).
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Given perfect information about the returns to unilateral capacity and multilateral (European) effort, 
jc and 0, the government maximises the utility of acting U(A) given from (3.1) and (3.2). 
Government’s will then act if U*(A) > U(N). U*(A) is the maximum expected utility from acting 
when the government invests the utility maximizing amount o f multilateral effort.
Given imperfect information, the returns to the actions based on unilateral capacity and multilateral 
(European) effort, % and 9, are not known. However, the government holds beliefs about them, as 
expressed in (3.4) and (3.5) below:
(3.4) 7 T = Z 7 Î+ (l-z)n
(3.5) 6 = z 0  + (I-z)n .
In (3.4) and (3.5), ( n \  0’) are the returns to unilateral and multilateral effort if  the correct (or true) 
state of the world corresponds to a situation where the multilateral (European) effort is more 
effective than unilateral action. Similarly (7t, 0) are the returns to unilateral and multilateral effort if 
the correct state o f the world instead represents the situation where unilateral action is more 
effective than multilateral action. Tilde (~) generally expresses that it is a belief.
In order to maximise the government’s utility given by (3.1) above, the government thus now 
maximises (3.1) subject to a probability function based on (3.2), but now expressed in terms o f 
beliefs, as in (3.6) below:
(3.6) P ( S )  = * ev + 0 € £
In (3.6), ?(S)is the government’s belief about the probability o f success given the unilateral 
capacity ev (here assumed constant), and the beliefs about the returns to effort o f respectively
unilateral and European foreign policy, n ,6  . The government acts if  U*(A) > U(N) where U*(A) 
under imperfect information is derived from (3.1) and (3.6). U*(A) is the maximum expected utility 
from acting when the government invests the utility maximizing amount o f multilateral effort. 
Based on the degree o f  Action, A, which corresponds to the maximum utility, the government is 
expected to allocate its effort between unilateral and multilateral foreign policy. Hereby, the beliefs 
held about the workings o f either unilateral effort and multilateral action will alongside the interests
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and the fixed capacity for unilateral action determine the effort attached to European foreign policy. 
One may note that the interests have been assumed constant until now. However, the impact of 
changed preferences for unilateral and multilateral action will be investigated under the derivation 
of the comparative statics effects below.
A formal way to regard the updating o f beliefs over time is to assume that the beliefs z are updated 
according to Bayes Rule, where the future beliefs depends on the previously held beliefs and the 
outcomes in international relations, i.e. where z(t+l) = f  (z(t), outcome).
In Bayesian learning, beliefs converge either to a belief representing the true state o f the world, 
which could be either (ts\  0’) or (ti, 0) or to z* which is the confounded learning belief described in 
the text.
If  one in 3.6 lets z enter explicitly as a parameter o f beliefs, (3.6) may be rewritten as shown in (3.7) 
below,
(3.7) P(z) = P(tc,6 )  = Tzev  + 0e£
One can now compute the posterior beliefs of governments that experience either a successful or 
unsuccessful outcome, since these are following (3.7), and Bayes Rule given by (3.8) and (3.9) 
below.
( 3 . 8 )  s ? . ,  <: , , e E ) - _____________z,  (JT ,e u + 9  'g E )____________________z ,  (JT 'ey + 6 ’e F ) + (1 -  z ,  )( tce„ + Oe F )
( 3 -9) *ƒ+/ (*!»*£ ) =
_____________  z ,  (1 -  it 'eu + 9 e E )______________
z ,  (1 -  7t fc v  -  9  e E ) + (1 -  z ,  )( 1 -  Tcev  -  Q e E )
(3.8) and (3.9) are thus simply substitution of the probability functions into the classical Bayesian 
updating function. (3.8) expresses the posterior beliefs Zt+i in case the government experiences a 
successful outcome. In (3.8), the posterior beliefs zt+i are determined by the prior beliefs, zt and the 
distribution of outcomes of success/failures given these prior beliefs. The fraction expresses how 
much the previously held beliefs and the corresponding allocation of effort corresponded with the 
actual outcome. It thus determines the new posterior weight that needs to be attached to the true 
state of the world (ji\  0’), namely, that European foreign policy is most effective. In (3.9) the 
updating o f beliefs is shown for a government that experiences a failure given the fact that the true 
state of the world still is that European foreign policy is more effective than unilateral policies.
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As mentioned above the interests are in these equations assumed to be constant. However, interests 
enter as a parameter in the allocation o f effort to unilateral or multilateral action. Interests are thus 
expressed implicitly in eu (constant interests) and Qe (constant interests). The comparative statics for 
the Bayesian updating functions (3.8) and (3.9) are shown below.
Appendix 3.2 C om parative statics
The following partial derivatives are computed using the case o f the government experiencing a 
successful outcome as an example, i.e, equation (3.8) above.
A. Change in previously held beliefs
The first effect to be looked at is the impact o f  a change in the previously held beliefs, or the initial 
beliefs, related to the workings of either unilateral or multilateral action. Clearly, changes in Zt may 
either stem from exogenous changes or may be regarded as the effect linked to all previous updating 
o f beliefs, i.e. the learning that has been accumulated until now. The box below shows the partial 
derivatives o f changes in z.
From (3.8) a change in zton zt+i will have the
Effect: 8 z = __________ !___________ .w here „  = * e v  + d e <!-
d z , z , 2 (1 -  a  + 1 / z  , ) 2 7T 'ea + 0  'e E
d z f +]
d z (
> 0 / /  z , * 0 A 7 - or + * 0
The first condition resembles “0” in Figure 3.2. The second condition defines the confounded 
learning belief z*. This maybe seen from simply substitution o f a  into
1 - a  + *£)<=> 1--------- o
a  -  1 z t *
________ 1
7t e v  + 6 e F 
x  'e r, + 8  ’e p
B. Change in the re tu rn s  to m ultilateral (European) foreign policy effort
The second comparative static effect to be investigated is the effect on the posterior beliefs of a 
change in the returns to multilateral efforts. Following derivations similar to above this is given by:
Change in 0 ’, i.e. the re tu rns to m ultilateral effort increases:
( a  +  k  )  p
Effect: d z ?+ 1d o ’ (k + p e ' )2 w here
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a  = z  t 7 t e v  \ p  -  z  t e E ; and  
k  -  z  t n  ’e v  + 7 r e v  + Qe E -  z  t 7 t e v  -  z  t 9 e  E
It can be shown that as long as eE is different from 0, the effect
d 6  '
> 0 always.
C. Change in the re tu rns to unilateral foreign policy capacity
The third comparative static effect to be investigated is the effect o f  a change in the returns to 
unilateral foreign policy capacity on the posterior beliefs.
Change in tt*, i.e. the returns to unilateral capacity increases:
Effect: 3 2 - i ( a + K )  P  w here
d X  ' (fe + 0 X V
a  = z , 9  ’e ii 2 t e u ; and
k  - = z  , 6 'x e u + x e u + 6 e £ -  z ¡x e v -  z , 6  e £
It can be shown that if  ee and eu both are positive (non zero): d z
si + i
d 7Z '
> 0 i f  0 ’ > 0  i 2 -
D. Change in the interests, r.
Finally, the effect on the posterior beliefs o f  a change in the interests, r, can be computed by 
assuming that interests, r, enters in the function for multilateral effort, ec = ee (r). It can be shown
that the posterior beliefs will be positively affected by an increase in r, if  P  e  e  >  q  ,  and the
d r
workings of European foreign policy is truly more effective than the unilateral capacity. Similarly,
a *
if  __— L_ < o ) and the workings o f  European foreign policy is more effective than unilateral 
d r
policies, the posterior beliefs in the workings o f European foreign policy will be negatively affected 
by an increase in the interests, r. This is described in the box below.
From  3.8, it follows tha t a change in r, in terest, on the posterior beliefs, zr+1 will be:
d r
d e E
_______d_r______
(e F P  + a  ) 2
( f e e  £ P  +  CCK
where. OL =  €  y  (  Z  f 7 l  +  7T — Z f 7T )  , 
P  = z  , 6  + 0  -  z , 9  ,
pK e £ -  cop )
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K  — Z  t 0  , and 
co = z  t n  e v
It follows that
d r
- >
° - i f  ’ » 7
>  0 a  k e E p  + aK -  pK e
3 2 , * ,
d r
- >
“ ■i f  7 7
oA
a  e v ( z  tn + n  -  z  tn
( 2  , 9  ' 4- e  - z t e  ) 0} -  <=>
K
d z t + i
d  r
> 0 ,  i f K  (1 -  Z t ) V ± _  
7t 1 +  z  , )  6
d z 0 , if d e
d r  ' d r
resu lt de sc ribed  in  the  text above.
n 8 7t < 8
E -  co/3 > 0 o
) >
<=>
' w h ich  resem bles the
Appendix 4.1 Goldstein’s version (1992) of the W EIS coding scheme
10: [1.0] YIELD
11: [0.6] SURRENDER
12:[0.6] RETREAT
13: [2.0] RETRACT
14: [3.0] ACCOMMODATE, CEASEFIRE
15:[5.0] CEDE POWER
20:[0.0] COMMENT
21: [-0.1] DECLINE COMMENT
22: [-0.4] PESSIMIST COMMENT
23: [-0.2] NEUTRAL COMMENT
24:[0.4] OPTIMIST COMMENT
25:[0.0] EXPLAIN POSITION
26:[1.0] APPOINT OR ELECT
27: [-2.0] ALTER RULES
30: [1.0] CONSULT
31: [1.0] MEET
32: [1.9] VISIT
33: [2.8] RECEIVE
34: [1.0] VOTE, ELECT
40: [3.5] APPROVE
41: [3.4] PRAISE
42: [3.6] ENDORSE
43: [3.8] RALLY
50: [4.0] PROMISE
51: [4.5] PROM POLICY SUPPORT
52:[5.2] PROM MATERIAL SUPPORT
53:[4.5] PROM OTHER SUPPORT
54:[2.8] ASSURE
55:[4.5] PROMISE RIGHTS
60:[2.0] GRANT
61: [1.8] APOLOGIZE
62: [2.5] STATE INVITATION
63: [-1.1] GRANT ASYLUM
64: [5.4] GRANT PRIVILEGE
65: [2.9] TRUCE
66:[1.9] RELEASE
67: [3.5] GRANT POSITION
70: [7.0] REWARD
71: [7.4] EXTEND ECON AID
72: [8.3] EXTEND MIL AID
73: [6.5] GIVE OTHER ASSIST
80: [6.0] AGREE
81: [6.5] MAKE AGREEMENT
82: [3.0] AGREE FUTURE ACT
83: [6.0] ALLY
84: [10.0] MERGE, INTEGRATE
90: [3.0] REQUEST
91: [0.1] ASK INFORMATION
92: [3.4] ASK POLICY AID
93: [3.4] ASK MATERIAL AID
94: [-0.1] CALL FOR
95:[1.2] PLEAD
96:[-0.3] REQUEST POLICY CHANGE
97:[-0.3] REQUEST RIGHTS
100:[0.5] PROPOSE
101:[1.5] OFFER PROPOSAL
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102:[-0.1]URGE
110:[-4.0]REJECT
111:[-4.0]TURN DOWN
112:[-4.0]REFUSE
113:[-5.0]DEFY LAW
120:[-2.0]ACCUSE
121:[-2.2]CRITICIZE
122:[-3.4]DENIGRATE
123:[-1.0]INVESTIGATE
131:[-1.9]MAKE COMPLAINT
132:[-2.4]FORMAL PROTEST
133:[-1.0]SYMBOLIC ACT
140: [-1.0]DENY
141:[-0.9]DENY ACCUSATION
142: [-1.1]DENY ACTION
150:[-4.9]DEMAND
151: [-4.0]ISSUE COMMAND
152:[-5.0]CLAIM RIGHTS
160:[-3.0]WARN
161:[-3.0]WARN POLICIES
162:[-3.0]WARN OF PROBLEM
170:[-6.0]THREATEN
171:[-4.4]UNSPECIF THREAT
172:[-5.8]NONMIL TRHEAT
173:[-7.0]SPECIF THREAT
174: [-6.9]ULTIMATUM
180:[-6.0]DEMONSTRATE
181:[-5.2]NONMIL DEMO
182: [-7.6]MILITARY DEMO
190:[-4.0]REDUCE RELATIONS
191:[-2.2]CANCEL EVENT
192:[-4.1]CUT ROUTINE ACT
193:[-5.6]CUT AID
194:[-3.8]HALT NEGOTIATION
195:[-7.0]BREAK DIPL RELAT
196:[-6.0]STRIKE
197:[-5.0]CENSOR
198:[-4.0]WITHDRAW FROM
200:[-5.0]EXPEL
201:[-5.0]EXPEL PERSONNEL
202:[-4.9]EXPEL GROUP
203:[-5.0]BAN ORGANIZATION
210:[-5.0]SEIZE
211:[-9.2]SEIZE POSSESSION
212:[-4.4]ARREST PERSON
213:[-9.0]HIJACK KIDNAP
220:[-9.0]FORCE
221:[-8.3]NONINJURY DESTR
222:[-8.7]NONMIL DESTR
223:[-10.0]MIL ENGAGEMENT
224:[-7.0]RIOT
225:[-9.0]ASSASSINATE TORTURE 
226:[-8.0]COUP ATTEMPTED
Appendix 4.2 Stationarity/Unit root tests
Phillips-Perron test for unit root
Variable Test Statistic 1% Critical Value 5% Critical Value 10% Critical Value MacKinnon 
approximate 
p-vatue for
mZ (»
Z(t) Z(>) Z(t) Z(>) m Z(>) Z(t)
EFPGU -42.870 -5.256 -19.134 -3.562 -13.404 -2.920 -10.778 -2.595 0.0000
EFPGU 
198 7q3- 
1999ql
-32.966 -4.628 -18.696 -3.600 -13.204 -2.938 -10.640 -2.604 0.0001
EFPGU
1990ql-
1999ql
-26.927 -4.284 -18.016 -3.668 -12.884 -2.966 -10.440 -2.616 0.0005
EFPGU
1984ql-
1999q4
-41.691 -5.420 -19.098 -3.565 -13.388 -2.921 -10.766 -2.596 0.0000
GMSGU -58.345 -6.180 -19.152 -3.560 -13.412 -2.919 -10.784 -2.594 0.0000
GUKFRGEGU -58.123 -6.326 -19.152 -3.560 -13.412 -2.919 -10.784 -2.594 0.0000
GUWO -50.761 -6.265 -19.134 -3.562 -13.404 -2.920 -10.778 -2.595 0.0000
USGU -56.185 -7.581 -19.152 -3.560 -13.412 -2.919 -10.784 -2.594 0.0000
IDEUGU -23.221 -4.567 -19.098 -3.565 -13.388 -2.921 -10.766 -2.596 0.0001
IAVEUGU -20.101 -4.067 -19.098 -3.565 -13.388 -2.921 -10.766 -2.596 0.0011
EDEUGU -61.257 -7.892 -19.098 -3.565 -13.388 -2.921 -10.766 -2.596 0.0000
EAVEUGU -60.450 -6.909 -19.098 -3.565 -13.388 -2.921 -10.766 -2.596 0.0000
YUWO -4.081 -0.370 -18.220 -3.648 -12.980 -2.958 -10.500 -2.612 0-9161
d.YUWD*
YUWOD1
-34.347 -4.945 -18.152 -3.655 -12.948 -2.961 -10.480 -2.613 0.0000
EDEUWO -22.601 -27.98 -18.99 -3.573 -13.340 -2.926 -10.730 -2.598 0.0000
EAVEUWO -9.044 9.044 -18.990 -3.573 -13.340 -2.926 -10.730 -2.598 1.0000
d.EAVEUWO -55.236 87.142 -18.972 -3.574 -13.332 -2.927 -10.724 -2.598 1.0000
EAVEUWO,
Trend
■ • -25.870 -4.139 -19-890 -3.495 -16.870 -3.177 1.0000
EDEUWO -18.990 -3.573 -13.340 -2.926 -10.730 -2.598 1.0000
d.EDEUWO , . -18.972 -3.574 -13.332 -2.927 -10.724 -2.598 1.0000
IAVEUI2 - 
log
IAVEUIRN
-21.277 -2.597 -19.008 -3.572 -13.348 -2.925 -10.736 -2.598 0.0936
IAVEUWO -26.534 -2.473 -18.990 -3.573 -13.340 -2.926 -10.730 -2.598 0.1221
IDEUWO -55.364 -5.577 -18.990 -3.573 -13.340 -2.926 -10.730 -2.598 0.0000
Note: The Phillips-Perron test of unit roots is performed as a regression of a variable on its lags.
Augmented Dickey Fuller
Variable Test Statistic 1% Critical Value 5% Critical Value 10% Critical Value MacKinnon approximate 
p>value for 
Z(t>
Z(t) Z(t) Z(t) m
IAVEUWO -4.309 -3.573 -2.926 -2.598 0.0004
EDEUWO -3.573 -2.926 -2.598 1.0000
d.EDEUWO -3.574 -2.927 -2.590 1.0000
d.EAVEUWO • -3.574 -2.927 -2.598 1.0000
EDEUWO ■ -3.573 -2.926 -2.598 1.0000
d.EDEUWO -3.574 -2.927 -2.598 1.0000
Note: The augmented Dickey Fuller test of unit roots performs a regression of the differenced variables on its lags 
and a specified number of lagged differences of the variable. (Supplementary tests to the Phillips Perron tests).
Results: The hypothesis of unit roots could be rejected for most variables above, however not all. In 
cases where the hypothesis of unit roots failed to be rejected the procedure applied was to difference 
the time series of the relevant variable attempting to obtain stationarity this way. If this failed, a 
time trend was included to see whether this could establish stationarity. Only if both differencing 
and inclusion of time trend failed to reject the unit-root hypothesis the variable was omitted.
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Appendix 4.3 Correlation (Covariance) M atrixes: All Variables
CORRELATION M ATRIXES: M ODEL G U LF VARIABLES
EFPGU GMSGU GUKFRGEGU GUEU GUWO USGU
EFPGU | 1.0000
GMSGU | 0.6696 1.0000
GUKFRGEGU | 0.6262 0.9865 1.0000
GUEU | -0.0848 -0.1553 -0.1754 1.0000
GUWO | -0.8853 -0.6861 -0.6429 0.2034 1.0000
USGU | -0.8056 -0.6831 -0.6632 0.1768 0.8805 1.0000
IDEUGU | 0.4696 0.4286 0.4006 0.1819 -0.3070 -0.2654
IAVEUGU | 0.2800 0.3695 0.3309 0.1173 -0.2029 -0.2268
edeugu i -0.0715 -0.0937 -0.0756 0.0525 0.0092 0.0865
EAVEUGU | -0.1040 -0.1075 -Û.0873 0.0816 0.0506 0.1193
YUWODl t -0.1996 -0.2058 -0.2161 -0.2859 0.0391 0.1145
IDEUWD | * É *
EDEUWO f
XAVEUWO | -0.0077 -0.2801 -0.2918 -0.0626 -0.1112 -0.1592
EAVEUWO | • • * •
1 IDEUGU IAVEUGU EDEUGU EAVEUGU XUWODl IDEUWO
IDEUGU I 1.0000
IAVEUGU | 0.6915 1.0000
EDEUGU I -0.0383 -0.2117 1.0000
EAVEUGU I -0.0021 -0.1726 0.9786 1.0000
YUWOD1 | -0.1174 -0.0190 -0.1019 -0.0876 1.0000
IDEUWD | * 9
EDEUWO | .
IAVEUWO | -0-0400 -0.1119 0.0457 0.0461 0-2518 *
EAVEUWO ! • • • • •
1 EDEUWO IAVEUWO EAVEUWO
EDEUWO I
IAVEUWO | 1.0000
EAVEUWO 1 ■ • •
PAIRW ISE CO RRELA TIO N  CO EFFICIEN TS: M ODEL G U LF VARIABLES
1 EFPGU GMSGU GUKFRGEGU GUEU GUWO USGU
EFPGU 1 1.0000
GMSGU 1 0.4493 1.0000
GUKFRGEGU| 0.3960 0.9869 1.0000
GUEU 1 -0.0698 -0.0939 -0.1150 1.0000
GUWO 1 -0.6065 -0.5415 -0.4940 0.1153 1.0000
USGU 1 -0.5822 -0.7101 -0.6979 0.1374 0.7356 1.0000
IDEUGU 1 0.2651 0.1194 0.0936 0.1259 -0.0235 -0.0915
IAVEUGU 1 0.1698 0.1082 0.0734 0.0459 0.0182 -0.0717
EDEUGU 1 -0.0403 -0.0536 -0.0375 0.0327 0.0194 0.0668
EAVEUGU 1 -0.0225 -0.0177 0.0069 0.0597 0.1035 0.0497
YUWOD1 1 -0.0722 -0.4171 -0.4432 -0.2273 0.1198 0.3268
IDEUWO 1 -0.0385 -0.0510 -0.0521 0.0321 0.0354 0.0079
EDEUWO t » *
IAVEUWO 1 -0.0486 -0.3004 -0.3151 -0.0377 -0.1132 -0.1298
EAVEUWO 1 • • • • • •
I IDEUGU IAVEUGU EDEUGU EAVEUGU YUWODl IDEUWO
IDEUGU 1 1.0000
IAVEUGU I 0.8212 1.0000
EDEUGU 1 0.0027 -0.1036 1.0000
EAVEUGU 1 0.1315 0.0004 0.9471 1.0000
YUWODl f 0.1021 0.2268 -0.0490 -0.0655 1.0000
IDEUWO 1.0000
EDEUWO 1 * .
IAVEUWO 1 -0.0572 -0.1121 0.0250 -0.0010 0.2518 0.0259
EAVEUWO 1 • • • •
! EDEUWO IAVEUWO EAVEUWO
EDEUWO 1
IAVEUWO I 1.0000
EAVEUWO 1
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Appendix 4.4 , Extended version o f the results shown In Table 4.2-4.3
TABLE 4.2
AR (1) TESTS OF GULF DATA FOR EFP ON SEPARATE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
All estimates uses robust estimators (i.e. the Huber/White/Sandwich estimator of 
variance was used in place of the traditional calculation) .
EFPGU AR(1) robust
Sample: 1983q2 to 1999ql
Number of obs * 64
Wald *2(1) = 2.75, Pr > x2 = 0.0970
Log likelihood = -278.742____________________________
EFPGU
1
1 Coef.
Semi-robust 
Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
EFPGU
_cons
1
1 10.33791 3.4852 2.966 0.003 3.507047 17.16878
ARMA
ar
1
1
L I | .3453866 .2081341 1.659 0.097 -.0625487 .7533219
1 18.82936 4.250414 4.430 0.000 10.4987 27.16002
EFPGU GMSGU AR<1) robust
Sample: 1983q2 to 1999ql
Number of obs ■ 64
Wald x2(2) = 12.43, Pr > x2 - 0.0020
Log likelihood ■ -272.2339__________
I Semi-robust
EFPGU 1 Coef. Std. Err. z P>lz| [95% Conf. Interval]
EFPGU
GMSGU
1
1 .0827631 .0407072 2.033 0.042 .0029784 .1625478
ARMA
ar
LI
1
1
1 .3530549 .1223909 2.885 0.004 .1131732 .5929366
c 1 17.00788 3.011145 5.648 0.000 11.10615 22.90962
EFPGU GUKFRGEGU AR(1) robust
Sample: 1983q2 to 1999ql
Number of obs - 64
Wald x2(2) = 11.26, Pr > x2 - 0.0036
Log likelihood ■= -274.3124__________
!
EFPGU | Coef.
Semi-robust 
Std. Err. z P>lz| [95% Conf. Interval]
EFPGU | 
GUKFRGEGU | .0841228 .0478254 1.759 0.079 -.0096131 .1778588
ARMA | 
ar l 
LI I .3785518 .1344475 2.816 0.005 .1150395 .6420641
<y l 17.56631 3.113409 5.642 0.000 11.46414 23.66848
EFPGU GUWO AS.il) robust
Sample: 1983q2 to 1999ql
Number of obs = 64
Wald x2(2} = 16.10, Pr > x2 = 0.0003 
Log likelihood = -264.0265__________
EFPGU
1
1 Coef.
Semi-robust 
Std. Err. z P> ] z 1 [95% Conf. Interval]
EFPGU
GUWO
1
1 -.0190681 .004753 -4.012 0.000 -.0283838 -.0097525
ARMA
ar
LI
o
1
1
1
1
.4109131
14.95484
.152825
2.650733
2.689
5.642
0.007
0.000
.1113816
9.7595
.7104446
20.15018
EFPGU USGU ARtl) robust
Sample: 1983q2 to 1999ql
Number of obs = 64
Wald *2(2] = 60.12, Pr > *2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -264.0566_________
1
EFPGU l Coef.
Semi-robust 
Std. Err. z P>|zl [95% Conf. Interval]
EFPGU | 
USGU | -.0386026 .0056309 -6.855 0.000 -.049639 -.0275661
ARMA | 
ar l 
LI I .5117544 .1436582 3.562 0.000 .2301895 .7933192
a t 14.94866 3.055632 4.892 0.000 8.959727 20.93758
EFPGU YUWOD1 AR(1) robust
Sample: 1989q2 to 1999ql
Number of obs * 40
Wald x2(2) = 6.10, Pr > x2 = 0.0475
Log likelihood ~ -185.1341_________
I Semi-robust
EFPGU 1 Coef. Std. Err. z P>l z] [95% Conf. Interval]
EFPGU
YUW0D1
1
) -.0118329 .0271377 -0.436 0.663 -.0650217 .0413559
ARMA
ar
LI
1
1
1 .4725619 .2216782 2.132 0.033 .0380805 .9070432
d 1 24.68581 5.409788 4.563 0.000 14.08282 35.2888
EFPGU EDEUGU AR(1> robust
Sample: 1984ql to 1999ql
Number of obs = 61
Wald x2(2) = 5.77, Pr > *2 - 0.0559 
Log likelihood ~ -270.1093_________
EFPGU
1
1 Coef.
Semi-robust 
Std. Err. z P>lzi [95% Conf. Interval]
EFPGU
EDEUGU
1
l -2.80e-08 7.13e-07 -0.039 0.969 -1.42e-06 1.37e-06
ARMA
ar
LI
i
1
1 .4835794 .2204522 2.194 0.028 .0515011 .9156578
a l 20.22929 4.369591 4.630 0.000 11.66505 28.79353
EFPGU EAVEUGU AR(1) robust
Sample: 1984ql to 1999ql
Number of obs ■= 61
Wald x2(2) * 10.29, Pr > x2 = 0.0058
Log likelihood = -268.453_________
| Semi-robust
EFPGU 1 Coef. Std. Err. z P>l z 1 [95% Conf. Interval]
EFPGU l 
EAVEUGU I .0237099 .0112588 2.106 0.035 .001643 .0457767
ARMA | 
ar I 
LI I .3502402 .220888 1.586 0.113 -.0826924 .7831728
a 1 19.70568 4.494505 4.384 0.000 10.89662 28.51475
EFPGU IAVEUWO AR(1) robust
Sample: 1983q2 to 1997ql
Number of obs = 56
Wald x2(2) - 2.72, Pr > y 2 = 0.2567 
Log likelihood = -237.5368
2 3 4
EFPGU
1
1 Coef.
Semi-robust 
Std. Err. z P>l 2| [95% Conf. Interval]
EFPGU 1
IAVEUWO 1 12.11237 7.914979 1.530 0.126 -3.400709 27.62544
ARMA i
ar t
LI 1 .5165819 .3166486 1.631 0.103 -.1040379 1.137202
a 1 16.77709 4.271799 3.927 0.000 8.404513 25.14966
EFPGU IDEUWO AR(1) robust
Sample: 1983q2 to 1997ql
Number of obs * 56
Wald *2(2) * 186.08, Pr > * 0.0000
Log likelihood - -240.9267__________
EFPGU
1
1 Coef.
Semi-robust 
Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
EFPGU l
IDEUWO I 3.195061 .3500935 9.126 0.000 2.50889 3.881231
ARMA 1
ar 1
LI 1 .5525612 .2904802 1.902 0.057 -.0167695 1.121892
<r I 17.81391 4.546565 3.918 0.000 8.902807 26.72501
TABLE 4.3: AR(1) TESTS OF GULF DATA FOR EFP ON ALL SIGNIFICANT EXPLANATORY 
VARIABLES (AGGREGATE MODEL)
All estimates use robust estimators (i.e. the Huber/White/Sand wich estimator of variance was used in place of the 
traditional calculation).
EFPGU GUKFRGEGU USGU GUWO GMSGU EAVEUGU IDEUWO AR(1) robust
Note: IDEUWO dropped due to collinearity.
Sample: 1984ql to 1997ql
Number of obs = 53
Wald x2<6) - 503.73, Pr > x2 = 0.0000
Log likelihood ~ -194.2529____________________________________________________________________
t Semi-robust
EFPGU ] Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
EFPGU |
GUKFRGEGU | -.0303784 .0591286 -0.514 0.607 -.1462683 .0855116
USGU | -.0265665 .0088664 -2.996 0.003 -.0439443 -.0091887
GUWO | -.0089979 .004749 -1.895 0.058 -.0183057 .0003099
GMSGU | .0372889 .0536772 0.695 0.487 -.0679164 .1424942
EAVEUGU | -.0018713 .0068349 -0.274 0.784 -.0152675 .0115248
ARMA |
ar |
LI | .5869094 .1742662 3.368 0.001 .2453539 .9284648
o 9.413932 1.419327 6.633 0.000 6.632102 12.19576
EFPGU GMSGU GUKFRGEGU GUWO USGU EAVEUGU IDEUWO ROBUST TEST IN PERIOD 1984ql-1997ql
Sample: 1984ql to 1997ql
Number of obs = 53
Wald x2(6) = 503.73, Pr > x2* 0.0000
Log likelihood = -194.2529
1 Semi-robust
EFPGU 1 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
EFPGU !
GMSGU | .0372889 .0536772 0.695 0.487 -.0679164 .1424942
GUKFRGEGU| -.0303784 .0591286 -0.514 0.607 -.1462683 .0855116
GUWO | -.0089979 .004749 -1.895 0.058 -.0183057 .0003099
USGU | -.0265665 .0088664 -2.996 0.003 -.0439443 -.0091837
EAVEUGU | -.0018713 .0068349 -0.274 0.784 -.0152675 .0115248
ARMA 1
ar 1
LI 1 .5869094 . 1742662 3.368 0.001 .2453539 .9284648
o 1 9.413932 1.419327 6.633 0.000 6.632102 12.19576
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EFPGU GMSGU GUKFRGEGU GUWO USGU EAVEUGU IDEUWO Robust TEST IN PERIOD 1983q2-1993q4
Note: ideuwo dropped due to collinearity.
Sample: 1984ql to 1993q4
Number of obs *= 40
Wald x2<6) - 1259.09, Pr > x2 * 0.0000
Log likelihood ■ -140.8919_______________________________________ ________________
| Semi-robust
EFPGU l Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval)
EFPGU
GMSGU
1
l .0033033 .0473799 0.070 0.944 -.0895595 .0961662
GUKFRGEGU| .0134049 .0512169 0.262 0.794 -.0869783 .1137881
GUWO 1 -.0121667 .0051992 -2.340 0.019 -.022357 -.0019764
USGU 1 -.0180149 .007747 -2.325 0.020 -.0331988 -.002831
EAVEUGU t -.0107253 .010714 -1.001 0.317 -.0317244 .0102738
ARMA 1
ar 1
L I 1 .674211 .1172322 5.751 0.000 .4444401 .9039819
a 1 8.131674 1.35204 6.014 0.000 5.481724 10.78162
EFPGU GMSGU GUKFRGEEGU GUWO USGU EAVEUGU IDEUWO Robust TEST IN PERIOD 1987q3-1997ql
Note: ideuwo dropped due to collinearity.
Sample: 1987q3 to 1997ql
Number of obs * 39
Wald x2(6) - 482.59, Pr > x2 * 0.0000 
Log likelihood =* -146.7897
EFPGU 1 coef.
Semi-robust 
Std. Err. z P>l 2 1 [95% Conf. Interval]
EFPGU 1 
GMSGU 1 .0511501 .0566153 0.903 0.366 -.0598138 .1621139
GUKFRGEGU| -.0507334 .0636352 -0.797 0.425 -.1754561 .0739892
GUWO 1 -.0099329 .006282 -1.581 0.114 -.0222454 .0023795
USGU | -.0260074 .0110842 -2.346 0.019 -.047732 -.0042828
EAVEUGU | -.0020472 .0071643 -0.286 0.775 -.016089 .0119947
ARMA I 
ar 1 
LI 1 .629928 .1888933 3.335 0.001 .259704 1.000152
<T 1 10.36431 1.68424 6.154 0.000 7.063264 13.66537
EFPGU GMSGU GUKFRGEEGU GUWO USGU EAVEUGU IDEUWO Robust TEST IN PERIOD 1990ql-1997ql 
Note: ideuwo dropped due to collinearity.
Sample: 1990ql to 1997ql
Number of obs = 29
Wald x2(6) = 432.16, Pr > x2 - 0.0000 
Log likelihood m -110.0361___________
1
EFPGU 1 Coef.
Semi-robust 
Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
EFPGU | 
GMSGU I .0367807 .071682 0.513 0.608 -.1037135 .1772748
GUKFRGEGU 1 -.0352752 .0810669 -0.435 0.663 -.1941633 .1236129
GUWO I -.0159209 .0124689 -1.277 0.202 -.0403594 .0085176
USGU I -.0197164 .0192414 -1.025 0.306 -.057429 .0179961
EAVEUGU | -.0027735 .0125426 -0.221 0,825 -.0273564 .0218095
ARMA I 
ar 1 
Ll ] .481913 .3920387 1.229 0.219 -.2864688 1.250295
CF 1 10.70713 2.097588 5.104 0.000 6.595934 14.81833
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EFPGU GMSGU GUKFRGEEGU GUWO USGU EAVEUGU IDEUWO Robust TEST IN PERIOD 1990ql-l997ql
Note: ideuwo dropped due to collinearity.
Sample: 1990ql to I997ql
Number of obs * 29
Wald x2 (6) = 447.49, Pr > x2 =* 0.0000
Log likelihood = -108.9819_____________________________________
I Semi-robust
EFPGU I Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 195% Conf. Interval]
-------- +--
EFPGU | 
GMSGU | 
GUKFRGEGU | 
GUWO 1 
USGU I 
EAVEUGU |
.0286733
-.0168255
-.032285
.0016247
-.0272242
.090464
.1023913
.0061359
.0110929
.0140356
0.317
-0.164
-5.262
0.146
-1.940
0.751
0.869
0.000
0.884
0.052
-.1486328
-.2175088
-.0443112
-.0201171
-.0547334
.2059795
.1838578
-.0202588
.0233664
.0002851
ARMA I 
ar 1 
L3 I .5228017 .2577232 2.029 0.043 .0176734 1.02793
o 1 10.20168 1.593439 6.402 0.000 7.078596 13.3247
Appendix 4.5 Test for im pact o f exclusion of either USW O o r GUWO
EFPGU GMSGU GUKFRGEGU USGU EAVEUGU robust
Sample: 19S4ql to 1999ql
Number of obs = 61
Wald |2 (5) = 65.34; Pr > ¡2 - 0.0000
Log likelihood = -248. 9926
1 Semi-robust
EFPGU [ Coef. Std. Err. z P>UI [95% Conf. Interval]
EFPGU |
GMSGU | .247156 .1261967 1.958 0.050 -.0001851 .494497
GUKFRGEGU | -.2675032 .1382142 -1.935 0.053 -.5383981 .0033917
USGU | -.0351037 .0074237 -4.729 0.000 -.0496539 -.0205535
EAVEUGU | .0070769 .0061317 1.154 0.248 -.0049409 .0190948
ARMA |
ar |
LI I .4072185 .1539991 2.644 0.008 .1053859 .7090512
a 1 14.3166 2.901081 4.935 0.000 8.630587 20.00261
EFPGU Q-iSGU GUKFRGEGU GUWO EAVEUGU robust
Sample: 1984ql to 1999ql
Number of obs = 61
wald 12 <5) = 29.73; Pr > |2 - 0.0000
Log likelihood * -250 6275
1 Semi-robust
EFPGU | Coef. Std. Err. z P>lzl [95% Conf. Interval]
EFPGU |
GMSGU I .1427639 .1291548 1.105 0.269 -.1103749 .3959026
GUKFRGEGU1 -.130896 .1399009 -0.936 0.349 -.4050968 .1433048
GUWO I -.0167991 .0048035 -3.497 0.000 -.0262137 -.0073845
EAVEUGU | -. 011B708 .0092166 -1.288 0.198 -.0299349 .0061934
ARMA |
ar |
LI I .3786966 .1191403 3.179 0.001 .145186 .6122073
f f 14.70842 2.866216 5.132 O.COO 9.090738 20.3261
EFPGU GMSGU GUKFRGEGU USGU EAVEUGU robust in period 1983q2-1993q4
Sample: 1984ql to 1993q4
Number of obs = 40
Wald chi2(5) = 325.88; Pr > chi2 - 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -145.3505
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]
EFPGU I Coef.
Semi-robust 
Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
EFPGU I 
GMSGU I 
GUKFRGEGU | 
USGU | 
EAVEUGU |
.0710869
-.0524269
-.0336026
.0088166
.0532802
.0588936
.0036641
.0088455
1.334
-0.890
-9.171
0.997
0.182
0.373
0.000
0.319
-.0333403
-.1678562
-.040784
-.0085203
.1755141
.0630025
-.0264211
.0261534
ARMA | 
ar | 
LI | .6090642 .152958 3.982 0.000 .3092721 .9088563
f 1 9.107239 1.880662 4.843 0.000 5.421208 12.79327
EFPGU GMSGU GUKFRGEGU USGU EAVEUGU robust in period 1987q3-1997ql
Sample: 1987q3 to 1997ql
Number of obs = 39
Wald chi2(5] - 415.77; Pr > chi2 = 0.0000
Loq likelihood = -148. 9583
1 Semi-robust
EFPGU I Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
EFPGU I
GMSGU I .1244127 .0727946 1.709 0.087 -.0182621 .2670875
GUKFRGEGU| -.124528 .0761027 -1.636 0.102 -.2736865 .0246305
USGU I -.0385052 .0039813 -9.672 0.000 -.0463085 -.030702
EAVEUGU | .0042628 .0050833 0.839 0.402 -.0057003 .0142259
ARMA I
ar | >
LI 1 .617267 .2047168 3.015 0.003 .2160294 1.018505
r i 10.96105 1.838646 5.961 0.000 7.357372 14.56473 -
EFPGU GMSGU GUKFRGEGU USGU EAVEUGU robust in period 1990ql-1997ql
Sample: 1990ql to 1997ql
Number of Obs = 29
Wald 12(5) - 404.93 Pr > |2 * 0,0000
Log likelihood * -112. 9035
1 Semi-robust
EFPGU I Coef. Std. Err. z P>l z] [95% Conf. Interval]
EFPGU |
GMSGU l .1391139 .1028435 1.353 0.176 -.0624558 .3406835
GUKFRGEGU1 -.1418489 .102361 -1.386 0.166 -.3424728 .0587749
USGU I -.0398291 .0045137 -8.824 0.000 -.0486756 -.0309825
EAVEUGU 1 .005875 .0053007 1.108 0.263 -.0045141 .0162641
ARMA 1
ar 1
LI I .6114353 .250323 2.443 0.015 .1208114 1.102059
f 1 11.77835 2.213738 5.321 0.000 7.439498 16.11719
EFPGU GMSGU GUKFRGEGU GUWO robust in period 1983q2- L993q4
Sample: 1983q2 to 1993q4
Number of obs = 43
Wald l2(4) = 112.50, Pr > \z * 0.0000
Log likelihood = -156 7123
1 Semi-robust
EFPGU 1 Coef. Std. Err. z P>] ZI [95% Conf. Interval]
EFPGU 1
GMSGU 1 -.0188213 .0562279 -0.335 0.738 -.1290259 .0913833
GUKFRGEGU 1 .0545116 .0592641 0.920 0.358 -.061644 .1706672
GUWO 1 -.0188709 .0034692 -5.440 0.000 -.0256704 -.0120715
ARMA
ar 1
LI I .7393312 .0982341 7.526 0.000 .5467959 .9318665
r i 9.173642 .8437483 10.872 0.000 7.519926 10.82736
EFPGU GMSGU GUKFRGEGU GUWO robust in period 1987q3-1997ql
Sample: I987q3 to 1997ql
Number of obs * 39
Wald |2{4) - 106.07, Pr > |2 - 0.0000
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Log likelihood = -152.1988
1
EFPGU 1 Coef.
Semi-robust 
Std. Err. z P>|zl [95% Coni. Interval]
EFPGU 1 
GMSGU 1 
GUKFRGEGU | 
GUWO !
.0014661 
.0266677 
-. C202914
.0729284
.0759542
.0030725
0.020
0.351
-6.604
0.984
0.726
0.000
-.1414509
-.1221999
-.0263135
.1444231
.1755352
-.0142693
ARMA 1 
ar 1 
LI [ .6301948 .1789739 3.521 O.COO .2794127 .980977
f I 11.907 1.988726 5.987 0.000 8.009169 15.80483
EFPGU GMSGU GUKFRGEGU GUWO robust 1990ql-1997ql
Sample: I990ql to 1997ql
Number of obs = 29
Wald 12 {4 ) = 264.78; Pr > |2 - 0.0000
Log likelihood = -112.6195
1 Semi-robust
EFPGU 1 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|zl (95% Coni. Interval]
EFPGU 1
GMSGU 1 -.0156609 .0840477 -0.186 0.852 -.1803913 .1490696
GUKFRGEGUI .0332241 .0876821 0.379 0.705 -.1386296 .2050778
GUWO ! -.0246839 .0034364 -7.183 0.000 -.0314192 -.0179487
ARMA 1
ar 1
LI 1 .4067721 .1842634 2.208 0.027 .0456225 .7679217
r \ 11.72086 2.314368 5.064 0.000 7.184781 16.25694
Appendix 4.6 Test for alternative G ulf model specification 1990ql-1997ql
EFPGU GMSGU GUKFRGEGU USGU GUWO EAVEUGU AR(3) period 1990ql - 1997ql robust
Sample: 1990ql to 1997ql
Number of obs = 29
Wald b (6) = 447.49; Pr > l2 = 0.0000
Log likelihood * -108. 9819
1 Semi-robust
EFPGU 1 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Coni. Interval]
EFPGU 1
GMSGU 1 .0286733 .090464 0.317 0.751 -.1486328 .2059795
GUKFRGEGU1 -.0168255 .1023913 -0.164 0.869 -.2175088 .1838578
USGU 1 .0016247 .0110929 0.146 0.884 -.0201171 .0233664
GUWO 1 -.032285 .0061359 -5.262 0.000 -.0443112 -.0202588
EAVEUGU 1 -.0272242 .0140356 -1.940 0.052 -.0547334 .0002851
ARMA 1
ar t
L3 1 .5228017 .2577232 2.029 0.043 .0176734 1.02793
r 1 10.20163 1.593439 6.402 0.000 7.078596 13.32476
EFPGU GMSGU GUKFRGEGU USGU GUWO EAVEUGU AR(2] period 1990ql - 1997ql robust
Sample: 1990ql to 1997ql
Number of obs = 29
Wald chi2(6 = 283.70, Pr > chi2 = 0 0000
Log likelihood = -111. 3972
1 Semi-robust
EFPGU 1 Coef. Std. Err. 2 ?>|Z] [95% Conf. Interval]
EFPGU 1
GMSGU [ .0197585 .1274184 0.155 0.877 -.229977 .2694941
GUKFRGEGU f -.0089885 .1437001 -0.063 0.950 -.2906356 .2726585
USGU 1 -.0062531 .0112573 -0.555 0.579 -.0283171 .0158108
GUWO 1 -.0268577 .0065179 -4 .122 0.000 -.0396425 -.014093
EAVEUGU 1 - .0166203 .0033036 -2.002 0.045 -.032895 -. CC03455
ARMA 1
ar !
L2 ! .0803317 .1836648 0.440 0.660 -.2791447 .440808
f 1 11.26904 2.170424 5.192 0.000 7.015089 15.52299
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HiMMWVWWWWWw
uEFPGU GMSGU GUKFRGEGU USGU GUWO EAVEUGU AR<4> period 1990ql - 1997ql robust
Sample: 1990ql to 1997ql
Number of obs = 2 9  . ,
Wald chi2(6) - 596.91; Pr > chi2 * 0.0000 
Log likelihood » -111.4102_______________
1 Semi-robust
EFPGU 1 Coef. Std. Err. z P>| z| [95% Conf. Interval]
EFPGU
GMSGU
1
1 ,0220837 .1337223 0.165 0.869 -.2400071 .2841745
GUKFRGEGU| -.0090371 .1491397 -0.061 0.952 -.3013455 .2832713
USGU 1 -.0035522 .0107999 -0.329 0.742 -.0247196 .0176152
GUWO 1 -.0279987 .0063464 -4.412 0.000 -.0404374 -.01556
EAVEUGU 1 -.0194081 .0077221 -2.513 0.012 -.0345432 -.004273
ARMA I
ar 1
L4 1 -.1186997 .3339502 -0.355 0.722 -.77323 .5358307
f 1 11.26517 2.047587 5.502 0.000 7.251974 15.27837
Appendix 4.7 O LS tests fo r various lags o f EFP in period 1990-1997
The estimation is based on the Prais-Winsten regression. As mentioned in the text, the Prais- 
Winsten estimator is a generalised least squares estimator. In all estimations below, the SSE search 
has been used. SSE search is performed for the value of ) that minimises the sum of squared errors 
o f the transformed equation. The regressions have been performed with robust standard errors.
PRAIS EFPGU EFPGU*. i GMSGU GUKFRGEGU GUWO USGU EAVEUGU EDEUGU 1AVEUGU YUWOD1
Number o f  o bs  -  29
F { 9 ,20) = 10.03
Pr > F = 0.0000
R2 - 0.8884
Root MSE = 11.396
Durbin-Watson statistic (original) 1.929497 
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 1.958874
1 Semi-robust
EFPGU 1 coef. Std. Err. t P»|t| [95% Conf, Interval]
EFPGU 1
LI | .1368873 .08036 1.70 0.104 -.0307407 .3045153
GMSGU | -.0408384 .1241676 -0.33 0.746 -.2998475 .2181707
GUKFRGEGU | .0391188 .1374137 0.28 0.779 -.2475211 .3257587
GUWO | -.0281535 .0065523 -4.30 0.000 -.0418214 -.0144856
USGU I -.0039911 .0133378 -0.30 0.768 -.0318133 .0238311
EAVEUGU t -.0890103 .0716965 -1.24 0.229 -.2385665 .0605459
EDEUGU ] 7.96e-06 7.08e-06 1.12 0.275 -6.82e-06 .0000227
1AVEUGU | .0986663 .0964952 1.02 0.319 -.1026191 .2999517
YUWOD1 | -.0517797 .0241024 -2.15 0.044 -.1020564 -.001503
p | .0719845
PRAIS EFPGU EFPGUt-i EFPGU*.: GMSGU GUKFRGEGU GUWO USGU EAVEUGU EDEUGU IAVEUGU YUWODl in period
1990ql-1997ql
Number of obs = 29
FUO, 19) = 38.45
Pr > F = 0.0000
R2 = 0.9086
Root MSE = 11.475
Durbin-Watson statistic (original) 2.011873
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 1.970799
1 Semi-robust
EFPGU I Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
EFPGU 1
LI t .1871382 .0886695 2.11 0.048 .0015507 .3727257
L2 1 -.1080556 .0573455 -1.88 0.075 -.228081 .0119698
GMSGU [ -.0288597 .1347885 -0.21 0.833 -.3109753 .2532559
GUKFRGEGU I .0435059 .1531597 0.28 0.779 -.277061 .3640728
GUWO | -.0312944 .0059553 -5.25 0.000 -.043759 -.0188298
USGU | .0039243 .0118448 0.33 0.744 -.0208672 .0287159
EAVEUGU | -.0750394 .0629661 -1.19 0.248 -.206829 .0567502
EDEUGU 1 £.36e-06 6.32e-06 1.01 0.327 -6.87e-06 .0000196
IAVEUGU 1 .0700264 .0373835 C.80 0.433 -.1128694 .2529221
YUWODl | -.0545304 .0254039 -2.15 0.045 -.1077013 -.0013594
> 1 -.0722432
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PRAIS EFPGU EFPGUt-i EFPGU*-, EFPGU*-, GMSGU GUKFRGEGU GUWO USGU EAVEUGU EDEUGU IAVEUGU YUWOD1 in period 
1990ql to 1997ql
note: EFPGU dropped due to collinearity 
Number of obs * 29
F (10,19) = 12.44
Pr > F = 0.0000
R2 = 0.9091
Root MSE = 17.701
Durbin-watson statistic (original) 2.564933
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 2.642868______________________________________________________
l Semi-robust
L.EFPGU 1 Coef. Std. Err. t F> 1 11 195% Conf. Interval]
EFPGU
L2
1
1 .7319011 .1458235 5.02 0.000 .426689 1.037113
1 .654033 .2758992 2.37 0.028 .0765694 1.231497
GMSGU 1 -.1221505 .1417613 -0.86 0.400 -.4188604 .1745594
GUKFRGEGU 1 .0715401 .1202094 0.60 0,559 -.1800609 .3231412
GUWO 1 .0071908 .0139194 0.52 0.611 -.0219429 .0363244
USGU 1 -.0241945 .0154642 -1.56 0.134 -.0565615 .0081725
EAVEUGU 1 .0280299 .0669986 0.42 0.680 -.1121998 .1682595
EDEUGU 1 -3.31e-06 6.41e-06 -0.52 0.611 -.0000167 .0000101
IAVEUGU 1 -.0206276 .0944626 -0.22 0.829 -.21834 .1770849
YUWOD1 1 .0101818 .0205819 0.49 0.626 -.0328966 .0532603
> 1 -.8244055
Appendix 5.1 Phiilips-Perron test for unit root/Interpolated D ickey-Fuller (63 obs)
Variable
GEFPIR
Test
Statistic
Z ( rh o ) 
Z(t)
1% Critical 
Value
-46.246
-5.585
5% Critical 
Value
-19.134
-3.562
10% Critical 
Value
-13.404
-2.920
Mackinnon appro­
ximate p-value for Z(t)
-10.778 0.0000 
-2.595
GEFPIR 1987q3‘-1999ql
Z( r ho)
Z( t )
-35.452
-4.924
-18.696
-3.600
-13.204
-2.938
-10.640
-2.604
0.0000
GEFPIR 1983q2'-1993q4
Z( r ho)  
Z ( t  >
-48.440
-7.429
-18.356
-3.634
-13.044
-2.952
-10.540
-2.610
0.0000
GEFPIR 1990ql -1999ql
Z ( rho)  
Z( t )
-28.532
-4.459
-18.016
-3.668
-12.884
-2.966
-10.440
-2.616
0.0002
OlSIR Z ( rho)  
Z i t )
-33.766
-4.960
-18.990
-3.573
-13.340
-2.926
-10.730
-2.598
0.0000
GUKFRGEIRN Z ( rho)  
Z( t )
-38.430
-5.215
-19.134
-3.562
-13.404
-2.920
-10.778
-2.595
0.0000
NIRNEU Z( r ho)  
Z( t )
-63.060
-8.452
-19.134
-3.562
-13.404
-2.920
-10.778
-2.595
0.0000
IRWO Z( r ho)  
Z( t )
-10.216
-2.424
-19.134
-3.562
-13.404
-2.920
-10.778
-2.595
0.1350
d.IRWO 
* IRWOl
Z ( rho)  
Z ( t )
-69.737
-9.319
-19.116
-3.563
-13.396
-2.920
-10.772
-2.595
0.0000
USIR Z( r ho)  
Z( t )
-31.006
-4.873
-19.098
-3.565
-13.388
-2.921
-10.766
-2.596
0.0000
IDEUIR Z( r ho)  
Z( t )
-34.798
6912.432
-19.008
-3.572
-13.348
-2.925
-10.736
-2.598
1.0000
IAVEURIN Z ( rho)  
Z(t)
-21.434
328.184
-19.008
-3.572
-13.348
-2.925
-10.736
-2.593
1.0000
d. IDEUIR Z( r ho)  
Z( t )
-57.566
54994.581
-18.990
-3.573
-13.340
-2.926
-10.730
-2.598
1.0000
EDEUIRN Z( r ho)  
Z( t )
-9.307
178548.320
-19.008
-3.572
-13.348
-2.925
-10.736
-2.598
1.0000
EAVEUIRN Z( r ho) -5.418 -19.008 -13.348 -10.736 1.0000
241
11,11 M,BUUtil
z it) 1027.622 -3.572 -2.925 -2.598
d . EAVEUIRN* 
EAVEUIRD
2 (rho) 
2 (t)
-69.823
241.592
-18.990
-3.573
-13.340
-2.926
-10.730
-2.598
1.0000
d.edeuim
=EDEUIRND
Z(rho) 
Z(t)
-79.C7S
-241892.736
-18.990
-3.573
-13.340
-2.926
-10.730
-2.598
0.0000
IAVEURIN,trend
Z(rho) 
Z(t)
-22.141
281.537
-25.904
-4.137
-19.908
-3.494
-16.884
-3.176
1.0000
Augmented Dickey F u ller (supplem entary tests to the Phillips P erron  tests)
IDEUIR 2 (t) -5.261 -3.572 -2.925 -2.598 0.0000
IAVEURIN 2 (t) -3.947 -3.572 -2.925 -2.598 0.0017
IAVEURIN, trend
Z(t) -3.919 -4.137 -3.494 -3.176 0.0114
IDEUIR 2 it) -5.261 -3.572 -2.925 -2.598 0.0000
IAVEUI2 Zlt) -3.863 -3.572 -2.925 -2.598 0.0023
EAVEUIRD z It) -9.619 -3.573 -2.926 -2.598 0.0000
Note: When differenced one time NIRWO and EDHUIR became stationary (NIRWOI, EDEUIR1). 
IAVEUIRN clearly seemed to include a trend. Indeed, the Augmented Dickey Fuller Test for the 
variable including a trend term could reject the hypothesis of a unit root. However, including the trend 
could still not reject the unit root hypothesis under the Phillips-Perron test. As mentioned in the text 
IDEUIR and EAVEUIRN were both kept in the mode. While IDEUIR and EAVEUIRN failed to reject 
the unit root hypothesis with the Phillips-Perron test, it passed the Dickey-Fuller test.
Appendix 5.2 C orrellogram s
Including AC, PAC, Q-statistics and graphical expression o f AC/PAC, shown for 10 lags
GEFPIR
-1 0 1 -1 0
LAG AC PAC Q Prob>Q Autocorrelation Partial Autocor
1 0.3012 0.3017 6.0816 0.0137 l — 1 —
2 0.1405 0.0549 7.4262 0.0244 1 - l
3 0.2805 0.2566 12.873 0.0049 1 — 1 —
4 0.1284 -0.0306 14.034 0.0072 1 - 1
5 0.2909 0.3039 20.094 0.0012 1 — 1 —
6 0.0071 -0.3003 20.093 0.0027 1 —  1
NIRNEU
-1 0 1 -1 0
LAG AC PAC Q Frofc»Q Autocorrelation Partial Autocor
1 -0.0466 -0.0466 .1454 0.7030 l 1
2 -0.1279 -0.1305 1.2607 0.5324 -1 -1
3 0.1012 0.0899 1.9693 0.5788 1 1
4 -0.0732 -0.0859 2.3464 0.6723 1 1
5 -0.0042 0.0119 2.3477 0.7992 1 1
6 -0.0809 -0.1543 2.8246 0.8305 1 -1
USIR
-1 0 1 -1 0
LAG AC PAC Q prob>Q Autocorrelation Partial Autocor
1 0.4603 0.4617 13.992 0.0002 l-- 1--
2 0.1196 -0.1268 14.953 0.0006 1 -t
3 0.2207 0.2850 18.279 0.0004 1 - 1 —
4 0.2578 0.0382 22.89 0.0001 t — 1
GMSIR
-1 0 1 -1 0
LAG AC PAC Q Profc»Q Autocorrelation Partial Autocor
1 0.3746 0.3781 8.8462 0.0029 1 — 1 —
2 0.0987 -0.0583 9.4716 0.0088 1 1
242
3 0.2639 0.2881 14.018 0.0029 i — 1 —
4 0.1706 -0.0648 15.952 0.0031 1- 1
5 0.0605 0.0258 16.2 0.0063 1 1
6 '0.0644 -0.2057 16.486 0.0114 1 -1
GUKFRGEIRN
-1 0 1 -1 0
LAG AC PAC Q Prob>Q Autocorrelation Partial Autocor.
1 0.3862 0.3872 9.9986 0.0016 |-- 1--
2 0.1118 -0.0447 10.85 0.0044 1 1
3 0.2789 0.2967 16.236 0.0010 1 — 1 —
4 0.1830 -0.0406 18.595 0.0009 [ - 1
5 0.0676 0.0263 18.922 0.0020 1 1
6 '0.0496 -0.1858 19.101 0.0040 1 -1
IRW01
-1 0 1 -1 0
LAG AC PAC Q Prob>Q Autocorrelation Partial Autocor.
1 -0.1560 -0.1595 1.6076 0.2048 -| -1
2 0.0514 0.0253 1.785 0.4096 1 1
3 -0.1683 -0.1770 3.7172 0.2937 -1 -1
4 0.0792 0.0394 4.1522 0.3858 1 1
5 -0.1323 -0.1222 5.3877 0.3704 - [ 1
6 0.1625 0.1231 7.2857 0.2952 1 - 1
EOEUIKND
-1 0 1 -1 0
LAG AC PAC Q Prob>Q Autocorrelation Partial Autocor.
1 -0.3227 -0.3230 6.1512 0.0131 —  1 —  i
2 0.0550 -0.0633 6.3334 0.0421 1 1
3 0.4275 0.4783 17.536 0.0005 1-- 1--
4 -0.2241 0.1151 20.672 0.0004 -) 1
5 0.0392 -0.0743 20.77 0.0009 1 1
6 0.2301 0.0598 24.208 0.0005 1 - 1
EAVEUIRD
-1 0 1 -1 0
LAG AC PAC Q Prob>Q Autocorrelation Partial Autocor.
1 -0.2724 -0.2740 4.381 0.0363 —  1 —  1
2 -0.0067 -0.0918 4.3837 0.1117 1 1
3 0.1030 0.0910 5.0335 0.1694 1 1
4 -0.0455 -0.0077 5.1625 0.2710 1 1
5 -0.0641 -0.0818 5.4241 0.3663 1
6 0.3727 0.3856 14.446 0.0250 1 — 1--
IDEUIR
-1 0 1 -1 0
LAG AC PAC Q Prob>Q Autocorrelation Partial Autocor.
1 0.3280 0.3331 6.4607 0.0110 1 — 1 —
2 0.0222 -0.0843 6.4908 0.0390 1 1
3 0.1009 0.1488 7.1244 0.0680 1 | -
4 0.0027 -0.0934 7.1249 0.1294 1 t
5 0.0321 0.1061 7.1914 0.2068 1 1
6 -0.0599 -0.1393 7.4278 0.2831 1 -1
XAVEURIN
-1 0 1 -1 0
LAG AC PAC Q Prob>Q Autocorrelation Partial Autocor.
1 0.5696 0.5701 19.483 0.0000 1--- 1---
2 0.3340 0.0394 26.302 0.0000 1 — 1
3 0.2647 0.1397 30.664 0.0000 1 — | -
4 0.1975 0.0245 33.139 0.0000 | - 1
5 0.1593 0.0879 34.781 0.0000 | - 1
6 0.1182 0.0232 35.702 0.0000 ! t
A ppendix 5.3 A utocorrelation, selected explanatory  variables
EDEUIRND TEST FOR A R (1 )
Wa!d X2(l)  «  6.36, Pr > x2 = 0.0117
Log likelihood = 633.6836
Sample: 1983q3 to 1997q2
Number of obs = 56 __________________
EDEUIRND t 
EDEUIRND I
Coef. Std. Err. z P>l z \ 195% Cor.f. Interval]
_cons 1 
ARMA |
-5.21e-07 3.72e-G7 -1.400 0.161 -1.25e-06 2.08e-07
a r (
LI I -.3213411 .1274528 -2.521 0.012 -.5711441 -.0715381
O 2.94e-06 3.00e-07 9.830 0.000 2.36e-06 3.53e-06
EDEUIRND TEST FOR ARMA ( 1 , 1 )
Sample: 1983q3 to 1997q2
Number of obs ■ 56
Wald X2(2)- 6.39, Pr > x2 = 0.0410
Log likelihood ° 633.7118________
edeuirnd 1 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|2| [95% Conf. Interval]
edeuirnd 1 
cons | -5.18e-07 3.87e-07 -1.338 0.181 -1.26e-06 2.4ls-07
ARMA
ar
1
1
LI I -.2762827 .3254886 -0.849 0.396 -.9142286 .3616631
ma 1
LI I -.0529355 .3225631 -0.164 0.870 -.6851475 .5792766
o 2.94e-06 3.30e-07 8.925 0.000 2.30e-06 3.59e-06
EAVEUIRD TEST FOR ARMA ( 1 ,1 )
Wald x2(2>= 571.80. Pr > x2 = 0.0000
Log likelihood = 325.9
Sample: 1983q3 to 1997q2
Number o f  obs = 5 6 ____________________
EAVEUIRD t Coef. Std. Err. z F>l z| [95% Conf. Interval]
EAVEUIRD I 
cons 1 -.0001274 .0000952 -1.338 0.181 -.0003139 .0000591
ARMA
ar
1
1
LI I -.9649258 .0739951 -13.040 0.000 -1.109953 -.8198982
ma l
LI I .8895668 .1395857 6.373 0.000 .615984 1.16315
a .0007162 .0000681 10.512 0.000 .0005826 .0008497
USIR TEST FOR AR(1)
Sample:1983q2 to 1999ql 
Number of obs = 64 
Wald X2(l)= 41.56, Pr > x2 = 0.0000 
-342.9725
USIR 1 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
USIR
cons
1
1 -17.16541 20.60425 -0.833 0.405 -57.54899 23.21817
ARMA
ar
LI
1
1
1 .4590598 .0712119 6.446 0.000 .319487 .5986326
cr 51.32497 2.730461 18.797 0.000 45.97336 56.67657
USIR TEST FOR MA(1)
Sample:1983q2 to 1999ql 
Number of obs = 64
Wald x2d>= 56.80, Pr > x2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -341.7156________
USIR 1 Coef. Std. Err. z P>l zl [95% Conf. Interval]
USIR 1 
cons | -17.34027 14.39284 -1.205 0.228 -45.54972 10.86918
ARMA 1 
ma ] 
Ll I .5386006 .071463 7.537 0.000 .3985353 .6786654
0 50.28401 2.732107 IS.405 0.000 44.92918 55.63884
2 4 4
USIR TEST FOR ARMA (1,1)
Sample:1983q2 to 1999ql 
Number of obs - 64
Wald x2 ( 2 ) - 5 7 . 4 2 ,  Pr > x2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood - -341.6217_______
USIR t Coef. Std. Err. z P>|zl [95% Conf. Interval]
USIR l •
_cons 1 -17.31554 15.52694 -1.115 0.265 -47.74779 13.1167ARMA 1
ar 1
LI 1 .0978548 .1703386 0.574 0.566 -.2360027 .4317124
ma 1
LI 1 .4694459 .1580092 2.971 0.003 .1597536 .7791382
o 50.21067 2.66522 18.839 0.000 44.98693 55.43441
GMSIR TEST FOR ARMA(1,1)
Sample:1983q2 to 1999ql
Number of obs - 64
wald x2(2) = 531.59, Pr > x2 = 0.0000
Log likelihood = -304. 8686
GMSIR 1 Coef. Std. Err. z F> l z 1 [95% Conf. Interval]
GMSIR 1
cons 1 22.11843 8.713202 2.538 0.011 5.040867 39.19599
ARMA 1
ar 1
LI 1 -.3325421 .2645685 -1.257 0.209 -.8510869 .1860026
ma 1
LI 1 1.238436 .3048933 4.062 0.000 .640856 1.836016
a 1 22.79459 5.456119 4.178 0.000 12.10079 33.48839
GMSIR TEST FOR MA{1)
Sample: 1983q2 to 1999ql
Number of obs = 64
Wald x2(l) » 90.94, Pr > x2 - 0.0000
Log likelihood = -305. 9454
GMSIR 1 Coef. Std. Err. Z p>lzl [95% Conf. Interval]
GMSIR 1
cons 1 22.09354 9.674651 2.284 0.022 3.131575 41.05551
ARMA 1
ma 1
LI ! .5167653 .0541886 9.536 0.000 .4105575 .6229731
a 28.76614 1.977504 14.547 0 .000 24.8903 32.64197
GLKFRGEIRN TEST FOR AR(1)
Sample: I983q2 to 1999ql
Number of obs = 64
Wald chi2(l) = 15.18. Pr>tc2 - 0.0001
Log likelihood = -299.2429
GUKFRGEI 1 coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
GUKFRGEI 1
cons 1 17.92542 9.695663 1.849 0.064 -1.077728 36.92857
ARMA 1
ar 1
LI 1 .3832607 .0983771 3.896 0 .0 00 .1904452 .5760763
o 25.93233 1.614747 16.060 0 .000 22.76748 29.09717
Appendix 5.4 Correlation (Covariance) M atrixes: All V ariables
CORRELATION MATRIXES
1 YUWODl NIRNEU USIR GEFPIR GMSIR IRWOl EDEUIRND
YUWOD1 1 1.0000
NIRNEU 1 -0.2928 1 .0000
USIR 1 -0.0153 -0.1223 1.0000
GEFPIR 1 -0.1461 -0.0413 -0.0971 1 .00 0 0
GMSIR 1 -0.1247 0.1387 0.2428 0.1414 1.0000
IRWOl 1 -0.1321 0.3204 0.0953 -0.3638 0.1402 1.0000
EDEUIRND 1 0.3051 0.1898 0.1639 0.0425 0.0464 -0.2099 1 .00 0 0
EAVEUIRD 1 0.2863 -0.0622 0.1321 0.0120 0.2898 0.1109 0.4960
IDEUWO 1 * . 4 4
EDEUWO 1 . * 4 t 4 4
IAVEUWO ] 0.2518 -0.0576 -0.1199 0.1084 -0.2673 0.0177 -0.2370
EAVEUWO 1 • . 4
IDEUIR 1 0.2185 0.1726 -0.0944 -0.1433 -0.0091 0.0715 -0.0858
IAVEURJN [ 0.1287 0.1633 -0.1712 -0.2820 -0.0354 0.0006 0.0806
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I EAVEUIRD IDEUWO EDEUWO IAVEUWO EAVEUWO IDEUIR IAVEURIN
EAVEUIRD 1 
IDEUWO 1 
EDEUWO 1 
IAVEUWO 1 
EAVEUWO 1
1.0000
- 0 . 2 3 9 4 1.0000
IDEUIR 1 0 .1 9 0 3 . - 0 . 0 6 1 8 1.0000
IAVEURIN 1 0 .2 2 5 1 . - 0 . 1 8 4 4 0 . 6 8 2 0 1.0000
PAIRWISE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
1 YUWOD1 NIRNEU USIR GEFPIR GMSIR IRWOl EDEUIRND
YUWOD1 1 1.0000
NIRNEU 1 - 0 . 2 1 4 6 1.0000
DSIR 1 - 0 . 0 5 3 3 0 . 0 2 9 6 1.0000
GEFPIR 1 - 0 . 0 3 4 9 - 0 . 3 0 5 4 0 .0 6 4 2 1.0000
GMSIR 1 - 0 . 0 2 8 5 0 .0 7 9 0 - 0 . 5 9 8 4 0 . 0 8 1 1 1.0000
IRW01 1 - 0 .2 6 8 3 - 0 . 0 3 0 7 0 . 0 9 4 1 - 0 . 1 4 9 8 - 0 . 4 2 1 2 1.0000
EDEUIRND 1 0 .3 0 4 3 0 .0 8 8 3 - 0 . 0 1 8 2 0 . 0 5 9 6 0 .1 3 0 5 - 0 . 1 5 1 2 1.0000
EAVEUIRD 1 0 .2 7 9 1 0 .0 2 2 7 - 0 . 0 2 2 7 0 . 1 0 0 6 0 .1 4 0 1 - 0 . 2 3 7 8 0 . 5 5 6 7
IDEUWO 1 0 . 0 2 3 4 0 .0 4 2 1 - 0 . 0 4 7 0 - 0 . 0 5 6 8 - 0 . 0 2 5 1 - 0 . 1 0 6 3
EDEUWO 1 * 4 .
IAVEUWO 1 0 .2 5 1 8 - 0 . 0 3 3 4 - 0 . 0 7 4 1 0 . 0 6 7 1 - 0 . 0 0 4 6 0 .0 1 1 9 - 0 . 1 5 3 6
EAVEUWO 1
IDEUIR ! 0 .2 1 0 6 - 0 . 0 0 3 1 0 . 1 3 3 3 0 . 0 9 8 2 - 0 . 1 7 9 4 - 0 . 0 0 2 3 - 0 . 0 7 9 5
IAVEURIN 1 0 .1 3 0 8 0 . 0 4 9 7 0 . 1 5 3 6 - 0 . 0 5 8 5 - 0 . 2 1 4 8 - 0 . 0 7 1 0 - 0 . 0 3 4 6
1 EAVEUIRD IDEUWO EDEUWO IAVEUWO EAVEUWO IDEUIR IAVEURIN
EAVEUIRD 1 1.0000
IDEUWO 1 - 0 ,0 3 4 4 1.0000
EDEUWO 1
IAVEUWO 1 - 0 . 1 2 8 6 0 .0 2 5 9 1.0000
EAVEUWO 1 * É ,
IDEUIR 1 0 .0 7 3 5 0 .2 2 3 5 - 0 . 0 5 8 6 1.0000
IAVEURIN 1 0 .0 8 8 4 0 . 2 5 0 6 - 0 . 1 1 6 1 * 0 .7 8 5 8 1.0000
Appendix 5.5 Extended Version of Results of Table 5.2-S.3 
Table 5.2
GEFPIR AR(1) MA(1) robust
S a m p le :  1983q2  t o  1 9 9 9 q l
Number o f  o b s  = 64
W ald * 2 (2 )  » 7 7 . 6 0 ,  P r  > x2 -  0 .0 0 0 0
Log l i k e l i h o o d  = - 1 7 1 .6 7 5 8 __________________ _______________________ ____________
S e m i - r o b u s t
GEFPIR 1 
ARMA 1 
a r  1
C o e f . S t d .  E r r . z P > U I 195% C o n f . I n t e r v a l ]
U  1 
ma !
.863615 .1 4 0 1 4 6 6 .1 6 2 0 . 0 0 0 .5 8 8 9 3 3 9 1 .13B 296
LI t - . 6 3 3 3 1 6 7 .2 0 8 7 3 8 1 - 3 . 0 3 4 0 . 0 0 2 - 1 . 0 4 2 4 3 6 - .2 2 4 1 9 7 6
a  1 3 .5 2 9 5 2 4 1 .3 7 1 1 9 1 2 . 5 7 4 0 . 0 1 0 .8 4 2 0 3 9 5 6 .2 1 7 0 0 8
GEFPIR Q4SIR AR(1) MA(1) robust
S a m p le :  1983q2 t o  I 9 9 9 q l
Number o f  o b s  = 64
W ald X2(3) -  7 0 . 5 8 ,  P r  > y2  « 0 .0 0 0 0  
Log l i k e l i h o o d  = - 1 7 0 . 8 1 3 3 ____________
S e m i - r o b u s t
GEFPIR 1 
GEFPIR 1
C o e f . S t d .  E r r . z P>l zl Î 95% C o n f . I n t e r v a l ]
GMSIR I 
ARMA 1 
a r  1
.01 8 9 7 8 3 .0 1 3 3 4 6 9 1 .4 2 2 0 . 1 5 5 - .0 0 7 1 8 1 1 .0 4 5 1 3 7 6
ma 1
.8358414 .1 5 0 7 8 7 1 5 .5 4 3 0 . 0 0 0 .540304 1 .1 3 1 3 7 9
LI 1 - .6 0 7 3 7 7 4 .2 1 9 3 4 3 3 - 2 . 7 6 9 0 . 0 0 6 - 1 .0 3 7 2 3 2 - . 1 7 7 4 7 2 3
a  t 3 .4 8 3 8 1 7 1 .3 3 9 8 3 2 2 . 6 0 0 0 , 0 0 9 .8 5 7 7 9 3 9 6 .1 0 9 8 3 9
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GEFPIR IRWOl AR (1) MA (1) robust
Sam ple :  1983q2 t o  1 9 9 9 q l
Number o f  o b s  = 64
Wald x 2 (3 )  = 1 0 8 .9 4 ,  P r  > x2 = 0 .0 0 0 0  
Log l i k e l i h o o d  « - 1 7 0 . 7 4 2 8 ______________
1
GEFPIR | C o e f .
S e m i - r o b u s t  
S t d .  E r r .
GEFPIR t 
IRWOl 1 - .0 0 5 5 2 2 1 .0017947
ARMA 1 
a r  | 
L I t .8 6 5 6 8 7 5 .12 5 0 0 9 7
ma | 
L I  1 - .6 2 9 0 9 1 8 .1 8 4 4 0 6 6
o  1 3 .4 7 7 9 8 1 1 .4 0 0 3 3 3
z P > U I [95% C o n f . I n t e r v a l ]
- 3 . 0 7 7 0 .0 0 2 - .0 0 9 0 3 9 6 - . 0 0 2 0 0 4 6
6 . 9 2 5 0 . 0 0 0 .62 0 6 7 3 1 1 .1 1 0 7 C 2
- 3 . 4 1 1
2 . 4 8 4
0 .0 0 1
0 . 0 1 3
- .9 9 0 5 2 2 2
.7333782
- .2 6 7 6 6 1 4
6 .2 2 2 5 8 4
GEFPIR IDEUWO AR(1) HA(1) r o b u s t  
s a m p le :  1983q2 t o  1 9 9 7 q l  
Number o f  o b s  ■ 56
Wald x 2 (3 )  = 8 4 6 4 .7 1 ,  P r  > x2 = 0 . 0 0 0 0  
Log l i k e l i h o o d  ■ - 9 5 . 5 1 1 6 2
I
GEFPIR | C o e f .
S e m i - r o b u s t  
S t d .  E r r . z P> 1 z 1 [95% C o n f . I n t e r v a l ]
GEFPIR ]
IDEUWO 1 - .2 1 2 7 4 1 9 .2 3 5 6 8 2 6 - 0 . 9 0 3 0 .3 6 7 - .6 7 4 6 7 1 2 .2 4 9 1 8 7 5
ARMA I 
a r  1 
LI I .9 7 8 7 1 8 .0718669 1 3 .6 1 8 0.000 .8378614 1 .1 1 9 5 7 5
ma [ 
LI | - . 8 9 2 0 8 4 .27 2 4 9 7 2 - 3 . 2 7 4 0.001 - 1 .4 2 6 1 6 9 - .3 5 7 9 9 9 4
a 1 .3 2 4 4 7 6 .3419121 3 . 8 7 4 0.000 .6543408 1 .9 9 4 6 1 2
GEFPIR IAVEUWO AR(1) MA(1) r o b u s t
Sam ple :  1983q2 t o  1 9 9 7 q l  
Number o f  c b s  ■ 56
Wald x 2 (3 )  = 1 1 .6 4 ,  P r  > x2 -  0 . 0 0 8 7
Log l i k e l i h o o d  = - 9 3 .6 5 9 7 1 ____________
I S e m i - r o b u s t
GEFPIR
GEFPIR
C o ef . S t d .  E r r . z P> 1 * 1 [95% C o n f . I n t e r v a l ]
IAVEUWO | 
ARMA | 
a r  |
.4837483 .2438121 1 . 9 8 4 0 .0 4 7 .0058854 .9 6 1 6 1 1 2
LI I 
ma |
.5 6 5 1 9 6 9 .2506184 2 . 2 5 5 0 .0 2 4 .0 7 3 9 9 3 8 1 .0 5 6 4
LI l - .4 1 8 8 7 5 7 .1 3 2 9 0 9 1 - 3 . 1 5 2 0 .0 0 2 - .6 7 9 3 7 2 8 - .1 5 8 3 7 8 5
o  | 1 .2 8 8 1 6 6 .3147704 4 . 0 9 2 0 .0 0 0 .67 1 2 2 7 3 1 .9 0 5 1 0 5
GEFPIR IAVEUI2 AR{1) MA<1> r o b u s t
Sam ple :  1983q2 t o  1997q2
Number o f  o b s  = 57
Wald x 2 (3 )  = 1 8 4 8 .3 2 ,  P r  > x2 = 0 . 0 0 0 0  
Log l i k e l i h o o d  -  - 1 5 2 . 2 8 8 5 _______________
GEFPIR C o e f . S t d .  E r r . z £>>UI [95% C o n f . I n t e r v a l ]
GEFPIR 
IAVEUI2 | - .3 4 6 5 5 6 4 .2 6 1 8 6 5 - 1 . 3 2 3 0 . 1 8 6 - .8 5 9 8 0 2 4 .1 6 6 6 8 9 6
ARMA l 
a r  1 
L I  j .92 8 4 8 7 4 .0223417 4 1 . 5 5 9 0 .0 0 0 .98 4 6 9 8 5 .9 7 2 2 7 6 2
ma | 
LI 1 - .7 3 0 7 1 8 4 .05 4 4 3 3 8 - 1 3 . 4 2 4 0 .0 0 0 - .3 3 7 4 0 6 8 - . 6 2 4 0 3
o  1 3 .4 8 5 4 3 1 .4 7 8 1 1 1 2 . 3 5 8 0 .0 1 8 .5883858 6 .3 8 2 4 7 4
GEFPIR IDEUIR AR(1) MA(1) r o b u s t
Sam p le :  1983q2 t o  1997q2  
Number o f  o b s  = 5 7
Wald x2(3} = 1 5 0 6 .6 9 ,  P r  > x2 -  0 . 0 0 0 0  
Log l i k e l i h o o d  -  - 1 5 0 . 7 6 6 4 _______________
GEFPIR I 
GEFPIR
C o e f . S t d .  E r r . z P > |z i [951 C o n f . I n t e r v a l ]
IDEUIR 
ARMA 1 
a r  !
1 1 9 4 0 .2 7 1 1 0 7 9 .2 6 1 . 0 7 8 0 .2 8 1 - 9 7 7 4 .6 7 2 3 3 6 5 5 .2 2
LI I 
ma 1
- .4 6 0 7 7 8 5 .42 5 2 0 0 8 - 1 . 0 8 4 0 .2 7 9 - 1 .2 9 4 1 5 7 .3 7 2 5 9 9 8
LI 1 .9 0 6 8 9 4 6 .03 7 5 0 9 4 2 4 . 1 7 8 0 .0 0 0 .8333774 .9 8 0 4 1 1 7
o 1 3 .3 8 2 0 1 2 1 .1 8 7 3 8 7 2 . 8 4 8 0 .0 0 4 1 .0 5 4 7 7 6 5 .7 0 9 2 4 8
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GEFPIR GUKFRGEI AR(1) MA(1)robust
Sample: 1983q2 to 1999ql
Number of obs = 64
Wald x2 <3) = 75,82, Pr > x2 = 0.0000
Log likelihood - -170,8337_______
GEFPIR Coef. Std. Err. z P>lz| [95% Cortf. Interval]
GEFPIR
GUKFRGEI t .0210997 .0160029 1.318 0.187 -.0102654 .0524647
ar 1
LI | .8412507 .1431091 5.878 0.000 .560762 1.121739
ma [
LI I -.6157677 .2077151 -2.964 0.003 -1.022882 -.2086535
o 1 3.484798 1.332839 2.615 0.009 .8724826 6.097114
Table 5.3
GEFPIR IRWOl IAVEUWO AR(1) MA(1) robust
Sample: 1983q2 to 1997ql
Number of obs = 56
Wald x2 <4) - 13.81, Pr > x2 - 0.0079 
Log likelihood = -91.6454__________
GEFPIR | Coef. Std. Err. z P>|2| [95% Conf. Interval]
GEFPIR I 
IRWOl -.0033166 .001162 -2.854 0.004 -.0055941 -.0010391
IAVEUWO | .4933211 .2468061 1.999 0.046 .0095901 .9770522
ar
LI
1
| .5558097 .2628826 2.114 0.034 .0405694 1.07105
ma
LI
1
| -.3770951 .15451 -2.441 0.015 -.6799292 -.074261
o 1.242491 .299372 4.150 0.000 .6557324 1.829249
GEFPIR IRWOl IAVEUWO from 1983q2 to 1993q4 AFMA(1,1)robust
Sample: 1983q2 to 1993q4
Number of obs = 43
Wald x2(4> - 14.68, Pr > = 0.0054
Log likelihood - -48.8287
GEFPIR Coef. Std. Err. z P>lz| [95% Conf. interval]
GEFPIR
IRWOl -.0019265 .0007034 -2.739 0.006 -.0033051 -.0005478
IAVEUWO | .2980115 .1131151 2.635 0.008 .0763099 .5197131
ar
LI
1
1 -.6173778 .5073887 -1.217 0.224 -1.611841 .3770857
ma
LI
1
1 .4991701 .49665 1.005 0.315 -.4742461 1.472586
a .7529692 .1721666 4.373 0.000 .4155289 1.090409
GEFPIR IRWOl IAVEUWO from 1967q3 to 1999ql ARMA{1,1) robust 
Sample: 1987q3 to 1997ql
Number of obs * 39
Wald x214> - 10.41, Pr > x2 * 0.0341 
Log likelihood = -69.19577_________ _
GEFPIR Coef. Std. Err. z P>t2 | [95% Conf. interval]
GEFPIR |
IRWOl ] -.0043144 .0017272 -2.498 0.012 -.0076996 -.0009292
IAVEUWO I .6532875 .2929375 2.230 0.026 .0791406 1.227434
ar l
LI I .467725 .2911999 1.606 0.108 -.1030162 1.038466
ma 1
LI I -.3157796 .1739419 -1.815 0.069 -.6566995 .0251404
a 1 1.426032 .3566978 3.998 0.000 .7269176 2.125147
GEFPIR IRWOl IAVEUWO from 1990ql to 1999ql ARMA (1 1) robust
Sample: 1990ql to 1997ql
Number of obs =29
Wald y2 (4) = 6.26, Pr > x2 “ 0.1804
Log likelihood = -53. 80799
GEFPIR I Coef. Std. Err. z p>lz| [95% Conf Interval]
GEFPIR I
IRWOl 1 -.0128104 .0056204 -2.279 0.023 -.0238261 -.0017947
IAVEUWO | .779448 .3861442 2.019 0.044 .0226193 1.536277
ar 1
LI 1 .432692 .3459349 1.251 0.211 -.245328 1.110712
na i
LI 1 -.2314784 .2824723 -0.819 0.413 -.785114 .3221572
or 1 1.545932 .3496108 4.422 0.000 .8607076 2.231157
2 4 8
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Appendix 5.6 Test for specification of periods between s tru c tu ra l breakpoints
GEFPIR IRWOl iaveuwo in period 1983q2 - 1993q4 AR(2) H M D  Robust
S a m p le :  1983q2 t o  1993q4  
Number o f  o b s  * 43
Wald c h i 2 {4) = 9 .9 9  P r  > c h i 2  * 0 .0 4 0 6  
Log l i k e l i h o o d  -  - 4 8 . 6 5 0 9 4
GEFPIR 1 C o e f . S t d .  E r r . z P > |z i [95% C o n f . I n t e r v a l ]
GEFPIR 1
IRWOl 1 - .0 0 1 9 7 6 .0006837 - 2 . 8 9 0 0 .0 0 4 - .0 0 3 3 1 5 9 - . 0 0 0 6 3 6
ia v e u w o  I .3093064 .1 364632 2 . 2 6 7 0 .0 2 3 .0 4 1 8 4 3 5 .5 7 6 7 6 9 2
a r  1
L2 1 .1 459293 .2 188752 0 . 6 6 7 0 .5 0 5 - .2 8 3 0 5 8 3 .5 7 4 9 1 6 9
ma 1
LI ! - . 0 9 7 3 9 2 9 .0484312 - 2 . 0 1 1 0 .0 4 4 - .1 9 2 3 1 6 3 - .0 0 2 4 6 9 5
a  1 .7496858 .1691064 4 . 4 3 3 0 .0 0 0 .4 1 8 2 4 3 3 1 .0 8 1 1 2 8
GEFPIR IRWOl iaveuw o i n  p e r io d  1983q2 - 1993q4 AR(3) H M D  Robust
S a m p le :  1983q2 t o  1993q4
Number o f  o b s  ■ 43
W ald c h i 2 (4) -  1 0 . 0 6 ;  Pr > c h i2  -  0 .0 3 9 4  
Log l i k e l i h o o d  »= - 4 9 . 0 6 7 5 6
GEFPIR 1 C o e f . S t d .  E r r . z P > U I (95% C o n f . I n t e r v a l ]
GEFPIR 1
IRWOl 1 - .0 0 1 9 1 6 4 .0 0 0 7 1 2 6 - 2 . 6 8 9 0 .0 0 7 - . 0 0 3 3 1 3 - . 0 0 0 5 1 9 8
ia v e u w o  | .2946514 .1 1 0 7 4 1 7 2 . 6 6 1 0 .0 0 8 .0 7 7 6 0 1 8 .5 1 1 7 0 1 1
L3 1 - .0 2 5 0 9 3 5 .04 9 9 7 4 6 - 0 . 5 0 2 0 . 6 1 6 - .1 2 3 0 4 2 .0 7 2 8 5 4 9
ma 1
LI 1 - .0 8 4 7 0 6 5 .0382344 - 2 . 2 1 5 0 .0 2 7 - . 1 5 9 6 4 4 5 - .0 0 9 7 6 8 5
o  1 .75 7 3 4 3 3 .1760184 4 . 3 0 3 0 .0 0 0 .4 1 2 3 5 3 6 1 .1 0 2 3 3 3
GEFPIR IRWOl iaveuwo in period 1983q2 - 1993q4 AR(4) MA(1) Robust
S a m p le :  1983q2  t o  1993q4
Number o f  o b s  * 43
Wald c h i 2 (4) = 1 9 . 0 9 ;  P r  > c h i2  -  0 .0 0 0 8
Log l i k e l i h o o d  -  - 4 8 . 8 9 1 7 __________________________ ________ ______________
GEFPIR 1 C o e f . S t d .  E r r . z P > l z | [95% C o n f . I n t e r v a l ]
GEFPIR 1
IRWOl 1 - .0 0 1 9 0 5 7 .0 007362 - 2 . 5 8 8 0 .0 1 0 - .0 0 3 3 4 8 8 - .0 0 0 4 6 2 7
ia v e u w o  1 .28 3 1 8 9 6 .09 6 2 4 0 3 2 . 9 9 4 0 .0 0 3 .0 9 9 5 6 2 1 .4 7 6 8 1 7 2
a r  ]
L4 1 - . 1 1 8 3 1 3 2 .0958323 - 1 . 2 3 5 0 .2 1 7 - .3 0 6 1 4 1 1 .0695147
ma 1
LI 1 - .  C933094 .0424941 - 2 . 1 9 6 0 .0 2 8 - .1 7 6 5 9 6 3 - .0 1 0 0 2 2 5
o  1 .7537604 .1 712993 4 . 4 0 0 0 .0 0 0 .4 1 8 0 2 1 .0 8 9 5 0 1
GEFPIR IRWOl iaveuwo in period 1987q3 - 1999ql AR(2) MA(1) Robust 
S a m p le :  1987q3 to 1 9 9 7 q l
Number o f  o b s  * 39
Wald c h i2 { 4 )  = 8 . 9 7 ;  P r  > c h i2  -  0 .0 6 1 9
Log l i k e l i h o o d  M - 6 8 . 3 3 6 1 7 _________________________________________________
GEFPIR ! C o e f . S t d .  E r r . z P > lz | [95% C o n f . I n t e r v a l ]
GEFPIR 1
IRWOl 1 - .0 0 3 8 7 2 6 .0 0 1 4 9 6 - 2 . 5 8 9 0 .0 1 0 - .0 0 6 8 0 4 6 - .0 0 0 9 4 0 6
ia v e u w o  i .6354812 .3041544 2 . 0 8 9 0 .0 3 7 .0 3 9 3 4 9 5 1 .2 3 1 6 1 3
a r  1
L2 1 .2 4 8 9 6 0 6 .31 5 5 3 1 3 0 . 7 8 9 0 .4 3 0 - .3 6 9 4 6 9 4 .86 7 3 9 0 7
ma |
LI 1 .13 0 0 4 2 9 .1485324 0 . 8 7 6 0 .3 8 1 - .1 6 1 0 7 5 2 .42 1 1 6 1 1
c  1 1 .3 9 3 0 8 4 .30 9 9 4 7 1 4 . 4 9 5 O.OOC .7 8 5 5 9 9 3 2 .0 0 0 5 6 9
GEFPIR IRWOl iaveuwo in period 1987q3 - 1999ql AR(3) MA(1) Robust
S a m p le :  1987q3 t o  1 9 9 7 q l
Number o f  o b s  ■ 3 9 ;  Wald c h i 2 ( 4 )  = 1 0 . 9 2 ;  P r  > c h i2  -  0 .0 2 7 5
Log l i k e l i h o o d  = - 6 9 .1 3 8 2 3 _______________________________
GEFPIR 1 C o e f . S t d .  E r r . z P > l z | [95% C o n f . I n t e r v a l ]
GEFPIR !
IRWOl 1 - . 0 0 4 2 6 6 3 .0 0 1 7 5 1 9 - 2 . 4 3 5 0 .0 1 5 - .0 0 7 6 9 9 9 - .0 0 0 8 3 2 7
ia v e u w o  1 
a r  1 
L3 1
.6452622 .2 368878 2 . 7 2 4 0 .0 0 6 .1 8 0 9 7 0 6 1 .1 0 9 5 5 4
- .1 9 7 4 3 5 2 .08 0 1 9 1 3 - 2 . 4 6 3 0 .014 - .3 5 4 6 5 7 2 - .0 4 3 3 1 3 2
ma 1
LI 1 .1099641 .0 5 8 1 1 7 7 1 . 8 9 2 0 .0 5 8 - .0 0 3 9 4 4 5 .2 2 3 8 7 2 8
o  1 1 .4 2 2 1 3 2 .3 7 6 3 2 4 9 3 . 7 7 9 0 .0 0 0 .6 8 4 5 4 8 8 2 . 1 5 9 7 1 5
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GEPPIR XRW01 iaveuwo in period 1987q3 - 1999ql AR(4) MA(1) Robust
Sample: 1987q3 to 1997ql 
Number of obs « 39
Wald chi2(4) - 11.86; Pr > chi2 - 0.0184
Log likelihood » -68.6271_______________________________________
GEFPIR ( Coef. Std. Err. z F>UI [95% Conf. Interval]
GEFPIR |
IRWOl | -.0050123 .0022936 -2.185 0.029 -.0095076 -.0005171
iaveuwo I .6420136 .2057059 3.121 0.002 .2388374 1.04519
ar |
L4 | -.3059935 .1540609 -1.986 0.047 -.6079472 -.0040398
ma 1
LI 1 .0541481 .0673219 0.804 0.421 -.0778005 .1860967
a | 1.398851 .3519105 3.975 0.000 .7091187 2.088583
GEFFXR IRWOl iaveuwo in period 1990ql - 1999ql AR(2) MA <1) Robust 
Sample: 1990ql to 1997ql 
Number of obs ■ 29
Wald chi2<4) - S.58; Pr > chi2 » 0.2330 
Log likelihood - -53.6725
GEFPIR t Coef. Std. Err. z P>]z| [95% Conf. Interval]
GEFPIR |
IRWOl | -.0117584 .0064352 -1.827 0.068 -.0243711 .0008544
iaveuwo | 
ar | 
L2 |
.7787296 .3934692 1.979 0.048 .0075442 1.549915
.1637107 .2806616 0.583 0.560 -.3863759 .7137972
ma |
LI 1 .1758102 .1428519 1.231 0.218 -.1041745 .4557948
c 1 1.533066 .336949 4.565 0.000 .8776579 2.198473
GEFPIR IRWOl iaveuwo in period 1990ql -1999ql AR(3) MA (1) Robust
Sample: 1990ql to 1997ql
Number of obs =■ 29
Wald chi2(4) - 11.04; Pr > chi2 - 0.0262 
Log likelihood - -54.03759
GEFPIR | 
GEFPIR |
Coef. Std. Err. z P>| z| [95% Conf. Interval]
IRWOl | -.0132147 .0072843 -1.814 0.070 -.0274917 .0010622
iaveuwo j 
ARMA | 
ar |
.7827486 .3653419 2.143 0.032 .0666917 1.498806
L3 | 
ma |
.0101083 .2102156 0.048 0.962 -.4019067 .4221232
LI | .1648527 .1152762 1.430 0.153 -.0610844 .3907899
o 1 1.558845 .3718039 4.193 0 . 0 0 0 .8301227 2.287567
GEFPIR IRWOl iaveuwo in period 1990ql - 1999ql AR(4) MA(1) Robust
Sample: 1990ql to 1997ql
Number of obs * 29
Wald chi2<4) - 10.42; Pr > chi2 - 0.0339
Log likelihood - -52.90398___________________________
GEFPIR I 
GEFPIR |
Coef. Std. Err. z P> 1 z | [95% Conf. Interval]
IRWOl | -.0134932 .0046879 -2.878 0.004 -.0226814 -.0043051
iaveuwo I 
ARMA | 
ar |
.6999637 .2343306 2.987 0.003 .2406842 1.159243
L4 | 
ma |
-.399642 .1874713 -2.132 0.033 -.767079 -.0322049
LI 1 .1496036 .0923003 1.621 0.105 -.0313017 .3305089
<7 1 1.481529 .3259266 4.546 0.000 .8427244 2.120333
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